GDR SoC SiP

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PUF properties Uniqueness• Each circuit has a unique signature Steadiness• The PUF response is always the same, whateverthe noise and environment Security• Mathematically unclonable and unpredictable• Not sensitive to physical attacks (invasive, sidechannel,fault injection) Cost• Not only the core but• Extra structure to make it steady and securepage 4Télécom ParisTechGDR SoC SiP
PUF TaxonomyThis talkNon silicon PUFSilicon PUFOptical PUFRF DNADelay PUFGlitch PUFCoating PUFMemory PUFRavikanth S. Pappu. Physical One-Way Functions. PhD thesis,Massachusetts Institute of Technology, March 2001Tuyls P., Schrijen G.J., Skori B., Van Geloven J., Verhaegh N.,Wolters, R.: “Read-proof hardware from protective coatings”. In:Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems Workshop, LNCS, vol.4249, pp. 369–383. Springer, 2006Gerald DeJean and Darko Kirovski. Rf-dna: Radio-frequencycertificates of authenticity. In CHES 2007, 9th InternationalWorkshop,Vienna, Austria, September 10-13, 2007, Proceedings,volume 4727 of LNCS, pages 346–363. Springer, 2007.Blaise Gassend, Dwaine E. Clarke, Marten van Dijk, and SrinivasDevadas. “Silicon physical random functions”. In ACM Conference onComputer and Communications Security, pages 148–160, 2002.Su Y., Holleman J., Otis B.: “A 1.6pj/bit 96% stable chip-id generatingcircuit using process variations”. In:. ISSCC 2007. Digest of TechnicalPapers. IEEE, pp. 406-611, 2007Daisuke Suzuki and Koichi Shimizu. 2010. The glitch PUF: anew delay-PUF architecture exploiting glitch shapes. InProceedings of the CHES'10. Springer-Verlag, Berlin,Heidelberg, 366-382page 5Télécom ParisTechGDR SoC SiP
Page 1 and 2: GDR SoC SiPPUF and TrojansDelay PUF
Page 3: PUF Concept Function returning a si
Page 8 and 9: Delay PUF Principle: Differential D
Page 10 and 11: Memory PUFMore details given in the
Page 12 and 13: Glitch PUF Exploits the glitches of
Page 14 and 15: Table of Contents PUF overview Dela
Page 16 and 17: XOR arbiter PUF Proposed by Suh et
Page 18 and 19: Feed-Forward PUF Proposed by Gassen
Page 20 and 21: ASYNC PUF RO-PUF with better stabil
Page 22 and 23: Table of Contents PUF overview Dela
Page 24 and 25: PUF reliability Results from the UN
Page 26 and 27: Reliable Key generation Fuzzy extra
Page 28 and 29: ML attack on delay PUFs Modeling At
Page 30 and 31: Countermeasures Brute Force Attack

GDR SoC SiP

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