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Aristotle's Theory Unity of Science

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9 Introductioncannot all be included in one universal science. Each science has a subject ora subject-genus. This is what the science is about and the subject <strong>of</strong> whichthe predicates are predicated. A science is the sum <strong>of</strong> the demonstrativesyllogisms that concern the same subject.' The subject <strong>of</strong> the science isindicated by the qua expression, and the per se criterion for includingother terms in a science implies that each science is autonomous and hasits own and unique set <strong>of</strong> principles.When these restrictions are violated, when there is an attempt tointroduce a term that is not per se and qua related to the other termsinto a demonstrative syllogism, the result is an error, which Aristotle callsI'ETa/3arJ'lS or kind-crossing, and this will destroy the demonstrative power<strong>of</strong> the syllogism and the cogency <strong>of</strong> the science.In contrast to Plato's and Speusippus' universalizing and inclusivetendencies, <strong>Aristotle's</strong> theory <strong>of</strong> demonstration is a powerfully isolatingforce. The qua requirement especially entails that understanding occurswithin a single subject-genus, and not in relation to other genera throughan analysis <strong>of</strong> sameness and difference.' Each science will be specializedand isolated from every other except by incidental connections, and therewill be no communication between disciplines. Each subject-genus, boundby necessity solely to its own principles and predicates, will form an islandin the sea <strong>of</strong> Being. The view <strong>of</strong> the world that this theory <strong>of</strong> sciencerepresents will be that <strong>of</strong> a heap <strong>of</strong> subjects, in which one genus is onlyincidentally related to another.It is clear, however, that Aristotle never advocated such a degree <strong>of</strong>isolation. In fact there are a multitude <strong>of</strong> ways in which sciences are connectedwith one another and share principles. The axioms, like the principle<strong>of</strong> non-contradiction, are common to all sciences, and are the preconditionfor any understanding at all. More elaborately developed within the APois the connection between a more abstract, superordinate science and a lessabstract, subordinate science. A superordinate science, usually a branch <strong>of</strong>mathematics, supplies principles and explanations for a fact or conclusionfound in a distinct and subordinate natural science, for instance, harmonicsor optics. Since this technique and its place in the APo has been well studied6 I am deliberate in avoiding the claim that a science is the sum <strong>of</strong> demonstrations whichhave the same minor term for reasons which will be discussed in chapter 4.7 No doubt, division remains an important part <strong>of</strong> <strong>Aristotle's</strong> epistemology, but it plays apreliminary role in establishing the extent <strong>of</strong> the subject-genera and the attributes thatare coextensive with them. It is not the primary form <strong>of</strong> understanding. See Ferejohn1991, who places division in the 'framing' or pre-demonstrative stage <strong>of</strong> science. Seealso chapter 2 below.

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