heightened sectarianism in the middle east: causes, dynamics ... - Ispi

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IntroductionSectarian tendencies and antagonisms grew into levels previouslyunknown in the modern Middle East. They were exacerbated byconflicts in Iraq, Syria, Bahrain and Lebanon, and by the socialand political uprisings following the Arab Spring. Some argue thatthe Sunni-Shi’a divide, in particular, is “on its way to displacingthe broader conflict between Muslims and the West as the primarychallenge facing the Islamic societies of the Middle East for theforeseeable future” 1 .The toppling of Saddam’s regime and the occupation of Iraq by USforces in 2003 intensified sectarian conflict and resulted in extremeforms of inter-communal violence. As a consequence, a processof identity construction that emphasizes the sectarian dividewithin Islam has further evolved and its geopolitical implicationsbegun to be noticeable. This process gained momentum after the uprisingin Syria in 2011 that led to a bloodshed that has the characteristicsof sectarian civil war. The Syrian war became a proxy war, involvingstates and non-state actors divided between predominantly Sunni andpredominantly Shi’a camps.This paper examines both the socio-cultural contexts of this heightenedsectarianism and its instrumental exploitation by political entrepreneurs.Following the literature on ‘ethnicization’ 2 , I argue that ‘Sectarianization’is a process caused by complex social, economic and politicaltransformations. It cannot be simplified as a ‘revival’ of ancientreligious hatreds. There are sociological and cultural conditions thatstrengthened sectarian solidarities in societies characterized by weak‘national’ identities. I also argue that using sectarian rhetoric and mobilizationas a political instrument has been a significant factor in thereconstruction of sectarian identities in the region.The post‐revolutionary‘Sectarianization’ is aprocess caused by complexsocial, economic andpolitical transformations.It cannot be simplified as a‘revival’ of ancientreligious hatreds. Thereare sociological andcultural conditions thatstrengthened sectariansolidarities in societiescharacterized by weak‘national’ identities©ISPI20131G. ABDO, The New Sectarianism: the Arab Uprising and the Rebirth of theShi’a-Sunni Divide, Analysis paper P2, The Saban Center for Middle East Policy,Brookings, 2013.2Recent literature on identity politics and ethnic conflicts tend to reject primordialism,which takes ethnic and sectarian groups as ‘givens’ and conceives themas de-contextualized ‘entities’. For example, the very concept of ‘group’ has beenquestioned by Brubaker who, instead, preferred to analyze the ‘groupness’ ascognitive processes conditioned by external variables. Rather than the commonconcept of ethnicity, he suggested the concept of ethnicization (in my analogy, sectarianization)to reflect the dynamic nature of culture and identities. See R.BRUBAKER, Ethnicity Without Groups, Harvard, Harvard University Press,2004.; R. BRUBAKER, M. LOVEMAN, P. STAMATOV, Ethnicity as Cognition,«Theory and Society», vol.33, no. 1, 2004, pp. 31-64.2
Socio-Cultural Dynamics of Sectarianization‘Ancient conflict’ narratives are used by groups with sectarian ideologiesto create the sense of historical continuity and mission.However, today’s heightened sectarianism, I argue, is caused bythe specific conditions of incomplete modernization in the MiddleEast.Any attempt to address past events through the lenses of today’sconflicts leads to more misconceptions. For example, defining SaddamHussein’s regime in Iraq as ‘Sunni’ and Assad’s regime in Syriaas simply ‘Alawite’, is driven less by concrete facts and more bya reductionist approach that views everything through the sectariannarrative. This is not to say that sectarianism has not beenan influential force. It was always there, usually playing a role inshaping behind-the-scenes alliances and political leanings. Nevertheless,it was not the only force, nor an important one sometimes.It is difficult to imagine a minority (e.g. Syrian Alawites or Iraqi Sunnis)ruling a majority within a context emphasizing their minority status:in this case the sectarian identity. While it is undeniable that mostMiddle Eastern regimes had an inherent sectarian bias, they have alwayssought to conceal this bias. Their efforts to do so were helped bypast conditions when religious and sectarian affiliation was not themain source of categorization and mobilization. The two Ba’athist regimesin Iraq and Syria, both accused of strong sectarian biases, rose topower when ‘secular’ leftist and nationalist ideologies were dominant,especially among civilian and military activists, who descended fromnewly urbanized or lower middle class families. 3Meanwhile, a process of Islamization and Sectarianization started tochange social and cultural identities, contrary to what classic modernizationapproaches have assumed. This process was facilitated by severalfactors such as the exacerbating exclusionary nature of power structuresand the increasing politicization of previously traditional socialsectors that found sanctuaries in their religious identity. Sincethe 1950s, political authorities in the Middle East had been consolidatingtheir powers in patterns based on extreme centralizationand exclusionary politics. This was justified by the needs of statebuildingprocesses and the confrontation with internal and externalfoes. The transformation of the region into a strategic energysource and the Cold War rivalries allowed ruling elites to benefitIt is difficult to imagine aminority (e.g. SyrianAlawites or Iraqi Sunnis)ruling a majority within acontext emphasizing theirmi‐nority status: in thiscase the sectarian identity.While it is undeniable thatmost Middle Easternregimes had an inherentsectarian bias, they havealways sought to concealthis bias©ISPI20133For more details: H. BATATU, The Old Social Classes & the RevolutionaryMovement in Iraq. London, Saqi Books, 2004.3
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heightened sectarianism in the middle east: causes, dynamics ... - Ispi

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