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the Shi’a population in Lebanon and Bahrain. These were eventsof historical significance because they challenged the status quo inthe region and empowered Shi’a communal identity, which haslong been repressed by ruling ‘secular’ elites.Sunni-dominated regimes, especially Saudi Arabia in which Salafismis the main shaper of state identity, reacted by seeking to reconstruct aregional Sunni identity which views political Shiism as its main enemy.This was compatible with official policy, greatly concerned with theobjective of combating Iran’s regional influence. Therefore, power wasthe main catalyst in a conflict that mainly took place between antistatusquo forces and pro-status quo forces.Through its political ideology, the Iranian Islamist regime managed tobuild powerful patronage networks with Shi’a movements in Lebanon,Iraq and Yemen. These networks helped the regime to buildand maintain its influence in the region and legitimize its claim tolead the ‘resistance’ against Israel and the Western powers. ThisIranian-led transnational Shiism has been confronted by a Saudiledtransnational Sunnism, generating proxy wars in Iraq, Syria,Bahrain and Yemen. The geopolitical basis of these alliances providedthe right environment, resources and channels of communication andmobilization for dogmatic sectarian groups. The conflict itself has becomethe main shaper of sectarian identities because it cultivates feelingsof victimhood and mutual hatreds.The Saudi patronage of Salafist groups all over the region aims at sustainingthe Kingdom’s influence as the centre of Sunni Islam and appeasingthe powerful Salafist establishment that was historically alliedwith the royal family. The instrumentalist nature of this relationhas recently been shown in the hostility of the Saudi authorities toMuslim Brotherhood (MB) organizations. Saudi Arabia was themain regional power that unconditionally supported the coupd’état against the MB’s president in Egypt. MB, and to some extentthe Justice and Development Party (AKP) which currentlyrules Turkey, are viewed as real or imagined rivals for Al-Saud’sleadership in the Sunni world. In the Saudi view, their Sunnism isnot sufficient justification for tolerating their potential emergenceas rivals for the same constituency.Through its politicalideology, the IranianIslamist regime managedto build powerfulpatronage networks withShi’a movements inLebanon, Iraq and YemenThis Iranian‐ledtransnational Shiism hasbeen confronted by aSaudi‐led transnationalSunnism, generating proxywars in Iraq, Syria,Bahrain and Yemen©ISPI2013ConclusionsSocieties in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Bahrain have been subjectedto unprecedented processes of fragmentation incited by sectarianviolence and politics. They are facing the threat of breaking up orcontinuously engaging in armed conflicts that will be sustained by8
©ISPI2013external interventions and the dominance of radical groups.Sectarianism lacks features that could make it a constructive orstabilizing force. It is based on conflict-oriented narratives, fed bymutual hatreds and victimizations. While there are some hardlineforces, such as the Islamic State in Iraq and Sham, that seekto establish a Sunni state all over the region, most other forces relatetheir sectarian solidarities to pragmatic or calculated purposes. Despitethe heightened sectarianism, it would be wrong to ignore the intracommunaldivides that, if taken seriously, might question the very existenceof sectarian community. Political, ideological, regional and tribaldivisions are concealed or made invisible by the Sunni-Shi’a tensions,but they could be awakened as soon as these tensions de-escalate.Therefore, sectarian groups and their sponsors have an interest inmaintaining sectarian divides. Again, it is a question of power. It determines“who controls the group” which is equivalent to who “definesthe group”.The coming years are likely to see the continuity of difficult coexistencebetween sectarian identities and the ‘state’ in the region. The “fragilestates” whose number has increased following the “Arab Spring”, arethe outcomes of the failure of nation-building processes and developmentapproaches in the region. However, replacing the fragile stateswith those based on sectarian identities will only complicate the currentconflicts. The problem does not lie in the existence of multiple religiousand sectarian identities, but in the politics of exclusion. Nomatter how powerful sectarianism seems to be today, it cannot repressother social cleavages that might emerge again if the exclusiontook other forms. Any solution for sectarian conflicts in theregion must begin with the understanding that these conflicts arenot about religious doctrines. They are about power and social statusin contexts where large social sectors have been denied accessto them.Solutions have to be based on broad regional agreement to stop usingsectarian instigation as a tool of influence and mobilization.Ideologies of sectarian hatred must be banned and condemned onthe global level. In addition, solutions should not be based on emphasizingand institutionalizing sectarian identities, as was thecase with the kind of ‘democratic’ consociationalism applied inLebanon and Iraq. This is a model that sustains socio-cultural divisionsand perpetuates the power of sectarian entrepreneurs.The viability of sectarianism in the Middle East is largely dependenton the potential transformations of socio-cultural conditionsthat permitted its recent growth in the first place. Addressing theDespite the heightenedsectarianism, it would bewrong to ignore the intracommunaldivides that, iftaken seriously, mightquestion the very existenceof sectarian community.Political, ideological,regional and tribaldivisions are concealed ormade invisible by theSunni‐Shi’a tensions, butthey could be awakened assoon as these tensions deescalate9
Page 1 and 2: Analysis No. 205, November 2013HEIG
Page 3 and 4: Socio-Cultural Dynamics of Sectaria
Page 5 and 6: ©ISPI2013Islam was re-introduced a
Page 7: ©ISPI2013by the ‘Sunni’ majori

heightened sectarianism in the middle east: causes, dynamics ... - Ispi

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