Authoritarian Rule and Democracy in Africa: A Theoretical Discourse

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authorities may co-opt the leadership or introduce policies that compromise the politicaleffectiveness of the groups. Public welfare supports the patronage system even though suchwelfare does not need to be as high as in the other systems of social control. The relativefreedom of the groups frees the ruling authorities from defending a costly social contract. Thestate then relies on the fragmented rural communities, through patron-client networks, tocounter the political weight of the urban groups. Where patron-client relations are used tobuttress authoritarianism, the social groups lose their formal independence, but they may becompensated with relatively higher expenditure on welfare to sustain compliance.1.7 Models of accumulation and political systemsModel A creates conditions for the emergence of sustainable liberal democracy. Rent-seekingactivities become less central to the business practices of the private monopolies and the localentrepreneurs. The private capitalist sector expands and transforms the petty commodityenterprises. Some of the groups in this sector are transformed into wage workers, others jointhe ranks of the power élite or remain as peasants, but with sustainable agricultural systems.The disparities between town and country are reduced. Economic expansion encourages theestablishment of integrated rural enterprises. Corruption is minimized, resources are“rationally” allocated, classes mature, and patron-clientelism is checked. The authoritarianismassociated with monopolies is restrained by broadening the social base of the firms and bymaking extensive economic and political concessions to the dominated groups at the workplace and civil society and in the administration of state power. This may necessitate theestablishment of a corporate social contract. The nature of the concessions and the characterof the democracy may vary according to the specific demands of the social forces.In model B the excesses of rent-seeking activities have either been checked or minimized.The state tends to act more rationally, in a developmental way, but largely in defence ofprivate capital. Industrial monopolies and capitalist agriculture are, however, not strongenough to transform the petty commodity sector. Although the state is still open tomanipulation from privileged groups, the political élites insist on some rational legal order inregulating conflicts of interests in the economy. The limited nature of transnational capitaland the checks imposed on rent-seeking activities forces social groups in the modern sector tomaintain an active presence in the petty commodity sector. Patron-client relations thrive. Themodel allows for some kind of clientelist democracy, such as those operating in Botswana,Senegal and the Gambia. The patronage social order acts as a constraint on the relatively freesocial and political organizations to effectively challenge governmental authority. Suchconstraints limit the development of civil society.In Botswana, for instance, the ruling Botswana Democratic Party makes use of traditionalpolitical systems such as the kgotla to legitimize its rule and blunt the effectiveness ofopposition parties (Molokomme, 1989; Holm, 1988). High levels of sustained growth haveallowed the régime to raise incomes, provide public welfare and support rural schemes thatbenefit peasant farmers – the backbone of its patronage network. Weak working class andprofessional groups make less critical demands on the political system.The ruling Union Progressiste Sénégalaise transformed itself from an authoritarian into a“social democratic” party between 1978 and 1983. It attempted to infuse greater rationality inthe administration of the state and economy by insisting on public accountability andcleansing the party and state apparatus of corruption. But in order to administer its highlycontested democracy it has had to depend on the old patronage system that co-opts themarabouts, the main social and political force in the countryside, into the policy-makingapparatus (Coulon, 1988). But, whereas Botswana has been able to sustain its clientelistdemocracy without much opposition, that of Senegal is undergoing serious stress. In recenttimes, opposition political parties and urban-based groups have challenged the dominance ofthe ruling party. It would seem Senegal’s economic crisis is eroding the ruling party’s ability12
to oil its patronage machine and govern without much coercion. Botswana on the other handhas one of the fastest growing economies in Africa. Its growth rests, however, on potentiallyshaky mineral revenues, whose collapse may strain the patronage system that underpins itsfledgling democracy.Model C represents an economy in rapid transition to capitalism, where rent-seekingactivities play crucial roles in supporting private capital. Most African economies werelaunched on this path of development at independence. Authoritarian rule accompanied suchexpansion. We analyze the details of this development and that of model D in the next sectiondealing with “stages in the struggles for democracy”. Here it is significant to point out thatvarious authoritarian ideologies – negritude, authenticity, African socialism – and politicalrégimes such as military and one-party dictatorships were devised to push the frontiers ofaccumulation and maintain a firm grip on the political process.Model D represents an economy in crisis. There is de-industrialization, excessive pilfering ofpublic resources and dependence on the petty commodity sector for social reproduction. Thefiscal crisis and adjustment measures introduced to cope with the recession lead to furtherrepression as disaffected groups try to resist them. The social contract comes underconsiderable stress. Pressures for democratization intensify. This may even lead to theestablishment of democratic governments as in many Latin American countries that are intransition from authoritarian to democratic rule. But stable and sustainable democracy cannotbe guaranteed without substantial changes in the forms of accumulation and socio-economicdevelopment.Model E represents an economy in deep crisis. De-industrialization is buttressed by thefailure of the petty commodity sector to absorb the displaced groups in the modern sector.Rural-urban relations are marked by extreme dualism. Competition for state power intensifies.Authoritarianism is rife. Individualist solutions flourish, further weakening the collectivestruggles for democracy. State terror intensifies with the collapse of the social contract and thefailure of patron-client relations to check the instability generated by the depression.Model F represents the collapse of the modern economy and a return to petty commodityproduction. Economic activity is marked by subsistence production, low levels of exchangeand barter. Fragmented kinship ties tend to regulate social relations. Collective family andkinship support systems take the place of public welfare. Civil society disappears as thepublic and private roles of individuals and enterprises become fused. This can lead tomixtures of authoritarian and informal, village level democracy. Recent scenarios of thewithering away of the African state and general theories of state decay, in a way, fit thismodel of accumulation (Chazan, 1983; Sandbrook, 1985). This perspective does not ignorethe progressive role that has been played by the petty commodity sector in most Africansocieties in building modern states and supporting the activities of large-scale capital. It isalso the case that in the current crisis, informal sector and peasant activities provide useful fallback positions for many individuals and households that have been displaced by modernenterprises and the state. Some sectors also show some promise in providing a basis forsustained economic development. Petty commodity production cannot, however, be viable inthe absence of a properly functioning modern sector.Most African countries are currently operating either model D or E. IMF and World Bankprogrammes seek to check the expansion of the state, which they believe is responsible forrent-seeking activities and the economic crisis, and move the economies to model B andeventually to A. But there is the danger that the adjustment programmes will lead tostagnation at D or a movement to E. The scenario of decaying states (F) should also not beruled out. Popular forces may be interested in a strategy that pushes the economies to model Bor A in order to strengthen their bargaining positions in the new democratic polity. Peasants13
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Page 7 and 8: of working conditions. Industrial d
Page 9 and 10: themselves at the level of civil so
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Page 35 and 36: IMF Survey, June 1988, Washington,
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Authoritarian Rule and Democracy in Africa: A Theoretical Discourse

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