Perner 2010.pdf

Page 243Anti-cognitivism infiltrates theory of mind 243This controversy is marked by much discussion of what possible behaviorrules there could be to account for the range of available data. One argument(Tomasello & Call, 2006) was that the scoffers, who denigrate the animal’sabilities, have to assume so many more different explanations than theboosters, who grant the animal mental insight: “the boosters clearly haveparsimony on their side. The number of different explanations requiredto explain the evidence is sensibly smaller (12 versus 1 for 12 items of evidence)”(p. 380). This conclusion is a good demonstration of the current anticognitivismof the mentalist boosters. They treat mentalism as a singleexplanation, in contrast to the myriad of behavior rule explanations requiredto cover the evidence. This is to overlook that a cognitive analysis of theanimals’ mentalism also requires a myriad of rules – in fact, for this particularcase, as many plus one as there are behavior rules required.Without going into details of the nature of the required behavior rules, Ifocus on the general observation by Povinelli and Vonk (2004):NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION. . . the subject’s predictions about the other agent’s future behaviorcould be made either on the basis of a single step from knowledge aboutthe contingent relationships between the relevant invariant features ofthe agent and the agent’s subsequent behavior, or on the basis of multiplesteps from the invariant features, to the mental state, to the predictedbehavior. (pp. 8–9)This general observation then issues into my Recipe for posing Povinelli’schallenge:Let the Mentalist give you a specification of the inference proceduresrequired to get from what the animal observes to the ensuing mental stateand from that state to the predicted behavior. Collapse these inference rulesinto one that allows inference of the predicted behavior directly from whatthe animal observes.So, in case of food competition, a Mentalist has to specify for the subordinatechimp something like the following two computational inference procedures(CIPs), where “S” stands for the observable situation including the dominant’slooking behavior, “m” for an unobservable, to-be-inferred mental state(knows about food), “A” for the to-be-predicted action (e.g., goes for bait),and “→” for the respective CIPs on which these (subconscious) inferences arebased:S → m:“IF a dominant D looks at (has visual access to) a bait Bbeing placed at location L,THEN P knows 3 that B is at L.”Perception, attention, and action:International Perspectives on Psychological Science (Volume1). Peter A. Frensch and Ralf Schwarzer (Eds). 2010.Published by Psychology Press on behalf of the International Union of Psychological Science.This proof is for the use of the author only. Any substantial or systematic reproduction,re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or distribution in anyform to anyone is expressly forbidden.15:58:17:03:10Page 243