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RIAC-Visegrad-Report22-Eng

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2. EVOLUTION OF THE VISEGRAD GROUP’SPOLICY ON UKRAINE2. Evolution of the <strong>Visegrad</strong> Group’s Policyon UkraineSince the 1990s, relations with Ukraine have been marked by attempts by the<strong>Visegrad</strong> Group to work out a common policy. In addition to the more successfulbilateral contacts, these relations have developed in two other directions: as aregional policy of the <strong>Visegrad</strong> Group based largely on historical traditions, and as apolicy of an EU and NATO sub-region with corresponding geostrategic obligations.As for the region’s independent policy, “the hereditary factor” played an importantrole. It was an attempt to fit into the new policy and new relations the range ofproblems the region had inherited from the post-war territorial settlement, whichduring Soviet times had been sustained by membership of the Moscow-led WarsawTreaty Organization. First of all, it was necessary to work out new approachesto the problems of national minorities in neighbouring states. Practically everymember of the <strong>Visegrad</strong> Group had so-called co-national minorities on Ukrainianterritory: Lemkos, Rusyns, Czechs, Slovaks, Poles, Hungarians, Romanians andGermans. 14 Another important element in bilateral relations was the fact that the<strong>Visegrad</strong> Group countries saw Ukraine as a promising close-lying market.Both factors made it necessary for the <strong>Visegrad</strong> Group to shape a special approachtowards Ukraine in order to derive maximum benefit from neighbourhood relationswithout formalizing them. This gave great room for manoeuvre: depending on thesituation, the <strong>Visegrad</strong> Group countries could either act on their own or implementthe strategy of their Euro-Atlantic allies, who were interested in the Ukrainiangeopolitical space and the opportunities it offered to influence Russia. Thus, therewas tangible external influence in the policy of the <strong>Visegrad</strong> community, and inbilateral relations with Ukraine.Both factors made it necessary for the <strong>Visegrad</strong> Group to shape a special approach towards Ukraine inorder to derive maximum benefit from neighbourhood relations without formalizing them.The inclusion in the <strong>Visegrad</strong> Group of such a large, ethnically and culturallycomplex and economically weak state could greatly impede the efforts of theGroup’s countries to achieve the average European level of social and economicdevelopment. Relations between the <strong>Visegrad</strong> Group and Ukraine followed thesame formula as the European Neighbourhood Policy and later the EasternNeighbourhood Policy: as close as possible, but ruling out membership. Thedoors to negotiations remained open, but the decisions were vague. Ukraine washeld on a hook without being allowed to swallow the bait.The first opportunity to expand the <strong>Visegrad</strong> Group presented itself in connectionwith the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA). At the Poznan Summitin spring 1995, the Czech Prime Minister Václav Klaus articulated three conditions14According to the recent Ukrainian census held in 2001, there were: 157,000 Hungarians; 151,000 Romanians; 144,000Poles; and 33,000 Germans living in Ukrainian. In Subcarpathia alone there were: 152,000 Hungarians; 32,000 Romanians;6,000 Slovaks; and 3,500 Germans. Rusyns are not recognized as a nationality in Ukraine.URL: http://www.2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua/rus/results/general/nationality (in Russian).www.russiancouncil.ru13

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