RIAC-Visegrad-Report22-Eng

4. UKRAINE AND THE EASTERN PARTNERSHIPIN THE POLICY OF THE VISEGRAD COUNTRIESThe key factor that prompted Poland to come up with the Eastern Partnershipinitiative was undoubtedly geostrategic. 57 Poland pretends to obtain the role ofregional leader, and these claims often clash with Russia’s interests. Seekingto ensure its security, Poland’s foreign policy cannot ignore the possibility ofincreased Russian influence in the “near abroad” countries. This can be avoided,according to many Polish analysts, only if Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, Azerbaijanand Moldova reorient their policies towards the West. In other words, thesecountries should adopt Western European values and become integrated in theEuropean structures.Seeking to ensure its security, Poland’s foreign policy cannot ignore the possibility of increasedRussian influence in the “near abroad” countries.When Poland initiated the Eastern Partnership programme, it had Ukraine in mindabove all. Back in 1993, the Polish Prime Minister Hanna Suchocka characterizedrelations with Ukraine as a “strategic partnership”. In turn, at the Prague EasternPartnership Summit in 2009 President Yushchenko declared that the Partnership’sgoals corresponded to Ukraine’s strategic goals.Poland saw the Eastern Partnership as a departure from its special relationship withUkraine towards a common Eastern policy. This Polish approach plays down theanti-Russian aspects of its policy in Ukraine. Not all Polish analysts agree with thisapproach, insisting that Ukraine plays a special role in Poland’s Eastern policy. 58The problems faced by the Eastern Partnership were highlighted at the WarsawEastern Partnership Summit in the autumn of 2011. Polish Prime Minister DonaldTusk called for new life to be breathed into the Partnership’s activities. UkrainianPresident Viktor Yanukovych was present at the Summit. He was sceptical aboutthe programme and proposed to invest it with concrete substance. What is more,he repeatedly urged the need to allow Ukraine to join the European Union which,as it is known, was not the intention of the “old Europe” countries.Nevertheless, Poland still believed its programme could succeed. Donald Tuskproposed that the principles and goals of the Eastern Partnership be revisitedin order to make them more concrete and realistic: “We need a new definitionof Eastern Partnership which would focus on the principles of ‘more for more’and ‘less for less’…. Our neighbours must see that if they follow the path ofdemocratic and market reforms they will be rewarded. In choosing the oppositepath they will face serious consequences.” 59In general, the Warsaw Eastern Partnership Summit was not a breakthrough eventbut it cannot be seen as a failure. Its participants managed to agree to increasefinancing and create an Eastern Partnership Academy of Public Administration. 6057Mizerska-Wrotkowska M. Geneza i instytualizacja Partnerstwa Wschodniego // Między sąsiedstwem a integracąa.Zalożenia, funkcjonowanie i perspektywy Partnerstwa Wschodniego Unii Europejskiej. Warsaw, 2011, p. 52; Zurawski P.vel Grajewski Partnerstwo Wschodnie Unii Europejskiej główne, czy pomocnicze narzędzie polskiej polityki wschodniej?// Partnerstwo wschodnie w kontekscie europejskiej polityki sąsiedstwa i agendy Grupy Wyszehradzkiej. Krakow, 2010,p. 46 (both in Polish).58Stolarczyk M. Nowe akcrenty w polityce wschodniej Polski pod koniec pierwszej dekady XX I w. // Partnerstwo wschodnie.Wielka szansa Europy. Poznan–Chorzów, 2011, p. 36 (in Polish).59Council of the European Union. URL: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/homepage/showfocus.aspx?lang=en&focusID=6885960Joint declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit in Warsaw on September 29–30, 2011.URL: http://www.eap-csf.eu/ru/news-events/news/joint-declaration-of-the-warsaw-eastern-partnership-summit (in Russian).www.russiancouncil.ru25