Table of ContentsIntroduction 41. Russia, the <strong>Visegrad</strong> Group and the Eastern PartnershipProgramme (Shishelina L.N.) 82. Evolution of the <strong>Visegrad</strong> Group’s Policy on Ukraine (Shishelina L.N.) 133. Economic Relations between the <strong>Visegrad</strong> Group and Ukraine (Drynochkin A.V.) 184. Ukraine and the Eastern Partnership in the Policy of the <strong>Visegrad</strong>Region Countries (Shishelina L.N., Lykoshina L.S., Shcherbakova Yu.A.) 245. <strong>Visegrad</strong>–Russian Relations and the Ukrainian Сrisis(Shishelina L.N., Lykoshina L.S., Shcherbakova Yu.A., Drynochkin A.V.) 38Conclusion 66
RUSSIA AND THE VISEGRAD GROUP:THE UKRAINIAN CHALLENGEIntroductionThe Eastern Partnership policy that triggered the Ukrainian crisis has providedample opportunity to reflect on Russia–EU relations, alongside with evaluatingcooperation between Russia and the <strong>Visegrad</strong> Group countries (also calledthe <strong>Visegrad</strong> Four or V4). The <strong>Visegrad</strong> Four have taken a significant part ofresponsibility for the eastward enlargement of the European Union having becomeits members.After almost a quarter of a century, relations between Russia and the <strong>Visegrad</strong>Group (Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia) have not evolved asefficiently as Russia’s contacts with each of the group’s member countries. Thereason lies above all in the geopolitical nature of the two actors, their potential,goals and tasks. Having launched reforms in the mid-1980s, the Soviet Unionpaved the way for transformations in the Central European countries. However, itsubsequently failed to preserve its leadership and prevent regional disintegrationin the 1980s. Of course, Russia was not the only player in the region. Since it wasnot Moscow’s initiative to create the <strong>Visegrad</strong> Four, its attitude to the Group hasbeen critical.The European countries and the United States do not perceive the <strong>Visegrad</strong> Groupas a subject or object of modern international relations. However, the UnitedStates still considers the <strong>Visegrad</strong> Group a region of its influence at the formerSoviet Union borders. As for the European Union, it has repeatedly demonstratedits concern about the meetings of Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and the CzechRepublic before summits in Brussels, and has delegated some of its projects,like in case of the Eastern Partnership, to the <strong>Visegrad</strong> Group. The former SovietUnion Republics represent an area of clash of interest. Russia has not yet severedits multiple links with the former USSR republics while the <strong>Visegrad</strong> Groupcountries feel responsible for the EU security in the East, alongside with the EUenlargement. This is why bilateral relations between Russia and the <strong>Visegrad</strong>Group countries can no longer respond to international challenges.The mission of the <strong>Visegrad</strong> Group might have consisted in balancing Russian influence in Ukraine.Ukraine that receives integration impulses from both sides brings together and atthe same time separates the <strong>Visegrad</strong> Group countries and Russia. The missionof the <strong>Visegrad</strong> Group might have consisted in balancing Russian influence inUkraine. Each of the <strong>Visegrad</strong> Group countries had its historical and economicinterests in the country, but it was only together that Hungary, Poland, Slovakiaand the Czech Republic could become an equal and effective partner to Ukrainecapable of balancing the “Eastern challenges” emanating from Russia.Ukraine regretfully could not be turned from an area of confrontation to a space ofcooperation that would reflect the interests of all parties to the conflict. Possiblecauses of the most dangerous European and global conflict of the 21 st centurymight arise from internal problems in Ukraine itself, which has failed to become a4 Report 22 / 2015
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