Eliminating Stockpiles of Highly Enriched Uranium - Pugwash ...

cover less than half of the estimated total Russian HEU stocks. Clearly, there may be
room for additional and accelerated reductions.
Secondly, financial incentives – perhaps in the context of a broader economic
cooperation with the European Union – may improve the practical progress in Russian
practical nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation activities. Indeed, before the US
in 1993 indicated its willingness to buy and eliminate Russian HEU surplus, no stocks
were identified by Russia as excessive to national security needs. Fresh European
funds may thus not only improve Russian interest in HEU stockpile accountability, it
may actually facilitate the process of Russia identifying additional stocks that could
be declared as excess and slated for elimination.
The prospects of additional HEU excess declarations
Elimination of HEU beyond the already negotiated 500 tons that have been declared
as excess obviously requires some political bargaining. In order to help possible
donors understand the size of the problem, Russia needs to declare its stocks of HEU
and the material possibly in excess to national security needs. Russian Minatom 8
experts stress that though there are facilities available to accelerate down-blending
beyond the existing and agreed quantity, any additional HEU stock for elimination
should be officially admitted and announced by the Russian government as “excessive
to military needs”. To reach such a political decision several domestic actors need to
be closely involved in the process, , e.g. the Russian Ministry of Defence, the Foreign
Ministry, the Security Council, the Russian Academy of Science and the respective
structures inside the President’s Administration.
Analysis of the history of the first Russian HEU excess declaration in
conjunction with the US-Russian HEU deal may, however, provide hope that external
actors may indeed influence such vital Russian decisions, and that there actually is
more HEU available for a coming HEU excess declaration.
8 In the hour of finalization of this report, the reformation of the government of the Russian Federation
has changed the position and weight of what used to be Minatom. Though the reform process is
expected to go on for some time (Julie Corwin, “Reforming the Russian Bureaucracy: A Progress
Report, RFE/RL, 15 April 2004), its seems clear at this stage that Minatom will no longer be a ministry
with its own minister but a federal agency, the Federal Agency for Atomic Energy, FAAE under the
Ministry of Industry and Energy, headed by Minister Viktor Khristenko; Matthew Bouldin, “Russian
Government Restructuring and the Future of WMD Threat Reduction Cooperation: A Preliminary
Analysis, RANSAC Policy Update, March 2004.
In the following, the reference to “Minatom” will be kept and not be changed to the new name. This is
in order to avoid obfuscation where some issues are past statements, agreements etc. made in the name
of Minatom and where other future assessment etc are related to the FAAE. If both names were to be
used it would create confusion and give the impression that it is two different agents that are
mentioned.
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