Eliminating Stockpiles of Highly Enriched Uranium - Pugwash ...

nuclear leakage could make Europe particularly exposed to nuclear terrorism. This
threat can only be reduced by denying potential nuclear proliferators access to highly
enriched uranium. The ultimate way of preventing proliferation is by eliminating as
much of the HEU as possible – as quickly as possible.
Proposed HEU elimination scheme
In cooperation with the Russian Federation, European parties should urgently
consider an agenda for eliminating stockpiles of highly enriched uranium by deconcentrating
the HEU into low-enriched uranium (LEU) through down-blending.
Technically, down-blending is a simple process and the existing Russian nuclear
infrastructure can be used.
The HEU should be down-blended to a level where it is ”proliferation safe”; that is
below 20% enrichment in uranium-235. Uranium enriched below this level is not
suited to sustain chain reactions that result in a nuclear explosion. Hence,
manufacturing nuclear explosive devices is not feasible unless the material is reenriched.
This is a process that only resourceful states can handle – terrorist groups
can hardly accomplish this procedure.
Through financial incentives - possibly in the form of creating civilian jobopportunities
in the oversized Russian nuclear weapons complex - it is likely that
Russia could consider which stocks of HEU are exceeding to national needs. These
stocks could be slated for elimination with European economic assistance. The G8
Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction
could form a natural point of departure and a framework for the European HEU
elimination support.
The goal of European parties should be to buy as much HEU as possible for
elimination – by down-blending it. The resulting LEU should remain in Russia and
under Russian ownership. Russia could explore future commercial potentials of the
LEU on the world market.
In other words, European parties should provide financial incentives to Russia for the
down-blending services at Russian facilities. However, for European parties security
considerations must prevail over economic and commercial benefits. Russia would
have to commit itself to refrain from producing any new HEU and not to re-enrich
any of the down-blended LEU above a plus-20% level.
The elimination should come as a supplement – not as a substitute – for the ongoing
US-Russian HEU elimination activities. The cooperation should therefore build upon,
and not rest upon, the 1993 US-Russian HEU agreement to eliminate 500 tons of
Russian HEU. After a decade of cooperation, well-functioning working schemes for
the down-blending and needed transparency provisions have been put in place under
the US-Russian cooperation. These experiences can constitute important lessons for
further efforts to eliminate HEU.
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