Eliminating Stockpiles of Highly Enriched Uranium - Pugwash ...

The addition of key transparency arrangements in 1995 was undoubtedly aided by the
$100-million cash advances to the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy. 84 However,
while it is clearly the goal to verify that the HEU originates from Russian weapons,
doubts have been raised whether the measurements really can determine if the HEU is
derived from dismantled warheads, as required by the agreement. 85
Other relevant examples of HEU verification include the HEU weapon
component measurements performed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory in November
1996 and August 1997. 86 The first measurements aimed at demonstrating the receipt
of a weapons component and to detect the presence of HEU in the sample. The
measurement also confirmed that two sealed components were identical. Secondly, in
1997, the successful conversion of a HEU component into metal shavings behind a
metal barrier was demonstrated.
In sum, it is possible to establish and have verification systems that politically
fit into the requirements and sensitivities of the controlled and the controlling parties.
Technically, it has also been proved that it is possible to apply such techniques and
technologies which offer assurances and confidentiality at the same time.
84 Oleg Bukharin and Kenneth Luongo, “U.S.-Russian Warhead Dismantlement Transparency: The
Status, Problems, and Proposals”, PU/CEES Report No. 314, April 1999, www.ransac.org/new-website/pub/reports/transparency.html#introduction
85 Oleg Bukharin and Kenneth Luongo, “U.S.-Russian Warhead Dismantlement Transparency: The
Status, Problems, and Proposals”, PU/CEES Report No. 314, April 1999, www.ransac.org/new-website/pub/reports/transparency.html#introduction
86 Based on Andrew Bieniawski’s “Historical Review”, as presented in table 3 in Bukharin O. and J.
Doyle. 2002. Transparency and Predictability Measures for U.S and Russian Strategic Arms
Reductions. Nonproliferation Review, vol. 9, no. 2, Summer 2002, p. 89.
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