08.08.2015 Views

Economic Report of the President

Report - The American Presidency Project

Report - The American Presidency Project

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS
  • No tags were found...

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

CONTENTSPageECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 1ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC AD-VISERS* 9CHAPTER 1. FROM RECESSION TO RECOVERY AND GROWTH 17CHAPTER 2. THE DUAL PROBLEMS OF STRUCTURAL AND CYCLICALUNEMPLOYMENT 29CHAPTER 3. THE UNITED STATES IN THE WORLD ECONOMY:STRAINS ON THE SYSTEM 51CHAPTER 4. INCREASING CAPITAL FORMATION 77CHAPTER 5. THE BURDEN OF ECONOMIC REGULATION 96CHAPTER 6. REVIEW OF 1982 AND THE ECONOMIC OUTLOOK 124APPENDIX A. REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON THE ACTIVITIES OFTHE COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS DURING 1982 147APPENDIX B. STATISTICAL TABLES RELATING TO INCOME, EM-PLOYMENT, AND PRODUCTION , 157*For a detailed table <strong>of</strong> contents <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Council's <strong>Report</strong>, see page IS.(Ill)


ECONOMIC REPORTOF THE PRESIDENT


ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTTo <strong>the</strong> Congress <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States:Two years ago, I came to Washington with a deep personal commitmentto change America's economic future. For more than adecade, <strong>the</strong> economy had suffered from low productivity growth anda rising rate <strong>of</strong> inflation. Government spending absorbed an increasingshare <strong>of</strong> national income. A shortsighted view <strong>of</strong> economic prioritieswas destroying our prospects for long-term prosperity.The economic program that I proposed shortly after I took <strong>of</strong>ficeemphasized economic growth and a return to price stability. My taxproposals were designed to encourage private initiative and to stimulatesaving and productive investment. I have supported and encouraged<strong>the</strong> Federal Reserve Board in its pursuit <strong>of</strong> price stabilitythrough sound monetary policy. My Administration has slowed <strong>the</strong>growth <strong>of</strong> Federal regulation, streng<strong>the</strong>ning <strong>the</strong> forces <strong>of</strong> competitionin a number <strong>of</strong> economic sectors. And I have worked with <strong>the</strong> Congressto enact legislation that has reversed or limited <strong>the</strong> growth <strong>of</strong>government programs that have become too large or outlasted <strong>the</strong>irusefulness.Although <strong>the</strong> full effect <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se changes in government policy willtake time to develop, some <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> benefits have already become apparent.The rate <strong>of</strong> consumer price inflation between December 1981and December 1982 was only 3.9 percent, about one-third <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ratein <strong>the</strong> year before I took <strong>of</strong>fice. Interest rates are now lower thanwhen I took <strong>of</strong>fice, and have fallen rapidly during <strong>the</strong> last 6 months.The Administration will propose many additional measures over<strong>the</strong> next several years to streng<strong>the</strong>n economic incentives, reduce burdensomeregulations, increase capital formation, and raise our standard<strong>of</strong> living. It is easy to lose sight <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se long-term goals in ayear, like 1982, when <strong>the</strong> economy was in an extended recession. Iam deeply troubled by <strong>the</strong> current level <strong>of</strong> unemployment in <strong>the</strong>United States and by <strong>the</strong> suffering and anxiety that it entails for millions<strong>of</strong> Americans. The unemployment that many <strong>of</strong> our citizens areexperiencing is a consequence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> disinflation that must necessarilyfollow <strong>the</strong> accelerating inflation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> last decade. Allowing <strong>the</strong>upward trend <strong>of</strong> inflation to continue would have risked even greaterincreases in unemployment in <strong>the</strong> future. In spite <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> present highunemployment rate and <strong>the</strong> accompanying hardships, it is essentialthat we maintain <strong>the</strong> gains against inflation that we have recently


achieved at substantial cost. Continuing success in restraining inflationwill provide a stronger foundation for economic recovery in1983 and beyond.ReducingUnemploymentThe Federal Government can play an important role in reducingunemployment. I believe, however, that <strong>the</strong> government should focusits attention on those groups that will continue to face high unemploymentrates even after <strong>the</strong> recovery has begun. By helping <strong>the</strong>mto develop <strong>the</strong>ir job-related skills, we will foster productive careers in<strong>the</strong> private sector ra<strong>the</strong>r than dead-end jobs. This emphasis on trainingand private sector employment is <strong>the</strong> focus <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Jobs TrainingPartnership Act that I supported and signed into law in 1982. I amproposing additional steps this year to streng<strong>the</strong>n Federal trainingand retraining programs and to help <strong>the</strong> structurally unemployedfind lasting jobs.It is understandable that many well-meaning members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Congresshave responded to <strong>the</strong> current high unemployment rate by proposingvarious public works and employment programs. However, Iam convinced that such programs would only shift unemploymentfrom one industry to ano<strong>the</strong>r at <strong>the</strong> cost <strong>of</strong> increasing <strong>the</strong> Federalbudget deficit.Although programs to help <strong>the</strong> structurally unemployed are important,only a balanced and lasting recovery can achieve a substantialreduction in unemployment. There are now over four million moreunemployed people than <strong>the</strong>re were at <strong>the</strong> peak <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> last businesscycle. Nine million new workers are expected to join <strong>the</strong> labor forceby 1988. Only a healthy and growing economy can provide <strong>the</strong> morethan 13 million jobs needed to achieve a progressively lower level <strong>of</strong>unemployment over <strong>the</strong> next 5 years.The Prospects for <strong>Economic</strong> RecoveryThere are now signs that an economic recovery will begin soon. ByDecember 1982 <strong>the</strong> index <strong>of</strong> leading economic indicators had risen in7 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> last 8 months. Housing starts have risen substantially over<strong>the</strong> last year, and by December 1982 were 39 percent higher than 12months earlier. Inventory levels have fallen sharply, so that increasedsales should translate quickly into increased production and employment.Both long-term and short-term interest rates have fallen substantially.The Administration's economic forecast predicts that <strong>the</strong>gross national product will begin to rise in <strong>the</strong> first quarter <strong>of</strong> 1983and will <strong>the</strong>n rise more quickly as <strong>the</strong> year continues. Most privateforecasters also predict a recovery in 1983.


Monetary policy will play a critical role in achieving a sound andsustainable economic recovery. If <strong>the</strong> monetary aggregates grow tooslowly, <strong>the</strong> economy will lack <strong>the</strong> level <strong>of</strong> financial resources neededfor continued economic growth. But if <strong>the</strong>se aggregates are allowedto expand too rapidly, an increase in inflation and a short-lived recoverywill result. I recognize <strong>the</strong> difficulties that <strong>the</strong> Federal Reservehas faced and will continue to face in guiding <strong>the</strong> growth <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>money supply at a time when major regulatory changes have made itdifficult to rely on old guidelines. I expect that in 1983 <strong>the</strong> FederalReserve will expand <strong>the</strong> money supply at a moderate rate consistentwith both a sustained recovery and continued progress against inflation.Investment and <strong>Economic</strong> GrowthAn economic recovery beginning in 1983 should bring not only areduction in unemployment but also an increase in business investmentover <strong>the</strong> next several years. A higher level <strong>of</strong> investment is animportant ingredient in raising productivity and economic growth.The Accelerated Cost Recovery System that I proposed and that <strong>the</strong>Congress enacted in 1981 was designed to encourage a substantialexpansion <strong>of</strong> business investment above <strong>the</strong> relatively low levels <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> 1970s. Since that time <strong>the</strong> adverse effects <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> recession haveoutweighed <strong>the</strong> positive effects <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> new tax rules. As <strong>the</strong> economyturns from recession to recovery, however, incentives to invest willbecome more powerful. But business investment may not grow rapidlyunless measures proposed by <strong>the</strong> Administration to reduce potentiallylarge Federal budget deficits are enacted.Federal borrowing competes with private investment for availablesavings. If <strong>the</strong> government continues to borrow large amounts to financeits deficit, <strong>the</strong> real interest rate will remain high and discourageprivate investment. This process <strong>of</strong> "crowding out" will tend todepress private investment in <strong>the</strong> years ahead unless <strong>the</strong> budget deficitis progressively reduced.Fiscal Year 1984 Budget ProposalsIt is important to distinguish <strong>the</strong> cyclical part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> budget deficitfrom <strong>the</strong> structural part, which would remain even at <strong>the</strong> peak <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>business cycle. Approximately one-half <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1983 budget deficit isdue to <strong>the</strong> depressed state <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> economy. With earnings and pr<strong>of</strong>itsreduced, tax receipts have significantly decreased, and expenditureshave increased. As <strong>the</strong> economy recovers, <strong>the</strong> cyclical part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> deficitwill shrink. But cyclical recovery alone will not bring <strong>the</strong> deficitdown to an acceptable size.


In <strong>the</strong> budget I am now submitting to <strong>the</strong> Congress, I am proposing<strong>the</strong> dramatic steps needed to reduce Federal budget deficits infuture years. My budget proposals are designed to reduce <strong>the</strong> deficitby dealing directly with <strong>the</strong> rapid growth <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> domestic spendingprograms (apart from interest payments) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Federal Government.In 1970 <strong>the</strong>se programs accounted for 10 percent <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> gross nationalproduct and 48 percent <strong>of</strong> Federal spending. By 1980 <strong>the</strong>seprograms had grown to 14 percent <strong>of</strong> gross national product and 63percent <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> budget. I remain committed to <strong>the</strong> idea that we canreduce budget deficits without increasing <strong>the</strong> burden on <strong>the</strong> poor,without weakening our national defense, and without destroying economicincentives by counterproductive tax increases.Rapid congressional enactment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> budget would provide clearand credible evidence that <strong>the</strong> Federal Government intends not toplace heavy burdens on <strong>the</strong> capital markets in future years. Such reassuranceshould hasten <strong>the</strong> decline in interest rates, especially longterminterest rates on bonds and residential mortgages, and improveprospects for <strong>the</strong> recovery <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> housing, automobile, and capital investmentsectors <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> economy.I recognize <strong>the</strong> special importance <strong>of</strong> protecting <strong>the</strong> social securityand medicare programs for aged retirees and <strong>the</strong>ir dependents.These programs now face very serious financial problems. The bipartisanNational Commission on Social Security Reform has recentlyrecommended a series <strong>of</strong> measures, which I have endorsed, to eliminate<strong>the</strong> cumulative deficiency <strong>of</strong> $150 billion to $200 billion projectedfor <strong>the</strong> social security system in <strong>the</strong> years 1983 through 1989. It iscritically important at this time to make changes in <strong>the</strong> social securityprograms that will protect <strong>the</strong>ir solvency and financial viability for<strong>the</strong> years to come.The Remaining Burden <strong>of</strong> Federal <strong>Economic</strong> RegulationFor many decades, <strong>the</strong> Federal Government has regulated <strong>the</strong> priceand entry conditions affecting several sectors <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> American economy.Much <strong>of</strong> this regulation is no longer appropriate to <strong>the</strong> conditions<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> contemporary economy. Over time, most <strong>of</strong> this regulation—byrestraining competition and <strong>the</strong> development <strong>of</strong> new servicesand technologies—has not served <strong>the</strong> interests <strong>of</strong> ei<strong>the</strong>r consumersor producers. Since deregulation <strong>of</strong> some markets began severalyears ago, <strong>the</strong> experience has been almost uniformly encouraging.My Administration has supported <strong>the</strong>se step-by-step efforts to reduce<strong>the</strong>se regulations in markets that would o<strong>the</strong>rwise be competitive.It is now time to consider broad measures to eliminate many <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong>se economic regulations especially as <strong>the</strong>y affect <strong>the</strong> natural gas,transportation, communications, and financial markets.


Interest Rates and <strong>the</strong> U.S. Trade DeficitThe very high levels <strong>of</strong> real interest rates over <strong>the</strong> last several yearsare a principal cause <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> sharp rise in <strong>the</strong> exchange value <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>dollar relative to foreign currencies. This rise has reduced <strong>the</strong> ability<strong>of</strong> American exporters to compete in foreign markets and increased<strong>the</strong> competitiveness <strong>of</strong> imports in <strong>the</strong> domestic market. Largely as aresult, <strong>the</strong> U.S. merchandise trade balance showed a substantial deficitin 1982.Our current trade deficit is a reminder <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> importance <strong>of</strong> internationaltrade to <strong>the</strong> American economy. The export share <strong>of</strong> U.S.gross national product has more than doubled over <strong>the</strong> last threedecades. American workers, businesses, and farmers suffer when foreigngovernments prevent American products from entering <strong>the</strong>irmarkets, thus reducing U.S. export levels. While <strong>the</strong> United Statesmay be forced to respond to <strong>the</strong> trade distorting practices <strong>of</strong> foreigngovernments through <strong>the</strong> use <strong>of</strong> strategic measures, such practices donot warrant indiscriminate protectionist actions, such as domesticcontent rules for automobiles sold in <strong>the</strong> United States. Widespreadprotectionist policies would hurt American consumers by raisingprices <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> products <strong>the</strong>y buy, and by removing some <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> pressuresfor cost control and quality improvement that result from internationalcompetition. Moreover, protectionism at home could hurt<strong>the</strong> workers, farmers, and firms in <strong>the</strong> United States that producegoods and services for export, since it would almost inevitably leadto increased protectionism by governments abroad. I am committedto a policy <strong>of</strong> preventing <strong>the</strong> enactment <strong>of</strong> protectionist measures in<strong>the</strong> United States, and I will continue working to persuade <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>rnations <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> world to eliminate trade distorting practices thatthreaten <strong>the</strong> viability <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> international trading system upon whichworld prosperity depends.Trade in goods and services is only one aspect <strong>of</strong> our economicrelations with <strong>the</strong> rest <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> world. The international flow <strong>of</strong> capitalinto <strong>the</strong> United States and from <strong>the</strong> United States to o<strong>the</strong>r countriesis also <strong>of</strong> great importance. The United States should play a primaryrole in preserving <strong>the</strong> vitality <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> international capital market.Severe strains on that market developed in 1982 as several nationsfound it difficult to service <strong>the</strong>ir overseas debt obligations. In 1982,<strong>the</strong> Federal Government worked closely with debtor and creditor nationsand <strong>the</strong> major international lending agencies to prevent a disruptionin <strong>the</strong> functioning <strong>of</strong> world capital markets. Now, with <strong>the</strong> cooperation<strong>of</strong> a wide variety <strong>of</strong> creditors, countries with especiallysevere debt-servicing difficulties are establishing economic and financialprograms that will permit <strong>the</strong>m to meet <strong>the</strong>ir international obligations.


The Years AheadWe are now at a critical juncture for <strong>the</strong> American economy. Therecession has led to strong pressures from some members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Congress and from o<strong>the</strong>rs to abandon our commitment to a policythat is aimed at long-term economic growth, capital accumulation,and price stability. There are many who urge new governmentspending programs and forcing <strong>the</strong> Federal Reserve to raise monetarygrowth rates to levels that would rekindle inflation.I am convinced that such policies would prove detrimental to <strong>the</strong>long-run interests <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> American people. Our economy, despite <strong>the</strong>recession, is extraordinarily resilient and is now on <strong>the</strong> road to ahealthy recovery. It is essential in <strong>the</strong> year ahead that <strong>the</strong> Administrationand <strong>the</strong> Congress work toge<strong>the</strong>r, take a long-term perspective,and pursue economic policies that lead to sustained economic growthand to greater prosperity for all Americans.(j ^ CTVAJULAA^ \ CJL^MJ^K^February 2, 1983


THE ANNUAL REPORTOF THECOUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS


LETTER OF TRANSMITTALCOUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS,Washington, D.C., January 31, 1983.MR. PRESIDENT:The Council <strong>of</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> Advisers herewith submits its 1983Annual <strong>Report</strong> in accordance with <strong>the</strong> provisions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> EmploymentAct <strong>of</strong> 1946 as amended by <strong>the</strong> Full Employment and BalancedGrowth Act <strong>of</strong> 1978.Sincerely,N\ CutterMartin FeldsteinCHAIRMANWilliam A. Niskanen11


CONTENTSPageCHAPTER 1. FROM RECESSION TO RECOVERY AND GROWTH 17Legacies <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1970s . 18Rising Unemployment 18Declining Productivity Growth 18Rising Inflation 19The Recession 20The Decline in Velocity 21The <strong>Economic</strong> Recovery 23Implementing a Stable Monetary Policy 23The Budget Deficit 26CHAPTER 2. THE DUAL PROBLEMS OF STRUCTURAL AND CYCLICALUNEMPLOYMENT 29The Recent Recession 29The Composition <strong>of</strong> Cyclical and Structural Unemployment31Demographic Composition 31Reasons for Unemployment 33The Dynamics <strong>of</strong> Unemployment 35Combating Cyclical Unemployment 37The Limits <strong>of</strong> Macroeconomic Policy 37Public Works Employment Programs 39Combating Structural Unemployment 41The Problem <strong>of</strong> Youth Unemployment 42Policies to Reduce Youth Unemployment 44Long-Term Unemployment and Structural Change 45The Effects <strong>of</strong> Unemployment Compensation 47Conclusions 49CHAPTER 3. THE UNITED STATES IN THE WORLD ECONOMY:STRAINS ON THE SYSTEM 51Long-Run Trends in U.S. Competitiveness: Perceptionsand Realities 52Aggregate Performance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States andO<strong>the</strong>r Developed Countries 52The Changing Structure <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> U.S. Balance <strong>of</strong> Payments53The Issue <strong>of</strong> U.S. Trade with Japan 5613


PageThe Problem <strong>of</strong> Uncompetitive Sectors 58Challenges to U.S. Trade Policy 60Exchange Rates and <strong>the</strong> Balance <strong>of</strong> Payments 61Causes <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Dollar's Strength 61An Undervalued Yen? 65Effects <strong>of</strong> a Strong Dollar on U.S. Trade 66Responses to <strong>the</strong> Strong Dollar 67Macroeconomic Problems in Europe 70The International Debt Problem 72Debt-Financed Growth in <strong>the</strong> 1970s 72Causes <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Liquidity Problem 73Implications <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Debt Problem 74CHAPTER 4. INCREASING CAPITAL FORMATION 77The Historical Record 78An International Perspective 80The Importance <strong>of</strong> Capital Formation 82Measuring National Saving 85Budget Deficits and Saving 86Tax Rules and Personal Saving 87Financial Regulation and Private Saving 89The Role <strong>of</strong> International Capital Flows 90The Allocation <strong>of</strong> Capital 91Tax Policy and Investment 92Conclusions 95CHAPTER 5. THE BURDEN OF ECONOMIC REGULATION 96A Brief History <strong>of</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> Regulation 96The Traditional Rationale for <strong>Economic</strong> Regulation.... 98Problems <strong>of</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> Regulation 100Energy Policy 102Steps Toward a Market-Oriented Oil Policy 102Natural Gas Pricing and Allocation 102Emergency Preparedness 106Transportation and Communications 108Effects <strong>of</strong> Aviation Deregulation 109Effects <strong>of</strong> Partial Deregulation in Surface Transportation110Fur<strong>the</strong>r Deregulation <strong>of</strong> Surface Transportation 112Common Carrier Telecommunications 114Broadcasting 115Deregulation <strong>of</strong> Financial Markets 115Depository Institutions 116Stock Exchanges 119Opportunities for Fur<strong>the</strong>r Deregulation in <strong>the</strong> FinancialIndustry 12114


PageConclusions 122CHAPTER 6. REVIEW OF 1982 AND THE ECONOMIC OUTLOOK 124Overview <strong>of</strong> 1982 124Major Sectors <strong>of</strong> Aggregate Demand 126Personal Consumption Expenditures 127Residential Investment 128Business Fixed Investment 129Inventory Investment 130The Farm Economy 130Foreign Trade 132Government Purchases <strong>of</strong> Goods and Services 132Labor Market Developments 133Wages, Productivity, and Prices.. 134Credit Markets 136Interest Rates 137Monetary Developments 139Prospects for 1983 142Prospects and Policies Beyond 1983 143APPENDIXESA. <strong>Report</strong> to <strong>the</strong> <strong>President</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Activities <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Council<strong>of</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> Advisers During 1982 147B. Statistical Tables Relating to Income, Employment andProduction 157List <strong>of</strong> Tables and ChartsTables2-1. Median Family Income by Unemployment and FamilyStatus, 1981 302-2. Educational and Labor Market Activities <strong>of</strong> Youth Aged16 to 19, by Sex, October 1981 423-1. Structure <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> U.S. Balance <strong>of</strong> Payments, as Percent <strong>of</strong>GNP, 1960-80 553-2. Trade Balances by Commodity Group as Percent <strong>of</strong>GDP, United States, Japan, and <strong>the</strong> European <strong>Economic</strong>Community, 1980 573-3. Trade Balances by Region as Percent <strong>of</strong> GDP, UnitedStates and Japan, 1980 583-4. U.S. Trade Balances by Sector as Percent <strong>of</strong> GDP,1972-79 583-5. Real Appreciation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Dollar Against Major Currenciesto August 1982 663-6. <strong>Economic</strong> Performance by Major Industrial Countries,1973-82 713-7. Employment and Unemployment in <strong>the</strong> European <strong>Economic</strong>Community, 1973-80 7215


List <strong>of</strong> Tables and Charts—ContinuedTables4-1. Alternative Measures <strong>of</strong> Capital Formation, 1951-82 794-2. Comparison <strong>of</strong> Capital Formation in Six OECD Countries,1971-80 814-3. Net Saving as Percent <strong>of</strong> GNP, 1951-81 854-4. Investment Incentives under Different Tax Laws 936-1. Growth in Major Sectors <strong>of</strong> Real GNP, 1978-82 1276-2. Real Household Income, Consumption, Saving, andResidential Investment, 1978-82 1286-3. Labor Market Developments, 1978-82 1336-4. Changes in Wages and Compensation, 1978-82 1346-5. Productivity, Costs, and Prices in <strong>the</strong> Nonfarm BusinessSector, 1978-82 1356-6. Price Changes, 1978-82 1366-7. Funds Raised by <strong>the</strong> Nonfinancial Sector <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Economy,1978-82 1366-8. Components <strong>of</strong> Ml and M2, 1978-82 1416-9. <strong>Economic</strong> Outlook for 1983 1436-10. Projections <strong>of</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> Goals, 1983-88 144Charts2-1. Distribution <strong>of</strong> Unemployment by Age and Sex 322-2. Distribution <strong>of</strong> Unemployment by Family Status 332-3. Distribution <strong>of</strong> Unemployment by Race 342-4. Distribution <strong>of</strong> Unemployment by Reason 352-5. Distribution <strong>of</strong> Unemployment by Duration 363-1. Structural Changes in <strong>the</strong> Current Account Balance 553-2. Composition <strong>of</strong> Trade, 1980 573-3. Real Exchange Rates <strong>of</strong> Major Currencies Against <strong>the</strong>Dollar 633-4. International Real Short-Term Interest Rate Differentials644-1. Measures <strong>of</strong> Capital Formation 804-2. International Comparison <strong>of</strong> Investment and ProductivityGrowth, 1971-80 824-3. Three-Month Treasury Bill Rate and Regulation Q,Maximum Rate on Savings Accounts 906-1. Interest Rates 1256-2. Index <strong>of</strong> Leading Indicators and Real GNP 1266-3. Debt Burden Ratio 1296-4. Real Inventory/Sales Ratio and Industrial Production 1316-5. Nominal and Real 3-Month Treasury Bill Yield 13816


CHAPTER 1From Recession to Recovery andGrowthTHE MAJOR ECONOMIC ACHIEVEMENT OF 1982 was a dramaticreduction <strong>of</strong> inflation to its lowest rate in a decade. The 4.6percent increase in <strong>the</strong> gross national product (GNP) implicit pricedeflator between <strong>the</strong> fourth quarters <strong>of</strong> 1981 and 1982 was less thanhalf <strong>the</strong> 10.2 percent rate <strong>of</strong> increase between <strong>the</strong> fourth quarters <strong>of</strong>1979 and 1980. This decline in inflation has moderated <strong>the</strong> earlierwidespread fears that inflation would accelerate. While some <strong>of</strong> thisimprovement in inflation was transitory, reflecting such special factorsas <strong>the</strong> appreciation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> exchange value <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> dollar, <strong>the</strong> largestshare was almost certainly due to a decline in <strong>the</strong> underlying rate<strong>of</strong> inflation. The reduced rate <strong>of</strong> inflation is a major step toward <strong>the</strong>Administration's goals <strong>of</strong> full employment, healthy economic growth,and price stability.The progress made in reducing inflation, however, was accompaniedby a painful slowdown <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> economy. Beginning in July 1981,<strong>the</strong> Nation suffered <strong>the</strong> second <strong>of</strong> two back-to-back recessions thatbrought <strong>the</strong> unemployment rate to 10.8 percent in December 1982.At that time, approximately 5 million more people were unemployedthan in January 1980, when <strong>the</strong> first <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> two recessions began.The increase in long-term unemployment poses a particularlysevere problem. In January 1980, about 550,000 people had beenunemployed for more than 6 months. In December 1982 <strong>the</strong>re weremore than four times as many. Long-term unemployment is particularlyserious in that it causes substantial financial hardship and is associatedwith a loss <strong>of</strong> job skills that may reduce future income significantly.Some temporary decline in real economic activity was probably unavoidablein <strong>the</strong> process <strong>of</strong> reversing <strong>the</strong> upward trend <strong>of</strong> inflation.The United States entered <strong>the</strong> 1980s with a high rate <strong>of</strong> inflation andwith widespread public expectations that <strong>the</strong> rate would remain high,and perhaps increase. As high inflation persisted, it became embeddedin <strong>the</strong> plans and contracts <strong>of</strong> firms and workers, and lowering itinvolved a painful process. The decline <strong>of</strong> real GNP since early 198117


was in large part <strong>the</strong> price <strong>the</strong> United States paid for failing to controlinflation in <strong>the</strong> late 1970s.LEGACIES OF THE 1970sIn <strong>the</strong> 1960s, many economists believed that <strong>the</strong> Federal Governmentcould keep unemployment down permanently by accepting ahigher rate <strong>of</strong> inflation. Steady rises in productivity and living standardswere taken for granted. During <strong>the</strong> 1970s <strong>the</strong>se views proved tobe incorrect. By <strong>the</strong> closing years <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1970s, both <strong>the</strong> unemploymentrate and <strong>the</strong> inflation rate were higher than <strong>the</strong>y had been in<strong>the</strong> 1960s, and <strong>the</strong> rate <strong>of</strong> productivity growth was lower.Why did unemployment, productivity growth, and inflation allworsen in <strong>the</strong> 1970s? These developments occurred in part because<strong>of</strong> factors outside <strong>the</strong> government's control, such as changes in <strong>the</strong>size and composition <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> work force and rising world energyprices. But <strong>the</strong> economy also suffered from long-standing governmentpolicies that exacerbated inflation and distorted <strong>the</strong> incentivesto work, save, and invest.RISING UNEMPLOYMENTTotal employment grew rapidly in <strong>the</strong> 1970s but so did <strong>the</strong> rate <strong>of</strong>unemployment. The civilian labor force participation rate rose from60.4 percent <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> population in 1970 to 63.8 percent in 1980. Theunemployment rate averaged 5.4 percent in <strong>the</strong> first half <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>1970s, greater than <strong>the</strong> 4.8 percent average <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1960s. The recession<strong>of</strong> 1975 took <strong>the</strong> unemployment rate to a monthly high <strong>of</strong> 9.0percent. Unemployment <strong>the</strong>n declined to a monthly low <strong>of</strong> 5.6 percentin 1979, only to begin rising again to a peak <strong>of</strong> 7.8 percent inJuly 1980.In addition to cyclical fluctuations in <strong>the</strong> economy, a number <strong>of</strong>structural factors contributed to <strong>the</strong> rise in <strong>the</strong> unemployment rateover <strong>the</strong> decade. These included <strong>the</strong> changing demographic structure<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> labor force, <strong>the</strong> increased number <strong>of</strong> workers dislocated bychanges in technology and international competitiveness, and <strong>the</strong>work registration requirements in a number <strong>of</strong> government welfareprograms.A more detailed analysis <strong>of</strong> unemployment and <strong>the</strong> labor marketconsequences <strong>of</strong> macroeconomic policy is presented in Chapter 2.DECLINING PRODUCTIVITY GROWTHFrom 1960 to 1970, real output per hour in <strong>the</strong> private sector roseat an annual rate <strong>of</strong> 3.0 percent; from 1970 to 1980 it rose at a rate<strong>of</strong> only 1.4 percent. Labor productivity growth would probably have18


slowed somewhat in <strong>the</strong> 1970s regardless <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> policies adopted.The sharp increases in <strong>the</strong> price <strong>of</strong> oil caused by supply disruptionsin 1974 and 1979 reduced productivity growth as firms substitutedcapital and labor for energy. Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, as <strong>the</strong> post-World War IIbaby-boom generation entered <strong>the</strong> labor force and <strong>the</strong> percentage <strong>of</strong>working-age women seeking employment rose, <strong>the</strong> proportion <strong>of</strong> lessexperienced workers increased, fur<strong>the</strong>r depressing productivity.The slowdown in productivity growth was, however, exacerbatedby a decline in rates <strong>of</strong> capital formation. Net investment in fixedbusiness capital fell from 3.5 percent <strong>of</strong> GNP in <strong>the</strong> 1960s to 3.0 percentin <strong>the</strong> 1970s, and <strong>the</strong> rate <strong>of</strong> growth <strong>of</strong> capital per worker felleven more sharply, from 3.2 percent per year in <strong>the</strong> 1960s to only1.3 percent in <strong>the</strong> 1970s. The interaction <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> tax system with inflationplayed an important role in reducing <strong>the</strong> rate <strong>of</strong> capital formation.Ano<strong>the</strong>r cause <strong>of</strong> slow productivity growth was an increase in governmentregulation. In some sectors <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> economy, Federal regulationsdirectly reduced labor productivity; in o<strong>the</strong>rs, <strong>the</strong>y diverted capitalinvestment away from <strong>the</strong> improvement <strong>of</strong> productivity into <strong>the</strong>satisfaction <strong>of</strong> regulatory requirements. Some <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se regulationsserved useful purposes, but some imposed economic costs that exceeded<strong>the</strong>ir economic benefits.The tax changes proposed by <strong>the</strong> Administration and enacted by<strong>the</strong> Congress in 1981 and 1982 were designed to lead to fastergrowth and higher productivity by stimulating saving, investment,and individual effort. In addition, <strong>the</strong> Administration's policy <strong>of</strong> reducinggovernment regulation is intended to enhance <strong>the</strong> efficiency<strong>of</strong> individual markets and <strong>the</strong>reby increase total production.RISING INFLATIONOf all <strong>the</strong> economic problems that this Administration inheritedwhen it came to <strong>of</strong>fice in 1981, <strong>the</strong> most urgent was <strong>the</strong> problem <strong>of</strong>rising prices. Double-digit inflation had created serious economic distortions.An equally serious concern was that <strong>the</strong> trend rate <strong>of</strong> inflationwas rising over time.From 1960 to 1970, <strong>the</strong> GNP deflator rose at an average rate <strong>of</strong>3.0 percent per year. Between 1970 and 1973, <strong>the</strong> average rate <strong>of</strong> inflationby this measure was 5.3 percent. Then, aggravated by <strong>the</strong>sharp jump in world oil prices and o<strong>the</strong>r special factors, inflationreached 10.2 percent during 1974, but by 1976 it was down to 4.7percent. In <strong>the</strong> next 4 years, which included <strong>the</strong> second oil priceshock in 1979, inflation increased continually until it reached 10.2percent again in 1980.19


Over short periods <strong>of</strong> time a variety <strong>of</strong> factors influence <strong>the</strong> rate <strong>of</strong>inflation. One important factor in <strong>the</strong> 1970s was supply-determinedchanges in commodity prices resulting from fluctuations in harvestsand disruptions in <strong>the</strong> supply <strong>of</strong> foreign oil. Ano<strong>the</strong>r important factorwas <strong>the</strong> increasing level <strong>of</strong> expected inflation. Once <strong>the</strong> expectation<strong>of</strong> continuing inflation has become firmly entrenched, prices andwages may continue to rise even in <strong>the</strong> face <strong>of</strong> declining demand, and<strong>the</strong> cost <strong>of</strong> reducing inflation may increase.These factors, however, only affect <strong>the</strong> rate <strong>of</strong> inflation for a limitedtime. The popular axiom that attributes inflation to "too muchmoney chasing too few goods" reflects a basic truth: it is difficult toimagine a sustained inflation that is not supported by excessivemoney growth. Over long periods <strong>of</strong> time, an additional percentagepoint in <strong>the</strong> rate <strong>of</strong> growth <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> money stock will tend to producean additional percentage point <strong>of</strong> growth <strong>of</strong> nominal GNP, that is,GNP measured at current prices. If <strong>the</strong> rate <strong>of</strong> real GNP growth doesnot change, <strong>the</strong> entire increase in nominal GNP growth will take <strong>the</strong>form <strong>of</strong> increased inflation. Although <strong>the</strong> relations between moneygrowth, nominal GNP growth, and inflation are considerably morevariable over shorter periods than <strong>the</strong>y are in <strong>the</strong> long run, <strong>the</strong>impact <strong>of</strong> money growth on nominal income and inflation remainspowerful even in <strong>the</strong> short run.THE RECESSIONThe substantial decline in <strong>the</strong> rate <strong>of</strong> growth <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Ml measure <strong>of</strong>money that occurred between <strong>the</strong> end <strong>of</strong> 1980 and <strong>the</strong> end <strong>of</strong> 1981was a principal contributor to <strong>the</strong> decline in nominal income growthin 1982, a decline compounded by a marked change in <strong>the</strong> velocity <strong>of</strong>money. Part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> slowdown in nominal GNP growth took <strong>the</strong> form<strong>of</strong> lower inflation, and part <strong>of</strong> it took <strong>the</strong> form <strong>of</strong> a decline in realeconomic activity.The adverse short-run effect <strong>of</strong> a slowdown in nominal GNP onreal economic activity is a basic feature <strong>of</strong> our economy that reflects<strong>the</strong> stickiness <strong>of</strong> wages and prices in most markets. If prices andwages were perfectly flexible, reduced nominal GNP growth wouldtranslate immediately and painlessly into reduced inflation. However,not all wages and prices are flexible. When expectations <strong>of</strong> future inflationare deeply embedded, prices and wages may continue to risefor some time despite excess supplies <strong>of</strong> goods and labor. A changein inflationary expectations, toge<strong>the</strong>r with <strong>the</strong> direct pressures exertedby excess supplies, eventually causes prices and wages to adjust tonew market-clearing levels. But until that occurs a slowdown in nomi-20


nal GNP growth is reflected in a slowing <strong>of</strong> real growth as well as ina slowing <strong>of</strong> inflation.The severity <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> recession in 1982 reflected a combination <strong>of</strong>circumstances which caused a very sharp decline in nominal GNPgrowth between 1981 and 1982. Between <strong>the</strong> fourth quarter <strong>of</strong> 1980and <strong>the</strong> fourth quarter <strong>of</strong> 1981, nominal GNP grew at a rate <strong>of</strong> 9.6percent; in contrast, nominal GNP rose only 3.3 percent last year.About one-third <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 6.3 percentage point drop in nominal GNPgrowth between 1981 and 1982 was reflected in a 1.9 percentagepoint decline in <strong>the</strong> real GNP growth rate—from an increase <strong>of</strong> 0.7percent in 1981 to a decline <strong>of</strong> 1.2 percent in 1982. The reduction ininflation accounted for <strong>the</strong> remaining two-thirds <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> drop in nominalGNP.Although some slowdown in nominal GNP growth and in inflationin 1982 was a predictable effect <strong>of</strong> tighter monetary policies, <strong>the</strong> verysharp decline actually experienced did not reflect a decrease in <strong>the</strong>growth <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> monetary aggregates. Ra<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> exceptional severity<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> slowdown in nominal GNP growth can be traced to a combination<strong>of</strong> factors that led to an unusually sharp decline in <strong>the</strong> velocity<strong>of</strong> money, that is, in <strong>the</strong> ratio <strong>of</strong> GNP to <strong>the</strong> money stock.THE DECLINE IN VELOCITYThe 1982 decline in <strong>the</strong> velocity <strong>of</strong> money—as measured by <strong>the</strong> velocity<strong>of</strong> ei<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> Ml or M2 monetary aggregates—was historicallyatypical. Between 1961 and 1981, Ml velocity rose at an averageannual rate <strong>of</strong> 3.2 percent, while <strong>the</strong> velocity <strong>of</strong> M2 remained essentiallyconstant, rising at an average annual rate <strong>of</strong> 0.2 percent. Incontrast, in 1982 <strong>the</strong> velocity <strong>of</strong> Ml fell 4.9 percent and M2 velocityfell 6.0 percent on a fourth quarter to fourth quarter basis. By ei<strong>the</strong>rmeasure, <strong>the</strong> growth <strong>of</strong> nominal GNP was well below <strong>the</strong> rate thatwould have prevailed if <strong>the</strong> Ml or M2 measures <strong>of</strong> velocity hadgrown at <strong>the</strong>ir average historic rates. These velocity declines were <strong>the</strong>largest since 1959, <strong>the</strong> earliest year for which <strong>the</strong> Federal Reservehas published data on <strong>the</strong> monetary aggregates under <strong>the</strong> definitionscurrently in use.If <strong>the</strong>se velocity shifts had not occurred, <strong>the</strong> rise in nominal GNPin 1982 would have been between 10 and 12 percent. While it is uncertainhow this hypo<strong>the</strong>tical change would have been distributed betweenreal activity and inflation, it is likely that real GNP would haveincreased enough to have ended <strong>the</strong> recession sometime before <strong>the</strong>final quarter <strong>of</strong> 1982.Although <strong>the</strong> cause <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> large velocity shift that occurred in 1982is not fully understood, it is likely that major changes in asset demands<strong>of</strong> individuals and businesses played an important role. More21


precisely, an increase in <strong>the</strong> demand for Ml or M2 at any incomelevel decreases <strong>the</strong> corresponding velocity <strong>of</strong> money. Such shifts mayoccur because <strong>of</strong> regulatory changes that provide new financial opportunities—like<strong>the</strong> introduction <strong>of</strong> nationwide interest-bearing negotiableorder <strong>of</strong> withdrawal (NOW) accounts—or because <strong>of</strong>changes in asset preferences—like <strong>the</strong> increased demand for moneymarket mutual funds instead <strong>of</strong> long-term securities.The uncertain cause <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> recent decline in velocity is characteristic<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> problems that <strong>the</strong> Federal Reserve has encountered in applying<strong>the</strong> new monetary control procedures that it adopted in October1979. Changes in banking regulations and <strong>the</strong> development <strong>of</strong>new financial instruments by <strong>the</strong> private sector have compelled <strong>the</strong>Federal Reserve to make frequent revisions to <strong>the</strong> definitions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>monetary aggregates and reassessments <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir economic impacts. In1980 a complete revision <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> definitions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> monetary aggregateswas introduced. In <strong>the</strong> next year, a "shift adjusted" Ml-B wasdefined in an effort to adjust for shifts from savings deposits toNOW accounts. Most recently, in 1982 and early 1983, definitionalchanges in Ml and M2 were required to deal with <strong>the</strong> advent <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>new money market deposit account—which was added to M2—and<strong>the</strong> new super NOW account—which was added to Ml.The Federal Reserve was aware throughout 1981 and 1982 that <strong>the</strong>relationship between <strong>the</strong> monetary aggregates and economic activitywas in a state <strong>of</strong> flux, and that future velocity trends were uncertain.While sustained but unanticipated shifts in velocity growth can beidentified in hindsight, it is nearly impossible to know at <strong>the</strong> time<strong>the</strong>y occur whe<strong>the</strong>r unusual quarter-to-quarter changes in velocitywill continue or reverse <strong>the</strong>mselves. The presumption, on <strong>the</strong> basis<strong>of</strong> past experience, is that most velocity changes are temporary.Thus, increasing <strong>the</strong> rate <strong>of</strong> money growth in response to temporarydeclines in velocity runs <strong>the</strong> risk <strong>of</strong> providing excessive liquidity andincreasing inflation, while a failure to recognize a continuing shift inliquidity preference or velocity runs <strong>the</strong> risk <strong>of</strong> providing inadequateliquidity and reducing real GNP. Given <strong>the</strong> circumstances <strong>of</strong> 1982,<strong>the</strong> somewhat greater growth in <strong>the</strong> monetary aggregates than initiallyintended by <strong>the</strong> Federal Reserve appeared to be an appropriateway to balance those risks.ECONOMIC RECOVERYThe Administration believes that <strong>the</strong> American economy will soonrecover from <strong>the</strong> recession that began in July 1981. The forecast presentedin Chapter 6 projects that economic recovery will begin in1983, marking <strong>the</strong> start <strong>of</strong> a long period <strong>of</strong> sustained growth with low22


inflation. More specifically, <strong>the</strong> Administration forecasts that realGNP will rise 3.1 percent from <strong>the</strong> fourth quarter <strong>of</strong> 1982 to <strong>the</strong>fourth quarter <strong>of</strong> 1983, and that nominal GNP will rise 8.8 percent.Realization <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> economic forecast and steady noninflationarygrowth in subsequent years will depend upon <strong>the</strong> implementation <strong>of</strong>appropriate monetary and fiscal policies.IMPLEMENTING A STABLE MONETARY POLICYThe Administration has repeatedly indicated that <strong>the</strong> fundamentalguiding principle <strong>of</strong> monetary policy in an inflationary economyshould be a gradual reduction in <strong>the</strong> rate <strong>of</strong> growth <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> moneystock until <strong>the</strong> rate is consistent with price stability. This principle isconsistent with <strong>the</strong> general approach enunciated in recent years by<strong>the</strong> independent Federal Reserve.The basic challenge for monetary policy at present is to balance<strong>the</strong> principle <strong>of</strong> stable money growth with <strong>the</strong> need to take account<strong>of</strong> changing asset preferences that may alter <strong>the</strong> velocity <strong>of</strong> money.While maintaining <strong>the</strong> approach <strong>of</strong> setting specified target ranges formoney growth, <strong>the</strong> Federal Reserve will also need to use its judgmentto adjust money growth rates and <strong>the</strong> corresponding targets toreflect lasting changes in asset demands.The extent to which a policy <strong>of</strong> predetermined money growth ratesis appropriate depends on <strong>the</strong> stability and predictability <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> velocity<strong>of</strong> money. Strictly speaking, inflexible monetary growth rates areappropriate only if <strong>the</strong> trend in income velocity is constant or haspurely random disturbances. The advisability <strong>of</strong> a strict policy ruledepends on <strong>the</strong> degree <strong>of</strong> predictability <strong>of</strong> velocity disturbances. Themore predictable velocity disturbances are, <strong>the</strong> more <strong>the</strong>y can be<strong>of</strong>fset by countervailing shifts in <strong>the</strong> money stock. The less predictable<strong>the</strong>y are, <strong>the</strong> more likely it is that any attempt at countervailingshifts in <strong>the</strong> money stock will add to <strong>the</strong> overall volatility <strong>of</strong> nominalGNP.The task <strong>of</strong> making appropriate adjustments to <strong>the</strong> monetary targetsis enormously difficult. An excessive increase in <strong>the</strong> money stockwill cause a period <strong>of</strong> increased inflation while an insufficient increasein <strong>the</strong> money stock will not provide adequate liquidity for <strong>the</strong>needs <strong>of</strong> an expanding economy. Eventually such deviations are selfcorrecting,but only after a period <strong>of</strong> accelerating inflation or weakeconomic performance.One possible way to avoid such periods is to use <strong>the</strong> obseryed behavior<strong>of</strong> nominal GNP to guide a gradual recalibration <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> monetarygrowth targets, recognizing that <strong>the</strong>re are uncertain lags betweenmoney stock changes and <strong>the</strong> resulting changes in nominal GNP.Basing <strong>the</strong> recalibration <strong>of</strong> monetary targets on nominal GNP is con-23


sistent with <strong>the</strong> basic principle <strong>of</strong> pursuing a stable monetary policy.Indeed, it is <strong>the</strong> relatively stable long-run relationship between <strong>the</strong>monetary aggregates and nominal GNP that justifies <strong>the</strong> Federal Reserve'spolicy <strong>of</strong> setting targets for <strong>the</strong> growth <strong>of</strong> Ml and M2. Thisimplies that caution in revising <strong>the</strong>se targets is appropriate. The principle<strong>of</strong> targeting money growth rates is not an end in itself but onlya means <strong>of</strong> achieving control <strong>of</strong> nominal GNP.Disadvantages <strong>of</strong> Interest Rate TargetingFrom World War II until <strong>the</strong> mid-1970s <strong>the</strong> Federal Reserve, likemost central banks, conducted monetary policy by focusing on interestrates and money market conditions. Over <strong>the</strong> 1970s, increasingemphasis was given to targeting monetary aggregates. More recently,under new procedures first adopted in October 1979, <strong>the</strong> FederalReserve has given greater emphasis to keeping <strong>the</strong> growth <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>monetary aggregates within pre-announced target ranges, eventhough it was recognized that this could result in greater variations ininterest rates.Since 1979 both long-term and short-term interest rates haveproven more variable than in <strong>the</strong> past. Many critics attribute thischange to <strong>the</strong> increased emphasis on monetary targets and <strong>the</strong> level<strong>of</strong> bank reserves as <strong>the</strong> operational basis for monetary policy. Althoughsome have argued that <strong>the</strong> Federal Reserve should dropmonetary targeting in favor <strong>of</strong> targeting interest rates, <strong>the</strong> Administrationbelieves strongly that targeting interest rates, ei<strong>the</strong>r nominalor real, would prove to be a serious error.The nominal rate <strong>of</strong> interest is a very unreliable indicator <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>thrust <strong>of</strong> monetary policy. The financial variable important to borrowersand lenders is not <strong>the</strong> nominal interest rate but a real interestrate determined by subtracting <strong>the</strong> rate <strong>of</strong> inflation from <strong>the</strong> nominalinterest rate. Borrowers and lenders take into account <strong>the</strong> fact that<strong>the</strong> dollars repaid when a loan matures do not have <strong>the</strong> same purchasingpower as <strong>the</strong> dollars originally borrowed. When inflation isexpected, lenders insist that <strong>the</strong> nominal rate <strong>of</strong> interest include apremium to compensate <strong>the</strong>m for <strong>the</strong> declining purchasing power <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> dollar, and borrowers are willing to pay such a premium.Although <strong>the</strong> real interest rate is more closely linked to borrowingand lending decisions than <strong>the</strong> nominal interest rate, <strong>the</strong> real interestrate is also not an appropriate target for monetary policy. There areseveral basic reasons for rejecting <strong>the</strong> policy <strong>of</strong> real interest rate targeting.First, real interest rate targeting might well lead to an inflationarymonetary policy. Any given real interest rate is compatible with awide range <strong>of</strong> inflation rates. For example, a real interest rate <strong>of</strong> 2percent could occur with a 5 percent nominal rate and a 3 percent24


inflation rate, or with a 12 percent nominal rate and a 10 percent inflationrate. Thus, achieving a real interest rate target would provideno assurance <strong>of</strong> price stability.Second, <strong>the</strong> real interest rate that governs economic behavior is<strong>the</strong> difference between <strong>the</strong> nominal interest rate and <strong>the</strong> expected rate<strong>of</strong> inflation. Since expectations <strong>of</strong> inflation are not observable, <strong>the</strong>monetary authorities cannot as a practical matter measure or target<strong>the</strong> expected real interest rate.A third reason why real interest rate targeting is not feasible is that<strong>the</strong> relevant interest rate is not merely <strong>the</strong> real rate but <strong>the</strong> real net<strong>of</strong>-taxinterest rate. Because net-<strong>of</strong>-tax rates <strong>of</strong> interest vary amongindividuals and businesses in different tax positions, <strong>the</strong>re is no wayfor <strong>the</strong> monetary authorities to determine <strong>the</strong> relevant average realnet-<strong>of</strong>-tax interest rate in financial markets. Compounding <strong>the</strong> problemfur<strong>the</strong>r, different rates <strong>of</strong> inflation can result in very differentnet-<strong>of</strong>-tax real interest rates corresponding to <strong>the</strong> same pretax realinterest rate, even for a particular taxpayer. For example, a taxpayerwith a marginal tax rate <strong>of</strong> 40 percent earns a real net-<strong>of</strong>-tax return<strong>of</strong> 1 percent if he receives a nominal rate <strong>of</strong> 10 percent and <strong>the</strong>re is 5percent inflation; that same taxpayer earns a real net-<strong>of</strong>-tax return <strong>of</strong>— 2 percent if he receives <strong>the</strong> same real return <strong>of</strong> 5 percent but <strong>the</strong>reis zero inflation. Similarly, <strong>the</strong> real interest rate and <strong>the</strong> real net-<strong>of</strong>taxinterest rate can easily move in opposite directions when <strong>the</strong> inflationrate changes.There is a final and even more fundamental reason for rejectingreal interest rate targeting. Even if <strong>the</strong> expected real interest ratewere measurable, <strong>the</strong>re would remain <strong>the</strong> virtually impossible task <strong>of</strong>determining what level <strong>of</strong> that interest rate is actually compatiblewith noninflationary growth. The problem <strong>of</strong> identifying <strong>the</strong> equilibriuminterest rate is made even more difficult by <strong>the</strong> interaction <strong>of</strong>tax rules and inflation.Monetary Rules and DiscretionThere is no simple solution to <strong>the</strong> problem <strong>of</strong> guiding monetarypolicy in a time <strong>of</strong> rapid institutional change. Interest rate targeting,as shown above, is not a desirable approach. Instead, <strong>the</strong> monetaryauthorities should be guided by <strong>the</strong> principle <strong>of</strong> keeping moneygrowth within a prespecified target range while adjusting those targetswhen a careful consideration <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> evidence indicates that sustainedshifts in asset demands have occurred.The combination <strong>of</strong> monetary rules and discretion must be appliedwith great care and judgment. The observance <strong>of</strong> rules must notbecome a doctrinaire attachment to arbitrary standards, and <strong>the</strong> exercise<strong>of</strong> discretion must not degenerate into unprincipled fine tuning.Instead, <strong>the</strong> monetary rules must be understood as a way <strong>of</strong> achiev-25


ing an appropriate long-run path for <strong>the</strong> economy. The exercise <strong>of</strong>discretion in recalibrating monetary targets must be subject to <strong>the</strong>discipline that such revisions are ultimately compatible with <strong>the</strong> desiredlong-run path <strong>of</strong> nominal GNP. With rules and discretion balancedin this way, monetary policy can support a sound recovery thatleads to sustained and noninflationary growth.THE BUDGET DEFICITThe Federal budget deficit has become a major problem for <strong>the</strong>American economy. Without <strong>the</strong> savings proposed by <strong>the</strong> Administrationin its budget plan for <strong>the</strong> years 1984 through 1988, <strong>the</strong> UnitedStates is forecasted to experience a series <strong>of</strong> deficits that would consumemore than 6 percent <strong>of</strong> GNP in each <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> next 6 years. Althoughbudget deficits have been a nearly constant feature <strong>of</strong> our Nation'seconomic life for <strong>the</strong> past two decades, <strong>the</strong> prospective budgetdeficits that would result if no legislative actions were taken toreduce <strong>the</strong>m would be far larger than those previously experiencedin <strong>the</strong> postwar period. The economic effects <strong>of</strong> such deficits arebeyond our previous experience.The fiscal 1983 deficit is partially a result <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> recession. Any recessionreduces tax collections and increases outlays for unemploymentbenefits, retirement benefits, and certain o<strong>the</strong>r activities. A reasonableapproximation is that <strong>the</strong> change in economic output associatedwith a percentage point change in <strong>the</strong> unemployment rate wouldraise <strong>the</strong> fiscal 1983 deficit by about $25 billion. The Administrationforecasts that <strong>the</strong> unemployment rate for fiscal 1983 will average 10.7percent. If <strong>the</strong> unemployment rate were 6.5 percent instead, <strong>the</strong>budget deficit would be about half <strong>the</strong> $208 billion now forecast forfiscal 1983. The cyclical component represents a similarly large share<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> fiscal 1984 deficit.<strong>Economic</strong> recovery and growth in <strong>the</strong> years ahead will reduce <strong>the</strong>cyclical component <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> deficit. The Administration's forecast projectsa decline in <strong>the</strong> unemployment rate by 4 percentage points betweenfiscal 1983 and fiscal 1988, leaving only a negligible cyclicalcomponent in <strong>the</strong> fiscal 1988 budget. Unless <strong>the</strong> Administration'sproposals are enacted, a current services budget deficit <strong>of</strong> $300 billionis forecasted to materialize.To see <strong>the</strong> origin <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se large deficits, it is useful to compare <strong>the</strong>components <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1988 current services budget with <strong>the</strong> same componentsfor 1970. Between those years, taxes decline very slightly asa percentage <strong>of</strong> GNP, from 19.9 percent in 1970 to 18.9 percent in1988. The defense share <strong>of</strong> GNP remains unchanged at 8.1 percent<strong>of</strong> GNP in both years. By contrast, nondefense activities excluding interestrise from 10.6 percent <strong>of</strong> GNP in 1970 to 13.6 percent in26


1988, an increase <strong>of</strong> about one-fourth. In addition, <strong>the</strong> accumulation<strong>of</strong> previous deficits raise <strong>the</strong> net interest component <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> budgetdeficit from 1.5 percent <strong>of</strong> GNP to 3.4 percent <strong>of</strong> GNP.Deficits and Long-Term GrowthA succession <strong>of</strong> large budget deficits is likely to reduce substantially<strong>the</strong> rate <strong>of</strong> capital formation. The government's borrowing to financesuch deficits would compete directly with borrowing by privatebusinesses and households. With a limited amount <strong>of</strong> savings availablefor borrowing, high budget deficits would cause interest rates torise until private demand for funds was reduced to <strong>the</strong> amount thatremained after <strong>the</strong> government's borrowing needs were satisfied.The magnitude <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> potential crowding out <strong>of</strong> private investmentis immense. During <strong>the</strong> past two decades, <strong>the</strong> net saving <strong>of</strong> householdsand businesses totaled only about 7 percent <strong>of</strong> GNP. Prospectivedeficits <strong>of</strong> more than 6 percent <strong>of</strong> GNP would represent virtuallyall <strong>of</strong> current net saving. Even though existing saving would be augmentedby borrowing from abroad and by some increase in <strong>the</strong> privatesaving rate, <strong>the</strong> reduced rate <strong>of</strong> capital formation would be verysubstantial.A lower rate <strong>of</strong> capital formation would have adverse consequencesbecause <strong>the</strong> accumulation <strong>of</strong> capital is a key determinant <strong>of</strong> future increasesin productivity and economic growth and <strong>the</strong>refore <strong>of</strong> higherreal wages and standards <strong>of</strong> living. Fur<strong>the</strong>r reductions in <strong>the</strong> rate <strong>of</strong>capital formation would be particularly unfortunate because, as Chapter4 discusses in detail, <strong>the</strong> U.S. rate <strong>of</strong> capital formation has beenundesirably low for several decades. In <strong>the</strong> years since 1960, net privateinvestment has averaged only 6 percent <strong>of</strong> GNP, significantlyless than <strong>the</strong> rate in most major industrial countries. Moreover, sincehalf <strong>of</strong> this 6 percent has gone into housing, only about 3 percent <strong>of</strong>GNP has been available for productivity-increasing investments inplant and equipment. Deficits <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> level implied by <strong>the</strong> currentservices budget could reduce <strong>the</strong> rate <strong>of</strong> net investment in plant andequipment enough to preclude any increase in <strong>the</strong> amount <strong>of</strong> capitalper worker. If this occurred, <strong>the</strong> process <strong>of</strong> increasing capital intensitywould cease to contribute to rising productivity and real wages.Deficits and <strong>the</strong> RecoveryThe adverse effects <strong>of</strong> large budget deficits are not limited to <strong>the</strong>distant future. The deficits that would occur without <strong>the</strong> budget actionsproposed by <strong>the</strong> Administration could seriously affect <strong>the</strong>degree to which various economic sectors share in <strong>the</strong> benefits <strong>of</strong> recoveryfrom <strong>the</strong> current recession. The crowding out <strong>of</strong> private investmentwhich would accompany large deficits could depress <strong>the</strong>level <strong>of</strong> output in <strong>the</strong> construction industries, <strong>the</strong> steel industry, <strong>the</strong>27


machinery and equipment industries, and industries that produceo<strong>the</strong>r durable goods.In addition, large budget deficits raise <strong>the</strong> exchange value <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>dollar relative to foreign currencies by attracting foreign capital to<strong>the</strong> United States. This weakens <strong>the</strong> competitive position <strong>of</strong> U.S. exportsin <strong>the</strong> world economy and hurts those domestic industries thatcompete with imports from abroad. The nature and magnitude <strong>of</strong>this effect are discussed in Chapter 3 <strong>of</strong> this <strong>Report</strong>.A "lopsided" recovery in which some sectors remained relativelydepressed might prove more fragile than a recovery which wasbroadly based. An increase in economic activity limited to some sectorsand regions might result in greater upward pressure on pricesand wages at any given level <strong>of</strong> total output and employment thanwould be <strong>the</strong> case if <strong>the</strong>re were balanced expansion among industries.In addition, an unbalanced recovery would produce more inflationand less real growth, regardless <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> rate <strong>of</strong> expansion <strong>of</strong>nominal GNP.The prospect <strong>of</strong> large budget deficits in <strong>the</strong> second half <strong>of</strong> thisdecade may also have an adverse effect on <strong>the</strong> prospects for recoveryin 1983. If <strong>the</strong> financial markets respond to expected future deficitsby keeping real long-term interest rates higher in 1983 than <strong>the</strong>ywould o<strong>the</strong>rwise be, <strong>the</strong> level <strong>of</strong> spending in 1983 on interest-sensitivepurchases may remain depressed. Clear evidence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> willingness<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Administration and <strong>the</strong> Congress to reduce Federalbudget deficits substantially in <strong>the</strong> second half <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1980s can playan important part in ensuring a healthy and balanced economic recoveryin <strong>the</strong> more immediate future.28


CHAPTER 2The Dual Problems <strong>of</strong> Structural andCyclical UnemploymentUNEMPLOYMENT IS THE MOST SERIOUS ECONOMICPROBLEM now facing <strong>the</strong> United States. By December 1982 <strong>the</strong>number <strong>of</strong> unemployed had risen by more than 4 million since <strong>the</strong>beginning <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> recession in July 1981. The unemployment rate washigher in December 1982 than at any point since <strong>the</strong> Depression,with over 12 million persons counted as unemployed. Even after <strong>the</strong>economy recovers from <strong>the</strong> recent recession, it is likely that <strong>the</strong> unemploymentrate will reach a plateau between 6 and 7 percent.This chapter analyzes <strong>the</strong> two major types <strong>of</strong> unemployment: cyclicaland structural. The high level <strong>of</strong> cyclical unemployment now prevailingin <strong>the</strong> United States is a major problem, but it should provetransitory. Only a healthy and sustained recovery from <strong>the</strong> recent recessioncan effectively diminish cyclical unemployment. Even afterfull recovery, however, a serious structural unemployment problemwill remain unless measures are taken to improve <strong>the</strong> functioning <strong>of</strong>labor markets. Reducing structural unemployment will require attacking<strong>the</strong> special problems <strong>of</strong> young people and <strong>the</strong> long-term adultunemployed.This chapter begins by describing <strong>the</strong> dimensions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> cyclicaland structural unemployment problems. It <strong>the</strong>n examines <strong>the</strong> potential<strong>of</strong> public employment programs and macroeconomic policies tolower cyclical unemployment. Finally, policies for reducing structuralunemployment are considered.THE RECENT RECESSIONThe unemployment rate in December 1982 stood at 10.8 percent<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> civilian labor force. Since <strong>the</strong> recent period <strong>of</strong> economic slack thatbegan in January 1980, <strong>the</strong> unemployment rate has risen by 4.5 percentagepoints. During <strong>the</strong> recent recession, which began in July1981, <strong>the</strong> unemployment rate rose by 3.6 percentage points.Historical experience suggests that <strong>the</strong> unemployment rate tends toincrease for several months after <strong>the</strong> level <strong>of</strong> production bottoms out29


and it is possible that <strong>the</strong> unemployment rate will reach 11 percent atsome point during 1983.Beyond those <strong>of</strong>ficially counted as unemployed, <strong>the</strong> recent recessionhas prevented many Americans from working as much as <strong>the</strong>ywould like. In December 1982 <strong>the</strong>re were over two million personsinvoluntarily working part time. The Bureau <strong>of</strong> Labor Statistics alsoreported that <strong>the</strong>re were over 1.8 million discouraged workers in December.These are individuals who have given up looking for workbecause <strong>the</strong>y believe <strong>the</strong>y cannot find jobs.Unemployment is <strong>of</strong>ten linked to economic hardship. While many<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> unemployed receive unemployment insurance and live in familiesthat have o<strong>the</strong>r members who work, many unemployed individualsand <strong>the</strong>ir families suffer economic distress. Table 2-1 presentsinformation on <strong>the</strong> incomes <strong>of</strong> families in which <strong>the</strong> husband, wife, orhead <strong>of</strong> household experienced unemployment during 1981. (Datafor 1982 are not yet available.) Three types <strong>of</strong> families are distinguished:(1) families in which both husband and wife worked, (2)families in which only <strong>the</strong> husband or male head worked, and (3)families in which only <strong>the</strong> wife or female head worked. For all <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>family types, unemployment experienced by husband, wife, or head<strong>of</strong> household significantly lowered median family income. For example,single-earner families in which <strong>the</strong> husband (or male head) wasnever unemployed had a median income in 1981 <strong>of</strong> $25,000. In contrast,<strong>the</strong> median income <strong>of</strong> similar families in which <strong>the</strong> male headexperienced 1 to 26 weeks <strong>of</strong> unemployment was $16,500. Familiesin which <strong>the</strong> male head was unemployed for more than 26 weeks hada median family income <strong>of</strong> $10,200.TABLE 2-1.—Median family income by unemployment and family status, 1981 (current dollars)Family statusUnemployment status <strong>of</strong> husband, wife,or head <strong>of</strong> householdPersonneverunemployedPersonunemployedless than26 weeksPersonunemployedmore than26 weeksHusband and wife both work$31,600$23,000$17,900Only husband or male head works..25,00016,50010,200Only wife or female head works18,90015,20011,200Source.- Department <strong>of</strong> Labor, Bureau <strong>of</strong> Labor Statistics.The financial losses <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> unemployed are not <strong>the</strong> only costs <strong>of</strong> aprolonged economic decline. Considerable anxiety and emotionaldistress is experienced by those who have lost <strong>the</strong>ir jobs or who fearthat <strong>the</strong>y might lose <strong>the</strong>ir jobs in an economy with a decliningnumber <strong>of</strong> employment opportunities. Protracted unemployment is30


frequently associated with poor heafyh, psychological problems, andgradual erosion <strong>of</strong> job-related skills.THE COMPOSITION OF CYCLICAL AND STRUCTURALUNEMPLOYMENTThe unemployment problem can be divided into two components,cyclical and structural unemployment. The term cyclical unemploymentis used to refer to <strong>the</strong> unemployment associated with cyclical downturnsin aggregate economic activity. The incremental unemploymentassociated with <strong>the</strong> recent recession would fall into this category. Theterm structural unemployment is used to refer to <strong>the</strong> unemployment thatremains even after cyclical recoveries in aggregate economic activity.In large part, structural unemployment is a natural concomitant <strong>of</strong>a dynamic economy with constantly changing patterns <strong>of</strong> demand.Labor markets are in constant flux, with people entering and leaving<strong>the</strong> labor force, losing or quitting old jobs, and looking for and acquiringnew jobs. Some amount <strong>of</strong> structural unemployment is aninevitable aspect <strong>of</strong> a large modern industrial economy such as ours. Itis important to realize that although expansionary macroeconomicpolicies cannot reduce structural unemployment permanently, certainmicroeconomic policy interventions can affect <strong>the</strong> ease and speed <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> process that matches workers with jobs.Some insight into <strong>the</strong> differences between cyclical and structuralunemployment can be obtained by comparing <strong>the</strong> characteristics <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> unemployed in 1982 and in a period <strong>of</strong> low cyclical unemployment.Since <strong>the</strong> unemployment rate in 1978 was 6.1 percent, close tomost observers' estimates <strong>of</strong> full employment, data from that yearwill be used to illustrate <strong>the</strong> characteristics <strong>of</strong> structural unemployment.The next two sections examine <strong>the</strong> composition <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> unemployedpopulation in 1978 and 1982 in terms <strong>of</strong> demographic compositionand reasons for unemployment. A third section analyzes <strong>the</strong>dynamics <strong>of</strong> unemployment.DEMOGRAPHIC COMPOSITIONChart 2-1 provides information on <strong>the</strong> demographic composition<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> unemployed population in 1978 and in 1982. The chart showsthat young people under age 24 account for a substantial fraction <strong>of</strong>unemployment both when <strong>the</strong> economy is weak and when it isstrong. Persons under 24 accounted for 49 percent <strong>of</strong> total unemploymentduring 1978 and 41 percent <strong>of</strong> unemployment in 1982.The decline in <strong>the</strong> share <strong>of</strong> youth unemployment reflected <strong>the</strong> largeincrease in unemployment among adult males in cyclically sensitivesectors <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> economy, such as manufacturing.31


Chart 2-1Distribution <strong>of</strong> Unemployment by Age and SexADULT MALES25 AND OVER25.2% ADULT MALES25 AND OVER34.5%ADULT FEMALES,25 AND OVER24.6%1978 1982NOTE.—DATA RELATE TO PERSONS 16 YEARS AND OVER.SOURCE: DEPARTMENT OF LABOR.A pattern that appears in Chart 2-2 is <strong>the</strong> cyclical sensitivity <strong>of</strong> unemploymentamong those who provide <strong>the</strong> primary financial supportfor a family. The share <strong>of</strong> unemployment among husbands, wives,and family heads in families without a working spouse rose from 20percent in 1978 to 24 percent in 1982. Because unemployment undoubtedlyimposes its greatest hardship when it hits a worker uponwhom o<strong>the</strong>rs depend for <strong>the</strong>ir sole support, this increase is particularlydistressing.A continuing tragedy in both good and bad times is <strong>the</strong> very highrates <strong>of</strong> unemployment <strong>of</strong> blacks and o<strong>the</strong>r minorities. This group accountsfor a share <strong>of</strong> unemployment that is greatly disproportionateto its share <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> labor force. While blacks and o<strong>the</strong>r minoritiescomprised 13 percent <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> labor force in 1982, <strong>the</strong>y comprised approximately23 percent <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> unemployed. Chart 2-3, shows that <strong>the</strong>recent recession raised <strong>the</strong> unemployment rate <strong>of</strong> blacks and o<strong>the</strong>rminorities proportionally less than that <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> rest <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> population.However, black and o<strong>the</strong>r minority unemployment rates increasedsharply during <strong>the</strong> recession and continue to greatly exceed those <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> entire population. The unemployment rate for black and o<strong>the</strong>rminority adult males was 16.2 percent in 1982, compared to 7.8 percentfor white males. For black and o<strong>the</strong>r minority teenagers <strong>the</strong> unemploymentrate was 43.9 percent, compared to 20.4 percent forwhite teenagers.32


Chart 2-2Distribution <strong>of</strong> Unemployment by Family StatusHUSBANDS,SPOUSE WORKING7.8%HUSBANDS.SPOUSE WORKING11.5%1978 1982'HUSBANDS AND WIVES WHOSE SPOUSE DOES NOT WORK AND PERSONS WHO MAINTAINFAMILIES.NOTE.^DATA RELATE TO PERSONS 16 YEARS AND OVER.SOURCE: DEPARTMENT OF LABOR.REASONS FOR UNEMPLOYMENTAnalyzing <strong>the</strong> problem <strong>of</strong> unemployment requires understanding<strong>the</strong> process by which people become unemployed. The unemployedare <strong>of</strong>ten described in stereotyped terms as <strong>the</strong> victims <strong>of</strong> permanentlay<strong>of</strong>fs by firms that are ei<strong>the</strong>r partially or fully shutting down. Evenduring <strong>the</strong> recent recession, however, this characterization applied toless than half <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> unemployed.As part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> monthly Current Population Survey, <strong>the</strong> unemployedare asked a number <strong>of</strong> questions designed to elicit <strong>the</strong> reasonsfor <strong>the</strong>ir unemployment. The answers to <strong>the</strong>se questions permit abreakdown <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> unemployed into five groups: (1) persons laid <strong>of</strong>fwho can expect to return to <strong>the</strong> same job; (2) persons who have lostjobs to which <strong>the</strong>y cannot expect to return; (3) persons who havequit <strong>the</strong>ir jobs; (4) reentrants who are returning to <strong>the</strong> labor forceafter a spell <strong>of</strong> nei<strong>the</strong>r working nor looking for work; and (5) newentrants who have never worked at a full-time job before but are nowseeking employment.Chart 2-4 shows that <strong>the</strong> distribution <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> unemployed among<strong>the</strong>se categories is very sensitive to cyclical conditions. The share <strong>of</strong>persons who have lost <strong>the</strong>ir jobs, ei<strong>the</strong>r temporarily or permanently,33


Chart 2-3Distribution <strong>of</strong> Unemployment by Race1978 1982NOTE.—DATA RELATE TO PERSONS 16 YEARS AND OVER.SOURCE: DEPARTMENT OF LABOR.is particularly sensitive, rising from 42 percent in 1978 to 59 percentin 1982. Over this period <strong>the</strong> number <strong>of</strong> job losers on temporarylay<strong>of</strong>f tripled and <strong>the</strong> number <strong>of</strong> permanent job losers more thandoubled. The decline in alternative employment opportunities resultedin a decline in <strong>the</strong> share <strong>of</strong> unemployment traceable to workersleaving <strong>the</strong>ir jobs voluntarily during <strong>the</strong> recession—from 14 percentin 1978 to 8 percent in 1982. Finally, because <strong>the</strong> number <strong>of</strong> laborforce entrants and reentrants is relatively constant, <strong>the</strong>ir share intotal unemployment declined somewhat during <strong>the</strong> recession.The data on reasons for unemployment indicate a major differencebetween cyclical and structural unemployment. Almost 90 percent <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> increase in unemployment during cyclical downturns involves increasesin job losses and lay<strong>of</strong>fs, as firms respond to declines indemand for <strong>the</strong>ir products. On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand, almost 60 percent <strong>of</strong>structural unemployment is comprised <strong>of</strong> voluntary job leavers, laborforce entrants, and reentrants. The remainder are job losers. As describedbelow, <strong>the</strong> very different causes <strong>of</strong> cyclical and structural unemploymentsuggest that different policy responses are appropriate.34


Chart 2-4Distribution <strong>of</strong> Unemployment By Reason1978 1982NOTE.—DATA RELATE TO PERSONS 16 YEARS AND OVER.SOURCE: DEPARTMENT OF LABOR.THE DYNAMICS OF UNEMPLOYMENTAn essential feature <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> unemployment problem is its dynamiccharacter. The appropriate design <strong>of</strong> policies to reduce unemploymentdepends on whe<strong>the</strong>r most <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> unemployed are out <strong>of</strong> workfor a long time and must wait for an economic upturn to find jobs orwhe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong>y are a group whose membership changes rapidly, evenduring recessions.The principal source <strong>of</strong> information on <strong>the</strong> duration <strong>of</strong> unemploymentis <strong>the</strong> monthly Current Population Survey, which asks personswho report <strong>the</strong>mselves as unemployed to report how long <strong>the</strong>y havebeen unemployed. Chart 2-5 presents information on <strong>the</strong> duration <strong>of</strong>unemployment in 1978 and 1982. The clearest difference betweencyclical and structural unemployment emerges in <strong>the</strong> incidence <strong>of</strong>long-term unemployment. In 1982 <strong>the</strong> number <strong>of</strong> unemployed individualswho reported that <strong>the</strong>y had been out <strong>of</strong> work for 6 or moremonths was almost three times <strong>the</strong> corresponding number in 1978,when <strong>the</strong> economy was operating without significant cyclical unemployment.While <strong>the</strong> incidence <strong>of</strong> long-term unemployment increases sharplyduring recessions, it is important to recognize that many <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> un-35


Chart 2-5Distribution <strong>of</strong> Unemployment by Duration1978 1982NOTE.—DATA RELATE TO PERSONS 16 YEARS AND OVER.SOURCE: DEPARTMENT OF LABOR.employed find jobs or withdraw from <strong>the</strong> labor force relatively quickly.Of all <strong>the</strong> persons who became unemployed in September 1982,over 45 percent were no longer unemployed by October, and over65 percent were no longer unemployed by November. However, evidenceon <strong>the</strong> duration <strong>of</strong> unemployment is not purely indicative <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> ease or difficulty with which persons find jobs since almost half<strong>the</strong> unemployed leave <strong>the</strong> labor force without finding jobs.While most persons who become unemployed look for work onlybriefly, this group does not comprise a large part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> unemploymentproblem. It is long-term unemployment that is <strong>of</strong> special concern.A recent study found that in 1978, more than 40 percent <strong>of</strong>total unemployment was due to <strong>the</strong> 15 percent <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> unemployedpopulation who were out <strong>of</strong> work a total <strong>of</strong> 6 months or longerduring <strong>the</strong> year. This concentration <strong>of</strong> long-term unemploymentamong a relatively small group <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> unemployed is particularly pronouncedduring cyclical downturns. Data on this subject are not yetavailable for 1982. During 1975, however, when <strong>the</strong> unemploymentrate was 8.5 percent, an estimated 52 percent <strong>of</strong> unemployment wasdue to <strong>the</strong> 22 percent <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> unemployed population who were out <strong>of</strong>work more than 6 months.36


These findings suggest several conclusions. First, even during recessions,most persons who become unemployed ei<strong>the</strong>r find jobs orleave <strong>the</strong> labor force relatively quickly. Second, <strong>the</strong> unemploymentproblem is most serious for those who are unemployed for prolongedstretches. Third, <strong>the</strong> incidence <strong>of</strong> long-term unemployment isvery sensitive to cyclical conditions, which suggests that it will diminishas <strong>the</strong> economy recovers. Even after a recovery is well underway,however, a sizable fraction <strong>of</strong> total unemployment will involve protractedjoblessness. The needs <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> long-term unemployed deservespecial recognition in <strong>the</strong> designing <strong>of</strong> policies to attack structuralunemployment.COMBATING CYCLICAL UNEMPLOYMENTHigh rates <strong>of</strong> cyclical unemployment, which <strong>the</strong> American economyis now experiencing, are largely a consequence <strong>of</strong> fluctuations in aggregatedemand caused by macroeconomic policies and shocks to <strong>the</strong>economy. As described in Chapter 1, <strong>the</strong> historical experience <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>United States and o<strong>the</strong>r countries suggests that disinflation is generallyassociated with lost output and increased unemployment. Duringperiods <strong>of</strong> disinflation and recession, <strong>the</strong> measures available toreduce <strong>the</strong> pain <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> transition from accelerating inflation to pricestability are limited. Greater fiscal or monetary stimulus might increaseemployment, but only at <strong>the</strong> risk <strong>of</strong> igniting inflation. Chapter1 describes <strong>the</strong> principles that <strong>the</strong> Administration feels govern soundmacroeconomic policies.THE LIMITS OF MACROECONOMIC POLICYThe only way to reduce current high levels <strong>of</strong> cyclical unemploymentis for <strong>the</strong> United States to achieve a sound recovery from <strong>the</strong>recent recession. Avoiding future recurrences <strong>of</strong> high cyclical unemploymentrequires avoiding an expansion so rapid as to lead to rapidlyincreasing inflation. Historical experience suggests that <strong>the</strong> changein <strong>the</strong> rate <strong>of</strong> inflation depends both on <strong>the</strong> rate at which economicactivity is expanding and on <strong>the</strong> level <strong>of</strong> economic slack. If <strong>the</strong> slackin <strong>the</strong> economy declines too rapidly, or capacity utilization is held attoo high a level, inflation will tend to increase. The lower limit onunemployment below which inflation will tend to increase is referredto as <strong>the</strong> inflation threshold unemployment rate.While it is not easy to pinpoint <strong>the</strong> inflation threshold unemploymentrate precisely, it probably lies between 6 and 7 percent. Econometricstudies <strong>of</strong> historical data suggest that when unemployment isclose to 6 percent, <strong>the</strong> rate <strong>of</strong> inflation tends to accelerate. For example,during 1978 when <strong>the</strong> unemployment rate was 6.1 percent, infla-37


tion as measured by percentage changes in <strong>the</strong> gross national product(GNP) deflator rose to 7.4 percent from 5.8 percent in 1977. Aneven larger increase occurred in 1979 when <strong>the</strong> unemployment rateaveraged 5.8 percent.The Effect <strong>of</strong> Demographic FactorsThere are a number <strong>of</strong> reasons to believe that <strong>the</strong> inflation thresholdunemployment rate increased during <strong>the</strong> 1960s and 1970s. Manyeconomists believe that demographic factors may have contributed to<strong>the</strong> increase. Persons with little labor market experience tend to havehigh rates <strong>of</strong> unemployment as <strong>the</strong>y move from job to job in aneffort to obtain a desirable career position. In <strong>the</strong> last 15 years, <strong>the</strong>children <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> baby boom have reached maturity thus raising substantially<strong>the</strong> share <strong>of</strong> inexperienced workers in <strong>the</strong> labor force. Inaddition, women with little recent labor market experience have entered<strong>the</strong> labor force at an unprecedented rate during <strong>the</strong> last 15years. It has been estimated that if <strong>the</strong> labor force had <strong>the</strong> same demographiccomposition today as it had in 1958, <strong>the</strong> unemploymentrate would have been about three-quarters <strong>of</strong> a percentage pointlower in 1982. The share <strong>of</strong> young people in <strong>the</strong> labor force will declinesharply over <strong>the</strong> next decade due to a dramatic reduction in <strong>the</strong>birth rate throughout <strong>the</strong> late 1960s and <strong>the</strong> 1970s. This providesgrounds for cautious optimism that <strong>the</strong> inflation threshold unemploymentrate will decline.Social Insurance ProgramsO<strong>the</strong>r factors which have increased <strong>the</strong> inflation threshold unemploymentrate in recent years are less likely to be reversed in <strong>the</strong>next decade. These include <strong>the</strong> effects <strong>of</strong> social programs. While providingimportant financial support to <strong>the</strong>ir recipients, <strong>the</strong>se programsalso have both behavioral and reporting effects on <strong>the</strong> measured unemploymentrate.Behavioral effects <strong>of</strong> social insurance programs such as unemploymentinsurance include <strong>the</strong> encouragement <strong>of</strong> firms to lay <strong>of</strong>f workersand <strong>the</strong> inducement <strong>of</strong> persons to prolong <strong>the</strong>ir spells <strong>of</strong> unemployment.These effects are discussed in more detail below. <strong>Report</strong>ingeffects occur when programs induce persons to change reporting<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir labor force status, without changing <strong>the</strong>ir behavior. For example,some experts believe that <strong>the</strong> Federal Supplemental Benefitsprogram instituted during <strong>the</strong> 1975 recession caused persons whoo<strong>the</strong>rwise would have withdrawn from <strong>the</strong> labor force to report that<strong>the</strong>y were unemployed because <strong>of</strong> job search requirements. There issome evidence to suggest that <strong>the</strong> work registration requirements in<strong>the</strong> food stamp and AFDC programs have had a similar effect.38


Wage RigidityA number <strong>of</strong> studies show that wages and prices are much morerigid now than prior to World War II, and that rigidity has increasedwithin <strong>the</strong> post-War period. Increased wage rigidity is likely to raise<strong>the</strong> economy's inflation threshold level <strong>of</strong> unemployment, since lessflexible wages increase <strong>the</strong> inevitable unemployment associated with<strong>the</strong> sectoral shocks which buffet <strong>the</strong> economy.The reasons for this change are not well understood. A side effect<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> provision <strong>of</strong> a "safety net" program is that employees maybecome more resistant to wage reductions, leading to increases inwage and price rigidity. To <strong>the</strong> extent that <strong>the</strong> two-earner family is aform <strong>of</strong> private "safety net" against <strong>the</strong> financial losses <strong>of</strong> unemployment,<strong>the</strong> recent growth in <strong>the</strong> number <strong>of</strong> two-earner families mayalso have contributed to increasing wage rigidity in <strong>the</strong> United Statesover time.Increasing Structural ChangeA final factor that may have contributed to a rising inflation thresholdunemployment rate is <strong>the</strong> increasing rapidity <strong>of</strong> structural changein <strong>the</strong> economy. This acceleration, which is in part caused by <strong>the</strong>economy's increasing sensitivity to events in <strong>the</strong> world economy, isevidenced by increasing dispersion across industries and localities inrates <strong>of</strong> unemployment. Because transfers <strong>of</strong> human and physical resourcesare costly and take time, increased unemployment is a concomitant<strong>of</strong> structural change.While <strong>the</strong> separate impacts <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se factors—changing demographiccomposition, larger social insurance programs, increased wage rigidity,and increased structural change—are difficult to quantify, it isreasonable to conclude that toge<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong>y may have significantly increased<strong>the</strong> inflation threshold unemployment rate. Expansionary macroeconomicpolicies are unlikely to reverse <strong>the</strong> effects <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>sechanges.PUBLIC WORKS EMPLOYMENT PROGRAMSDirect provision <strong>of</strong> public works jobs by <strong>the</strong> government is a politicallypopular response to cyclical unemployment during recessions.Available evidence suggests, however, that public works programsadopted in past recessions proved counterproductive, and that <strong>the</strong> inherentcapability <strong>of</strong> public works programs to combat cyclical unemploymentis limited.The Timing <strong>of</strong> Public Works ExpendituresPublic employment programs that produce useful goods or servicesgenerally take time to plan and implement. Therefore, such programs<strong>of</strong>ten have <strong>the</strong>ir greatest effects on public employment long39


after an economic recovery has begun. For this reason, public employmentprograms have sometimes exacerbated ra<strong>the</strong>r than mitigatedcyclical fluctuations in aggregate demand. A study <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> AcceleratedPublic Works program enacted in September 1962 by <strong>the</strong> Congressto combat <strong>the</strong> high unemployment rate <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> early 1960sfound that <strong>the</strong> number <strong>of</strong> jobs created by <strong>the</strong> program peaked inJune 1964, 37 months after <strong>the</strong> bottom <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> recession. More recentexperience also confirms that lags in implementation are long. Arecent study by <strong>the</strong> Office <strong>of</strong> Management and Budget found that 90percent <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> outlays for local public works projects designed tostimulate recovery from <strong>the</strong> 1974-75 recession occurred more than2J6 years after <strong>the</strong> trough <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> recession. The lags in implementingpublic works programs result in <strong>the</strong>ir having destabilizing effects,since a large share <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> resulting spending occurs during periods <strong>of</strong>economic expansion.The Effect <strong>of</strong> Federal Funding <strong>of</strong> Public Works on State ExpendituresEven when spending for <strong>the</strong>se programs begins immediately after<strong>the</strong>y are enacted, many public works projects do not yield a net increasein employment. Because <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> long planning and implementationlags, most <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> projects available for immediate funding arethose that were planned before <strong>the</strong> recession began. Thus, Federalexpenditures on <strong>the</strong>se projects <strong>of</strong>ten substitute for outlays that wouldhave taken place anyway.A major effect <strong>of</strong> Federal public works expenditures may be toalter <strong>the</strong> timing <strong>of</strong> public works projects. The expectation <strong>of</strong> newpublic works programs may induce State and local governments todelay making outlays during <strong>the</strong> early stages <strong>of</strong> economic downturnsin <strong>the</strong> hope that <strong>the</strong>y will receive Federal funds for projects <strong>the</strong>y have"on <strong>the</strong> shelf/' The importance <strong>of</strong> this possibility is suggested by experienceswith <strong>the</strong> Local Public Works Capital Development and InvestmentAct <strong>of</strong> 1976 and <strong>the</strong> Public Works Employment Act <strong>of</strong>1977, programs intended to spur recovery from <strong>the</strong> 1975 recession.Three characteristics <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se programs may have created incentivesfor local governments to delay <strong>the</strong>ir own discretionary spending until<strong>the</strong>y could see whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> Federal Government would pay <strong>the</strong>irentire bill: (1) projects were financed fully by <strong>the</strong> Federal Government;(2) grants were limited to quick-starting projects; and (3) <strong>the</strong>rewas considerable uncertainty and lengthy delays in <strong>the</strong> process <strong>of</strong>awarding money to State and local governments. One study foundthat State and local public works expenditures fell substantially inmid-1976 and decreased fur<strong>the</strong>r between 1976 and 1977. It suggestedthat this may have occurred because States and local governmentsdelayed projects in anticipation <strong>of</strong> funds becoming available under<strong>the</strong> 1976 and 1977 public works programs. The study also suggested40


that <strong>the</strong>se measures may have caused <strong>the</strong> postponement <strong>of</strong> as muchas $22 billion in total government spending.Crowding Out <strong>of</strong> Private Sector EmploymentAno<strong>the</strong>r reason for discounting <strong>the</strong> efficacy <strong>of</strong> public works measuresis <strong>the</strong>ir adverse side effects on private employment. If publicworks outlays are financed by additional taxes, <strong>the</strong> income andspending <strong>of</strong> consumers are reduced, decreasing <strong>the</strong> number <strong>of</strong> jobsin <strong>the</strong> private economy. Alternatively, ins<strong>of</strong>ar as public works outlaysare financed by borrowing from <strong>the</strong> public, interest rates are raised,crowding out some forms <strong>of</strong> private spending and reducing privateemployment. The higher interest rates resulting from increased Federalborrowing also discourage capital investments that help createfuture employment.Benefits to WorkersAn additional reason to discount <strong>the</strong> efficacy <strong>of</strong> accelerated publicworks projects is <strong>the</strong>ir limited value to participants. Most jobs incountercyclical public works projects are <strong>of</strong> extremely short durationand are unlikely to provide participants with lasting job skills. Under<strong>the</strong> Public Works Impact Program, initiated in fiscal year 1972, <strong>the</strong>average duration <strong>of</strong> employment amounted to only 4.1 weeks. Almost60 percent <strong>of</strong> all employees worked 2 weeks or less. Data for <strong>the</strong>local public works programs initiated in 1976 and 1977 and describedabove, indicate that <strong>the</strong> average job lasted only 3.5 weeks.Although public works programs are motivated by a desire to providejobs for <strong>the</strong> unemployed, very few jobs are actually filled by unemployedworkers. Under <strong>the</strong> Public Works Impact Program, only 27percent <strong>of</strong> all jobs were filled by <strong>the</strong> previously unemployed. Under<strong>the</strong> more recent public works programs <strong>of</strong> 1976 and 1977, it hasbeen estimated that only 12 percent <strong>of</strong> all jobs were filled by previouslyunemployed workers.COMBATING STRUCTURAL UNEMPLOYMENTThe preceding analysis suggests that it would be imprudent to usemacroeconomic policies to reduce <strong>the</strong> unemployment rate below itsinflation threshold level <strong>of</strong> 6 to 7 percent. Such an effort would increaseinflation, and ultimately prove counterproductive as increasedinflation was followed by recession. This does not mean that unemploymentrates in <strong>the</strong> 6 to 7 percent range are ei<strong>the</strong>r inevitable ordesirable. The inflation threshold level <strong>of</strong> unemployment can be reducedby policies that consider <strong>the</strong> special problems <strong>of</strong> two groups <strong>of</strong>workers: (1) young people, and (2) adults experiencing long-term unemployment.It can also be reduced by reforms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> unemployment41


insurance system, which, while providing valuable insurance, may increase<strong>the</strong> incidence <strong>of</strong> unemployment.THE PROBLEM OF YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENTAt times <strong>of</strong> low cyclical unemployment, about half <strong>the</strong> unemployedare young people between <strong>the</strong> ages <strong>of</strong> 16 and 24. Close to one-fourth<strong>of</strong> all <strong>the</strong> unemployed are teenagers aged 16 to 19. While unemploymentclearly imposes hardships on youths, it has very different economicimpacts than it does for adults. Many unemployed youths arein school and looking for part-time work. Most <strong>of</strong> this group, andmany o<strong>the</strong>r young people who have left school, are not economicallyindependent, but ra<strong>the</strong>r live at home and rely on <strong>the</strong>ir parents forfinancial support. Many o<strong>the</strong>r young people experience only brief periods<strong>of</strong> unemployment as <strong>the</strong>y move from one job to <strong>the</strong> next.Table 2-2 provides information on <strong>the</strong> labor market activities <strong>of</strong>young men and women aged 16 to 19 in October 1981, when <strong>the</strong>teenage unemployment rate was 24.1 percent. Data for 1982 are notyet available. As <strong>the</strong> table reveals, only 5 percent <strong>of</strong> all teenagerswere out <strong>of</strong> school and measured as unemployed (because <strong>the</strong>y werelooking for work). A striking feature <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> youth labor market is <strong>the</strong>large fraction <strong>of</strong> young people who are out <strong>of</strong> school but are nei<strong>the</strong>rworking nor looking for work. Over 30 percent <strong>of</strong> female and 14 percent<strong>of</strong> male out-<strong>of</strong>-school teenagers were not in <strong>the</strong> labor force. Thefactors underlying this labor force withdrawal by young people arenot well understood. In some cases, young people may withdrawfrom <strong>the</strong> labor force because <strong>the</strong>y are discouraged about <strong>the</strong>ir prospectsfor finding suitable employment. In o<strong>the</strong>r cases, labor forcewithdrawal may reflect a desire for leisure.The observations about <strong>the</strong> dynamic character <strong>of</strong> unemploymentmade elsewhere in this chapter are especially true <strong>of</strong> young people.TABLE 2-2.—Educational and labor market activities <strong>of</strong> youth aged 16 to 19, by sex, October 1981ItemNumber(thousands)Percent <strong>of</strong>subgroupMalesPercent <strong>of</strong>populationNumber(thousands)Percent <strong>of</strong>subgroupFemalesPercent <strong>of</strong>populationTotal population8,036100.08,059100.0Enrolled in school..,5,683100.070.75,526100.068.6EmployedUnemployedNot in labor forceUnemployment rate (percent)..Not enrolled in schoolEmployedUnemployedNot in labor forceUnemployment rate (percent)..2,0244243,23517.32,3531,58543433421.535.67.556.9100.067.418.414.225.25.340.329.319.75.44.21,8294293,26819.02,5331,34041777623.733.17.859.1100.052.916.530.622.75.340.631.416.65.29.6Source: Department <strong>of</strong> Labor, Bureau <strong>of</strong> Labor Statistics.42


Most young people find jobs or leave <strong>the</strong> labor force fairly quickly. Itwas recently estimated that <strong>of</strong> those male teenagers who become unemployedin a given month only 42 percent remain unemployed in<strong>the</strong> next month.Youth unemployment is never<strong>the</strong>less a critical economic problem.A large part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> youth unemployment problem is traceable to <strong>the</strong>small group <strong>of</strong> teenagers who experience extensive unemployment.More than 52 percent <strong>of</strong> all unemployment experienced by teenagemales aged 16 to 19 in 1981 was due to <strong>the</strong> 4.4 percent <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> maleteenage population <strong>of</strong> this group who were out <strong>of</strong> work for morethan 6 months during that year.Evidence also suggests that certain teenagers who suffer extensiveunemployment earn lower wages later in life. The direction <strong>of</strong> causationis very difficult to establish since persons with low skills maysimply fare poorly both early and late in life. However, <strong>the</strong> best evidenceavailable suggests that poor labor market experiences early inlife cause reduced wages during adulthood. This suggests <strong>the</strong> importance<strong>of</strong> developing policies to improve employment opportunitiesfor <strong>the</strong> long-term unemployed and to reduce job turnover.Training, Unemployment, and <strong>the</strong> Minimum WageA major problem in <strong>the</strong> youth labor market is <strong>the</strong> dearth <strong>of</strong>*'career-oriented" employment opportunities. While people who participatein post-secondary schooling are generally subsidized by <strong>the</strong>public sector, public support <strong>of</strong> equivalent magnitude has not beenavailable for <strong>the</strong> post-high school training <strong>of</strong> youth who choose toenter <strong>the</strong> labor force after high school.Employers may find it very difficult to <strong>of</strong>fer such training because<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> constraints imposed by minimum wage legislation. These lawsdiscourage employers from hiring unskilled workers at very lowwages and compensating <strong>the</strong>m fur<strong>the</strong>r by providing training. Thismay help explain very high job turnover among youths as <strong>the</strong>y moverapidly in and out <strong>of</strong> "dead-end" jobs. Ano<strong>the</strong>r consequence <strong>of</strong> minimumwage laws is that <strong>the</strong>y prevent some young people from acquiring<strong>the</strong> training that would permit <strong>the</strong>m to find steady, well-payingemployment as adults. Statistical studies provide evidence that minimumwages significantly depress <strong>the</strong> accumulation <strong>of</strong> valuable skillsand .resulting growth in earnings among youths who are paid <strong>the</strong>minimum wage. There is also evidence that <strong>the</strong> negative effects <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> minimum wage on employment and training are concentrated43


disproportionately among youths with <strong>the</strong> fewest labor market skills.Thus, although <strong>the</strong> stated purpose <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> minimum wage is to reducepoverty, experience suggests that it may actually decrease <strong>the</strong> lifetimeearnings <strong>of</strong> some <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> poor and <strong>the</strong>reby increase income inequality.POLICIES TO REDUCE YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENTAlmost all observers agree that mitigating <strong>the</strong> problems <strong>of</strong> instabilityand high unemployment in <strong>the</strong> youth labor market requires increasing<strong>the</strong> availability <strong>of</strong> career-oriented employment and training.This can be accomplished through public support <strong>of</strong> training, minimumwage reforms, and employment tax credits.The Job Training Partnership ActThe Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) <strong>of</strong> 1982 represents amajor Federal initiative to reduce structural unemployment amongyouth and adults. The JTPA departs from previous Federal employmenttraining programs by establishing a formal partnership betweenprivate industry, <strong>the</strong> public sector, and vocational training institutionsfor <strong>the</strong> purposes <strong>of</strong> planning, designing, and providing federally financedtraining. Federal resources are targeted to individuals identifiedas most in need: economically disadvantaged youth, low-skilledand chronically unemployed adults, and skilled workers who have lostjobs in declining industries and regions. The problems faced by <strong>the</strong>latter group are discussed more fully later in this chapter.The JTPA is intended to fill an important niche in <strong>the</strong> national employmentand training system by serving individuals who are unableto make use <strong>of</strong> job training provided by more traditional institutions:high schools, vocational-technical schools, community colleges, universities,and employers. Federally funded training programs such asJTPA provide a second chance to youth and adults experiencingtrouble in <strong>the</strong> labor market. The JTPA is administered at <strong>the</strong> Stateand local level. This allows training programs to be tailored to <strong>the</strong>particular needs <strong>of</strong> workers and employers in local labor markets.Minimum Wage ReformsThe Administration will propose a summertime differential minimumwage for young people under <strong>the</strong> age <strong>of</strong> 22. Between May 1and September 30 <strong>of</strong> each year <strong>the</strong> minimum wage for this groupwould be reduced to $2.50 from $3.35. This measure would encouragefirms to hire young people, just out <strong>of</strong> school, and give <strong>the</strong>m <strong>the</strong>experience needed to compete effectively in <strong>the</strong> labor market. It willalso encourage employers to provide youth who remain in schoolwith valuable work experience during <strong>the</strong> summer months.The Targeted Jobs Tax CreditAn alternative policy avenue for encouraging employment andtraining <strong>of</strong> young people is to provide tax credits or wage subsidies44


to employers who hire youths. Tax credits are currently provided t<strong>of</strong>irms that employ economically disadvantaged youths, aged 18 to 24,under <strong>the</strong> Targeted Jobs Tax Credit program. The credits are alsotargeted to welfare recipients, and economically disadvantaged Vietnamveterans, cooperative education students, handicapped persons,and ex-convicts.The tax credit lasts for up to 2 full years. In <strong>the</strong> first year it isequal to 50 percent <strong>of</strong> an individual's earnings, up to a maximumcredit <strong>of</strong> $3,000. In <strong>the</strong> second year it is equal to 25 percent <strong>of</strong> earnings,up to a maximum credit <strong>of</strong> $1,500. Participation in <strong>the</strong> programhas been limited since its inception in 1979. This is an apparent consequence<strong>of</strong> administrative problems encountered by <strong>the</strong> agencies responsiblefor determining program eligibility (especially <strong>the</strong> Job Service),reluctance on <strong>the</strong> part <strong>of</strong> eligible recipients to use <strong>the</strong> tax creditas a self-marketing tool, and employers' reluctance to let governmentprograms influence hiring decisions.Recent legislation added a second component to <strong>the</strong> tax credit programby providing a tax credit for summer employment targeted ateconomically disadvantaged youths aged 16 and 17. The tax creditfor this group is quite large, equaling 85 percent <strong>of</strong> wages, up to atotal summer income <strong>of</strong> $3,000. The summer Targeted Jobs TaxCredit program, in effect, allows employers to hire eligible youths,who are paid <strong>the</strong> minimum wage for a net cost to <strong>the</strong> firms <strong>of</strong> 50cents an hour. The program will be in place for <strong>the</strong> first time during<strong>the</strong> summer <strong>of</strong> 1983.A virtue <strong>of</strong> measures which subsidize employment and on-<strong>the</strong>-jobtraining for youth is that <strong>the</strong>y counteract <strong>the</strong> large bias toward formalschooling over on-<strong>the</strong>-job training inherent in current policies. Inpart because <strong>of</strong> large public subsidies to higher education during <strong>the</strong>last two decades, <strong>the</strong> percentage <strong>of</strong> young people, aged 18 to 24, enrolledin higher education rose very sharply from 26 percent in 1963to 41 percent in 1975. This shift toward increased formal schoolingwas accompanied by a decline in <strong>the</strong> relative wages <strong>of</strong> college graduatesand high school graduates. The ratio <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> average annual incomes<strong>of</strong> college graduates to that <strong>of</strong> high school graduates, aged 25and over, fell from 1.53 in 1968 to 1.38 in 1978.LONG-TERM UNEMPLOYMENT AND STRUCTURAL CHANGEAn especially visible and serious component <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> unemploymentproblem is composed <strong>of</strong> adults suffering protracted unemployment.At present, most long-term unemployment is a consequence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>recession and <strong>the</strong> resulting reduction in <strong>the</strong> demand for labor. But asdiscussed earlier in <strong>the</strong> chapter, long-term unemployment will remaina significant problem even after <strong>the</strong> economy recovers.45


Structural Change and <strong>Economic</strong> AdjustmentA large part <strong>of</strong> long-term unemployment among adults can betraced to structural changes in <strong>the</strong> economy. An increasingly importantsource <strong>of</strong> structural change is <strong>the</strong> growing interdependence <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> U.S. economy with that <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> rest <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> world. The share <strong>of</strong>export and import-competing industries in GNP has increased over<strong>the</strong> last several decades, and many industries have consequently felt<strong>the</strong> cold winds <strong>of</strong> economic change. By December 1982 <strong>the</strong> unemploymentrate had reached 23.2 percent in <strong>the</strong> motor vehicle industryand 29.2 percent in <strong>the</strong> primary metals industry. O<strong>the</strong>r industries, includingmining, construction, and lumber, have also contracted rapidly,leaving behind a significant number <strong>of</strong> long-term unemployed.These figures reflect both changes resulting from foreign competitionand <strong>the</strong> sharp declines in <strong>the</strong> demand for manufactured goodscaused by <strong>the</strong> recent recession. The gradual decline <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> dollar inforeign exchange markets to historically prevailing levels, a drop inreal interest rates, and general economic recovery would contributeto easing <strong>the</strong> problems <strong>of</strong> troubled industries, as explained in Chapter3. However, most observers believe that foreign competition willpresent persistent problems in some domestic industries even in <strong>the</strong>long run.In a number <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se industries, significant adjustments will needto take place. If foreign firms can continue to produce goods at lowercosts than U.S. firms, ei<strong>the</strong>r domestic production will contract, forcingworkers to leave <strong>the</strong> affected industries, or workers will have toaccept constant or even declining real wages. The former option isparticularly painful in industries like automobiles and steel, whereworkers have become accustomed to high standards <strong>of</strong> living. Becausewages in <strong>the</strong>se industries are substantially greater than wagesin o<strong>the</strong>r manufacturing industries, workers find it difficult to locatesuitable alternative jobs.Programs which inhibit <strong>the</strong> transition <strong>of</strong> workers from declining industriesto growing industries would raise <strong>the</strong> level <strong>of</strong> structural unemploymentin <strong>the</strong> economy. Included in this group are programswhich would provide financial assistance to industries without providingincentives for employee relocation or wage and price flexibility.In a dynamic economy subject to <strong>the</strong> pressures <strong>of</strong> domestic and foreigncompetition, our economic health depends critically on <strong>the</strong> ability<strong>of</strong> workers and firms to respond quickly to changing economicconditions.Policies to Alleviate Long-term UnemploymentThe centerpiece <strong>of</strong> Federal policy to alleviate long-term unemploymentis Title III <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> new Job Training Partnership Act discussedearlier in <strong>the</strong> chapter. Title III established State-administered programs<strong>of</strong> employment and training assistance for dislocated workers,46


defined broadly to include individuals who have become unemployedas a result <strong>of</strong> plant closures, laid-<strong>of</strong>f workers who are unlikely toreturn to <strong>the</strong>ir previous industry or occupation, and individuals experiencinglong-term unemployment in occupations with limited employmentopportunities. Matching grants are provided to States on<strong>the</strong> basis <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir unemployment conditions. Title III authorizesStates to establish a wide variety <strong>of</strong> employment and training activities,including job search assistance, job training, relocation assistance,and employment counseling. Individuals receiving Title III assistancemay also receive unemployment compensation, if <strong>the</strong>y areeligible.The Administration in its 1984 budget has introduced two new approachesto <strong>the</strong> problem <strong>of</strong> reducing long-term unemployment. First,it has proposed that Federal unemployment laws be amended topermit States to use a portion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> unemployment insurance taxes<strong>the</strong>y collect to support retraining and job search assistance for <strong>the</strong>irunemployed workers. Second, <strong>the</strong> Administration has proposed that<strong>the</strong> Federal Supplemental Compensation program be replaced whenit expires with a new temporary program that provides incentives forwork as well as compensation for long-term unemployment. As an alternativeto added weeks <strong>of</strong> unemployment compensation, this programwould give recipients <strong>the</strong> option <strong>of</strong> receiving assistance in securingwork through a system <strong>of</strong> tax credits to employers. This willgive employers a significant incentive to hire <strong>the</strong> long-term unemployed.THE EFFECTS OF UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATIONFor more than 40 years, unemployment compensation has givenvaluable support to millions <strong>of</strong> unemployed workers and has providedan important source <strong>of</strong> security to millions more who are employed.Along with <strong>the</strong>se beneficial consequences, however, <strong>the</strong> presentstructure <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> unemployment insurance system has altered <strong>the</strong>incentives faced by employers in hiring and firing decisions and <strong>the</strong>incentives <strong>of</strong> unemployed workers to accept new employment opportunities.As a result, unemployment compensation seems to have increased<strong>the</strong> incidence and duration <strong>of</strong> unemployment.The current system <strong>of</strong> unemployment compensation produces twodistinct but related adverse incentive effects. First, for those who areunemployed it reduces <strong>the</strong> cost <strong>of</strong> unemployment, providing an incentivefor longer durations <strong>of</strong> unemployment. Second, currentmethods <strong>of</strong> financing unemployment insurance increase <strong>the</strong> incidence<strong>of</strong> unemployment by increasing <strong>the</strong> size <strong>of</strong> seasonal and cyclical flucuationsin unemployment and by making temporary jobs morecommon.47


Incentives to Prolong UnemploymentPayments to <strong>the</strong> unemployed clearly raise <strong>the</strong> level <strong>of</strong> householdexpenditures that can be maintained when one or more family membersare not working. Such payments reduce <strong>the</strong> economic pressureto find work immediately, encouraging a longer period <strong>of</strong> job searchduring which <strong>the</strong> unemployed worker hopes to find a more attractivejob than might o<strong>the</strong>rwise be found. For some workers unemploymentinsurance replaces more than 70 percent <strong>of</strong> after-tax wages duringperiods <strong>of</strong> unemployment. <strong>Economic</strong> research indicates that <strong>the</strong>re isa positive relationship between duration <strong>of</strong> job search and <strong>the</strong> level<strong>of</strong> unemployment benefits.Workers who take longer to find jobs because <strong>of</strong> unemploymentcompensation are in no sense "loafing" or "cheating." An unemployedperson who does not expect to be recalled by his previousemployer can expect, on average, to find a better job <strong>the</strong> longer andmore carefully he looks. Unemployment insurance, by reducing <strong>the</strong>cost <strong>of</strong> additional weeks without work, encourages unemployed workersto continue searching for better employment opportunities.Incentives for More Unstable EmploymentA second avenue through which <strong>the</strong> unemployment insurancesystem, as currently financed, tends to increase <strong>the</strong> economy's rate <strong>of</strong>structural unemployment is by increasing seasonal and cyclical fluctuationsin <strong>the</strong> demand for labor and <strong>the</strong> relative number <strong>of</strong> shortlived,casual jobs.The effect <strong>of</strong> unemployment compensation is to <strong>of</strong>fset <strong>the</strong> marketforces that would o<strong>the</strong>rwise decrease, at least somewhat, <strong>the</strong> amount<strong>of</strong> unstable employment in <strong>the</strong> economy. Ins<strong>of</strong>ar as unemploymentcompensation provides a subsidy to unstable employment practices,it reduces <strong>the</strong> wage differential required to attract workers to seasonal,cyclical, and temporary jobs. And because employers pay a relativelysmall premium for unstable employment practices under currentmethods <strong>of</strong> financing unemployment insurance, <strong>the</strong>y have littleincentive to reduce this instability.The current subsidy to unstable employment patterns would be reducedif unemployment insurance were financed through a morecompletely experience-rated employer tax that more accurately reflected<strong>the</strong> expected level <strong>of</strong> unemployment benefits to a firm's laid<strong>of</strong>fworkers in <strong>the</strong> future. The <strong>the</strong>ory <strong>of</strong> experience rating is clear: ifan employer pays <strong>the</strong> full cost <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> unemployment benefits that hisformer employees receive, he will not have an incentive to make excessiveuse <strong>of</strong> unstable employment practices. Recent statistical researchdemonstrates that <strong>the</strong>re is, in fact, a strong positive relation-48


ship between incomplete experience rating and employment instability.Most States use experience rating to some extent, in that some employerscontribute to <strong>the</strong> State unemployment compensation fundpartially on <strong>the</strong> basis <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> unemployment experience <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir ownemployees. The degree <strong>of</strong> experience rating is highly imperfect,however, for two reasons.First, a significant share <strong>of</strong> benefits paid are not directly charged t<strong>of</strong>irms, but ra<strong>the</strong>r, are spread across all <strong>the</strong> firms in a State. These includebenefits paid to job leavers, benefits to employees <strong>of</strong> firms nolonger doing business in a State, and allowances for dependents. Extendedbenefits, which are available in high unemployment States toworkers who have exhausted <strong>the</strong>ir regular unemployment insurance,are also not directly charged to employers.Second, employer contributions are limited by minimum and maximumtax rates. Firms stuck at <strong>the</strong> maximum or minimum tax rateswill find that <strong>the</strong>ir tax rates do not change even if <strong>the</strong> unemploymentexperience <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir workers is altered. As a consequence <strong>the</strong>y face reducedeconomic incentives to smooth employment fluctuations.One measure <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> extent <strong>of</strong> experience rating is <strong>the</strong> proportion<strong>of</strong> benefits received that are not effectively charged to <strong>the</strong>former employer. A value <strong>of</strong> 100 percent represents perfect experiencerating. A recent study <strong>of</strong> nine States over <strong>the</strong> period 1971-1978found that on average, less than 60 percent <strong>of</strong> total benefits were experiencerated, by this definition. The degee <strong>of</strong> experience rating fellto 47.5 percent during <strong>the</strong> 1975 recession and reached a high <strong>of</strong> 62.6percent in 1978, a year with relatively low unemployment.The problem <strong>of</strong> imperfect experience rating has been partially remediedby a provision <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Tax Equity and Fiscal ResponsibilityAct <strong>of</strong> 1982 which raised <strong>the</strong> federally proscribed lower bound onState maximum unemployment insurance tax rates from 2.7 percentto 5.4 percent <strong>of</strong> employers' taxable payroll. Because <strong>of</strong> this change,fewer firms are likely to face <strong>the</strong> maximum tax rate.CONCLUSIONSThe dual problems <strong>of</strong> cyclical and structural unemployment areboth extremely serious. Increased unemployment during cyclicaldownturns, and <strong>the</strong> high levels <strong>of</strong> unemployment that prevail evenafter <strong>the</strong> economy recovers, impose large costs on <strong>the</strong> unemployedand <strong>the</strong> economy as a whole. Fortunately, both can be ameliorated byprudent public policy. Sound macroeconomic policies will avoid recurrences<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> rising inflation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1970s and subsequent in-49


creases in cyclical unemployment. Policies directed at young peopleand <strong>the</strong> long-term unemployed, and reform <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> unemployment insurancesystem, can significantly reduce <strong>the</strong> level <strong>of</strong> structural unemployment.50


CHAPTER 3The United States in <strong>the</strong> WorldEconomy: Strains on <strong>the</strong> SystemDURING THE 1970s <strong>the</strong> world's market economies became moreintegrated with each o<strong>the</strong>r than ever before. Exports and imports asa share <strong>of</strong> gross national product (GNP) reached record levels formost industrial countries, while international lending and direct foreigninvestment grew even faster than world trade. This closer linkage<strong>of</strong> economies was mutually beneficial. It allowed producers ineach country to take greater advantage <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir country's special resourcesand knowledge, and to take advantage <strong>of</strong> economies <strong>of</strong> scale.At <strong>the</strong> same time, it allowed each country to consume a wider variety<strong>of</strong> products, at lower costs, than it could produce itself.Underlying <strong>the</strong> growth in world trade and investment was a progressivereduction <strong>of</strong> barriers to trade. The postwar period wasmarked by a series <strong>of</strong> agreements to liberalize trade: both multilateral,like <strong>the</strong> Kennedy Round, and bilateral, like <strong>the</strong> Canada-U.S. autopact.In spite <strong>of</strong> its huge benefits, however, this liberalized tradingsystem is now in serious danger. Within <strong>the</strong> United States, demandsfor protection against imports and for export subsidies have grownas a combination <strong>of</strong> structural changes, sectoral problems, and shortrunmacroeconomic developments has led to a perception that weare becoming uncompetitive in world markets. In Europe, a growingstructural unemployment problem, aggravated by <strong>the</strong> recession, hasincreased protectionist pressures. In <strong>the</strong> developing countries a financialcrisis threatens <strong>the</strong> integration <strong>of</strong> capital markets and is pushingmany countries back toward <strong>the</strong> exchange controls and import restrictions<strong>the</strong>y had begun to dismantle.These problems must not be allowed to disrupt world trade. If <strong>the</strong>system comes apart—if <strong>the</strong> world's nations allow <strong>the</strong>mselves to becaught up in a spiral <strong>of</strong> retaliatory trade restrictions—a long timemay pass before <strong>the</strong> pieces are put back toge<strong>the</strong>r.This chapter reviews <strong>the</strong> strains on <strong>the</strong> international economicsystem and <strong>the</strong> policies by which <strong>the</strong> United States is attempting toovercome <strong>the</strong>m. It is divided into four sections. The first section discusseslong-term changes in U.S. competitiveness. The correction <strong>of</strong>51


widespread misconceptions about <strong>the</strong> competitive position <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>United States is essential if we are to get through <strong>the</strong> difficult periodahead without making major policy mistakes. The second section <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> chapter is devoted to financial developments and <strong>the</strong>ir effects ontrade, especially <strong>the</strong> appreciation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> dollar and its likely effects on<strong>the</strong> U.S. trade balance. Two final sections examine macroeconomicand financial problems in Europe and <strong>the</strong> developing countries.LONG-RUN TRENDS IN U.S. COMPETITIVENESS:PERCEPTIONS AND REALITIESConcern over <strong>the</strong> international competitiveness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> UnitedStates is as high as it has ever been. It is argued with increasing frequencythat U.S. business has steadily lost ground in <strong>the</strong> internationalmarketplace. This alleged poor performance is <strong>of</strong>ten attributedboth to failures <strong>of</strong> management in <strong>the</strong> United States and to <strong>the</strong> supportgiven to foreign businesses by <strong>the</strong>ir home governments. Feeding<strong>the</strong> perception <strong>of</strong> declining competitiveness is <strong>the</strong> persistent U.S.deficit in merchandise trade, especially <strong>the</strong> imbalance in trade withJapan.Changes in U.S. trade performance must, however, be put into <strong>the</strong>context <strong>of</strong> changes in <strong>the</strong> U.S. role in <strong>the</strong> world economy. This widerapproach reveals that much <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> concern about long-run competitivenessis based on misperceptions. Although <strong>the</strong> recent appreciation<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> dollar has created a temporary loss <strong>of</strong> competitiveness,<strong>the</strong> United States has not experienced a persistent loss <strong>of</strong> ability tosell its products on international markets; in fact, in <strong>the</strong> 1970s <strong>the</strong>United States held its own in terms <strong>of</strong> output, exports, and employment.Changes in <strong>the</strong> relationship <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States to <strong>the</strong> worldeconomy, however, have made <strong>the</strong> United States look less competitiveby some traditional measures.AGGREGATE PERFORMANCE OF THE UNITED STATES AND OTHERDEVELOPED COUNTRIESDiscussion <strong>of</strong> U.S. competitiveness <strong>of</strong>ten gives <strong>the</strong> misleading impressionthat <strong>the</strong> United States has consistently performed poorly relativeto o<strong>the</strong>r industrial countries. The U.S. share <strong>of</strong> world trade andworld GNP did in fact decline throughout <strong>the</strong> 1950s and 1960s, reflecting<strong>the</strong> recovery <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> rest <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> world from World War II, toge<strong>the</strong>rwith <strong>the</strong> narrowing <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> huge and unsustainable U.S. technologicallead. In <strong>the</strong> 1970s, however, this long decline leveled <strong>of</strong>f.• From 1973 to 1980, real gross domestic product (GDP) in <strong>the</strong>United States grew at an annual rate <strong>of</strong> 2.3 percent, compared52


with 2.6 percent in <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r Organization for <strong>Economic</strong> Cooperationand Development (OECD) countries.• From 1973 to 1980 <strong>the</strong> U.S. share <strong>of</strong> OECD exports remainednearly constant, declining from 17.6 to 17.2 percent.• Over <strong>the</strong> same period, employment in <strong>the</strong> United States grew at2.1 percent a year, compared with only 0.5 percent in <strong>the</strong> rest <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> OECD countries.The United States, in part as a side effect <strong>of</strong> its relatively rapidgrowth in employment, did do poorly by comparison in one respect,productivity growth. Output per worker grew at only 0.2 percent in<strong>the</strong> United States, compared with 2.2 percent a year in <strong>the</strong> rest <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>OECD countries. Productivity is, <strong>of</strong> course, crucial to living standards;ultimately, <strong>the</strong> level <strong>of</strong> consumption per capita depends on <strong>the</strong>level <strong>of</strong> output per worker. But <strong>the</strong>re is no necessary relation betweenproductivity and competition in international markets. Slowgrowth in productivity only hampers a country's international competitivenessif it is not <strong>of</strong>fset by correspondingly slow growth in realwages. If U.S. workers, for example, were to receive real wage increasesequal to those granted in o<strong>the</strong>r countries while <strong>the</strong>ir productivityfailed to increase at a comparable rate, U.S. industry would finditself increasingly uncompetitive. The fact is, however, that this didnot occur, as <strong>the</strong> comparative experience <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States and<strong>the</strong> European <strong>Economic</strong> Community illustrates. From 1973 to 1980output per manufacturing worker in <strong>the</strong> European <strong>Economic</strong> Communityrose at an annual rate <strong>of</strong> 2.7 percent, but real compensationrose at an annual rate <strong>of</strong> 4.1 percent. By contrast, output per workerin <strong>the</strong> United States rose 1.1 percent annually, while real compensationrose only 1.8 percent annually. In fact, until <strong>the</strong> recent rise in<strong>the</strong> dollar's exchange rate, it was workers in <strong>the</strong> European <strong>Economic</strong>Community, ra<strong>the</strong>r than those in <strong>the</strong> United States, who were probablypricing <strong>the</strong>mselves out <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> world market in spite <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir relativelygood productivity performance.The overall performance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States, <strong>the</strong>n, does not suggesta long-term problem <strong>of</strong> competitiveness. The shift from persistenttrade surplus to persistent deficit which occurred over <strong>the</strong> lastdecade is, however, <strong>of</strong>ten misinterpreted as a sign <strong>of</strong> an inability tocompete. In fact, changes in <strong>the</strong> structure <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> U.S. balance <strong>of</strong> paymentsare more <strong>the</strong> result <strong>of</strong> changes in <strong>the</strong> U.S. saving and investmentposition than <strong>of</strong> slow productivity growth.THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF THE U.S. BALANCE OF PAYMENTSIn <strong>the</strong> 1950s and early 1960s <strong>the</strong> United States normally had atrade surplus and invested heavily in o<strong>the</strong>r countries. In <strong>the</strong> yearsafter 1973, however, <strong>the</strong> United States normally had a trade deficit,53


and annual investment by foreigners in <strong>the</strong> United States began toapproach annual U.S. investment abroad. The shift in <strong>the</strong> U.S. tradebalance was closely connected with <strong>the</strong> shift in investment flows.Taken as a whole, U.S. international transactions always balance.Any force tending to increase or decrease <strong>the</strong> balance in one category<strong>of</strong> transactions sets in motion a process leading to exactly <strong>of</strong>fsettingchanges in balances in o<strong>the</strong>r categories. For example, an increasein foreign demand for U.S. exports tends directly to improve<strong>the</strong> trade balance, but this improvement leads to a rise in <strong>the</strong> dollar'sexchange rate against foreign currencies. The exchange-rate appreciationin turn leads to increases in imports, a worsened balance onservices, and so on. Similarly, an increased desire by foreign residentsto invest in <strong>the</strong> United States is reflected in an increase in <strong>the</strong>capital account but leads to an appreciation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> dollar and an <strong>of</strong>fsettingdecline in o<strong>the</strong>r parts <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> balance <strong>of</strong> payments.The shift in <strong>the</strong> U.S. trade balance from persistent surplus topersistent deficit was largely an <strong>of</strong>fset to changes in <strong>the</strong> U.S. capitalaccount. In <strong>the</strong> 1950s and <strong>the</strong> first half <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1960s, rates <strong>of</strong> returnon capital were lower and wage rates were higher in <strong>the</strong> UnitedStates than in o<strong>the</strong>r industrial countries. Since <strong>the</strong> United States sufferedno war damage, its capital stock was intact, and <strong>the</strong> diffusion <strong>of</strong>U.S. technology abroad created a demand for new capital investmentin <strong>the</strong> recipient countries. The result was that returns to investmentwere higher abroad than in <strong>the</strong> United States, and <strong>the</strong> United Stateswas a heavy net foreign investor. The counterpart to this foreign investmentwas a persistent surplus on current transactions, includingmerchandise trade.By <strong>the</strong> 1970s <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r industrial countries had narrowed or eliminated<strong>the</strong>se differences in capital and labor costs. The result was that<strong>the</strong> demand for new capital abroad was no longer a great deal largerthan it was in <strong>the</strong> United States. At <strong>the</strong> same time, <strong>the</strong> supply <strong>of</strong> savingsin <strong>the</strong> United States was restricted by a low national saving rate(<strong>the</strong> lowest among <strong>the</strong> major industrial countries). Thus <strong>the</strong> UnitedStates ceased to be a major net exporter <strong>of</strong> capital, and <strong>the</strong> currentaccount <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> balance <strong>of</strong> payments moved from surplus to roughbalance. Meanwhile, <strong>the</strong> U.S. balance on items o<strong>the</strong>r than merchandisetrade improved: <strong>the</strong> deficit in military transactions fell, <strong>the</strong> surplusin services rose, and, in particular, <strong>the</strong> accumulation <strong>of</strong> past foreigninvestments began to yield increasing income. This meant that abalanced current account was associated with a deficit in merchandisetrade.Table 3-1 and Chart 3-1 show how <strong>the</strong> structure <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> U.S. currentaccount has changed, measuring its components as percentages<strong>of</strong>GNP.54


TABLE 3-1 .—Structure <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> U.S. balance <strong>of</strong> payments, as percent <strong>of</strong> GNP, 1960-80Type <strong>of</strong> balancePercent <strong>of</strong> GNP1960-661974-80Change,percentagepointsMerchandise trade0.86-0.80-1.66Investment income.741.06.32Military transactions.41-.03.38Travel and services.04.12.16Remittances-.44-.30.15Current account.70.06-.64Source: Department <strong>of</strong> Commerce, Bureau <strong>of</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> Analysis.Chart 3-1Structural Changes in <strong>the</strong> Current Account BalancePERCENT OF GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT1.51.0INVESTMENTINCOME.5-.5-1.0-1.51962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982NOTE.—DATA ARE 16-QUARTER WEIGHTED CENTERED MOVING AVERAGES.SOURCE: DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE.55


THE ISSUE OF U.S. TRADE WITH JAPANThe perception <strong>of</strong> diminished U.S. competitiveness stems not onlyfrom <strong>the</strong> U.S. trade deficit but from an impression that U.S. tradeperformance compares poorly with that <strong>of</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r countries, especiallythat <strong>of</strong> Japan. Japan runs a huge surplus in its manufactures trade,while <strong>the</strong> United States runs only a small one, and Japan also has alarge surplus in its bilateral trade with <strong>the</strong> United States. These factsare <strong>of</strong>ten attributed to Japanese trade restrictions. Japan does maintainrestrictions which seriously hurt U.S. businesses. Trade restrictions,however, do not in <strong>the</strong> long run improve <strong>the</strong> Japanese tradebalance; as discussed more fully below, <strong>the</strong>y lead to <strong>of</strong>fsetting increasesin o<strong>the</strong>r imports or declines in exports. The main explanation<strong>of</strong> Japan's surplus in manufactures trade and in trade with <strong>the</strong> UnitedStates is that Japan, with few natural resources, incurs huge deficitsin its trade in primary products, especially oil, and with primary producers,especially <strong>the</strong> Organization <strong>of</strong> Petroleum Exporting Countries(OPEC). The surpluses in <strong>the</strong> rest <strong>of</strong> Japan's trade <strong>of</strong>fset <strong>the</strong>se deficits.Table 3-2 and Chart 3-2 show <strong>the</strong> differences in <strong>the</strong> structure <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> Japanese, European, and U.S. trade accounts. They show clearlyhow <strong>the</strong> huge Japanese surplus in manufactures <strong>of</strong>fsets large deficitsin primary products.Corresponding to <strong>the</strong> Japanese sectoral deficit in primary products,especially oil, is a regional deficit with OPEC. Japan makes up for itsdeficit with OPEC by running surpluses in its trade with o<strong>the</strong>r regions.The extent <strong>of</strong> this regional imbalance—and its contrast with<strong>the</strong> U.S. position—is shown in Table 3-3. The point here is similarto that already made with respect to <strong>the</strong> overall U.S. trade balance:looking at Japanese-U.S. trade in isolation is misleading. The Japanesesurplus in trade with <strong>the</strong> United States is largely a response to<strong>the</strong> rise <strong>of</strong> OPEC.Although Japanese trade policy does not play a central role incausing <strong>the</strong> bilateral trade imbalance with <strong>the</strong> United States, Japaneseimport restrictions remain a major source <strong>of</strong> friction. Japan maintainsa variety <strong>of</strong> nontariff barriers against imports. These include importquotas for a number <strong>of</strong> agricultural products and "red tape" barriersagainst manufactured goods, such as stringent inspection requirementsapplied against imported goods but not against Japanese products.These trade restrictions probably do not lead to a larger overallJapanese trade surplus. If <strong>the</strong>y were removed, <strong>the</strong> yen would depreciateand increased Japanese imports in <strong>the</strong> currently protected sectorswould be <strong>of</strong>fset by reduced deficits or increased surpluses elsewhere.Japanese trade restrictions do, however, distort <strong>the</strong> composition <strong>of</strong>U.S. trade with Japan, imposing serious costs on some U.S. produc-56


TABLE 3-2.—Trade balances by commodity group as percent <strong>of</strong> GDP, United States, Japan, and <strong>the</strong>European <strong>Economic</strong> Community, 1980[Percent <strong>of</strong> GDP]Commodity groupUnitedStatesJapanEuropean<strong>Economic</strong>CommunityTotal..-1.45-0.99-2.23Primary products-1.93-10.11-5.41Food, beverages, and tobacco.40-1.26-.41Crude materials excluding petroleum...54-2.15-1.23Mineral fuels-2.87-6.71-3.77Manufactures.489.123.18Machinery and transport equipment....-.423.09.88O<strong>the</strong>r manufactured goods.906.022.30Source: Organization for <strong>Economic</strong> Cooperation and Development.Chart 3-2Composition <strong>of</strong> Trade, 1980PERCENT OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT10| | TOTALPRIMARYGOODSMANUFACTURESi—IHV.'.•'•'v> . ".:-5-10UNITED STATES EUROPEAN JAPANECONOMIC COMMUNITYSOURCE: ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT.57


ers. As <strong>the</strong> fastest growing and second largest market economy,Japan has a responsibility to help sustain <strong>the</strong> open trading system. Amajor trade liberalization by Japan would do much to relieve <strong>the</strong> politicalstrains on that system, while <strong>the</strong> failure <strong>of</strong> Japan to make morethan token concessions would intensify <strong>the</strong>m.TABLE 3-3.—Trade balances by region as percent <strong>of</strong> GDP, United States and Japan, 1980[Percent <strong>of</strong> GDP]Industrial countriesOil-exporting countries..Non-oil developing countries..,Source: International Monetary Fund.UnitedStates0.23= 1.45.52Japan1.92-3.201.46THE PROBLEM OF UNCOMPETITIVE SECTORSAnalysis <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> overall U.S. trade deficit and <strong>the</strong> bilateral deficitwith Japan suggests that worries about U.S. competitiveness arebased in part on a misunderstanding <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> situation. There is noquestion, however, that increased foreign competition has forcedsome sectors <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> U.S. economy to contract.This is partly a consequence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> fact that trade has becomemore important to <strong>the</strong> U.S. economy. Specialization by nations is <strong>the</strong>reason for international trade. If <strong>the</strong> United States is to expand itstrade, <strong>the</strong> U.S. economy must become more specialized. This meansthat some sectors will grow and o<strong>the</strong>rs will shrink. During <strong>the</strong> 1970s<strong>the</strong> United States developed increasing surpluses in areas in which italready enjoyed a comparative advantage and developed increasingdeficits in sectors in which it was at a disadvantage. Some illustrativenumbers are given in Table 3-4.TABLE 3-4.—U.S. trade balances by sector as percent <strong>of</strong> GDP, 1972-79[Percent <strong>of</strong> GDP]Item 1972 1979U.S. comparative advantage:Research-intensive manufactures.,Resource-intensive products, o<strong>the</strong>r than fuels..Invisibles (services and investment income)....U.S. comparative disadvantage:Nonresearch-intensive manufactures..Fuels0.93.06.40-1.27-.271.63.671.44-1.44=2.41Sources: International Monetary Fund, National Science Board, and Organization for <strong>Economic</strong> Cooperation and Development.Specialization <strong>of</strong> this kind is desirable both for <strong>the</strong> United Statesand for its trading partners. Specialization and trade raise <strong>the</strong> efficiency<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> world economy as a whole by allowing each country to58


concentrate on doing what it does relatively well, and by allowing increasedeconomies <strong>of</strong> scale. But greater specialization can leave thoseinvolved in <strong>the</strong> contracting sectors worse <strong>of</strong>f, at least temporarily. Attemptsto prevent adjustment through trade barriers or subsidies,however, impose severe costs on unprotected sectors.Some sectoral reallocation <strong>of</strong> resources, <strong>the</strong>n, is a normal consequence<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> increasing U.S. integration into <strong>the</strong> world economy.This is not <strong>the</strong> whole story, however. Some sectors <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> U.S. economyare confronted by a problem that is not simply <strong>the</strong> result <strong>of</strong>market forces. Broadly speaking, <strong>the</strong>se sectors fall into two groups.In one group are sectors where firms or <strong>the</strong>ir workers, accustomed tohaving substantial market power, now find that <strong>the</strong>y have priced<strong>the</strong>mselves out <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> world market. In <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r group are sectorswhich are hurt by foreign protectionism or export subsidies.Market Power and CompetitivenessThe "problem" <strong>of</strong> diminished market power in some sectors actuallyderives from a desirable aspect <strong>of</strong> trade: <strong>the</strong> fact that trade increasescompetition. One <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> major benefits <strong>of</strong> an increasinglyopen U.S. economy is that it reduces <strong>the</strong> problems <strong>of</strong> monopoly andmarket power, thus increasing efficiency and helping consumers. But<strong>the</strong> transition to more competitive markets can prove painful. Whenan industry accustomed to having domestic market power encountersinternational competition, it must accept a reduction in <strong>the</strong> premiumin prices and wages it previously commanded over o<strong>the</strong>r sectors <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> economy. Both firms and workers may be reluctant to accept thisimplication <strong>of</strong> increased competition, and idle capacity and unemploymentmay result. Prices and wages in some U.S. heavy industriesare probably too high to be sustainable in an integrated world economy.Policies <strong>of</strong> Foreign GovernmentsA different problem is posed when foreign governments engage inprotective or export promotion measures that harm U.S. producers.U.S. trade negotiators have emphasized four particular areas <strong>of</strong> concern:1. Agriculture: Japan and <strong>the</strong> European <strong>Economic</strong> Community havehigh protective barriers against U.S. agricultural products. Fur<strong>the</strong>r,<strong>the</strong> European <strong>Economic</strong> Community now engages in massive subsidizedexport <strong>of</strong> agricultural products to dispose <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> surpluses createdby its price-support program. These measures depress worldprices <strong>of</strong> agricultural products, imposing substantial costs on U.S.producers in a sector where <strong>the</strong> United States holds a clear comparativeadvantage.59


2. High technology: In recent years, many countries have come toview <strong>the</strong> high-technology industries as vehicles for economic growthand have sought to promote <strong>the</strong>m through a complex mix <strong>of</strong> policies—outrightsubsidies, export credit subsidies, research subsidies,preferential procurement by State-owned enterprises, and so on. TheUnited States holds a comparative advantage in high-technologyproducts, and <strong>the</strong> U.S. export market share has remained roughlyconstant since 1973. Never<strong>the</strong>less, <strong>the</strong>re is concern that in some specificareas, especially aircraft, foreign subsidies are threatening <strong>the</strong>position <strong>of</strong> U.S. producers.3. Services: The United States has developed an increasingly strongnet export position in services. Services, however, have never beenrecognized as being under <strong>the</strong> rules <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> international tradingsystem, and trade in services is limited by a maze <strong>of</strong> foreign governmentregulations.4. Investment: Many countries impose "investment performance requirements'*on foreign investors in exchange for <strong>the</strong> right to investor to receive investment incentives. Many <strong>of</strong> those performance requirementsare trade-related, requiring foreign companies to exportmore, reach a specified level <strong>of</strong> local content, or reduce imports.CHALLENGES TO U.S. TRADE POLICYThe next few years are critical for <strong>the</strong> international trading system.Accumulating structural problems have combined with short-run macroeconomicstresses to produce a resurgence <strong>of</strong> protectionist pressures.The Administration's aim, none<strong>the</strong>less, is to preserve andextend <strong>the</strong> benefits <strong>of</strong> freer trade. To do this will require resistingprotectionist pressures at home while continuing to urge foreign governmentsto eliminate <strong>the</strong>ir more objectionable trade-distorting policies.Responding to Foreign ActionsThe practices <strong>of</strong> foreign governments pose extremely difficultissues for U.S. trade policy. The United States customarily seeks toinduce o<strong>the</strong>r nations to move in <strong>the</strong> direction <strong>of</strong> freer trade. The dilemmais how to do this without imposing costs on ourselves thatexceed <strong>the</strong> benefits from changes in o<strong>the</strong>r countries* policies.Trade-distorting measures, whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong>y take <strong>the</strong> form <strong>of</strong> protectionagainst imports or <strong>the</strong> promotion <strong>of</strong> exports, hurt <strong>the</strong> countrywhich adopts <strong>the</strong>m as well as o<strong>the</strong>r countries, even when <strong>the</strong>y are aresponse to foreign trade-distorting practices. If foreign governmentslimit imports from <strong>the</strong> United States and we respond in kind, <strong>the</strong> initialresults will be fur<strong>the</strong>r reductions in economic efficiency at homeand higher domestic prices. If foreign governments subsidize exports,depressing world prices for U.S. products, a countersubsidy by60


<strong>the</strong> United States will depress prices still fur<strong>the</strong>r. The belief that departuresfrom free trade are automatically called for if o<strong>the</strong>r countriesdo not play by <strong>the</strong> rules is a fallacy.Intervention in international trade by <strong>the</strong> U.S. Government, eventhough costly to <strong>the</strong> U.S. economy in <strong>the</strong> short run, may, however,be justified if it serves <strong>the</strong> strategic purpose <strong>of</strong> increasing <strong>the</strong> cost <strong>of</strong>interventionist policies by foreign governments. Thus, <strong>the</strong>re is a potentialrole for carefully targeted measures, explicitly temporary,aimed at convincing o<strong>the</strong>r countries to reduce <strong>the</strong>ir trade distortions.There are obvious risks in such a course <strong>of</strong> action. Instead <strong>of</strong> inducingo<strong>the</strong>r countries to move toward freer trade, U.S. pressuremight set <strong>of</strong>f a cycle <strong>of</strong> retaliation which would leave everyone worse<strong>of</strong>f. There are also domestic political risks. Trade measures intendedto be temporary may end up permanent and institutionalized. Theneed to balance <strong>the</strong> strategic objective <strong>of</strong> reducing foreign trade barriersagainst <strong>the</strong> harm which might be caused by U.S. retaliatorymeasures explains <strong>the</strong> U.S policy <strong>of</strong> negotiating for freer trade whileholding open <strong>the</strong> possibility <strong>of</strong> more direct action as a last resort.Responding to Problem IndustriesThe problems <strong>of</strong> industries which have recently lost <strong>the</strong>ir traditionalmarket power also pose a serious policy dilemma. There is strongpressure to give <strong>the</strong>se industries at least temporary relief from imports,in <strong>the</strong> hope that lower wage and price increases and improvedproductivity will eventually make <strong>the</strong>m competitive again. On <strong>the</strong>o<strong>the</strong>r hand, protection reduces <strong>the</strong> incentives for both firms andworkers to make <strong>the</strong>se changes. Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, protectionist measures,however temporary <strong>the</strong>y are supposed to be, tend to become permanent.The limitation <strong>of</strong> protection for <strong>the</strong>se problem industries is acentral goal <strong>of</strong> U.S. economic policy.EXCHANGE RATES AND THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTSDuring 1982 <strong>the</strong> dollar rose against o<strong>the</strong>r major currencies to itshighest level since <strong>the</strong> beginning <strong>of</strong> floating exchange rates in 1973.The strength <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> dollar provided some benefits to <strong>the</strong> U.S. economyby reducing import prices and thus accelerating progress againstinflation. On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand, <strong>the</strong> strong dollar caused severe problemsby decreasing <strong>the</strong> cost competitiveness <strong>of</strong> exported U.S. goods.CAUSES OF THE DOLLAR'S STRENGTHExchange-rate movements are not well understood. Econometricmodels <strong>of</strong> exchange-rate determination proposed in <strong>the</strong> past decadehave not shown any consistent ability to track past exchange-ratemovements, let alone predict future changes. Never<strong>the</strong>less, careful61


analysis can narrow <strong>the</strong> range <strong>of</strong> plausible explanations <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> dollar'srise.The recent appreciation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> dollar, unlike many earlier exchange-ratemovements, did not simply reflect contemporaneouschanges in relative price levels. The well-known <strong>the</strong>ory <strong>of</strong> purchasingpower parity suggests that <strong>the</strong> rate <strong>of</strong> change in <strong>the</strong> exchange rateshould equal <strong>the</strong> difference between <strong>the</strong> foreign and domestic inflationrates. Over <strong>the</strong> very long run, or in situations <strong>of</strong> very large differencesin inflation rates, <strong>the</strong> purchasing power parity <strong>the</strong>ory hasproved to be a useful guide. But <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>ory has little or no power toexplain <strong>the</strong> recent rise <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> dollar. Price increases over <strong>the</strong> past 2years in Germany and Japan, for instance, were lower than in <strong>the</strong>United States. Yet <strong>the</strong> dollar appreciated dramatically during thatperiod against both <strong>the</strong> mark and <strong>the</strong> yen. Stated differently, <strong>the</strong> rise<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> dollar was not simply a nominal but also a real appreciation, asillustrated in Chart 3-3.Large exchange-rate movements may also occur because <strong>of</strong> shiftsin world demand for a country's exports or changes in a country'sdemand for imports. An example <strong>of</strong> such an event was Great Britain'sdiscovery <strong>of</strong> oil in <strong>the</strong> North Sea, which has played at least somerole in <strong>the</strong> high level <strong>of</strong> Great Britain's real exchange rate relative too<strong>the</strong>r European currencies.No comparable event accounts for <strong>the</strong> appreciation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> dollar,although U.S. oil imports have declined sharply. The rise <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>dollar was not initially accompanied by a deterioration <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> tradebalance, a fact which might seem to suggest that <strong>the</strong>re was an increasein demand for U.S. goods. The initial lack <strong>of</strong> deterioration,however, stemmed from lags in <strong>the</strong> effect <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> exchange rate on <strong>the</strong>trade balance ra<strong>the</strong>r than from a shift in ei<strong>the</strong>r export or importdemand, and <strong>the</strong> U.S. trade deficit grew rapidly in <strong>the</strong> second half <strong>of</strong>1982.What <strong>the</strong> rise <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> dollar seems clearly to reflect is a rise not in<strong>the</strong> demand for U.S. goods, but in <strong>the</strong> demand for U.S. assets. Thereasons for <strong>the</strong> increased attractiveness <strong>of</strong> investment in <strong>the</strong> UnitedStates are somewhat controversial, but <strong>the</strong> effects are not. In order tobuy U.S. assets, foreigners must first acquire dollars. The increaseddemand for dollars drives up <strong>the</strong> exchange rate.One important factor in <strong>the</strong> increased demand for U.S. assets wasthat real interest rates in <strong>the</strong> United States were high relative to realinterest rates elsewhere. Real interest rates are not directly measurable,since <strong>the</strong>y equal <strong>the</strong> nominal rate minus expected inflation. Butsome rough measure is attainable by computing <strong>the</strong> nominal rateminus actual inflation. Chart 3-4 shows <strong>the</strong> differential in real interestrates, computed in this way between <strong>the</strong> United States and o<strong>the</strong>r62


Chart 3-3Real Exchange Rates Of Major CurrenciesAgainst The Dollar1973-80=10013012011010090807060%\-—--\1 ir•/"7/tI I I 11* **- *\1 1 1 iJV,1v \ YEN\ \l\MARK\ \ ,*• *1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1S \ \FRANC\\...A *i • . 1 . . • i i i i1980 1981 1982—7/^ ^/.**• /-*-i i i iNOTE.—CONSUMER PRICES USED AS DEFLATOR.SOURCE: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND.industrial countries. The chart suggests that <strong>the</strong> real interest rate in<strong>the</strong> United States was substantially higher than foreign rates in recentyears.But events in <strong>the</strong> fall <strong>of</strong> 1982 cast some doubt on whe<strong>the</strong>r real interestrates alone can explain <strong>the</strong> dollar's strength. As U.S. shortterminterest rates fell sharply, <strong>the</strong> differential between short-term interestrates in <strong>the</strong> United States and o<strong>the</strong>r countries was greatly reduced.Yet <strong>the</strong> dollar continued to rise. The explanation for this maylie in <strong>the</strong> difference between short- and long-term rates. Most exchange-ratemodels suggest that long-term real rates, and not shorttermones, are what affect <strong>the</strong> real exchange rate. A notable feature<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> U.S. financial scene in <strong>the</strong> fall <strong>of</strong> 1982 was that long-term rates63


Chart 3-4International Real Short-Term Interest RateDifferentialsPERCENTAGE POINTS64 -2 -1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982NOTE.—DATA ARE U.S. RATE MINUS AVERAGE OF RATES FOR MAJOR INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIESWEIGHTED BY GNP, ADJUSTED FOR DIFFERENCES IN CONSUMER PRICE INFLATION.SOURCE: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND.did not fall nearly as much as short-term rates. At <strong>the</strong> same time,long-run inflation expectations may have declined, so that it is unclearhow much long-term real interest rates actually fell.Many observers believe that o<strong>the</strong>r factors besides real interest rateshelp explain <strong>the</strong> dollar's strength. In particular, <strong>the</strong> unsettled state <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> world economy—particularly <strong>the</strong> problems in Europe and LatinAmerica described later in this chapter—may have created a desireon <strong>the</strong> part <strong>of</strong> investors for a safe haven for <strong>the</strong>ir funds. The UnitedStates, according to this argument, is still regarded as <strong>the</strong> most politicallyand economically stable <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> market economies and hasbecome a financial refuge in troubled times. While <strong>the</strong> importance <strong>of</strong>this factor is hard to assess, <strong>the</strong> worldwide search for financialsecurity may partially explain this country's rising capital account surplusand its growing current account deficit.64


AN UNDERVALUED YEN?The explanations <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> strong dollar discussed so far leave out aview which has received considerable attention—that <strong>the</strong> strength <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> dollar reflects deliberate undervaluation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir currencies byour competitors, especially Japan. This view is important enough inits implications for U.S. international economic policy to deserve separatetreatment.Arguments that <strong>the</strong> yen is undervalued are <strong>of</strong> two types, which arebasically independent <strong>of</strong> one ano<strong>the</strong>r. One argument is that <strong>the</strong> Japanesegovernment has persistently kept <strong>the</strong> yen undervalued. Theo<strong>the</strong>r is that <strong>the</strong> Japanese have only recently engineered a decline in<strong>the</strong> yen to gain competitive advantage. Nei<strong>the</strong>r <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se views appearscorrect in light <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> actual behavior <strong>of</strong> Japan's balance <strong>of</strong> paymentsand exchange rate.If <strong>the</strong> first allegation—that <strong>the</strong> yen has been persistently undervalued—wascorrect, Japan would run persistent current account surplusesin excess <strong>of</strong> what seems justified. We would also expect Japanto have experienced exceptionally rapid growth in its foreign exchangereserves. Nei<strong>the</strong>r <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se was <strong>the</strong> case:• From <strong>the</strong> beginning <strong>of</strong> floating exchange rates in 1973 through1981, Japan had an average surplus in its current account <strong>of</strong> only0.15 percent <strong>of</strong> GNP. This was not much more than <strong>the</strong> U.S.figure for <strong>the</strong> same period (0.11 percent), considerably less thanthat <strong>of</strong> Germany (0.47 percent), and much less than <strong>the</strong> U.S. surplus<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> early 1960s (0.70 percent).• From <strong>the</strong> beginning <strong>of</strong> floating exchange rates in 1973 to <strong>the</strong>third quarter <strong>of</strong> 1982, Japan's reserves minus gold grew at anannual rate <strong>of</strong> 4.8 percent, far less than <strong>the</strong> 9.7 percent rate <strong>of</strong>reserve growth for all non-OPEC countries.These facts contradict <strong>the</strong> view that <strong>the</strong> yen was persistently undervalued.There remains <strong>the</strong> possibility that <strong>the</strong> yen's weakness duringmuch <strong>of</strong> 1982 was excessive in some sense. A natural question iswhe<strong>the</strong>r, after adjustment for purchasing power parity, <strong>the</strong> yen fellmore against <strong>the</strong> dollar than o<strong>the</strong>r currencies. The answer to thisquestion depends on <strong>the</strong> base period used for comparison. For mostbase periods, however, <strong>the</strong> real depreciation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> yen against <strong>the</strong>dollar appears smaller than that <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> French franc and <strong>the</strong> Germanmark. Table 3-5 shows an illustrative set <strong>of</strong> numbers. As <strong>the</strong> tableshows, only for a few base periods does <strong>the</strong> yen appear more "undervalued"than <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r two currencies.The actual behavior <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Japanese balance <strong>of</strong> payments and exchangerate thus do not support <strong>the</strong> view that <strong>the</strong>re is any special undervaluation<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> yen—that is, <strong>the</strong>y suggest that exchange-rate65


TABLE S-5.—Real appreciation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> dollar against major currencies to August 1982[Percent change from base year to August 1982']Base yearFrench francGerman markJapanese yen19711972 . ...-1.011.8-2.19.5=-25.3= 13.11973197427 921.431.431.02.06.41975197639 529.633.728.87.310.91977197829.443.035.950.124.32 53.11979198050 851.653.844.236.825.9198121.111.3a 22.91 Percent change in <strong>the</strong> price <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> dollar In each currency, adjusted for differences in consumer price inflation.'Indicates a base year relative to which <strong>the</strong> August 1982 exchange rate <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> yen looks lower than that <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>rcurrencies.Source: Board <strong>of</strong> Governors <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Federal Reserve System.movements over <strong>the</strong> last several years stemmed from a strong dollarra<strong>the</strong>r than a weak yen. An examination <strong>of</strong> Japanese policy by <strong>the</strong>U.S. Treasury supports this conclusion. This study found that Japanhas attempted to isolate its domestic capital market from world capitalmarkets, but that this has tended to limit capital outflow ra<strong>the</strong>rthan inflow, supporting ra<strong>the</strong>r than weakening <strong>the</strong> yen. Japanese capitalcontrols have been relaxed in recent years, a move which <strong>the</strong>United States supports even though <strong>the</strong> result will be a weaker yenand an increase in Japan's current account surplus. In <strong>the</strong> 1980s,Japan may well become more <strong>of</strong> a capital exporter than it was in <strong>the</strong>1970s, and thus have larger current account surpluses. These surpluses,if <strong>the</strong>y materialize, will result from Japan's high domesticsaving rate, which gives Japan a natural role as an exporter <strong>of</strong> capitalto <strong>the</strong> rest <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> world.To show that <strong>the</strong>re is no special yen issue is not to deny that asubstantial deterioration has occurred in <strong>the</strong> relative cost position <strong>of</strong>U.S. firms. This deterioration was actually larger relative to o<strong>the</strong>rindustrial countries, but since Japan is <strong>the</strong> United States' most importantcompetitor, <strong>the</strong> depreciation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> yen worries U.S. firms more.There is no special yen issue, but <strong>the</strong> strong dollar does pose genuineproblems.EFFECTS OF A STRONG DOLLAR ON U.S. TRADEThe rise <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> dollar was associated with a large rise in <strong>the</strong> productioncosts <strong>of</strong> U.S. firms relative to those <strong>of</strong> foreign competitors.To take one measure, unit labor costs in U.S. manufacturing rose 32percent relative to those <strong>of</strong> a weighted average <strong>of</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r industrialcountries from <strong>the</strong>ir low point in <strong>the</strong> third quarter <strong>of</strong> 1980 to <strong>the</strong>second quarter <strong>of</strong> 1982. This rise in relative costs has at least tempo-66


arily reduced <strong>the</strong> international competitiveness <strong>of</strong> U.S. industry dramatically.O<strong>the</strong>r U.S. exporting and import-competing sectors, especiallyagriculture, have also been squeezed.Despite this deterioration in competitive position, it was only in <strong>the</strong>third quarter <strong>of</strong> 1982 that <strong>the</strong> U.S. trade deficit began to show a significantincrease. This delay was in line with previous experience <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> effect <strong>of</strong> exchange rates on trade. The full effect <strong>of</strong> changes inexchange rates on <strong>the</strong> volume <strong>of</strong> exports and imports is felt onlyafter some time has passed, because some trade takes place undercontracts signed in advance and because customers do not alwayschange suppliers immediately when relative prices change. The shorttermeffect <strong>of</strong> a rise in <strong>the</strong> dollar is to reduce import prices, whichactually tends to improve <strong>the</strong> trade balance. Although <strong>the</strong> negative effectseventually dominate, some econometric estimates suggest that<strong>the</strong> full negative effect is not felt for more than 2 years.As <strong>the</strong> effects <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> strong dollar are increasingly reflected in U.S.trade, <strong>the</strong> trade deficit will widen. <strong>Economic</strong> developments elsewherein <strong>the</strong> world will also contribute to a widening trade deficit. The recessionin o<strong>the</strong>r industrial countries will depress <strong>the</strong> demand for U.S.exports, and financial constraints in developing countries will lead<strong>the</strong>m to import less. Both developments will have negative consequencesfor U.S. exports. Record trade and current account deficitsin 1983 will almost surely result.Whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> trade and current account deficits persist will largelydepend on U.S. macroeconomic policies, particularly on <strong>the</strong> fiscalside. If large budget deficits are allowed to continue to depress <strong>the</strong>U.S. national saving rate, real interest rates may rise again, sustainingor even increasing <strong>the</strong> high real exchange rate <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> dollar. In thiscase <strong>the</strong> trade deficit could remain high for several years.A large and sustained trade deficit would result in an economic recoverywhich would be "lopsided" in <strong>the</strong> sense that exporting andimport-competing sectors would not share in <strong>the</strong> gains. Should thisoccur, government, business, and labor <strong>of</strong>ficials must bear in mindthat even though protectionist foreign trade practices distort <strong>the</strong>composition <strong>of</strong> world trade and reduce economic efficiency both in<strong>the</strong> United States and abroad, large trade deficits are not <strong>the</strong> result<strong>of</strong> unfair foreign competition. Large projected U.S. trade deficits area result <strong>of</strong> macroeconomic forces, particularly large budget deficits.The main sources <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> U.S. trade deficit are to be found not inParis or in Tokyo, but in Washington.RESPONSES TO THE STRONG DOLLARThe temporary adverse effects <strong>of</strong> a strong dollar create pressure todo something for <strong>the</strong> exporting and import-competing sectors. Three67


kinds <strong>of</strong> policies might be used: microeconomic intervention in <strong>the</strong>form <strong>of</strong> protection or export subsidies, direct intervention in <strong>the</strong> foreignexchange market, and changes in monetary and fiscal policy.Protection and Export PromotionThe negative effect <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> strong dollar on <strong>the</strong> competitiveness <strong>of</strong>many U.S. firms has fueled pressures for an interventionist tradepolicy. These pressures must be resisted. Protecting import-competingindustries or subsidizing exports is not just a harmful long-runpolicy. With a floating exchange rate, such policies would fail to improve<strong>the</strong> trade balance or create employment even in <strong>the</strong> short run.The exchange rate always moves to clear <strong>the</strong> market. An increasein exports or a reduction in imports would lead to an increaseddemand for or reduced supply <strong>of</strong> dollars on <strong>the</strong> world market, raising<strong>the</strong> exchange rate. This would lead to a fur<strong>the</strong>r loss <strong>of</strong> competitivenessin <strong>the</strong> sectors not protected or promoted. An export subsidy foragricultural products would worsen <strong>the</strong> situation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> auto industry,an import quota on steel would hurt <strong>the</strong> competitiveness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> aircraftindustry, and so on. Although <strong>the</strong>se indirect effects may seem <strong>of</strong>doubtful importance in <strong>the</strong> real world, <strong>the</strong>y are not. That governmentscannot simultaneously protect everyone is a basic principle <strong>of</strong>international trade.Instead <strong>of</strong> creating additional employment and output, <strong>the</strong> distortion<strong>of</strong> trade through protectionist policies or export promotionwould probably reduce <strong>the</strong>m. Market-distorting policies reduce <strong>the</strong>efficiency <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> economy. Thus, a turn to protectionism could createa "supply-side" shock that might have <strong>the</strong> same kind <strong>of</strong> stagflationaryeffects as an oil price increase. The effects would prove still worse if,as is likely, U.S. actions were to provoke foreign retaliation.Although protectionism and export subsidies provide no answer to<strong>the</strong> problems caused by a strong dollar, <strong>the</strong> pressure to use <strong>the</strong>m isincreasing. Many <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> exporting sectors, which make up <strong>the</strong> traditionalconstituency for freer trade, appear to have become convincedby <strong>the</strong> strength <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> dollar and <strong>the</strong> resulting loss <strong>of</strong> U.S. competitivenessthat a more interventionist policy is needed.Exchange-Market InterventionSince March 1981 <strong>the</strong> United States has abstained as much as possiblefrom direct intervention in <strong>the</strong> foreign exchange market. Thisunwillingness to intervene is based on doubts about whe<strong>the</strong>r exchange-marketintervention is effective or desirable. As long as <strong>the</strong>Federal Reserve continues to pursue a policy <strong>of</strong> targeting monetaryaggregates, any U.S. intervention on <strong>the</strong> foreign exchange marketmust be sterilized—that is, <strong>of</strong>fset by o<strong>the</strong>r transactions on domestic fi-68


nancial markets. These transactions are likely to wipe out most <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>effect <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> initial exchange-market intervention.The process <strong>of</strong> sterilization is straightforward. If <strong>the</strong> U.S. Governmentattempted to drive up <strong>the</strong> price <strong>of</strong> foreign exchange andweaken <strong>the</strong> dollar by buying foreign securities, <strong>the</strong> Federal Reservewould issue dollars to pay for <strong>the</strong> foreign assets. In order to prevent<strong>the</strong>se dollars from increasing <strong>the</strong> U.S. money stock, however, <strong>the</strong>Federal Reserve would <strong>the</strong>n have to withdraw an equal number <strong>of</strong>dollars from <strong>the</strong> market by selling Treasury bills. The only net resultwould be that <strong>the</strong> world's supply <strong>of</strong> dollar-denominated assets wouldincrease, while its supply <strong>of</strong> assets denominated in o<strong>the</strong>r currencieswould fall.The increase in <strong>the</strong> level <strong>of</strong> dollar-denominated assets would probablyhave little effect on <strong>the</strong> exchange rate because <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> sheer size<strong>of</strong> world financial markets. The world market in dollar-denominatedsecurities includes not only <strong>the</strong> dollar assets actually owned abroad—foreign deposits in U.S. banks, foreign holdings <strong>of</strong> Treasury bills,Eurodollar deposits, and <strong>the</strong> like—but also all those dollar assetswhich are potentially tradeable. Thus, <strong>the</strong> total pool <strong>of</strong> internationallymobile dollar assets is probably in <strong>the</strong> trillions <strong>of</strong> dollars. Thismakes it questionable whe<strong>the</strong>r even very large interventions in <strong>the</strong>exchange market can have much effect on <strong>the</strong> exchange rate.Macroeconomic PoliciesAlthough <strong>the</strong> government cannot significantly affect exchange ratesthrough direct intervention, monetary and fiscal policies do indirectlyaffect <strong>the</strong> exchange rate. A feasible strategy for bringing <strong>the</strong> dollardown would involve looser monetary policies and tighter fiscal policies.Both <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se changes would tend to lower real interest rates (atleast in <strong>the</strong> short run), making capital movement into <strong>the</strong> UnitedStates less attractive and thus driving down <strong>the</strong> value <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> dollar.Despite its unfortunate effects on <strong>the</strong> U.S. balance <strong>of</strong> trade, however,monetary restraint is <strong>the</strong> prime weapon in <strong>the</strong> fight against inflation.Disinflation, as we have learned, unfortunately involves substantialcosts. Under fixed exchange rates <strong>the</strong> heaviest costs <strong>of</strong> monetarycontraction and disinflation fell on <strong>the</strong> interest-sensitive sectors <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> economy, such as construction and consumer durables. Withfloating exchange rates, however, much <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> burden also falls onexporting and import-competing sectors, which are injured by <strong>the</strong>rise in <strong>the</strong> value <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> dollar.A tighter fiscal policy would also lower real interest rates and leadto a lower dollar. Under fixed exchange rates, budget deficits crowdedout domestic investment. With a floating exchange rate <strong>the</strong>ycrowd out exporting and import-competing products as well. A re-69


duction in deficits would lead—with some lag—to an improvement in<strong>the</strong> trade balance as well as higher investment.The strength <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> dollar has put considerable strain on <strong>the</strong> resolve<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States to remain committed to free trade. Thisstrain is not unique to <strong>the</strong> international sector. The recession andhigh interest rates have also put a strain on <strong>the</strong> resolve to let o<strong>the</strong>rtypes <strong>of</strong> markets, from housing to labor markets, operate freely. If<strong>the</strong>re is special reason for concern about <strong>the</strong> international side, it isbecause <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> danger that mistakes in U.S. policy could set <strong>of</strong>f aspiral <strong>of</strong> retaliation among all <strong>the</strong> major trading nations.The competitiveness <strong>of</strong> U.S. business as a whole—as opposed tothat <strong>of</strong> particular sectors—and <strong>the</strong> balance <strong>of</strong> payments are macroeconomicphenomena. Microeconomic interventions cannot curemacroeconomic problems; <strong>the</strong>y can only make one sector better <strong>of</strong>fby hurting o<strong>the</strong>r sectors even more. The most effective strategy <strong>the</strong>United States can pursue for its exporting and import-competing sectorsis to get its overall economic house in order—above all, bybringing budget deficits and real interest rates under control.MACROECONOMIC PROBLEMS IN EUROPEMore than 90 percent <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> output <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> industrial countries, andmore than 70 percent <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> output <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> world's market economies,is produced by <strong>the</strong> United States, Japan, and <strong>the</strong> European <strong>Economic</strong>Community. Table 3-6 shows some comparative figures for <strong>the</strong>three. The most striking feature <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> table is <strong>the</strong> favorable performance<strong>of</strong> Japan by all measures. The United States and <strong>the</strong> European<strong>Economic</strong> Community look ra<strong>the</strong>r similar in <strong>the</strong>ir less favorable performances.They experienced nearly <strong>the</strong> same growth rates before1979, have suffered nearly equal decelerations <strong>of</strong> growth since <strong>the</strong>n,and had roughly <strong>the</strong> same unemployment rate in 1981. The U.S. inflationrate was lower than that in Europe, but <strong>the</strong> United States alsoshowed lower productivity growth.Behind <strong>the</strong> similarity <strong>of</strong> U.S. and European experience, however,lies a major difference. The U.S. economy, whatever its o<strong>the</strong>r difficulties,has provided employment opportunities for a rapidly growinglabor force. The current high unemployment rate is a cyclical problem,not <strong>the</strong> result <strong>of</strong> a persistent failure <strong>of</strong> employment to expand.In Europe, by contrast, employment was virtually stationary over <strong>the</strong>last decade, and unemployment has risen in every year since 1973.This is a worrisome aspect <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> European situation.For a given rate <strong>of</strong> unemployment, <strong>the</strong> strains on society are probablygreater if employment is stagnant than if it is growing. Growingemployment means that more new jobs are always opening up, <strong>of</strong>fer-70


TABLE 3-6.—<strong>Economic</strong> performance by major industrial countries, 1973-82[Percent]ItemedesFour largeEuropeancountries'JapanGrowth rate in:Real gross domestic product (GDP), 1973-80..2.32.23.7Real GOP per employed person, 1973-80.22.23.0Real GDP, 1980:l-1981:IV-.2.12.3Level:Consumer price inflation, year ending 1982:11..6.810.22.4Unemployment rate, 19817.67.42.3'France, Germany, Italy, and United Kingdom.Sources: International Monetary Fund and Organization for <strong>Economic</strong> Cooperation and Development.ing job losers a chance for reemployment and new entrants to <strong>the</strong>labor market a chance to get <strong>the</strong>ir first job. If employment is stationary,workers who have lost <strong>the</strong>ir jobs may stay unemployed for a longtime, and young people may never find jobs. The results <strong>of</strong> near-zeroemployment growth are painfully visible in Europe, where long-termunemployment (more than 6 months) is several times higher than in<strong>the</strong> United States, and where <strong>the</strong> share <strong>of</strong> youth unemployment in<strong>the</strong> total pool <strong>of</strong> unemployed has risen steadily since 1973.How did <strong>the</strong> problem arise? The causes <strong>of</strong> structural unemploymentare always controversial, but a key element in <strong>the</strong> Europeanemployment problem was probably rapid increases in real labor costsin <strong>the</strong> first half <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1970s in <strong>the</strong> face <strong>of</strong> declining productivitygrowth and rising oil prices. These increases in labor costs—whichstemmed at least in part from increases in social insurance payments—squeezedpr<strong>of</strong>itability. Firms closed <strong>the</strong>ir marginal plants andinvested in increasingly capital-intensive techniques, which helped tosustain <strong>the</strong> rate <strong>of</strong> productivity growth but also led to employmentstagnation.The unemployment problem in Europe is not caused solely by excessivelabor costs. The periods <strong>of</strong> rapid increase in European unemployment,in 1973-76 and since 1979, came during business cyclecontractions (Table 3-7). The most recent rise in unemployment isprobably mostly due to restrictive monetary and fiscal policies adoptedby <strong>the</strong> European countries following <strong>the</strong> oil price shock <strong>of</strong> 1979.These policies were adopted out <strong>of</strong> concern that <strong>the</strong> rise in importprices resulting from that shock—and, later, <strong>the</strong> fur<strong>the</strong>r rise inimport prices resulting from <strong>the</strong> appreciation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> dollar—wouldlead to an uncontrollable inflationary spiral. Thus, recent developmentsin <strong>the</strong> European economy are to some extent similar in characterto those in <strong>the</strong> United States, which have also resulted largely71


from disinflationary policies. The European situation is more serious,however, because <strong>the</strong> current recession comes on top <strong>of</strong> a steadilygrowing structural unemployment problem.TABLE 3-7.—Employment and unemployment in <strong>the</strong> European <strong>Economic</strong> Community, 1973-80[Percent]YearIncrease inemploymentUnemploymentrate19731974197519761977197819791980Source: Organization for <strong>Economic</strong> Cooperation and Development.1.1 .1-1.1-.1.4.6.8.22.83.0424.9525.35.35.7The United States has a major stake in <strong>the</strong> success <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Europeancountries in dealing with <strong>the</strong>ir macroeconomic problems. The stake isnot simply due to <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong> major European countries are alsoallies <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States, nor is it simply due to <strong>the</strong> fact that roughlyone-quarter <strong>of</strong> U.S. exports go to Western Europe. More than this,Europe is a key part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> world economy, with an aggregate GNPas large as that <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States itself. If European countriesremain mired in economic stagnation and turn toward increased protectionismas a consequence, little chance will remain <strong>of</strong> saving <strong>the</strong>open trading system.THE INTERNATIONAL DEBT PROBLEMDifferent problems from those facing <strong>the</strong> United States and Europeafflict <strong>the</strong> economies <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> developing nations. The problems <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong>se economies have accumulated over <strong>the</strong> last several years and areproducts <strong>of</strong> both domestic policy mistakes and external developments,such as oil price increases, <strong>the</strong> recession in industrial countries,and high real interest rates. In <strong>the</strong> summer and fall <strong>of</strong> 1982 <strong>the</strong>problems came to a head in <strong>the</strong> form <strong>of</strong> a sharp reduction in internationallending to <strong>the</strong> developing countries.DEBT-FINANCED GROWTH IN THE 1970sUntil recently, <strong>the</strong> growth <strong>of</strong> such middle income developing countriesas Brazil, South Korea, and Taiwan was widely viewed as one <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> great success stories <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1970s. Particularly notable was <strong>the</strong>irsuccess in expanding exports <strong>of</strong> manufactured goods. While <strong>the</strong>growth <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se exports did give rise to some adjustment problems inindustrial countries, <strong>the</strong> successes <strong>of</strong> some middle income countries72


were undoubtedly a highly favorable development for <strong>the</strong> UnitedStates. Such success provided a dramatic demonstration to o<strong>the</strong>rcountries <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> potential <strong>of</strong> market-oriented economic policies.An important aspect <strong>of</strong> growth in <strong>the</strong> developing world, however,was heavy borrowing from foreign sources. There is nothing inherentlywrong in external borrowing to finance growth. Some <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>developed countries, including <strong>the</strong> United States, relied heavily onforeign capital during earlier periods <strong>of</strong> industrialization. But somedeveloping nations borrowed too much, investing in projects <strong>of</strong>doubtful productivity. When overly optimistic expectations aboutexport earnings and interest rates turned out to have been wrong,<strong>the</strong>se countries found <strong>the</strong>mselves in serious financial difficulty.From 1973 to 1981 <strong>the</strong> medium- and long-term external debt <strong>of</strong>non-oil developing countries rose at an annual rate <strong>of</strong> more than 20percent. Lenders might have viewed this rate <strong>of</strong> increase as morealarming than <strong>the</strong>y did, were it not for several factors which appearedto indicate that <strong>the</strong> eventual repayment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> debt would not imposea severe burden on borrowing countries. These factors included:• A rapid growth in <strong>the</strong> ability <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se countries to service <strong>the</strong>ir debt Exports<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> non-oil developing countries grew at an annual rate<strong>of</strong> 18 percent.• Very low real interest rates. From 1973 to 1979 Eurodollar rates inLondon, which set <strong>the</strong> basis for most international lending, averaged8.5 percent, while U.S. wholesale prices rose at an annualrate <strong>of</strong> 9.8 percent. Even allowing for <strong>the</strong> fact that third-worldborrowers paid small spreads over <strong>the</strong> Euromarket rate, <strong>the</strong> realinterest rates <strong>the</strong>y paid were still negative.• Special factors which appeared to ensure rising export earnings in <strong>the</strong>future. The most important <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se was oil reserves, which wereessentially treated as an asset against which countries couldsafely borrow.CAUSES OF THE LIQUIDITY PROBLEMExcessive borrowing by some developing countries made an eventualfinancial problem inevitable. The proximate factor whichbrought <strong>the</strong> era <strong>of</strong> debt-financed growth to a halt was, however, asharp deterioration in <strong>the</strong> world economy. The rise in oil prices in1979 was a blow to many debtor countries, and fur<strong>the</strong>r strains resultedfrom disinflation in <strong>the</strong> United States and o<strong>the</strong>r industrial countries.The factors which led to a loss <strong>of</strong> lender confidence in <strong>the</strong> developingcountries included:• The effects <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> world recession on export demand. The rapid exportgrowth <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1970s came to an abrupt end in <strong>the</strong> early 1980s.Exports <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> non-oil developing countries actually fell by 7.573


percent from <strong>the</strong> first half <strong>of</strong> 1981 to <strong>the</strong> first half <strong>of</strong> 1982. Exporters<strong>of</strong> primary products were hit particularly hard: real commodityprices fell by 25 percent from <strong>the</strong> fourth quarter <strong>of</strong> 1980to <strong>the</strong> second quarter <strong>of</strong> 1982.• High real interest rates. In 1981 and <strong>the</strong> first half <strong>of</strong> 1982, Euromarketinterest rates averaged 16 percent, while wholesale pricesin <strong>the</strong> United States rose at an annual rate <strong>of</strong> only 4.5 percent.• The appreciation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> dollar. Since most international debt is denominatedin dollars, while commodity prices tend to follow aweighted average <strong>of</strong> industrial country currencies, <strong>the</strong> effect <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> rise in <strong>the</strong> value <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> dollar was a sudden increase in <strong>the</strong>size <strong>of</strong> developing country debt relative to prospective exportearnings.The result <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se developments was that banks, which had beenwilling to lend large amounts to developing countries throughout <strong>the</strong>1970s, lost confidence that <strong>the</strong> loans would be promptly repaid. Thedebtor countries were highly vulnerable to such a loss <strong>of</strong> confidence.Much <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir debt was <strong>of</strong> short maturity, so that a large fraction <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong>ir debt required refinancing each year. Argentina, Brazil, andMexico, for example, must make annual payments <strong>of</strong> principal andinterest which exceed <strong>the</strong>ir total exports <strong>of</strong> goods and services.During <strong>the</strong> 1970s <strong>the</strong>se large financing needs did not pose a problem,since countries were able to roll over <strong>the</strong>ir debt as it came due.In <strong>the</strong> summer and fall <strong>of</strong> 1982, however, banks became reluctant tomake new loans and roll over old ones, first to Mexico and <strong>the</strong>n too<strong>the</strong>r countries. The result was a quick exhaustion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> foreign exchangereserves <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> major debtors.IMPLICATIONS OF THE DEBT PROBLEMThe debt situation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> developing countries poses two problemsfor <strong>the</strong> world economy. Although quite unlikely, failure to resolve <strong>the</strong>debt situation in an orderly way could lead to major financial marketdisruptions. More likely—indeed, it has already happened to a considerableextent—is a situation <strong>of</strong> forced austerity in debtor countries,with adverse effects on world trade and output.Risks to Financial MarketsThe threat <strong>of</strong> a financial disruption arises from <strong>the</strong> possibility thatdebtor countries will be unable to live within <strong>the</strong>ir new financial constraints.The unwillingness <strong>of</strong> banks to lend as much as in <strong>the</strong> recentpast means that debtor countries will need to cut <strong>the</strong>ir imports orexpand <strong>the</strong>ir exports. In <strong>the</strong> case <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> most heavily indebted countries,this will almost certainly mean achieving substantial trade surplusesin spite <strong>of</strong> depressed demand for <strong>the</strong>ir exports. The concern74


<strong>of</strong> lenders that some debtors will not be able to achieve <strong>the</strong> requiredadjustment is precisely what makes <strong>the</strong>m reluctant to lend.Fortunately, a serious financial disruption is unlikely. The debtorcountries and <strong>the</strong> banks which are <strong>the</strong>ir major creditors share astrong interest in an orderly resolution <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> debt problem. For <strong>the</strong>debtor countries, maintaining good financial standing is essential if<strong>the</strong>y are to maintain access both to world capital markets and to <strong>the</strong>irexport markets. At <strong>the</strong> same time, banks realize that demanding toorapid a repayment from debtor countries could prove counterproductive,and <strong>the</strong>y are probably willing to provide enough financing sothat debtor countries can more easily handle <strong>the</strong> financial squeeze. Althoughbanks find <strong>the</strong>mselves in somewhat <strong>of</strong> a "prisoner's dilemma"situation, in which no one bank will want to lend if it believes that<strong>the</strong> loans will only go to repay o<strong>the</strong>r banks, this problem should notprove insoluble. The banking community should be able to work with<strong>the</strong> International Monetary Fund (IMF) in negotiating agreementswhich balance an adequate degree <strong>of</strong> new lending to <strong>the</strong> debtorcountries with realistic economic adjustment plans. To aid in thisprocess, <strong>the</strong> Administration and representatives <strong>of</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r industrialnations recently agreed in principle to an enlargement <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> IMF'sresources.Perhaps <strong>the</strong> most important safeguard against a financial crisis is<strong>the</strong> ability <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> governments and central banks <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> majorindustrial countries to provide a safety net for <strong>the</strong> international financialsystem. Central banks act as lenders <strong>of</strong> last resort for commercialbanks, providing effective protection against banking panics. At <strong>the</strong>same time, industrial country governments have demonstrated <strong>the</strong>irwillingness to help provide temporary financing for developing countriesin order to bridge <strong>the</strong> interval until agreements can be reachedwith <strong>the</strong> IMF. (The IMF recently concluded agreements with Mexico,Argentina, and Brazil.)Effects on World TradeAlthough a serious disruption <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> international financial systemis unlikely, for all <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> reasons cited, serious problems still exist.Even under optimistic assumptions, those developing countries withhigh ratios <strong>of</strong> debt to exports will be forced to improve <strong>the</strong>ir tradebalances substantially in order to pay <strong>the</strong> interest on <strong>the</strong>ir debt.Much <strong>of</strong> this trade balance improvement will probably come throughreductions in imports, involving painful reductions in output and realwages in <strong>the</strong> debtor countries. This will also depress demand for <strong>the</strong>products <strong>of</strong> industrial countries—particularly <strong>the</strong> United States,which has especially close trading relations with some <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> majorLatin American debtors. The debt problem <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> developing countriesmay worsen <strong>the</strong> U.S. trade balance by $10 to $20 billion and75


educe U.S. GNP by one-half percentage point or more from <strong>the</strong>level it would o<strong>the</strong>rwise reach.The Outlook for Debtor NationsThe problems <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> developing countries are not insoluble. Ifgrowth in <strong>the</strong> world economy resumes and real interest rates fall tohistorical levels, <strong>the</strong> debt burden <strong>of</strong> even <strong>the</strong> most heavily indebtedcountries will become much more manageable. Mexico and Brazil,among <strong>the</strong> most heavily indebted countries, both have debts wellbelow half <strong>the</strong>ir GNPs. At a historically typical real interest rate <strong>of</strong> 2percent, <strong>the</strong> real burden <strong>of</strong> debt service would fall to less than 1 percent<strong>of</strong> GNP—a fully manageable level in a growing economy.The key to recovery from <strong>the</strong> debt problem, however, lies in increasedexports from <strong>the</strong> debtor countries. Import restrictions by <strong>the</strong>developing countries can only accomplish so much in improving <strong>the</strong>irtrade balances. Imports have already fallen considerably in high debtcountries in <strong>the</strong> last year, leaving limited room for fur<strong>the</strong>r cuts. Asgrowth resumes among <strong>the</strong> debtor countries, <strong>the</strong>y will tend to importmore, and will need to export more to pay for <strong>the</strong> imports. They willnot be able to do this if <strong>the</strong> industrial countries, including <strong>the</strong> UnitedStates, institute new protectionist measures. Yet as developing countriesattempt to increase <strong>the</strong>ir exports, strong political pressures willdevelop in <strong>the</strong> industrial countries to stop <strong>the</strong>m. Leaders in <strong>the</strong>industrial countries must realize that shutting out imports from <strong>the</strong>developing world will not only incur <strong>the</strong> usual costs <strong>of</strong> protection—higher prices to consumers and jobs lost in unprotected sectors—butalso will threaten <strong>the</strong> basic stability <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> world financial system.76


CHAPTER 4Increasing Capital FormationATTAINING AN ADEQUATE RATE OF CAPITAL FORMATIONin <strong>the</strong> United States is a crucial challenge for economic policy during<strong>the</strong> 1980s. Devoting a larger share <strong>of</strong> national output to investmentwould help restore rapid productivity growth and rising living standards.During <strong>the</strong> past two decades, fiscal, monetary, and regulatorypolicies contributed to <strong>the</strong> low rate <strong>of</strong> net investment in plant andequipment; <strong>the</strong> share <strong>of</strong> gross national product (GNP) devoted tocapital formation was below <strong>the</strong> levels achieved by most o<strong>the</strong>r industrializednations.The Administration and <strong>the</strong> Congress have instituted a set <strong>of</strong> taxand regulatory policies designed to increase <strong>the</strong> share <strong>of</strong> output devotedto capital formation. The noninflationary monetary policies followedby <strong>the</strong> Federal Reserve, with <strong>the</strong> Administration's support,should also contribute in <strong>the</strong> long run to increased capital formationand improved efficiency in <strong>the</strong> allocation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> capital stock. Thischapter examines <strong>the</strong> linkages between economic policy and capitalformation, and discusses <strong>the</strong> rationale for <strong>the</strong> Administration's initiativesin this area.Many forms <strong>of</strong> investment contribute to productivity growth. Researchand development expenditures provide <strong>the</strong> basis for <strong>the</strong> technologicalchange that is a wellspring <strong>of</strong> productivity growth. Ano<strong>the</strong>rmajor source <strong>of</strong> productivity growth is investment in education andtraining that promotes <strong>the</strong> accumulation <strong>of</strong> valuable human capital.Public sector infrastructure investments may also have an importantrole to play. This chapter, however, focuses on nonresidential plantand equipment investment. Past public policies probably discriminatedmost heavily against this form <strong>of</strong> investment. Plant and equipmentinvestment is also more amenable to quantitative analysis than o<strong>the</strong>rforms <strong>of</strong> capital investment because <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> difficulties involved inmeasuring intangible capital.By late 1982, investment and capacity utilization rates in <strong>the</strong>United States had fallen to very low levels. Even after <strong>the</strong> recoveryfrom <strong>the</strong> recession begins, capacity utilization will increase onlygradually, and it will take time for new policies to increase <strong>the</strong> share<strong>of</strong> national output devoted to saving and investment. Hence, levels <strong>of</strong>77


investment may prove disappointing over <strong>the</strong> next several years despite<strong>the</strong> beneficial long-run impact <strong>of</strong> policies recently put in place.This should not cause us to lose sight <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> importance <strong>of</strong> soundlong-run policy and <strong>the</strong> need to increase net capital formation in <strong>the</strong>years and decades ahead.THE HISTORICAL RECORDAlthough gross private domestic investment, which includes residentialand inventory investment, accounted for 16.1 percent <strong>of</strong> GNPbetween 1971 and 1980, gross investment in structures and equipmentaveraged only 10.8 percent <strong>of</strong> GNP during this period. Of thisgross structure and equipment investment, more than two-thirds wasdevoted to replacing depreciated capital, leaving only 3.0 percent <strong>of</strong>GNP for new structures and equipment.It is useful to place <strong>the</strong> patterns <strong>of</strong> investment in <strong>the</strong> United Statesduring <strong>the</strong> last decade in historical and geographic perspective. Table4-1 displays <strong>the</strong> behavior <strong>of</strong> alternative measures <strong>of</strong> capital accumulation.The data show that <strong>the</strong> rate <strong>of</strong> net nonresidential fixed investmentas a fraction <strong>of</strong> GNP declined by 27.5 percent between <strong>the</strong> late1960s and <strong>the</strong> late 1970s. The share <strong>of</strong> output devoted to net nonresidentialfixed investment in <strong>the</strong> late 1970s was slightly lower than<strong>the</strong> average rate during <strong>the</strong> entire 1950-80 period.Some analysts, examining only <strong>the</strong> data on gross investment, haveconcluded that investment performance was satisfactory during <strong>the</strong>1970s. This procedure ignores <strong>the</strong> fact that depreciation as a share <strong>of</strong>GNP was greater during this period than in <strong>the</strong> 1960s because <strong>of</strong> ageneral shift in net investment from long-lived assets, such as structures,toward assets with shorter lives, and because <strong>of</strong> a higher ratio<strong>of</strong> capital to GNP. The appropriate focus in examining data on investmentis <strong>the</strong> total stock <strong>of</strong> capital. Therefore, net investment,which measures <strong>the</strong> change in <strong>the</strong> total capital stock, is <strong>the</strong> most appropriateindicator <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> adequacy <strong>of</strong> capital formation.An alternative way to evaluate changes in <strong>the</strong> level <strong>of</strong> capital formationis to examine trends in <strong>the</strong> capital-labor ratio. Measures <strong>of</strong>capital per hour and capital per worker, displayed in Table 4-1 andChart 4-1, both show a large decline in <strong>the</strong> growth rate <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> capitalstock relative to <strong>the</strong> growth in <strong>the</strong> supply <strong>of</strong> labor. Capital per hourincreased at only a 0.9 percent annual rate between 1976 and 1980,compared to a 3.5 percent rate during <strong>the</strong> 1951-75 interval. Althoughthis dramatic decline was in part due to <strong>the</strong> low rate <strong>of</strong> netinvestment during <strong>the</strong> late 1970s, it was primarily a consequence <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> rapid growth <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> labor force. To maintain <strong>the</strong> pre-1975growth in <strong>the</strong> capital-labor ratio, a sharp increase in <strong>the</strong> post-197578


ate <strong>of</strong> net investment was required, instead <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> decline which actuallyoccurred.TABLE 4-1.—Alternative measures <strong>of</strong> capital formation, 1951-82[Percent]PeriodNet private domesticinvestment as percent <strong>of</strong>GNPTotalinvestmentNonresidentialfixedinvestmentGrowth rate <strong>of</strong> net capitalstock 'Per worker 2 Per hour 21951-557.21956-606.11961-65....6.71966-70....7.11971-756.41976-806.01951-806.61981..4.81982 3 2.13.13.54.12.44.92.6.93.04.5(*)'Real net private nonresidential fixed capital stock at year-end.2 All persons in private business sector. Year-end obtained by averaging fourth quarter value with value for first quarter <strong>of</strong>subsequent year.3 Preliminary.'Not available.Sources: Department <strong>of</strong> Commerce (Bureau <strong>of</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> Analysis), Department <strong>of</strong> Labor (Bureau <strong>of</strong> Labor Statistics), andCouncil <strong>of</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> Advisers.Properly measured, <strong>the</strong> decline in <strong>the</strong> growth rate <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> capitalstock is understated by <strong>the</strong> net investment figures in Table 4-1. Theenergy price shocks <strong>of</strong> 1973 and 1979 hastened <strong>the</strong> obsolescence <strong>of</strong> avariety <strong>of</strong> past investments, which implies that actual depreciationwas greater than <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>ficial statistics suggest. One estimate placed<strong>the</strong> premature obsolescence <strong>of</strong> capital during <strong>the</strong> late 1970s at anaverage <strong>of</strong> 0.5 percent <strong>of</strong> GNP per year. O<strong>the</strong>r studies have obtainedmuch larger estimates using data on <strong>the</strong> market valuation <strong>of</strong> capital.In addition, it is important to recall that much <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> investment <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> 1970s took place in <strong>the</strong> energy-producing sector. The share <strong>of</strong>GNP devoted to net fixed nonresidential investment outside <strong>the</strong>energy sector averaged only 1.8 percent between 1975 and 1980.Unfortunately, <strong>the</strong> combined effects <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> recent economic recessionand large Federal budget deficits will hold down <strong>the</strong> rate <strong>of</strong> capitalformation, as currently forecasted, over <strong>the</strong> next several years.Between 1981 and 1985, net investment in plant and equipment mayprove disappointing even by <strong>the</strong> standard <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> late 1970s. The capital-laborratio will grow only slowly and may even decline. While <strong>the</strong>low forecasted rate <strong>of</strong> net investment over <strong>the</strong> next several years isdue primarily to cyclical conditions, it does not negate <strong>the</strong> importance<strong>of</strong> developing permanent policies to encourage capital formation.In light <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> depth <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> recent recession, it is reasonable toexpect that investment performance probably would have proven79


Chart 4-1Measures <strong>of</strong> Capital FormationPERCENTINVESTMENT AS ,' *•PERCENT OF GNP 1 ' *I I I I I I I I I I I I1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 19801 NET PRIVATE NONRESIDENTIAL FIXED INVESTMENT AS PERCENT OF GNP; FIVE-YEARCENTERED MOVING AVERAGES.2 PERCENT CHANGE IN REAL NET PRIVATE NONRESIDENTIAL FIXED CAPITAL STOCK PERWORKER IN THE BUSINESS SECTOR; FIVE-YEAR CENTERED MOVING AVERAGES.SOURCES: DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, AND COUNCIL OF ECONOMICADVISERS.worse if <strong>the</strong> Congress and <strong>the</strong> Administration had not enacted taxmeasures to spur capital formation. These laws, and <strong>the</strong> proposals incorporatedin <strong>the</strong> <strong>President</strong>'s fiscal 1984 budget, are designed toraise <strong>the</strong> share <strong>of</strong> net investment to a high level by historical standardsin <strong>the</strong> late 1980s or before.AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVETable 4-2 shows that <strong>the</strong> United States falls behind o<strong>the</strong>r majorindustrial nations in several key measures <strong>of</strong> net capital formation.The share <strong>of</strong> U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) devoted to net fixedinvestment during <strong>the</strong> last decade was only 34 percent <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> compa-80


able share in Japan and 56 percent <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> comparable share in WestGermany. No o<strong>the</strong>r major industrial nation devotes as small a fraction<strong>of</strong> total output to new investment as does <strong>the</strong> United States.TABLE 4-2.—Comparison <strong>of</strong> capital formation in six OECD countries, 1971-80[Percent]CountryGrossinvestmentInvestment as percent <strong>of</strong> GDPGross fixedinvestmentNet fixedinvestmentGrowth rate<strong>of</strong> outputper hour inmanufacturingFrance24.222.912.24.8Germany23.722.811.84.9Italy22.420.110.74.9Japan34.032.919.57.4United Kingdom..19.218.78.12.9United States19.118.46.62.5Source: Organization for <strong>Economic</strong> Cooperation and Development.It is instructive to compare <strong>the</strong> growth rates <strong>of</strong> productivity fordifferent countries with <strong>the</strong>ir shares <strong>of</strong> output devoted to new investment.Although productivity growth and investment rates are simultaneouslydetermined by a multitude <strong>of</strong> factors, it is striking that astrong positive relationship emerges. As shown in Chart 4-2, Japanhas both <strong>the</strong> highest investment share and <strong>the</strong> highest growth rate <strong>of</strong>productivity, while <strong>the</strong> United States has <strong>the</strong> worst investment performanceand <strong>the</strong> lowest growth rate <strong>of</strong> productivity.While <strong>the</strong> reasons for <strong>the</strong>se large international differences in rates<strong>of</strong> capital formation are not precisely understood, some evidencesuggests that <strong>the</strong> roots may lie in different public policies. AfterWorld War II, rebuilding <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> capital stock was a primary goal <strong>of</strong>economic policy in continental Europe and Japan. Governments inthose countries encouraged saving and investment and disregarded<strong>the</strong> early Keynesian fear that oversaving could reduce aggregatedemand and depress real economic activity.In contrast, <strong>of</strong>ficials in <strong>the</strong> United States feared a postwar relapseinto depression and avoided policies which would encourage saving.For example, some economists advocated sustained budget deficits asa means <strong>of</strong> absorbing excess private savings.It is now clear—on <strong>the</strong> basis <strong>of</strong> four decades <strong>of</strong> economic experiencesince <strong>the</strong> end <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Great Depression—that fears <strong>of</strong> secularstagnation caused by a high and rising saving rate are unwarranted.The much greater risk is that productivity growth in <strong>the</strong> UnitedStates will continue to stagnate at low levels, and that Americanworkers will have to accept a lower growth rate in <strong>the</strong>ir standard <strong>of</strong>81


Chart 4-2PERCENT OF GDPInternational Comparison<strong>of</strong> Investment and Productivity Growth,1971-80GROWTH RATE20NET FIXED INVESTMENTAS PERCENT OF GDP(LEFT SCALE)GROWTH RATE OFMANUFACTURINGOUTPUT PER HOUR(RIGHT SCALE)1510•••:••:-:UNITEDSTATESUNITEDKINGDOMITALY GERMANY FRANCEJAPANSOURCE: ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT.living than <strong>the</strong>ir foreign counterparts. O<strong>the</strong>rwise, American goodscould cease to be competitive on world markets.THE IMPORTANCE OF CAPITAL FORMATIONThe case for increasing <strong>the</strong> rate <strong>of</strong> capital formation ultimatelyrests on three justifications. First, increased capital formation can reversepart <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> productivity slowdown that <strong>the</strong> United States hassuffered during <strong>the</strong> last decade. Second, government policies havediscriminated in favor <strong>of</strong> consumption and against saving and investment.Third, as a result <strong>of</strong> tax policies, <strong>the</strong> pretax return to capitalinvestment exceeds <strong>the</strong> after-tax return that any individuals are ableto capture privately, leading to an inappropriately low level <strong>of</strong> capitalformation.82


During <strong>the</strong> 1970s, productivity growth in <strong>the</strong> United States deceleratedrapidly. Between 1948 and 1967 <strong>the</strong> growth rate <strong>of</strong> productivity(as measured by output per hour in <strong>the</strong> private business economy)was 3.1 percent, compared to 2.3 percent between 1967 and 1973and only 0.8 percent between 1973 and 198 LThe consequences <strong>of</strong> reduced productivity growth for our standard<strong>of</strong> living over <strong>the</strong> long run are greater than those <strong>of</strong> any o<strong>the</strong>r currenteconomic problem. In 1981 <strong>the</strong> American economy producedapproximately $12,780 worth <strong>of</strong> output per capita. Had productivitygrowth continued at <strong>the</strong> 1948-67 rate during <strong>the</strong> 14 years subsequentto 1967, output per capita would have reached $16,128 in1981, 26 percent higher than <strong>the</strong> actual value. As a standard <strong>of</strong> comparison,<strong>the</strong> recent recession reduced per capita output by only 4percent between <strong>the</strong> third quarter <strong>of</strong> 1981 and <strong>the</strong> fourth quarter <strong>of</strong>1982, less than one-fifth <strong>the</strong> reduction attributable to <strong>the</strong> productivityshortfall. As time passes, <strong>the</strong> consequences <strong>of</strong> reduced productivitygrowth are compounded. Increasing <strong>the</strong> productivity growth rate by2 percentage points annually would more than double our materialstandard <strong>of</strong> living by 2020, compared to <strong>the</strong> level it would reach o<strong>the</strong>rwise.The productivity slowdown is not reliably attributable to any singlecause or combination <strong>of</strong> causes. Various analysts have suggested thathigher energy prices, regulatory changes, reduced research and developmentspending, reduced opportunities for technical innovation,<strong>the</strong> changing composition <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> labor force, and changing worker attitudes,as well as reduced capital formation, are responsible for <strong>the</strong>productivity slowdown. An accurate accounting <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> sources <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>slowdown is probably impossible in light <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> multitude <strong>of</strong> competingexplanations and <strong>the</strong> statistical difficulties associated with distinguishingbetween <strong>the</strong>ir relative effects precisely.Many <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> possible causes <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> productivity slowdown are probablynot reversible through public policy. There is relatively little <strong>the</strong>Federal Government could have done to <strong>of</strong>fset <strong>the</strong> negative effect <strong>of</strong>sharp increases in oil prices or, for that matter, to influence changingcultural attitudes toward work. Changing <strong>the</strong> rate <strong>of</strong> capital formation,however, is a principal way in which Federal economic policycan affect productivity growth.Increasing <strong>the</strong> rate <strong>of</strong> capital formation will raise productivitygrowth in several ways. More rapid capital formation results, on average,in workers having more equipment at <strong>the</strong>ir disposal. In addition,increases in investment reduce <strong>the</strong> average age <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> capital stock,permitting physical assets to embody more recent technological innovations.Technological development and <strong>the</strong> level <strong>of</strong> capital formationare intertwined, because <strong>the</strong> development <strong>of</strong> more efficient and83


sophisticated capital goods occurs when <strong>the</strong> demand for new capitalgoods increases.The legacy <strong>of</strong> past policies, which have artificially depressed savingand investment, provides a second reason for increasing <strong>the</strong> rate <strong>of</strong>capital formation. As described below, this discrimination againstcapital formation has taken many forms, including tax policy, monetarypolicy and recurring Federal budget deficits. Although <strong>the</strong>reexist instances <strong>of</strong> market failure, a market economy can generally beexpected to allocate resources in an efficient way. When public policiessystematically discriminate against one type <strong>of</strong> spending, however,<strong>the</strong>re is a strong presumption that too little <strong>of</strong> it will take place.A related and final justification for increased capital formationcomes from a comparison <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> total pretax return to investmentwith <strong>the</strong> return received by private investors. Estimates suggest that<strong>the</strong> total pretax return to investment in corporate capital, as measuredby its pretax marginal product, is about 11 percent. This meansthat $1.00 invested today yields society $1.11 next year, or alternativelya permanent yield <strong>of</strong> 11 cents. While <strong>the</strong> total pretax returnfluctuates from year to year with cyclical conditions, studies havetended to find that it has stayed within <strong>the</strong> range <strong>of</strong> 8 to 15 percentthroughout <strong>the</strong> postwar period.In contrast, private investors have earned much smaller rates <strong>of</strong>return over <strong>the</strong> last several decades, with many investors earningnegative real after-tax returns over much <strong>of</strong> that period. Even leavingaside <strong>the</strong> effects <strong>of</strong> personal taxes, <strong>the</strong> real return on short-term debtinstruments averaged less than 1 percent during <strong>the</strong> 1950-81 interval.While equity investments have yielded a higher average return,<strong>the</strong>y carry with <strong>the</strong>m a large amount <strong>of</strong> risk. The average real returnon common stock before personal taxes was 6 percent over <strong>the</strong>1950-81 period, but investors lost money in real terms in 12 <strong>of</strong> thoseyears and over periods as long as 17 years.This large spread between <strong>the</strong> total and private returns to investmentis a consequence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> tax system, which extracts a portion <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> total return to investment before it reaches private investors.Capital market returns are reduced because <strong>the</strong> corporate income taxreduces <strong>the</strong> return that corporations can pay out to investors. As aconsequence <strong>of</strong> this tax-induced divergence between <strong>the</strong> private andtotal return to investment, too little investment takes place. This suggests<strong>the</strong> desirability <strong>of</strong> measures both to reduce tax distortions andto increase incentives to save and invest.84


MEASURING NATIONAL SAVINGDomestic saving is an important determinant <strong>of</strong> a nation's level <strong>of</strong>investment. <strong>Economic</strong> output is ei<strong>the</strong>r invested in capital assets,which help produce future output, or consumed privately or publicly.Only by forgoing consumption does it become possible for a nationto invest in a sustained way. While funds from abroad are available t<strong>of</strong>inance some investment, experience suggests that most matureeconomies have financed investment through domestic saving. Increasing<strong>the</strong> rate <strong>of</strong> capital formation in <strong>the</strong> United States without increasingobligations to foreigners <strong>the</strong>refore probably requires increasednational saving.Table 4-3 provides information on net national saving as reportedin <strong>the</strong> national income and product accounts. On average, from 1951to 1981, <strong>the</strong> United States saved 6.7 percent <strong>of</strong> total output beyondthat necessary to replace depreciated capital. Private saving, comprisingpersonal saving and corporate retained earnings, totaled 7.3 percent<strong>of</strong> GNP. Federal Government dissaving through budget deficitsaveraged 0.9 percent <strong>of</strong> GNP, while <strong>the</strong> sum <strong>of</strong> State and local governmentsurpluses averaged 0.3 percent <strong>of</strong> GNP.TABLE 4-3.—Net saving as percent <strong>of</strong> GNP, 1951-81[Percent]Not adjusted for inflationAdjusted for inflation 3PeriodTotalFederalState andlocalPrivate >FederalState andlocalPrivate1951-551956-606.76,9-0.3.0-0.1-.27.27.10.91.1-0.1-.15.95.91961-651966-707.47.5-.4.6.0.17.88.0.2.6.2.47.06.51971-751976-806.45.8-1.8-1.9.61.27.66.5-.31.11.65.64.419815.0-2.01.15,9.01.53.61951-816.7-.9.37.3.4.65.8'Private saving less capital consumption allowances with capital consumption adjustment.2 Adjusted by GNP implicit price deflator.Sources: Department <strong>of</strong> Commerce (Bureau <strong>of</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> Analysis), Board <strong>of</strong> Governors <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Federal Reserve System, and Council<strong>of</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> Advisers.While <strong>the</strong> total saving rate can be measured unambiguously, <strong>the</strong>reare serious conceptual problems in measuring its various componentsduring an inflationary period. Inflation erodes <strong>the</strong> real value <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>national debt. Interest rates incorporate inflation premiums and<strong>the</strong>se premiums compensate lenders for <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong>y are repaidin cheaper dollars. Thus, <strong>the</strong>y do not really represent income to borrowersor costs to lenders. This principle is recognized by <strong>the</strong> FinancialAccounting Standards Board and is <strong>of</strong>ten applied in <strong>the</strong> privatesector. Table 4-3 <strong>the</strong>refore also presents a breakdown between pri-85


vate, Federal, and State and local government saving that is adjustedfor <strong>the</strong> effects <strong>of</strong> inflation.BUDGET DEFICITS AND SAVINGUnacceptably large Federal budget deficits are likely in <strong>the</strong> nextseveral years unless legislative changes are made. These deficitscould significantly reduce investment during <strong>the</strong> economic recovery.Increased public consumption with no reduction in private consumptionleaves fewer resources available for investment. When <strong>the</strong> FederalGovernment must compete with private borrowers for savings, realinterest rates are bid up, discouraging investment.Federal dissaving would not represent a serious problem if it automaticallycalled forth more private saving. While increased deficits donot induce an equal increase in private saving, <strong>the</strong>y also do notcrowd out investment expenditure dollar for dollar. Increases in <strong>the</strong>real rate <strong>of</strong> return caused by Federal deficits raise <strong>the</strong> yield savers receiveand may call forth some additional private saving. Higher realinterest rates also discourage spending on consumer durables, housing,and construction by State and local governments. Finally, bycontributing to increases in real interest rates, budget deficits encouragecapital inflows from abroad. These factors imply that deficitsdo not completely crowd out private investment; ra<strong>the</strong>r, a reasonableestimate is that funds available for private investment are reduced byperhaps one-half to three-fourths <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> budget deficit.The possibility that Federal budget deficits crowd out private investmenttakes on greater importance in light <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> large deficitsthat will occur over <strong>the</strong> next 5 years unless actions are taken. Thefiscal 1982 budget deficit <strong>of</strong> $110.7 billion absorbed 3.65 percent <strong>of</strong>GNP. Projections now suggest <strong>the</strong> 1983 deficit will equal $207.7 billionor 6.5 percent <strong>of</strong> GNP. Unless significant actions are taken, deficits<strong>of</strong> this magnitude or larger may continue even as <strong>the</strong> economyrecovers from <strong>the</strong> recent recession. If such deficits materialize, <strong>the</strong>consequences for capital formation could prove very serious unless adramatic increase in private saving also takes place. A budget deficit<strong>of</strong> 5 percent <strong>of</strong> GNP would likely reduce net investment by anamount equal to about one-half its historical level, relative to a balancedbudget. With large deficits, significant improvements in laborproductivity and <strong>the</strong> quality and quantity <strong>of</strong> housing would be lesslikely in <strong>the</strong> years ahead.86


TAX RULES AND PERSONAL SAVINGMany economists believe that tax rules in <strong>the</strong> United States encourageconsumer borrowing and discourage private saving. During<strong>the</strong> 1970s <strong>the</strong> combination <strong>of</strong> tax rules and inflation produced a dramaticdecline in <strong>the</strong> private return to saving and a large reduction in<strong>the</strong> cost <strong>of</strong> borrowing.During <strong>the</strong> 1960s, nominal interest rates on 3-month Treasury billsaveraged 4.0 percent, and <strong>the</strong> consumer price inflation rate averaged2.3 percent. On a pretax basis, this left savers with an average realreturn <strong>of</strong> 1.7 percent. For a saver in <strong>the</strong> 30 percent marginal taxbracket, <strong>the</strong> real after-tax return was only 0.5 percent.The return to saving fell significantly below this level during <strong>the</strong>1970s. While <strong>the</strong> average inflation rate rose to 7.1 percent, <strong>the</strong> averageinterest rate increased to only 6.3 percent. This caused a declinein <strong>the</strong> real interest rate measured on a pretax basis and a larger declinein <strong>the</strong> average after-tax rate (for a person in <strong>the</strong> 30 percentbracket) from 0.5 percent to —2.7 percent.The return to saving has fallen because <strong>of</strong> corporate taxes as wellas individual taxes. Corporate income taxes decrease <strong>the</strong> returns corporationscan afford to pay to <strong>the</strong> holders <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir securities. As describedbelow, <strong>the</strong>se tax burdens also increased substantially during<strong>the</strong> 1970s, In addition, corporate taxes reduce <strong>the</strong> amount <strong>of</strong> fundsthat corporations can retain for reinvestment.At <strong>the</strong> same time that tax rules have reduced <strong>the</strong> return on savings,<strong>the</strong>y have encouraged dissaving through borrowing. Because consumerinterest payments are tax deductible, taxpayers who itemize <strong>the</strong>irdeductions are encouraged to use credit to finance <strong>the</strong>ir purchases <strong>of</strong>consumer durables and o<strong>the</strong>r goods. As inflation increased during<strong>the</strong> 1970s, <strong>the</strong> real after-tax cost <strong>of</strong> borrowing declined and eventuallybecame negative. Indeed, in <strong>the</strong> first quarter <strong>of</strong> 1980 <strong>the</strong> real aftertaxcost <strong>of</strong> borrowing for a taxpayer in <strong>the</strong> 30 percent bracket was—1.2 percent. The encouragement <strong>of</strong> borrowing to finance purchases<strong>of</strong> durable goods probably reduced <strong>the</strong> aggregate saving rate substantiallyduring <strong>the</strong> 1970s.The tax reforms supported by <strong>the</strong> <strong>President</strong> in 1981and enactedby <strong>the</strong> Congress were designed to increase saving. Reductions inmarginal tax rates raise <strong>the</strong> after-tax return to saving and <strong>the</strong> aftertaxcost <strong>of</strong> borrowing. The <strong>Economic</strong> Recovery Tax Act <strong>of</strong> 1981 willreduce <strong>the</strong> marginal tax rate facing a median income family in 1984from 28 percent, which would have occurred under pre-1981 law, to22 percent. The act immediately reduced <strong>the</strong> marginal tax rate onhigh income taxpayers, who account for a large fraction <strong>of</strong> personalsaving, from 70 to 50 percent.87


The <strong>Economic</strong> Recovery Tax Act <strong>of</strong> 1981 also contained severalo<strong>the</strong>r provisions directed specifically at encouraging private saving.The Individual Retirement Account (IRA) provisions in <strong>the</strong> tax codewere extended to cover <strong>the</strong> entire working population. Working individualsare now permitted to make a yearly tax deductible contribution<strong>of</strong> $2,000 to finance consumption during retirement. Taxes areonly paid when <strong>the</strong> funds plus accumulated interest are withdrawnfrom <strong>the</strong> IRA. Private estimates suggest a substantial response to thislegislation, with about $10 billion placed in IRAs during 1982. A crucialissue in evaluating <strong>the</strong> efficiency <strong>of</strong> IRAs is <strong>the</strong>ir effectiveness inraising saving incentives on <strong>the</strong> margin. Some critics have arguedthat IRAs do not provide an incremental incentive for saving becausecontributors can simply transfer funds from o<strong>the</strong>r sources without increasingtotal savings. While this occurs to some extent, it is certainlynot universal and will decrease in <strong>the</strong> future as contributors exhaust<strong>the</strong>ir funds available from o<strong>the</strong>r sources. The fragmentary evidenceavailable from private sources suggests that more than half <strong>of</strong> all IRAcontributors contribute less than <strong>the</strong> maximum amount allowable, indicatingthat <strong>the</strong>y do face increased saving incentives on <strong>the</strong> margin.The 1981 tax legislation also provided for an interest exclusionstarting in 1985, allowing individuals to exclude 15 percent <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>irnet interest income up to a limit <strong>of</strong> $3,000. This will also raise <strong>the</strong>return to savings and spur capital formation. Extending <strong>the</strong> exclusionto dividends as well as interest payments would reduce <strong>the</strong> tax biasfavoring debt over equity as a source <strong>of</strong> corporate finance.The 1981 tax act also raised <strong>the</strong> return to saving by reducing <strong>the</strong>top marginal rate on capital gains from 28 percent to 20 percent.This reform partially compensates for <strong>the</strong> serious distorting effect <strong>of</strong>inflation on <strong>the</strong> measurement <strong>of</strong> capital gains. Because <strong>of</strong> inflation,an owner <strong>of</strong> an asset that experiences no real appreciation will never<strong>the</strong>lessbecome liable, at <strong>the</strong> time <strong>of</strong> sale, for taxes on <strong>the</strong> nominalappreciation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> asset. Complete elimination <strong>of</strong> this distortionwould require indexation for inflation in <strong>the</strong> measurement <strong>of</strong> capitalgains.In recent years support has grown among economists and o<strong>the</strong>rtax experts for moving <strong>the</strong> tax system toward taxation <strong>of</strong> consumptionand away from taxation <strong>of</strong> income. This change might entail expanding<strong>the</strong> existing exclusions <strong>of</strong> interest and dividend income andthose mechanisms, such as IRAs, which permit tax-deferred accumulation<strong>of</strong> savings. It might also involve limiting <strong>the</strong> deduction <strong>of</strong> interestexpenses for consumer borrowing. Movement toward taxation<strong>of</strong> consumption is supported by some advocates on <strong>the</strong> grounds thattaxing individuals on what <strong>the</strong>y take from <strong>the</strong> economy is "more fair"than taxing what <strong>the</strong>y contribute to <strong>the</strong> economy. A tax system based88


on consumption taxation might also prove easier to administer than<strong>the</strong> current system because it would eliminate many <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> problemsinvolved in measuring certain types <strong>of</strong> capital income.FINANCIAL REGULATION AND PRIVATE SAVINGAn additional set <strong>of</strong> public policies that has probably discouragedprivate saving over <strong>the</strong> last several decades is <strong>the</strong> regulation <strong>of</strong> financialinstitutions. As Chart 4-3 shows, small savers holding savings accountssubject to Regulation Q,have received below market rates <strong>of</strong>interest, and holders <strong>of</strong> checking accounts have received even lowerrates <strong>of</strong> interest. These low returns are largely consequences <strong>of</strong> regulationslimiting <strong>the</strong> interest rates financial institutions may pay oncustomer deposits. As late as 1980, <strong>the</strong> spread between Treasury billrates and <strong>the</strong> yield on savings deposits subject to Regulation Q wasas great as 8 percent.The adverse effects <strong>of</strong> financial regulations on personal savinghave probably lessened considerably in recent years, due to both privateand public actions. In <strong>the</strong> private sector, <strong>the</strong> development andexplosive growth <strong>of</strong> money market funds has made it possible formost high and middle income savers to receive market rates <strong>of</strong> interest.Legislation adopted in 1982 with Administration support has allowedcommercial banks and thrift institutions to <strong>of</strong>fer financial instrumentswith competitive interest rates to a wide range <strong>of</strong> depositors.The Administration has strongly supported removal <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> manyunnecessary regulations that have impeded competition in <strong>the</strong> financialservices industry. As discussed in more detail in Chapter 5, <strong>the</strong>Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act <strong>of</strong>1980 and <strong>the</strong> Depository Institutions Act <strong>of</strong> 1982 have played importantroles in beginning this process <strong>of</strong> deregulation. Banks and thriftinstitutions can now <strong>of</strong>fer insured accounts that are competitive withmoney market funds in terms <strong>of</strong> both <strong>the</strong> interest rates <strong>the</strong>y pay and<strong>the</strong> services <strong>the</strong>y provide, <strong>the</strong>reby increasing incentives for saving.A related development has occurred in <strong>the</strong> Federal Government'spolicies regarding U.S. Savings Bonds. Savings bonds have historicallypaid low rates <strong>of</strong> return. In 1980, 10-year Treasury bonds paid11.5 percent, while Series EE Savings Bonds paid an annual yield <strong>of</strong>only 7 percent from issue to maturity 11 years later. Because <strong>of</strong> legislationrecently proposed by <strong>the</strong> <strong>President</strong> and passed by <strong>the</strong> Congress,<strong>the</strong> return on savings bonds is now based on market rates. BetweenNovember 1, 1982, and April 30, 1983, for example, U.S. SavingsBonds will earn 11.09 percent if <strong>the</strong>y are held at least 5 years.Apart from making saving more attractive to savings bond purchas-89


Chart 4-3Three-Month Treasury Bill Rate andRegulation Q Maximum Rate on Savings AccountsPERCENT PER YEAR16141210MAXIMUM RATE ONSAVINGS ACCOUNTS\1950 1955 1960 1965 19701975 1980SOURCE: BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM.ers> <strong>the</strong> new rates on Series EE bonds are desirable on equitygrounds because small savers can now obtain yields close to those receivedby <strong>the</strong>ir higher income counterparts.THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL FLOWSIt is likely that budget deficits, tax policies, and ceilings on bankinterest rates have contributed to <strong>the</strong> lower net saving rates which<strong>the</strong> United States has experienced in recent years. In <strong>the</strong>ory, however,this low level <strong>of</strong> saving need not have strictly limited <strong>the</strong> level <strong>of</strong>funds available for investment. Funds from abroad can also financeinvestment in <strong>the</strong> United States. The link between domestic investmentand domestic saving is not absolute.90


Never<strong>the</strong>less, a number <strong>of</strong> economic studies cast doubt on <strong>the</strong>proposition that <strong>the</strong> United States could <strong>of</strong>fset low domestic savingrates through sustained borrowing from abroad. These studies havefound a consistently high correlation between rates <strong>of</strong> domestic investmentand domestic saving in <strong>the</strong> major industrialized countries.While <strong>the</strong> reasons for <strong>the</strong>se results are not well understood, <strong>the</strong>y mayreflect <strong>the</strong> high information costs and serious monitoring difficultiesassociated with holding foreign investments. Whatever <strong>the</strong> exactreason for <strong>the</strong> historically high correlation between domestic savingand investment, it suggests that increasing <strong>the</strong> rate <strong>of</strong> investment in<strong>the</strong> United States significantly will probably require policy measureswhich increase domestic saving.Ins<strong>of</strong>ar as savings from abroad are available for investment in <strong>the</strong>United States, it is not clear that <strong>the</strong>y provide a desirable substitutefor domestic saving. Throughout most <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> postwar period, <strong>the</strong>United States was a net exporter <strong>of</strong> capital. However, <strong>the</strong> UnitedStates has recently experienced a large surplus in its capital accountand incurred a large <strong>of</strong>fsetting deficit in its current account. This hasentailed large merchandise trade deficits, with deleterious impacts onU.S. export industries and those domestic industries which competewith imports.THE ALLOCATION OF CAPITALWith only a relatively small fraction <strong>of</strong> GNP available to finance investment,and with large budget deficits looming over <strong>the</strong> next fewyears, <strong>the</strong> allocation <strong>of</strong> capital in <strong>the</strong> United States among alternativeuses takes on added importance. In addition to holding down <strong>the</strong>rate <strong>of</strong> national saving, previous fiscal and monetary policies havetended to alter <strong>the</strong> allocation <strong>of</strong> capital investment, favoring housing,consumer durables, and State and local construction at <strong>the</strong> expense<strong>of</strong> business investment. Inflation, caused by overly expansionarymonetary policies, and taxes interact to affect <strong>the</strong> incentives ondifferent kinds <strong>of</strong> investments. While a sound economic recovery willboost saving sufficiently to provide for increases in all forms <strong>of</strong> investment,eliminating tax-induced distortions in <strong>the</strong> allocation <strong>of</strong> capitalwould also aid in regaining a rapidly rising standard <strong>of</strong> living.It is useful to examine how <strong>the</strong> tax structure has very different effectson alternative forms <strong>of</strong> investment. The income from investmentsby corporations is taxed at both <strong>the</strong> individual and <strong>the</strong> corporatelevel. Corporate pr<strong>of</strong>its are taxed as <strong>the</strong>y are earned. When<strong>the</strong>se pr<strong>of</strong>its are received by shareholders in <strong>the</strong> form <strong>of</strong> ei<strong>the</strong>r dividendsor capital gains, <strong>the</strong>y are taxed again. By contrast, <strong>the</strong> implicitreturns from most o<strong>the</strong>r forms <strong>of</strong> investment remain untaxed. The91


services to investors in owner-occupied housing and consumer durablesare largely untaxed.The bias in our tax system against corporate capital investment wasexacerbated during <strong>the</strong> 1970s by <strong>the</strong> effects <strong>of</strong> inflation. Corporationsare permitted to take depreciation allowances based on historicra<strong>the</strong>r than replacement costs for tax purposes. Thus, as <strong>the</strong> rate <strong>of</strong>inflation increases, <strong>the</strong> real value <strong>of</strong> depreciation allowances decreases,and <strong>the</strong> tax burden as a share <strong>of</strong> real pr<strong>of</strong>its rises. Ano<strong>the</strong>rsource <strong>of</strong> inflation-induced corporate tax increases is that inflationcauses "phantom" gains in <strong>the</strong> value <strong>of</strong> inventories, raising taxes forfirms using <strong>the</strong> first-in, first-out method <strong>of</strong> inventory valuation. Onestudy estimated that <strong>the</strong> tax law's use <strong>of</strong> historic costs ra<strong>the</strong>r than replacementcosts for depreciation purposes raised corporate tax paymentsby $19.1 billion in 1977, and raised tax burdens for corporationsusing first-in, first-out inventory accounting by $7.0 billion. Although<strong>the</strong>se tax increases were partially <strong>of</strong>fset because corporationsdeduct nominal ra<strong>the</strong>r than real interest payments in calculating <strong>the</strong>irtaxable income, <strong>the</strong> gains at <strong>the</strong> corporate level from <strong>the</strong> deductibility<strong>of</strong> nominal interest are <strong>of</strong>fset to some extent by losses from taxation<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> inflation component <strong>of</strong> interest rates at <strong>the</strong> individual level.The effects <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> interaction <strong>of</strong> taxes and inflation reached dramaticproportions during <strong>the</strong> 1970s. Increased taxation led to largemarket revaluations <strong>of</strong> corporate and noncorporate capital assets.The "q ratio," which measures <strong>the</strong> market value <strong>of</strong> capital in <strong>the</strong>nonfinancial corporate sector relative to its reproduction cost, fellfrom 1.09 in 1970 to .67 in 1980. The price <strong>of</strong> single-family nonfarmdwellings relative to <strong>the</strong> price <strong>of</strong> consumption goods rose by 29 percentduring <strong>the</strong> same period. During <strong>the</strong> last 2 years <strong>of</strong> falling inflation,however, <strong>the</strong> q ratio rose to about .80 in <strong>the</strong> fourth quarter <strong>of</strong>1982, and <strong>the</strong> relative price <strong>of</strong> single-family nonfarm dwellings fell by5.3 percent.The supply <strong>of</strong> different types <strong>of</strong> capital goods ultimately dependson <strong>the</strong>ir relative prices. The observation that reductions in inflationare associated with changes in <strong>the</strong> relative prices <strong>of</strong> different capitalgoods suggests that <strong>the</strong> reductions in inflation are likely to cause areallocation <strong>of</strong> capital toward plant and equipment investment andaway from investments in consumer durables and housing. Theseshifts simply reflect <strong>the</strong> reduced magnitude <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> biases caused byour current tax system in periods <strong>of</strong> inflation.TAX POLICY AND INVESTMENTIn 1981 <strong>the</strong> Congress instituted <strong>the</strong> accelerated cost recoverysystem as part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> Recovery Tax Act. This tax legisla-92


tion permitted businesses to depreciate most purchases <strong>of</strong> equipmentaccording to an accelerated 5-year schedule. It also permitted businessesto depreciate structures over 15 years using a 175 percent decliningbalance schedule. The <strong>Economic</strong> Recovery Tax Act preserved<strong>the</strong> investment tax credit on equipment and called for fur<strong>the</strong>r accelerationsin depreciation schedules in 1985 and 1986.The 1982 Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act altered <strong>the</strong> provisions<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> Recovery Tax Act by instituting a half-basisadjustment for investment tax credits in calculating depreciation andby eliminating <strong>the</strong>. planned fur<strong>the</strong>r accelerations in depreciationschedules. Table 4-4 shows <strong>the</strong> present value <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> depreciation deductionsand investment tax credits received by a corporation under<strong>the</strong> old accelerated depreciation system, <strong>Economic</strong> Recovery Tax Act(ERTA) rules and Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act (TEFRA)rules. The present value is calculated for a variety <strong>of</strong> hypo<strong>the</strong>ticalcombinations <strong>of</strong> discount and inflation rates.TABLE 4-4.—Investment incentives 1 under different tax laws[5-year property]Real interest rateTax law4Inflation rate (percent)68101 percentPre-ERTA 2ERTATEFRA.495.516.495.473.500.480.454.486.466.436.472.4544 percentPre-ERTA 2 .ERTATEFRA.462.492.472.444.478.459.427.465.446.412.452.4357 percent.....Pre-ERTA 2 .ERTATEFRA.435.471.452.419.458.440.404.446.428.390.434.41810 percentPre-ERTA 2ERTATEFRA.412.452.435.397.440.423,384,429.412.372.418.402'Present value <strong>of</strong> depreciation deductions and investment tax credits per dollar <strong>of</strong> Investment.2 Assumes depreciation over 9.5 years using double-declining balance switching to sum <strong>of</strong> years digits.Source: Council <strong>of</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> Advisers.Three qualitative conclusions emerge from <strong>the</strong>se calculations. First,current tax laws provide significantly more stimulus to most categories<strong>of</strong> investment than did <strong>the</strong> pre-1981 law. Second, <strong>the</strong> reductionin inflation that has occurred during <strong>the</strong> past 2 years has also increasedsubstantially <strong>the</strong> value <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> depreciation allowances. Third,even with a relatively short 5-year cost recovery period, <strong>the</strong> value <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> investment incentives remains quite sensitive to <strong>the</strong> anticipatedrate <strong>of</strong> inflation.In considering <strong>the</strong> economic effects <strong>of</strong> tax policies on investment,it is crucial to distinguish between measures which apply only to newinvestment, such as accelerated depreciation and <strong>the</strong> investment taxcredit, and measures which reduce <strong>the</strong> tax burden on all kinds <strong>of</strong>93


capital income, such as corporate rate reductions. These two types <strong>of</strong>investment incentives produce very different economic effects. Measureswhich apply only to new investments affect only marginal investmentdecisions; no tax benefit is conferred on <strong>the</strong> owners <strong>of</strong> existingcapital. Therefore, in <strong>the</strong> short term more investment is stimulatedper dollar <strong>of</strong> immediate revenue loss than would prove <strong>the</strong> case if <strong>the</strong>tax benefit were conferred on all capital. The tax legislation enactedin 1981 relied on tax incentives for new investments.Incentives for new investment are viewed by some observers asbenefiting primarily large wealthholders, but <strong>the</strong> reality may bedifferent. Since measures like <strong>the</strong> accelerated cost recovery systemreduce <strong>the</strong> effective cost <strong>of</strong> purchasing new capital goods, <strong>the</strong>y arelikely to reduce <strong>the</strong> value <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> old capital goods with which <strong>the</strong>ycompete. For example, a subsidy for <strong>the</strong> purchase <strong>of</strong> new cars willreduce <strong>the</strong> value <strong>of</strong> used cars. Likewise, reduced taxation <strong>of</strong> new investmentmay temporarily reduce <strong>the</strong> level <strong>of</strong> stock market prices,which in part reflects <strong>the</strong> market's valuation <strong>of</strong> existing capital. Thus,investment incentives like those recently enacted, while raising <strong>the</strong>rate <strong>of</strong> return on new investments, may actually hurt holders <strong>of</strong> existingwealth. Workers should benefit as greater capital accumulationraises <strong>the</strong>ir productivity and wages. The effect on <strong>the</strong> distribution <strong>of</strong>income is ambiguous* and might even prove progressive.Beginning with <strong>the</strong> enactment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> accelerated depreciation provisionsin 1954, policy has tended to rely on investment incentivesthat stimulate new investment and do not benefit existing investments.This continued reliance on measures that benefit new capitalat <strong>the</strong> expense <strong>of</strong> existing capital carries a subtle but real risk. As investorscome to anticipate this pattern <strong>of</strong> public policy, <strong>the</strong>y may takeinto account expected future changes in tax laws as <strong>the</strong>y make investmentdecisions. This might have an unintended effect. Investors whoexpect capital losses are less likely to invest. Stated differently, if <strong>the</strong>effective purchase price <strong>of</strong> new capital goods is expected to declinebecause <strong>of</strong> tax reforms, <strong>the</strong>re will be a tendency to defer investments.This suggests that in designing future reforms it may be desirable toconsider reducing taxes on existing as well as new capital.While current tax law provides significantly more stimulus to investmentthan did earlier law, <strong>the</strong>re is room for fur<strong>the</strong>r reform. Thevalue <strong>of</strong> depreciation allowances is still dependent on <strong>the</strong> rate <strong>of</strong> inflation,increasing <strong>the</strong> uncertainty <strong>of</strong> investment decisions. The acceleration<strong>of</strong> depreciation allowances has substantially reduced <strong>the</strong>burden <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> corporate income tax, but investment in plant andequipment is still discouraged by taxes on dividends and capitalgains.94


A final problem under current tax law is <strong>the</strong> treatment <strong>of</strong> corporatelosses. Because <strong>of</strong> low pr<strong>of</strong>its due to cyclical conditions, or large depreciationwrite-<strong>of</strong>fs, many corporations do not have taxable incomein some years, reducing <strong>the</strong> efficacy <strong>of</strong> investment incentives duringthose periods.CONCLUSIONSThe tax programs put in place in <strong>the</strong> last 2 years should play animportant role in increasing capital formation in <strong>the</strong> United States.Yet, much more can be done to ensure a rapidly growing standard <strong>of</strong>living in coming years. It is crucial that we take action to reduce largeFederal deficits and to fur<strong>the</strong>r stimulate private saving and investment.In considering <strong>the</strong> issue <strong>of</strong> capital formation, policymakers shouldtake a long view. The reasons for increasing capital formation primarilyinvolve long-run growth ra<strong>the</strong>r than current economic conditions.We should not allow <strong>the</strong> poor performance <strong>of</strong> investmentduring a period <strong>of</strong> recession and high deficits to blind us to <strong>the</strong> importance<strong>of</strong> policies that can help us achieve sustained and rapid economicgrowth in <strong>the</strong> years to come.95


CHAPTER 5The Burden <strong>of</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> RegulationFOR MANY DECADES, <strong>the</strong> Federal Government has regulated <strong>the</strong>prices and <strong>the</strong> conditions for entry in certain sectors <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> U.S.economy. This type <strong>of</strong> regulation, <strong>of</strong>ten called "economic regulation,*'was broadly applied to <strong>the</strong> transportation, communications,and financial sectors <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> economy. Whatever historical purposeswere served by economic regulation, <strong>the</strong>re is an increasing consensusthat much <strong>of</strong> this Federal regulation no longer serves <strong>the</strong> interests <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> contemporary economy. Indeed, over <strong>the</strong> last several years a substantialpart <strong>of</strong> this economic regulation has been relaxed or eliminated.A second form <strong>of</strong> regulation, "social regulation," is addressed tosituations where unregulated activity may pose significant threats topublic health, safety, or <strong>the</strong> environment. Although <strong>the</strong>re is an increasingconsensus that economic regulation should be substantiallyreduced, no such consensus exists concerning social regulation. Also,unlike economic regulation, <strong>the</strong> magnitude <strong>of</strong> social regulation hasgrown rapidly since <strong>the</strong> mid-1960s with <strong>the</strong> passage <strong>of</strong> extensive environmentaland safety legislation.<strong>Economic</strong> regulation has diminished in recent years due to a variety<strong>of</strong> deregulation measures. Substantial evidence is now availableconcerning <strong>the</strong> performance <strong>of</strong> industries that have experienced fullor partial deregulation. This chapter summarizes <strong>the</strong> history <strong>of</strong> Federaleconomic regulation, its rationale, its impacts, and <strong>the</strong> effects <strong>of</strong>recent laws designed to ease economic regulation. The chapter alsoidentifies some opportunities for fur<strong>the</strong>r deregulation. Special attentionis given to <strong>the</strong> economic regulation <strong>of</strong> energy, transportation,communications, and financial markets.A BRIEF HISTORY OF ECONOMIC REGULATIONThe first broad body <strong>of</strong> Federal economic regulation was establishedin 1887, when <strong>the</strong> Congress created <strong>the</strong> Interstate CommerceCommission (ICC) to resolve <strong>the</strong> increasing controversies between<strong>the</strong> railroads and shippers. Most <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> regulation <strong>of</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r sectors,except for energy, was established by <strong>the</strong> end <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1930s and re-96


fleeted efforts to deal with problems similar to those that led to <strong>the</strong>creation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ICC. The agencies created in <strong>the</strong> 1930s tended to operatein much <strong>the</strong> same way as <strong>the</strong> ICC, and <strong>the</strong> outcome was much<strong>the</strong> same.<strong>Economic</strong> regulation <strong>of</strong>ten evolved from a dispute among several groups. Forexample, <strong>the</strong> Federal Communications Commission (FCC) was createdto resolve disputes among users <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> broadcast spectrum. TheCivil Aeronautics Board (CAB) was created to resolve a disputeamong several Federal agencies concerning <strong>the</strong> administration <strong>of</strong> airmailcontracts.Congress delegated direct resolution <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se disputes to an independent agencywith very general authority. The typical "public convenience and necessity"standard cited in <strong>the</strong> enabling legislation provides no direct guidanceabout how <strong>the</strong> regulatory agencies should resolve disputes. Theindependent commissions are essentially quasi-judicial institutionsthat have developed <strong>the</strong>ir own bodies <strong>of</strong> administrative law.The initial regulations <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> independent agencies <strong>of</strong>ten served <strong>the</strong> interests <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> regulated industry. For example, some scholars contend that <strong>the</strong>ICC, by initially reinforcing <strong>the</strong> railroad cartels, caused higher averageprices and reduced <strong>the</strong> variance <strong>of</strong> prices. For a long time, both<strong>the</strong> CAB and <strong>the</strong> FCC restricted entry to <strong>the</strong> number <strong>of</strong> firms operatingat <strong>the</strong> time <strong>the</strong>se commissions were created.The initial regulation led to more regulation that served to protect <strong>the</strong> interests<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> initially regulated firms. For example, ICC regulation was extendedto trucks, buses, freight-forwarders, and barges, thus restraining<strong>the</strong> developing competition to <strong>the</strong> railroads. FCC regulation wasextended to cable television, protecting broadcasters using <strong>the</strong> frequencyspectrum.Over <strong>the</strong> long run, many economic regulations have not served <strong>the</strong> interests <strong>of</strong>ei<strong>the</strong>r producers or consumers. The development <strong>of</strong> excess capacity, relativelyhigh wages, restraints on technological improvements and operatingpractices, and competition outside <strong>the</strong> regulated environmentled to <strong>the</strong> lower-than-average rates <strong>of</strong> return in many <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> regulatedindustries. Consumers have <strong>of</strong>ten been adversely affected byhigher prices and restrictions on service.One o<strong>the</strong>r pattern <strong>of</strong> economic regulation was introduced in <strong>the</strong>1930s. A belief that <strong>the</strong> depression was caused by excessive competitionprovided a rationale for many laws and regulations that directlyrestricted entry, output, and competition. The broadest such law, <strong>the</strong>National Industrial Recovery Act, was declared unconstitutional;o<strong>the</strong>r similar legislation, such as <strong>the</strong> Agricultural Adjustment Act <strong>of</strong>1938, is still in force. One might argue that <strong>the</strong> several regulatorycommissions and laws approved in <strong>the</strong> 1930s achieved <strong>the</strong>ir intended97


effect <strong>of</strong> raising prices. A later generation questioned whe<strong>the</strong>r thiseffect was desirable.THE TRADITIONAL RATIONALE FOR ECONOMIC REGULATIONThe two traditional justifications for economic regulation havebeen to preserve <strong>the</strong> potential economic efficiencies associated withnatural monopoly in some industries and to eliminate <strong>the</strong> inefficienciesthought to be associated with excessive competition in o<strong>the</strong>rs.Natural MonopolyA natural monopoly exists when <strong>the</strong> entire relevant demand for agood or service can be satisfied at <strong>the</strong> least total cost by a single firm.At <strong>the</strong> local level it is probably wasteful to have duplicate distributionsystems to provide telephone, electric, gas, and water services.Among industries regulated at <strong>the</strong> Federal level, major gas pipelinesand high-voltage electric lines are <strong>of</strong>ten considered natural monopolies.Long-distance telephone transmission may also be a natural monopolyin areas <strong>of</strong> low density. Railroads are a potential natural monopolyonly for that declining share <strong>of</strong> rail traffic for which <strong>the</strong> shipperdoes not have an effective choice <strong>of</strong> carrier or mode <strong>of</strong> transport.Such industries present a dilemma. Competition may result in unnecessarilyhigh production costs through duplication <strong>of</strong> facilities, butan unregulated monopoly may not act in <strong>the</strong> public interest. Withoutregulation, a monopoly would probably set prices too high and producetoo little, with consumers willing to pay more for additionaloutput than <strong>the</strong> cost <strong>of</strong> supplying that output. A typical solution tothis dilemma is maximum price regulation. The primary objective <strong>of</strong>price regulation is to set <strong>the</strong> monopoly's price as close as possible toincremental cost while still assuring <strong>the</strong> monopoly a market rate <strong>of</strong>return on its investment.The growth <strong>of</strong> demand or <strong>the</strong> introduction <strong>of</strong> substitutes for aproduct can <strong>of</strong>ten transform a natural monopoly into what—in <strong>the</strong>absence <strong>of</strong> regulation—could become an effectively competitive industry.Oil pipelines, for example, are <strong>of</strong>ten assumed to be naturalmonopolies. However, <strong>the</strong>se pipelines now face competition fromo<strong>the</strong>r pipelines and o<strong>the</strong>r modes <strong>of</strong> transportation. Regrettably, priceregulation <strong>of</strong>ten continues long after it is efficient, restricting <strong>the</strong>emergence <strong>of</strong> a competitive market. The history <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> railroads providesa compelling illustration. In many parts <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> country rail lineswere few and far between in <strong>the</strong> 19th century. But as <strong>the</strong> market fortransportation services grew, and as technology developed, automobiles,buses, and airplanes provided increasing competition forpassenger traffic, and trucks, barges, and pipelines provided increasingcompetition for freight. The natural monopoly justification for98


egulation was probably not applicable in most rail markets by <strong>the</strong>middle <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 20th century.Even in markets where elements <strong>of</strong> natural monopoly still exist,government intervention will not necessarily produce a more efficientuse <strong>of</strong> resources. Increasingly, analysts are coming to recognize that,just as <strong>the</strong>re are market imperfections, <strong>the</strong>re are also government imperfectionsthat must be considered in making public policy choices.The relevant trade<strong>of</strong>fs are not between imperfect markets and flawlessgovernment regulation, but ra<strong>the</strong>r between markets with imperfectionsand regulation which is imprecise and sometimes counterproductive.Excessive CompetitionThe second traditional justification for economic regulation is thatunfettered markets result in excessive competition. This justification wasused for regulating railroads in <strong>the</strong> late 19th century and o<strong>the</strong>r industriesin <strong>the</strong> 1930s. A common element in early discussions <strong>of</strong> excessivecompetition was that without regulation, unrestrained rivalryamong firms would result in losses for some or all <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>m and thatadequate production <strong>of</strong> an o<strong>the</strong>rwise viable product would prove unsustainable.This argument, which was <strong>of</strong>ten ra<strong>the</strong>r vague, failed tonote that business losses are not a sufficient basis for government intervention.Losses and business failures are a normal part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> operation<strong>of</strong> competitive markets; <strong>the</strong>y act to eliminate inefficient firmsand to shift production to meet changes in consumer demands.While <strong>the</strong> concept <strong>of</strong> excessive competition was not generally welldefined, it has now come to refer to at least four possible sources <strong>of</strong>market imperfection: natural monopoly, cyclical demand with imperfectcapital markets, predatory pricing, and suboptimal product quality.As explained earlier, where natural monopoly conditions exist,competition among several firms can lead to higher costs because <strong>of</strong>wasteful duplication.A second interpretation <strong>of</strong> excessive competition is based on <strong>the</strong>argument that certain industries, particularly those with cyclicaldemand and heavy fixed investment, are prone to excessive pricefluctuations. According to this argument, firms are forced to closedown during recessions and <strong>the</strong>n unnecessarily incur large start-upcosts during recovery because <strong>of</strong> alleged imperfections in capitalmarkets. These wasteful shutdown and start-up costs are avoidable, itis argued, if government regulation sets minimum prices or allowsfirms to do so.A third definition <strong>of</strong> excessive competition focuses on <strong>the</strong> concept<strong>of</strong> predatory pricing. Unregulated competition in some markets is allegedto result in monopolization by a firm that engages in predatory99


pricing—setting prices below cost in order to drive out competitors.To succeed, a predator must outlast its rivals and barriers must existto prevent <strong>the</strong> entry <strong>of</strong> new competitors once <strong>the</strong> predator raisesprices. Regulation to prevent firms from charging excessively lowprices is intended to prevent such predatory practices and hence <strong>the</strong>higher monopolistic prices that would prevail once <strong>the</strong> predator haseliminated its competitors. No consensus exists among economiststhat such predatory tactics are effective. Indeed, many economists believethat apparently "predatory" behavior, if ever successful, is amanifestation <strong>of</strong> cost advantages or an enhanced ability to bear risk.A fourth interpretation concerns <strong>the</strong> alleged tendency <strong>of</strong> certaincompetitive markets to produce goods or services <strong>of</strong> inadequate quality,safety, or reliability if consumers are imperfectly informed aboutthose characteristics. For example, it has been argued that undercompetitive pressure banks might choose excessively risky investmentsin order to <strong>of</strong>fer <strong>the</strong>ir customers high rates <strong>of</strong> interest on deposits.Similarly, some have claimed that airlines may skimp on safetyin a highly competitive market. Even if such claims were true, it doesnot follow that restricting competition will necessarily improve qualityor safety. Moreover, <strong>the</strong>re are more direct ways <strong>of</strong> addressing<strong>the</strong>se potential market defects, such as Federal Aviation Administrationairplane safety inspections and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporationguarantees.PROBLEMS OF ECONOMIC REGULATIONMost economists agree that <strong>the</strong> regulation <strong>of</strong> price and entry inmarkets that would o<strong>the</strong>rwise be competitive is inefficient. Regulation<strong>of</strong> transportation, for example, has generally resulted in higherprices, higher production costs, and slower technological growth.Regulation <strong>of</strong> oil and gas prices has occasionally kept prices too low,causing shortages and inefficient choices among competing fuels.Deregulation usually leads to a reduction in cost to <strong>the</strong> marginaluser, whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> discarded regulations established maximum orminimum prices. A price kept below <strong>the</strong> market price by regulationhas <strong>the</strong> effect <strong>of</strong> creating a system <strong>of</strong> nonprice rationing in which excludedconsumers are forced to pay higher prices for substitutes. Theelimination <strong>of</strong> maximum price ceilings may lead to higher averageprices but lower prices to <strong>the</strong> marginal consumer. Exceptions to thisconclusion are where natural monopoly conditions exist or whereregulations lead to some cross-subsidy among consumers.In some cases, price regulation leads to an excessively high level <strong>of</strong>some service characteristic, because firms are prevented from competingon price. Because <strong>of</strong> price regulation <strong>of</strong> airlines by <strong>the</strong> Civil100


Aeronautics Board, for example, <strong>the</strong> airlines competed primarilythrough frequency <strong>of</strong> flights, which led to low load factors and considerableexcess capacity.Direct economic inefficiencies are not <strong>the</strong> only costs <strong>of</strong> rate andentry regulation in inherently competitive industries. Some additionalresources are used to lobby politicians and regulators for favorableregulatory actions. The greater <strong>the</strong> benefits to groups created by regulation,<strong>the</strong> more such groups have an incentive to spend to blockderegulation. The magnitude <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> benefits defended are <strong>of</strong>ten substantial.Trucking firms have sold operating rights, initially granted<strong>the</strong>m by <strong>the</strong> ICC, for over $20 million, and <strong>the</strong> broadcast rights <strong>of</strong>individual television stations have sold for substantially more.The argument that full deregulation is <strong>the</strong> appropriate policy forindustries with competitive market structures applies strictly only in<strong>the</strong> long run. To minimize <strong>the</strong> risk <strong>of</strong> adverse short-run consequencesfrom deregulation, most deregulatory initiatives have calledfor ei<strong>the</strong>r partial deregulation or a gradual transition to full deregulation.The Civil Aeronautics Board was not immediately abolished by<strong>the</strong> Congress, and it retained some temporary domestic authoritythrough 1982. The Staggers Rail Act provided railroads with greaterprice flexibility but did not provide for eventual elimination <strong>of</strong> allprice and entry controls. The Natural Gas Policy Act provides foronly partial deregulation <strong>of</strong> natural gas prices.It is not clear how much information about <strong>the</strong> long-run benefits<strong>of</strong> deregulation can be obtained by observing <strong>the</strong> process <strong>of</strong> gradualor partial deregulation. For example, minimum price regulation maycause excess capacity in an industry. When deregulation occurs, somefirms in <strong>the</strong> industry may go bankrupt. This may lead some to considerderegulation a failure and to propose re-regulation. Once <strong>the</strong>excess capacity is eliminated, however, <strong>the</strong> industry may operatepr<strong>of</strong>itably without any regulation.Economists can <strong>of</strong>fer one important piece <strong>of</strong> advice on partial deregulation:relaxing price restrictions without also relaxing entry restrictionsmay cause problems, such as developed in <strong>the</strong> air freightmarket. Eliminating minimum price constraints while barring entrymay result in predation. Eliminating maxium price restrictions withoutallowing free entry may result in monopoly pricing.Competitive economic forces, while powerful, are not <strong>the</strong> onlymeans available to consumers <strong>of</strong> products from deregulated industriesto defend <strong>the</strong>mselves. Antitrust policies may also be used toprotect consumers against <strong>the</strong> abuses regulation is sometimesclaimed to prevent. The antitrust laws prohibit anticompetitive behavior.Since regulated industries have <strong>of</strong>ten enjoyed broad exemptionsfrom <strong>the</strong> antitrust laws, a review <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> antitrust policies per-101


taining to <strong>the</strong>se industries should accompany <strong>the</strong> deregulation process.At <strong>the</strong> same time, however, it is important to avoid misusing <strong>the</strong>antitrust laws to maintain inappropriate types <strong>of</strong> regulation.ENERGY POLICYThe pricing and allocation <strong>of</strong> energy resources was a frequentfocus <strong>of</strong> public policies over <strong>the</strong> last decade. Many <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se policiesreduced <strong>the</strong> long-run supply <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se important resources. In <strong>the</strong> lastfew years, several measures have been taken to remove <strong>the</strong> inefficienciesand uncertainty caused by <strong>the</strong>se policies.STEPS TOWARD A MARKET-ORIENTED OIL POLICYIn January 1981, <strong>President</strong> Reagan ended <strong>the</strong> petroleum price andallocation controls that were previously scheduled to expire in September1981. Oil prices were first directly controlled as part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>general system <strong>of</strong> wage and price guidelines imposed in 1971. Thedata on subsequent production, drilling, consumption, imports, and<strong>the</strong> energy/gross national product (GNP) ratio suggest that oil pricederegulation has had many beneficial effects.Despite <strong>the</strong> disincentives provided by <strong>the</strong> "windfall pr<strong>of</strong>its"(excise) tax on crude oil, <strong>the</strong> data suggest that decontrol has reversed<strong>the</strong> steady decline in production (exclusive <strong>of</strong> Alaska) observedduring <strong>the</strong> period <strong>of</strong> price controls. As <strong>of</strong> October 1982, <strong>the</strong>re wereseven consecutive monthly production increases over year-earlierlevels, a series <strong>of</strong> increases not observed in <strong>the</strong> United States for 10years. <strong>Report</strong>ed oil well completions in 1982 were 49 percent higherthan in 1980, despite <strong>the</strong> recent decline in real oil prices.Since full decontrol, U.S. consumption has decreased by almost 11percent. While part <strong>of</strong> this decline is due to <strong>the</strong> recession, a majorcause is <strong>the</strong> continuing adjustment to <strong>the</strong> price increases <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>1970s. Since decontrol, <strong>the</strong> energy/GNP ratio has declined by over 5percent and imports (net <strong>of</strong> additions to <strong>the</strong> Strategic Petroleum Reserve)have declined by about 34 percent. The elimination <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> regulatoryframework for petroleum prices removed <strong>the</strong> artificial incentivesto import crude oil and residual fuel oil. The weakening <strong>of</strong> oilprices has contributed to a stronger dollar and, thus, to lower priceson all imported products.NATURAL GAS PRICING AND ALLOCATIONFollowing <strong>the</strong> 1954 Supreme Court decision in Phillips Petroleum Co.v. Wisconsin, <strong>the</strong> wellhead prices <strong>of</strong> natural gas sold in interstate commercewere regulated by <strong>the</strong> Federal Power Commission (FPC). Sinceintrastate gas prices were not subject to regulation, a two-market102


system resulted. Price controls, when effective, led to shortages in<strong>the</strong> interstate market both because <strong>the</strong> interstate pipelines could notcompete effectively against intrastate pipelines for gas supplies, andbecause artificially low prices encouraged consumers to demandmore natural gas than <strong>the</strong>y would have o<strong>the</strong>rwise.Rising oil prices in <strong>the</strong> 1970s triggered occasional gas shortages ininterstate markets. Industrial use <strong>of</strong> gas was curtailed during periods<strong>of</strong> shortages, and many potential users <strong>of</strong> gas, both at <strong>the</strong> industrialand residential level, were proscribed from using gas. The abnormallycold winter <strong>of</strong> 1977 produced a severe interstate gas shortage, resultingin numerous factory shutdowns, thousands <strong>of</strong> lay<strong>of</strong>fs, ando<strong>the</strong>r serious problems. It was evident by <strong>the</strong> mid-1970s that <strong>the</strong> existingsystem <strong>of</strong> wellhead price controls produced serious inefficienciescausing <strong>the</strong> underproduction <strong>of</strong> gas for <strong>the</strong> interstate market and<strong>the</strong> misallocation <strong>of</strong> gas between <strong>the</strong> interstate and intrastate marketsand among different users within <strong>the</strong> interstate markets.The Natural Gas Policy Act <strong>of</strong> 1978The natural gas regulatory environment was changed substantiallyby passage <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Natural Gas Policy Act (NGPA) in 1978. This actwas intended to encourage production by deregulating <strong>the</strong> prices <strong>of</strong>newly discovered gas while restraining <strong>the</strong> growth <strong>of</strong> average gasprices through permanent controls on <strong>the</strong> price <strong>of</strong> older gas. TheFederal Energy Regulatory Commission replaced <strong>the</strong> Federal PowerCommission, and price controls were extended to gas sold in intrastatemarkets. Over twenty regulated categories <strong>of</strong> gas were created,each with its own initial ceiling price and rules for price escalationover time.The NGPA provides for <strong>the</strong> phased deregulation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> wellheadprice <strong>of</strong> most gas discovered after 1977, which should account for 40to 60 percent <strong>of</strong> all gas in January 1985, while a smaller volume <strong>of</strong>gas is scheduled for deregulation in July 1987. A small amount <strong>of</strong>high-cost new gas was deregulated under <strong>the</strong> NGPA in 1979. Mostgas to be deregulated in 1985 or 1987 is fixed until those dates at aprice, in inflation-adjusted dollars, leading to <strong>the</strong> oil equivalent pricelevel existing in 1978. The NGPA also includes "incremental pricing"provisions intended to allocate high-priced gas to industrial users,thus preserving lower prices for o<strong>the</strong>r users. Along with <strong>the</strong> NGPA,<strong>the</strong> Congress passed <strong>the</strong> Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act; thislaw authorizes nonprice rationing <strong>of</strong> gas to counter <strong>the</strong> problems inherentin continued price controls.As with many efforts to regulate prices, <strong>the</strong> NGPA has created numerousproblems. Instead <strong>of</strong> producing <strong>the</strong> lowest cost gas suppliesfirst and moving successively to higher cost sources, producers areinduced by <strong>the</strong> different price categories to produce high-cost gas103


first in many cases, and generally to shift production efforts awayfrom cost-minimizing alternatives. The initial boom in <strong>the</strong> production<strong>of</strong> deep gas illustrated this effect.Fur<strong>the</strong>r problems arise from <strong>the</strong> control <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> prices <strong>of</strong> new gasuntil those prices are decontrolled in 1985 and 1987. Since oil priceshave risen substantially since 1978, partial decontrol will generate acontinued increase in delivered gas prices in 1985 as consumers bidup gas prices to levels equivalent with those <strong>of</strong> close substitutes suchas oil. Although real gas prices have risen and real oil prices havefallen in <strong>the</strong> last year, average real domestic wellhead prices <strong>of</strong> gaswill rise by about 28 percent between 1983 and 1985 if <strong>the</strong>re is nochange in <strong>the</strong> NGPA according to a preliminary Department <strong>of</strong>Energy estimate.The price <strong>of</strong> decontrolled gas is averaged with <strong>the</strong> price <strong>of</strong> controlledgas in determining <strong>the</strong> price to gas users and <strong>the</strong> demand forgas is affected by prices for fuel substitutes. This is reflected in preliminaryDepartment <strong>of</strong> Energy estimates which indicate that <strong>the</strong>average 1985 prices <strong>of</strong> gas under <strong>the</strong> NGPA are not likely to differgreatly from those that would evolve under full decontrol. Under <strong>the</strong>partial decontrol authorized by NGPA, <strong>the</strong> prices <strong>of</strong> decontrolled gasare bid up somewhat above <strong>the</strong> levels that would be observed in afully decontrolled market. Indeed, even now decontrolled deep gas isbeing sold at <strong>the</strong> wellhead for over $7.00 per million cubic feet. Thepreliminary Department <strong>of</strong> Energy estimates suggest that <strong>the</strong> average1985 price under full decontrol will be $3.78 per million cubic feet(both in 1982 dollars).The higher prices to be paid for decontrolled gas in 1985 and<strong>the</strong>reafter suggest that <strong>the</strong> average gas consumer will not benefitfrom <strong>the</strong> remaining controls, and that <strong>the</strong> primary beneficiaries willbe <strong>the</strong> producers <strong>of</strong> decontrolled gas. Under <strong>the</strong> NGPA, however,different groups <strong>of</strong> consumers will fare differently. Pipelines withaccess to substantial quantities <strong>of</strong> price-controlled gas will be able tobid deregulated gas away from o<strong>the</strong>r pipelines. This is because <strong>the</strong>higher prices on decontrolled gas can be averaged with <strong>the</strong> lowerprices paid for gas still subject to controls.This means, for some period, that consumers in different regionsmay face different average prices, and that some gas will be reallocatedartifically because <strong>of</strong> differential access to controlled gas. In particular,<strong>the</strong> intrastate pipelines will have relatively little access to controlledgas, and so some amount <strong>of</strong> gas will shift out <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> intrastatemarket into <strong>the</strong> interstate market. Interstate pipelines also will vary in<strong>the</strong>ir ability to bid for decontrolled gas, depending on <strong>the</strong>ir access tocontrolled gas and <strong>the</strong> actions <strong>of</strong> local regulatory authorities. In summary,in addition to <strong>the</strong> waste in gas production caused by <strong>the</strong>104


NGPA, both controlled and decontrolled gas will be allocated inefficientlyamong pipelines. The preliminary Department <strong>of</strong> Energy estimate<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> present value <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> efficiency gain that would accrue to<strong>the</strong> economy from full gas decontrol in 1983, relative to <strong>the</strong> partialderegulation authorized by <strong>the</strong> NGPA, is about $4.2 billion (in 1982dollars).The prospect <strong>of</strong> a price increase in 1985 may provide an impetustoward extension <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> NGPA price controls beyond 1985. Such anextension would sustain <strong>the</strong> inefficiencies experienced as a result <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> NGPA. The preliminary Department <strong>of</strong> Energy estimate <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>present value <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> efficiency gain <strong>of</strong> full decontrol in 1983, relativeto extension to 1995 <strong>of</strong> price controls now imposed by <strong>the</strong> NGPA, isabout $27 billion (in 1982 dollars). Because gas production would bereduced by extension <strong>of</strong> controls, oil consumption would probablyincrease. The preliminary Department <strong>of</strong> Energy estimate is that extension<strong>of</strong> gas price controls would increase oil import levels byabout 288,000 barrels per day between 1983 and 1995.<strong>Report</strong>ed gas well completions in 1982 increased 21 percent over1980, while under full decontrol, reported oil well completions increasedby 49 percent in <strong>the</strong> same period. Total proved gas reserves(excluding Prudhoe Bay) declined over one-third during <strong>the</strong> 1970s.The extension <strong>of</strong> controls thus would have very serious implicationsfor future domestic gas reserves.Recent Natural Gas Price DevelopmentsNatural gas prices have risen sharply in recent months because gascontrolled at relatively low prices is gradually becoming a smallercomponent <strong>of</strong> total production and because some contracts fixingvery low prices have expired. Moreover, <strong>the</strong> NGPA allows price increasesfor some gas beyond a simple inflation adjustment. While itappears that gas prices in some regions have reached short-termmarket clearing levels, that is not true for o<strong>the</strong>r regions. On average,gas prices are still apparently below market clearing levels—hence,<strong>the</strong> expected price increase in 1985 under <strong>the</strong> path outlined by <strong>the</strong>NGPA.Some observers have noted that pipelines are buying expensive gaswhile gas subject to lower price ceilings remains unsold. They haveconcluded from this that gas markets are "irrational," and that fullprice decontrol would not work effectively. This analysis is questionable.Under "take-or-pay" contracts, pipelines agree to pay for agiven volume <strong>of</strong> gas whe<strong>the</strong>r or not <strong>the</strong>y resell ("take") it. Sinceprice controls have prevented pipelines from competing for gas on<strong>the</strong> basis <strong>of</strong> price, <strong>the</strong>y compete on <strong>the</strong> basis <strong>of</strong> contract terms. Increased"take-or-pay" contractual requirements are one form <strong>of</strong> suchnonprice competition. This behavior is a rational response to <strong>the</strong> ar-105


tificial constraints imposed by price controls and <strong>the</strong> general expectation<strong>of</strong> future shortages. In essence, increased "take-or-pay*' requirementsare a way for pipelines (and implicitly <strong>the</strong>ir customers) to buyinsurance against future shortages. Pipelines with high levels <strong>of</strong>"take-or-pay" commitments must now take and pay for relatively expensivegas, even though "cheaper** gas is available. This is "irrational"only in hindsight since surpluses <strong>of</strong> gas exist. If shortages haddeveloped instead, <strong>the</strong> use <strong>of</strong> "take-or-pay*' commitments would lookquite rational and "farsighted."EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESSConditions in <strong>the</strong> world oil market and preceptions about <strong>the</strong> effects<strong>of</strong> supply disruptions have both changed substantially in <strong>the</strong> lastseveral years. Trends in world oil production and consumption aresimilar to those <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States. World (non-Communist) consumptionfell from 51.5 million barrels per day (mmbd) in 1978 to45.5 mmbd in 1982. Production outside <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Organization <strong>of</strong> PetroleumExporting Countries (including Communist nations) increasedfrom 30.3 mmbd in 1978 to 34.3 mmbd in 1982 (for <strong>the</strong> first 10months). Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, excess production capacity in OPEC has increasedto at least 8.5 mmbd. It is likely that a future oil supply disruption,should one occur, would have smaller proportionate priceeffects than those caused by disruptions during <strong>the</strong> 1970's. Both <strong>the</strong>increasing geographic diversification <strong>of</strong> production and <strong>the</strong> presence<strong>of</strong> substantial excess production capacity would mitigate <strong>the</strong> effect <strong>of</strong>future disruptions.The threat to use oil production as a political weapon may be lesseffective <strong>the</strong>n was previously perceived. It is very difficult to "target*'individual nations with such a weapon because <strong>the</strong> international oiltransport industry has substantial capacity to transfer oil among nations.This is why <strong>the</strong> United States and <strong>the</strong> Ne<strong>the</strong>rlands, despite<strong>the</strong>ir status as <strong>the</strong> intended targets <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1973 embargo, faced <strong>the</strong>same prices for imported oil as o<strong>the</strong>r oil-importing nations. Gasolinelines in <strong>the</strong> United States were caused by <strong>the</strong> U.S. regulations. Equallyimportant, oil producers cannot impose large penalties upono<strong>the</strong>rs without imposing substantial revenue losses upon <strong>the</strong>mselves.The policies <strong>of</strong> this Administration reflect <strong>the</strong> view that preparationfor disruptions in energy supplies can best take place through<strong>the</strong> operation <strong>of</strong> market forces, and that price adjustments present<strong>the</strong> most effective mechanism for dealing with such disruptions when<strong>the</strong>y occur. Minimizing <strong>the</strong> aggregate adverse effects <strong>of</strong> energysupply disruptions is most efficiently accomplished by allowing pricesto allocate available supplies to <strong>the</strong>ir most productive uses and by encouragingmarket forces to increase production <strong>of</strong> substitute fuels.106


Price and allocation controls only redistribute some <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> adverse effects<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> disruption away from politically favored groups, <strong>the</strong>reforemaking matters worse for o<strong>the</strong>r groups. In <strong>the</strong> aggregate, price andallocation controls would exacerbate <strong>the</strong> adverse effects <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> disruption.Standby controls, even if never implemented, are harmful because<strong>the</strong>y increase <strong>the</strong> perceived likelihood that controls will be imposedand <strong>the</strong>reby deter private preparedness. This is why <strong>the</strong> <strong>President</strong>vetoed <strong>the</strong> standby controls legislation in March 1982.Present policies also reflect a recognition that firms may have insufficientincentives to prepare for energy supply disruptions, in substantialpart because <strong>of</strong> past government policy. Previous price andallocation controls had <strong>the</strong> effect <strong>of</strong> penalizing those who had preparedfor disruptions and subsidizing those who had not. Because <strong>of</strong>governmental responses to energy supply disruptions in <strong>the</strong> past, and<strong>the</strong> recent congressional proposal to establish standby price and allocationcontrols, firms must regard as substantial <strong>the</strong> likelihood thatcontrols would be imposed once again, despite this Administration'sfirm commitment to avoid such policies. This expectation discouragesboth those who expect to benefit from controls and those whoexpect to have <strong>the</strong>ir supplies appropriated from preparing sufficientlyfor a disruption beforehand.In recognition <strong>of</strong> this perverse effect <strong>of</strong> past policy, <strong>the</strong> Administrationis striving to build up crude oil stocks in <strong>the</strong> Strategic PetroleumReserve (SPR) at an efficient rate. Built up to only slightly more than100 million barrels from 1977 until early 1981, <strong>the</strong> SPR now containsover 290 million barrels and is growing steadily toward.<strong>the</strong> plannedlevel <strong>of</strong> 750 million barrels. The SPR is intended to supplement, notsubstitute for, private sector stocks; accordingly, it would be usedonly in <strong>the</strong> event <strong>of</strong> a severe disruption. Once a decision was made touse SPR crude oil, it would be sold at market-clearing prices towhomever wished to purchase it. The Strategic Petroleum ReservePlan submitted to <strong>the</strong> Congress in December 1982 contains a provisionallowing <strong>the</strong> Secretary <strong>of</strong> Energy to reserve for special groupsfaced with extraordinary circumstances up to 10 percent <strong>of</strong> a givenperiod's drawdown; oil allocated under this provision would bepriced at <strong>the</strong> level established in <strong>the</strong> most recent competitive auction<strong>of</strong> SPR crude oil. This provision is not intended as a subsidy for particulargroups. The policy <strong>of</strong> this Administration to fill <strong>the</strong> SPR at asteady rate will move energy security preparedness in <strong>the</strong> UnitedStates toward a more optimal level. To <strong>the</strong> extent that <strong>the</strong> availability<strong>of</strong> SPR crude oil, combined with o<strong>the</strong>r energy policies and programs,enables future Administrations to resist pressures for price and allo-107


cation controls during a disruption, <strong>the</strong> SPR may enhance privatesector preparation as well.Except to <strong>the</strong> extent that use <strong>of</strong> foreign energy supplies is increasedartificially by price controls and o<strong>the</strong>r adverse policies, it isnot <strong>the</strong> policy <strong>of</strong> this Administration to reduce dependence on foreignenergy suppliers beyond <strong>the</strong> level determined by market forces.In a world with relatively free trade and substantial capacity for reallocation<strong>of</strong> supplies, <strong>the</strong> allocative effects <strong>of</strong> a change in oil prices(o<strong>the</strong>r than those operating through <strong>the</strong> exchange rate) are independent<strong>of</strong> whe<strong>the</strong>r a given nation's use <strong>of</strong> foreign supplies is greator small. A disruption would raise prices and thus reallocate all availablesupplies whe<strong>the</strong>r foreign or domestic. Thus, a nation totally selfsufficientin energy supplies still would face <strong>the</strong> same oil prices as anation totally dependent on foreign sources. It is <strong>the</strong> policy <strong>of</strong> thisAdministration to facilitate free trade while preparing for future contingenciesthrough primary reliance on market adjustments and judicioususe <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Strategic Petroleum Reserve.TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONSThe transportation and communications industries serve vital linkagefunctions in our Nation's economy. Until recently, <strong>the</strong>se industrieswere broadly subject to traditional rate and entry regulation.Regulation <strong>of</strong> most transportation sectors is probably not efficientunder contemporary market conditions. Most transportation markets,due to <strong>the</strong> mobility <strong>of</strong> most <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> capital assets <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> firms in thosemarkets, are highly contestable. That is, with nearly costless entryand exit, new firms can enter markets which have excessive pricesand can take advantage <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>itable opportunities that <strong>the</strong>y provide.Thus, even with significant economies <strong>of</strong> scale in a transportationmarket, <strong>the</strong> threat <strong>of</strong> entry by new rivals should result in nearcompetitivepricing <strong>of</strong> transportation services. Additionally, mosttransportation firms face significant intermodal competition. Theyare also disciplined indirectly in some cases by competitive conditionsin <strong>the</strong> national or international markets in which <strong>the</strong> commodities<strong>the</strong>y transport are sold. The only segments <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> interstatetransportation system for which regulation on a natural monopolybasis may be justifiable are <strong>the</strong> major gas pipelines, long-distanceelectric transmission lines, and those sections <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> rail systemwhere shippers do not have an effective choice <strong>of</strong> carrier or mode <strong>of</strong>transport.Telecommunications, due to a high rate <strong>of</strong> technological development,is one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> most rapidly changing sectors <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> U.S. economy.The Federal Government plays an active role in <strong>the</strong> telecommu-108


nications industries through <strong>the</strong> regulation <strong>of</strong> common carriers andbroadcasters. Several important steps toward deregulation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>seindustries were initiated in 1982. The government can enhance <strong>the</strong>development <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se industries through continued deregulation.EFFECTS OF AVIATION DEREGULATIONUntil <strong>the</strong> late 1970s <strong>the</strong> Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) regulated<strong>the</strong> airline industry extensively. It allocated interstate routes among<strong>the</strong> airlines and controlled airline fares on those routes. Through itscontrol <strong>of</strong> air routes, <strong>the</strong> CAB restrained entry into <strong>the</strong> airline industry.From its inception in 1938 until <strong>the</strong> late 1970s, <strong>the</strong> CAB did notallow any new airline to enter <strong>the</strong> interstate trunk market. Largely asa consequence, air fares were higher on most interstate routes than ifprice competition and freedom <strong>of</strong> entry were permitted. This was reflectedby <strong>the</strong> differences in fares between intrastate city-pairs thatwere not subject to CAB regulation, such as Los Angeles-San Francisco,and comparable interstate city-pairs that were. The latter <strong>of</strong>tenhad fares that were as much as 60 percent higher than <strong>the</strong> former.In 1977 <strong>the</strong> CAB began to ease restrictions on fares and entry. In1978 <strong>the</strong> Congress affirmed and extended <strong>the</strong> CAB's measures bypassing <strong>the</strong> Airline Deregulation Act. This act provided for <strong>the</strong> gradualderegulation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> airlines, with <strong>the</strong> termination <strong>of</strong> CAB domesticroute authority in 1981, <strong>the</strong> termination <strong>of</strong> CAB domestic pricingauthority in 1983, and <strong>the</strong> elimination <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> CAB itself in 1985. Subsequentsteps were taken to increase potential competition in internationalaviation. In July 1982 <strong>the</strong> U.S. Government entered a multilateralagreement with several European governments that permitsgreater flexibility in airline fares for trans-Atlantic flights than waspreviously allowed.While rising aviation fuel costs, <strong>the</strong> weak economy, and <strong>the</strong> 1981air traffic controllers strike complicate assessment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> effects <strong>of</strong>gradual deregulation, route and fare competition have increased substantiallysince 1977. From 1978 to 1981, <strong>the</strong> number <strong>of</strong> U.S. certificatedairlines more than doubled (from 36 to 86). The market share<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> major trunk airlines declined from 87.3 to 80.4 percent in <strong>the</strong>past 3 years while, during this same period, <strong>the</strong> market share <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>local, intrastate, and new airlines increased from 11.5 to 16.4 percent.Aircraft departures from large, medium, small, and nonhub airportsincreased substantially over <strong>the</strong> 2 years immediately followingairline deregulation. The percentage <strong>of</strong> domestic markets with fouror more carriers grew from 13 in May 1978 to 73 in May 1981. InApril 1982, 77 percent <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> domestic coach traffic <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> major airlinesmoved on discount fares, compared to 46 percent in April1978. And while operating expenses per available seat mile rose by109


73 percent from 1976 to 1981, airline revenue per available seat milerose by only 58 percent in this same period.Deregulation has also led to increases in operating efficiency. Airlinelabor cost increases have slowed and have actually declined relativeto inflation. The established airlines have been forced to control<strong>the</strong>ir labor costs in order to compete effectively with <strong>the</strong> new entrants,many <strong>of</strong> which pay substantially lower wages. Load factors(<strong>the</strong> ratio <strong>of</strong> revenue passenger miles to available seat miles) rosefrom an average <strong>of</strong> less than 55 percent between 1973 and 1977 tomore than 59 percent between 1978 and 1982. Airlines are nowusing a wider variety <strong>of</strong> airplanes to serve <strong>the</strong>ir diverse markets.Small markets are more likely to be served by smaller airplanes.There is little need to fear monopoly in airline markets when <strong>the</strong>CAB expires. Several studies have demonstrated that no system-wideeconomies <strong>of</strong> scale exist. Since airplanes are easily transferable fromone market to ano<strong>the</strong>r, airline markets are readily con testable. Theprospect <strong>of</strong> potential entry by rival carriers creates pressures forclose-to-competitive fares even in markets served by only one airline.Deregulation <strong>of</strong> airlines has established a competitive and more efficientairline industry. As air travel in <strong>the</strong> United States increasesover this decade and as <strong>the</strong> busiest airports become even more congested,<strong>the</strong> new competitive structure may be challenged. Allowingcompetition and <strong>the</strong> full transferability <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> right to land and take<strong>of</strong>f at <strong>the</strong>se airports may be necessary to sustain this competitivestructure. Additionally, <strong>the</strong> maintenance and future development <strong>of</strong> asafe and effective national airway system is important to ensure thatconsumers are well served.EFFECTS OF PARTIAL DEREGULATION IN SURFACE TRANSPORTATIONThe traditional rate and entry regulation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> trucking, freightforwarder,intercity bus, barge, and maritime industries is now largelyout <strong>of</strong> date. Many studies have demonstrated <strong>the</strong> absence <strong>of</strong> significanteconomies <strong>of</strong> scale in <strong>the</strong>se industries, weakening <strong>the</strong> "naturalmonopoly" rationale for entry restrictions. The high degree <strong>of</strong> capitalmobility in <strong>the</strong>se industries implies that individual city-pair andport-pair markets are highly contestable. The existence <strong>of</strong> intermodalsources <strong>of</strong> competition and competitive international output marketsfor transported commodities fur<strong>the</strong>r reduces any misallocations resultingfrom monoply behavior. Additionally, <strong>the</strong> high rate <strong>of</strong> technologicaldevelopment in <strong>the</strong> transportation sector renders many regulationsinapplicable. The experience since <strong>the</strong> recent deregulation <strong>of</strong>airlines and <strong>the</strong> partial deregulation <strong>of</strong> surface transportation indicatesthat a competitive industry structure would not reduce <strong>the</strong> financialviability <strong>of</strong> firms in <strong>the</strong>se industries.110


Several major pieces <strong>of</strong> legislation were enacted in <strong>the</strong> last fewyears to reduce <strong>the</strong> degree <strong>of</strong> regulation in <strong>the</strong> surface transportationindustries, including <strong>the</strong> Railroad Revitalization and RegulatoryReform Act <strong>of</strong> 1976, <strong>the</strong> Motor Carrier Act <strong>of</strong> 1980, <strong>the</strong> StaggersRail Act <strong>of</strong> 1980, and <strong>the</strong> Bus Regulatory Reform Act <strong>of</strong> 1982.The effects <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> partial deregulation <strong>of</strong> trucking—initiated by <strong>the</strong>Interstate Commerce Commission and affirmed by <strong>the</strong> Motor CarrierAct <strong>of</strong> 1980—have proven very encouraging. Published trucking ratesare now subject to large and widely available discounts. Shippersappear to be overwhelmingly satisfied with <strong>the</strong> rates, service options,and competition for <strong>the</strong>ir business. Service to small communities hasnot deteriorated, as was originally predicted by <strong>the</strong> opponents <strong>of</strong> deregulation,and most shippers in small communities also appear tosupport deregulation. Both <strong>the</strong> number <strong>of</strong> new firms and failing firmshave increased substantially, <strong>the</strong> latter due in part to <strong>the</strong> recession.Concerns have been expressed over <strong>the</strong> last year that <strong>the</strong> InterstateCommerce Commission may be slowing <strong>the</strong> deregulatory process.For example, <strong>the</strong> percentage <strong>of</strong> applications for grants <strong>of</strong> operatingauthority approved by <strong>the</strong> ICC declined slightly in both fiscal yearssince <strong>the</strong> passage <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Motor Carrier Act. On net, however, <strong>the</strong>ICC has facilitated increased competition in <strong>the</strong> trucking industry.The chaos predicted by <strong>the</strong> opponents <strong>of</strong> deregulation has not materialized,even during a sustained recession. The experience to dateclearly supports <strong>the</strong> case for more general deregulation <strong>of</strong> surfacetransport.The experience since <strong>the</strong> partial deregulation <strong>of</strong> railroads is similar.Although direct evidence on rail rates is not available, <strong>the</strong>number <strong>of</strong> contracts negotiated between rail carriers and shippers (ameasure <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> operating flexibility granted by <strong>the</strong> Staggers Rail Act)increased from 580 in fiscal 1980 to 2907 in fiscal 1982. Railroadshave increased <strong>the</strong>ir share <strong>of</strong> total freight traffic and have substantiallyincreased <strong>the</strong>ir shipments <strong>of</strong> some commodities, such as fruits andvegetables, that were previously carried almost exclusively by trucks.Railroad pr<strong>of</strong>its remained essentially steady despite <strong>the</strong> sustained recession.While recent partial deregulation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> surface transportation industrieshas increased <strong>the</strong> competitiveness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se industries, <strong>the</strong> opportunityremains for significant gains from fur<strong>the</strong>r deregulation.There seems to be little danger that fur<strong>the</strong>r deregulation would enhance<strong>the</strong> monopoly power <strong>of</strong> carriers. The high degree <strong>of</strong> capitalmobility in <strong>the</strong> trucking, bus, barge, and maritime industries shouldprevent monopoly pricing over a sustained period, even where <strong>the</strong>reis only one carrier on a route.Ill


FURTHER DEREGULATION OF SURFACE TRANSPORTATIONFor many decades, both carriers and shippers have made decisionsbased on expectations that <strong>the</strong> general regulatory system would continue.As a consequence, <strong>the</strong> transition to deregulation can be disruptive.The major conceptual problems <strong>of</strong> fur<strong>the</strong>r deregulation involve<strong>the</strong> following four issues: (1) <strong>the</strong> antitrust status <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> rate bureaus,(2) <strong>the</strong> vulnerability <strong>of</strong> shippers who do not have an effectivechoice <strong>of</strong> carrier or mode, (3) <strong>the</strong> restrictions on multimodal ownership,and (4) <strong>the</strong> restrictions on route abandonment.As suggested below, <strong>the</strong>se problems especially affect <strong>the</strong> prospectsfor fur<strong>the</strong>r deregulation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> railroads.Antitrust Status <strong>of</strong> Rate BureausFor many years <strong>the</strong> regional rate bureaus (composed <strong>of</strong> transportationfirms) have performed <strong>the</strong> normal functions <strong>of</strong> a trade associationand have provided <strong>the</strong> forum for multilateral agreements onboth single-line and interline rates. These rate bureaus were exemptedfrom <strong>the</strong> antitrust laws, and <strong>the</strong>ir proposed rates were generallyendorsed by <strong>the</strong> ICC. The Motor Carrier Act <strong>of</strong> 1980 removed <strong>the</strong>antitrust immunity <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> truck rate bureaus for single-line rates beginningin mid-1984, and established <strong>the</strong> Motor Carrier RatemakingStudy Commission to study whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> antitrust immunity for multilateralagreements on interline rates should be maintained. In testimonyto this commission, <strong>the</strong> Administration supported elimination<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> antitrust immunity <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> truck rate bureaus. Members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>commission, which was scheduled to complete its study by <strong>the</strong> end <strong>of</strong>1982, were equally divided on this issue at that time. Additionally,following <strong>the</strong> Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act <strong>of</strong>1976, <strong>the</strong> ICC restricted <strong>the</strong> authority <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> rail rate bureaus to addresssingle-line rates and restricted <strong>the</strong> carriers that could participatein an agreement on interline rates.There remains a legitimate dispute about whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> rail rate bureausshould retain antitrust immunity when setting interline rates.The general view <strong>of</strong> economists is that fur<strong>the</strong>r deregulation shouldbe accompanied by <strong>the</strong> elimination <strong>of</strong> antitrust immunity. This approachwould prevent <strong>the</strong> adverse effects <strong>of</strong> a carrier cartel andpermit interline agreements to be treated as a joint venture. Someclarification <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> application <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Sherman Act would also be appropriateto provide a stable legal environment for <strong>the</strong>se interlineagreements. The contrary view is that <strong>the</strong> antitrust immunity shouldbe maintained as long as no carrier is bound by any bureau rates towhich it did not agree. A multilateral agreement on interline ratesmay have substantially lower transactions costs on small shipmentsthan <strong>the</strong> alternative pattern <strong>of</strong> bilateral joint ventures, and any at-112


tempt to set cartel rates would be disciplined by <strong>the</strong> freedom <strong>of</strong> anycarrier to set o<strong>the</strong>r rates. (This issue is less important for trucks, becauseinterline traffic is now less than 15 percent <strong>of</strong> total truck traffic,and complete freedom <strong>of</strong> routes would fur<strong>the</strong>r reduce such interlinetraffic. Interline rail traffic, however, is 48 percent <strong>of</strong> total rail traffic,and it is more important to maintain a process that economizes on<strong>the</strong> contracting costs for small interline shipments.) The alternativemay be an undesirable situation in which rail carriers refuse small interlineshipments, use trucks for shipments to points beyond <strong>the</strong>irroutes, or face an artificial incentive for mergers.The "Captive Shipper Problem"The "captive shipper problem'* is what initially led to rail rate regulation.This problem was substantially reduced by <strong>the</strong> development<strong>of</strong> alternative carriers and modes but has not been eliminated. Twodimensions <strong>of</strong> this problem, however, have sometimes been misunderstood.This relation is a bilateral monopoly. Both <strong>the</strong> rail carrierand <strong>the</strong> shipper have substantial bargaining power, and it is not clearthat this relation leads to rates that are generally "too high." Second,this relation does not lead to any long-term misallocation <strong>of</strong> resourcesas long as <strong>the</strong> price <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> shipped commodity is determinedin a competitive market. In any case, <strong>the</strong> sum <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> rents on rail andshipper property is constant. This inherent tension suggests that it isimportant to avoid any effective restraint on <strong>the</strong> common ownership<strong>of</strong> rail carriers and major shippers. One alternative may be to requirejoint track use by competing carriers. Ano<strong>the</strong>r alternative would beto index <strong>the</strong> rate bands now authorized for, say, ano<strong>the</strong>r decade andto terminate <strong>the</strong>se bands at that time. Unless this problem is resolved,however, some form <strong>of</strong> maximum rate regulation is likely tobe maintained in <strong>the</strong> rail industry.Restrictions on Multimodal OwnershipThere no longer appears to be any case for restrictions on multimodalownership. It is especially important to allow rail carriers toown trucking operations to facilitate container and piggyback traffic.A change in <strong>the</strong> law would be required to allow rail carriers to ownbarge lines. A change in <strong>the</strong> law would also be required to allowfreight-forwarders to own trucks, even though trucking companiesare now allowed to own freight-forwarders. The Bus RegulatoryReform Act <strong>of</strong> 1982 provides a substantially streamlined process forapproving intermodal mergers not prohibited by law.Restrictions on Route AbandonmentThe primary problem <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> railroads is excess route capacity, aproblem that reflects a combination <strong>of</strong> increased truck competitionand ICC restrictions on route abandonment. Some studies have indi-113


cated that less than half <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> existing rail mileage generates enoughtraffic to cover total costs. The Staggers Rail Act provides for moreflexible procedures to resolve disputes on route abandonment.Recent highway legislation, by increasing allowable truck size, is expectedto make trucks more competitive with railroads in moving lowdensity freight. A better resolution <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> route abandonment issue isprobably necessary for a healthy railroad industry and an efficientdistribution <strong>of</strong> freight traffic across modes.In summary, pending a resolution <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se four issues as <strong>the</strong>yaffect railroads, it is probably appropriate to focus any near-term legislativeproposals on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r modes <strong>of</strong> surface transport and for <strong>the</strong>ICC to pursue selective rail deregulation within its existing authority.Additionally, <strong>the</strong> government should continue, through <strong>the</strong> appropriateapplication <strong>of</strong> user fees, to ensure that each mode <strong>of</strong> transportbears <strong>the</strong> entire costs <strong>of</strong> its operations when utilizing public facilities.COMMON CARRIER TELECOMMUNICATIONSEconomies <strong>of</strong> scale provided <strong>the</strong> original rationale for makinglong-distance telecommunications a regulated monopoly. But rapidtechnological change has reduced <strong>the</strong> industry's natural monopolycharacteristics and has paved <strong>the</strong> way for a more competitive industrystructure. The growth <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> market for telecommunications, duelargely to <strong>the</strong> convergence <strong>of</strong> data processing and telecommunicationstechnology, has fur<strong>the</strong>r reduced <strong>the</strong> natural monopoly characteristics<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> industry. These rapid developments in both demandand supply conditions have probably made <strong>the</strong> inherited regulatoryframework inappropriate.Major legal changes were made recently to allow increased competition.In 1982 a U.S. district judge gave final approval to a settlementbetween <strong>the</strong> American Telephone and Telegraph Company(AT&T) and <strong>the</strong> Department <strong>of</strong> Justice, transforming long-distancetelecommunications services into a competitive market with a greaternumber <strong>of</strong> companies and less regulation.In conjunction with o<strong>the</strong>r deregulatory steps by <strong>the</strong> Federal CommunicationsCommission, <strong>the</strong> settlement is expected to have majorbenefits for both <strong>the</strong> telecommunications industry and its customers.Equal access to local facilities, which is <strong>the</strong> cornerstone <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> settlement,should allow competition to act as an adequate substitute forregulation <strong>of</strong> interstate services. While <strong>the</strong> transition to equal accesswill take a few years, individual telephone customers will have progressivelyincreased opportunities to make <strong>the</strong>ir own arrangementswith AT&T's competitors in long-distance services. Meanwhile,AT&T will be allowed to develop its data processing subsidiary,American Bell Inc. While AT&T is prohibited from <strong>of</strong>fering home114


computer information and advertising services via its long-distancelines for 7 years, it is likely to become a vigorous competitor in o<strong>the</strong>rfields, such as cellular mobile radio technology. It is also likely t<strong>of</strong>ace increasing competition in <strong>the</strong>se areas.In 1982 an appeals court affirmed <strong>the</strong> Federal CommunicationCommission's power to deregulate where technological changemakes regulation outmoded. Developments in data processing andtransmission have tended to make many Federal and State regulationsunnecessary, inappropriate, or unworkable.BROADCASTINGThe FCC regulates <strong>the</strong> radio and television industries through issuanceand renewal <strong>of</strong> broadcast licenses. It promulgates guidelines on<strong>the</strong> amount <strong>of</strong> news and public affairs programming that stationsmust broadcast, <strong>the</strong> maximum number <strong>of</strong> commercials permissible inany time period, <strong>the</strong> recording <strong>of</strong> broadcast materials, and <strong>the</strong> ascertainmentand fulfillment <strong>of</strong> community needs. As a result, broadcastersare prevented in some cases from carrying programming that listenersand viewers would prefer.The original purpose <strong>of</strong> FCC regulation was to allocate broadcastspectrum space. The FCC allocated <strong>the</strong>se valuable spectrum rights inexchange for commitments on program content. Whatever <strong>the</strong> merits<strong>of</strong> this argument 50 years ago, it may be appropriate to review thisform <strong>of</strong> regulation to reflect <strong>the</strong> rapidly developing competition fromcable television, pay television, and direct satellite transmission.Recently, <strong>the</strong> FCC has made several moves toward deregulation. In1981 <strong>the</strong> Commission deregulated most commercial radio broadcastingand attempted, subject to legal challenge, to simplify <strong>the</strong> applicationrenewal process. The FCC is in <strong>the</strong> process <strong>of</strong> repeating thisderegulatory initiative for <strong>the</strong> television industry. It will soon attemptto amend <strong>the</strong> renewal process by eliminating <strong>the</strong> following criteriafor renewal: nonentertainment content, ascertainment <strong>of</strong> communityneeds, advertising concentration, and recording. The last Congressalso considered bills to repeal many requirements, such as <strong>the</strong> "reasonableaccess/' "equal time," and "fairness" doctrines that arecostly to broadcasters and unevenly applied to <strong>the</strong> mass media.These steps would partially remove <strong>the</strong> government from <strong>the</strong> determination<strong>of</strong> broadcast content.DEREGULATION OF FINANCIAL MARKETSThe financial service sector has been among <strong>the</strong> most heavily regulatedareas <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> economy. Price regulation, entry restrictions, andportfolio regulation were pervasive in both <strong>the</strong> banking and securities115


industries. Substantial and numerous innovations in <strong>the</strong> financial sectorsin <strong>the</strong> last decade largely preceded and were later facilitated byrecent partial deregulation.DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONSThe present structure <strong>of</strong> regulatory restraints on commercial banksand o<strong>the</strong>r depository institutions was imposed primarily in responseto <strong>the</strong> collapse <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> banking system in <strong>the</strong> 1930s. A common interpretation<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> events at that time is that <strong>the</strong> banking collapse was<strong>the</strong> result <strong>of</strong> an unsound banking structure which caused too muchcompetition. Competition among banks was thought to force <strong>the</strong>minto paying high interest rates for deposits, which in turn led <strong>the</strong>m toseek out high-yielding but risky—and ultimately unsound—investmentsin <strong>the</strong> stock, bond, and real estate markets.Legislative remedies in <strong>the</strong> Banking Acts <strong>of</strong> 1933 and 1935, andvarious revisions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Federal Reserve Act, focused on limitingprice competition between banks, separating banking from securitiesmarket activity, supervising banking and financial markets moreclosely, and restoring public confidence in <strong>the</strong> financial system.Reflecting a general concern about excessive competition, <strong>the</strong> payment<strong>of</strong> interest on demand deposits was prohibited by law. In addition,<strong>the</strong> Federal Reserve Board and <strong>the</strong> Federal Deposit InsuranceCorporation were given <strong>the</strong> power to place interest rate ceilings on<strong>the</strong> passbook and time deposits <strong>of</strong> commercial banks. Interest rateceilings were extended to <strong>the</strong> deposits <strong>of</strong> mutual savings banks andsavings and loan associations in 1966.The type and quality <strong>of</strong> assets held by banks were closely monitored.Commercial banks were not permitted to hold securities <strong>of</strong> aspeculative nature in <strong>the</strong>ir portfolios, and thrift institutions were subjectto even greater limits on <strong>the</strong>ir asset acquisition powers. In addition,most securities activities were divorced from commercial bankingby <strong>the</strong> Glass-Steagall sections <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Banking Act <strong>of</strong> 1933, andentry into banking became more closely controlled. To maintain <strong>the</strong>confidence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> public in <strong>the</strong> banking system, deposits were insuredby <strong>the</strong> Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and <strong>the</strong> Federal Savingsand Loan Insurance Corporation. With <strong>the</strong> introduction <strong>of</strong> depositinsurance, <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r regulations served mainly to limit <strong>the</strong> exposure<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> insurance funds ra<strong>the</strong>r than to protect depositors. Never<strong>the</strong>less,recent studies suggest that <strong>the</strong> web <strong>of</strong> regulatory restraintswas generally greater than required for this purpose.Moreover, this extensive regulatory framework for financial institutionshas adapted slowly to <strong>the</strong> economic changes <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> last two decades.High inflation rates and consequent high nominal interestrates, combined with reduced transactions costs from <strong>the</strong> application116


<strong>of</strong> computer technology to <strong>the</strong> payments system, have created seriousdistortions in financial markets. As market interest rates rose aboveRegulation Q, ceilings, inflows <strong>of</strong> funds to depository institutionswere curtailed, and new nonregulated instruments (especially moneymarket mutual funds) were created. The allocation <strong>of</strong> savings to varioussectors <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> capital market—particularly housing vis-a-vis o<strong>the</strong>rsectors—was altered, and small and less informed savers suffered declinesin <strong>the</strong> real rate <strong>of</strong> return on <strong>the</strong>ir savings. In addition, RegulationQ, generated a considerable amount <strong>of</strong> nonprice competition betweenfinancial institutions, such as an excessive number <strong>of</strong> branch<strong>of</strong>fices, with resulting adverse effects on efficiency. Interest rate ceilingson selected deposits were removed progressively beginning in1978.The Administration continues to support <strong>the</strong> removal <strong>of</strong> unnecessaryand excessive regulatory constraints on depository institutions.It is now widely asserted that <strong>the</strong> length and severity <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> bankingcollapse <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1930s was not <strong>the</strong> result <strong>of</strong> overly risky bank portfolios.Ra<strong>the</strong>r, many economists argue that <strong>the</strong>se failures became widespread,initially, because <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> reluctance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Federal ReserveSystem to engage in aggressive open market operations to counter<strong>the</strong> conversion <strong>of</strong> deposits to currency and, later, because <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> FederalReserve's failure to assure adequate liquidity to banks experiencingruns on <strong>the</strong>ir deposits. As banks scrambled to liquidate <strong>the</strong>irassets to meet <strong>the</strong> demands <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir depositors for currency, <strong>the</strong>irasset values fell, thus creating insolvencies. The provision <strong>of</strong> adequateliquidity by a lender <strong>of</strong> last resort has long been recognized asa primary responsibility <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Federal Reserve System.Partial deregulation <strong>of</strong> depository institutions is now proceedingunder provisions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Depository Institutions Deregulation andMonetary Control Act <strong>of</strong> 1980 and <strong>the</strong> Garn-St Germain DepositoryInstitutions Act <strong>of</strong> 1982. Under <strong>the</strong> 1980 act, interest rate ceilings ontime and savings deposits are to be phased out over a period <strong>of</strong> 6years. The same law permits depository institutions to <strong>of</strong>fer negotiableorder <strong>of</strong> withdrawal (NOW) accounts and preempted certainState usury ceilings. This act also created <strong>the</strong> Depository InstitutionsDeregulation Committee (DIDC) to administer <strong>the</strong> phaseout <strong>of</strong> interestrate ceilings at banks and thrifts.In March 1982, <strong>the</strong> DIDC adopted a deregulation schedule thatphases out interest rate ceilings, beginning with longer term time deposits.With <strong>the</strong> deregulation schedule in place, <strong>the</strong> focus <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>DIDC turned to short-term deposit instruments. Prevailing high interestrates had caused a continued erosion <strong>of</strong> low-cost deposits atbanks and thrifts, as depositors sought market rates elsewhere, particularlythrough money market mutual funds. The DIDC addressed117


this problem by authorizing, effective May 1, 1982, a 91-day time depositwith a $7,500 minimum denomination indexed to <strong>the</strong> 91-dayTreasury bill rate, and establishing, effective September 1, 1982, a 7-to 31-day deposit account with a $20,000 minimum denomination,also indexed to <strong>the</strong> 91-day Treasury bill rate.Following <strong>the</strong> directions given by <strong>the</strong> Garn-St Germain Act, <strong>the</strong>DIDC authorized, effective December 14, 1982, a new money marketdeposit account that can be <strong>of</strong>fered by commercial banks, savings andloan associations, and mutual savings banks. In addition, <strong>the</strong> DIDGauthorized a new super NOW account, effective January 5, 1983. Nei<strong>the</strong>raccount is subject to interest rate ceilings when account balancesexceed $2,500. The DIDC also reduced to $2,500 <strong>the</strong> minimum denominationrequired on <strong>the</strong> 6-montfi money market deposits, <strong>the</strong> 91-day time deposits, and <strong>the</strong> 7- to 31-day time deposits.The introduction <strong>of</strong> NOW accounts nationwide in 1981, <strong>the</strong> authorization<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> new money market accounts at banks and thrifts,and <strong>the</strong> general phasing out <strong>of</strong> interest rate restrictions substantiallyincrease <strong>the</strong> ability <strong>of</strong> depository institutions to compete for funds.Simultaneously, various actions have been taken to allow thrift institutionsgreater flexibility in <strong>the</strong> investment <strong>of</strong> funds. The Deregulationand Monetary Control Act expands <strong>the</strong> asset powers <strong>of</strong> savingand loan associations and mutual savings banks to include consumer,corporate, and business loans. This will lead to more diversified portfoliosfor <strong>the</strong>se institutions. In addition, new regulations issued by<strong>the</strong> Comptroller <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Currency in 1981 and <strong>the</strong> Federal HomeLoan Bank Board in 1982 permit depository institutions to <strong>of</strong>fer variablerate mortgages. Finally, <strong>the</strong> Garn-St Germain Act provides forFederal preemption <strong>of</strong> State laws and judicial decisions that restrict<strong>the</strong> enforcement <strong>of</strong> due-on-sale clauses in real property loans.The Garn-St Germain Act also deals with <strong>the</strong> problems <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> savingsand loan institutions discussed above. It provides capital assistanceto depository institutions that have suffered earnings and capitallosses resulting from regulatory restraints on <strong>the</strong>ir assets and liabilities.The assisted institutions issue capital investments, called "networth certificates," which <strong>the</strong> insuring agencies purchase with promissorynotes. This increase in net worth reduces <strong>the</strong> likelihood <strong>of</strong> insolvenciesarising from losses created by holdings <strong>of</strong> old, fixed-ratemortgages. As market rates <strong>of</strong> interest fall, and <strong>the</strong> earnings <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>sedepository institutions improve, <strong>the</strong> net worth certificates will be retired.Legislation following <strong>the</strong> banking collapse <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1930s tended toprevent competition among financial institutions and created a complexand <strong>of</strong>ten counterproductive labyrinth <strong>of</strong> financial regulations.Recent legislation and regulatory changes have begun to reverse this118


trend by widening <strong>the</strong> sources and uses <strong>of</strong> funds available to depositoryinstitutions, and by allowing for a far larger measure <strong>of</strong> pricecompetition in <strong>the</strong> financial services industry. These actions shouldcontribute to a stronger and more responsive financial system.STOCK EXCHANGESMuch <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> regulation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Nation's stock exchanges began in<strong>the</strong> 1930s, largely in response to <strong>the</strong> crisis in <strong>the</strong> financial marketscreated by <strong>the</strong> Great Depression. This regulation was broad and diverse,and included mandatory and systematic disclosure <strong>of</strong> corporaterecords as well as rule-setting authority over stock exchanges. Over<strong>the</strong> last several years, much <strong>of</strong> this regulation has been relaxed.Commission RatesPrior to 1968, commissions paid to members <strong>of</strong> stock exchangeswere fixed by those stock exchanges and approved by <strong>the</strong> Securitiesand Exchange Commission (SEC). After 1968, however, <strong>the</strong> fixedcommission schedule was slowly dismantled in favor <strong>of</strong> negotiatedcommissions. Beginning in May 1975, commission rates on all securitytransactions were negotiated.Negotiated commission rates were <strong>the</strong> product <strong>of</strong> a market-inducedbreakdown <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> fixed-rate commission structure. From 1961 to1966 <strong>the</strong> dollar volume and market share <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> regional stock exchangesincreased dramatically because <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> fixed-rate system. Regionalstock exchanges allowed customers dealing on those exchangesto "give up" or have transferred a portion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir fixedcommission to a third party who supplied o<strong>the</strong>r services. The NewYork Stock Exchange (NYSE) stipulated that customers <strong>of</strong> that exchangecould only give up commissions to o<strong>the</strong>r members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>NYSE. This constraint that <strong>the</strong> NYSE imposed on its customers encouragedmany <strong>of</strong> those customers to turn to <strong>the</strong> regional exchanges,where competition had effectively driven down <strong>the</strong> cost <strong>of</strong> exchangeservices.Faced with a declining share <strong>of</strong> stock transactions, <strong>the</strong> NYSE asked<strong>the</strong> SEC to force regional exchanges to eliminate <strong>the</strong> rules that wereaffording <strong>the</strong>m a competitive advantage. Commenting on <strong>the</strong> NYSEproposal, <strong>the</strong> Department <strong>of</strong> Justice suggested that <strong>the</strong> broader issue<strong>of</strong> possible elimination <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> fixed-rate commission structure shouldbe examined. In defense <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> fixed-rate commission structure, aNYSE study suggested that "destructive competition," reflected in adecline in <strong>the</strong> quality <strong>of</strong> broker services, could result from <strong>the</strong> absence<strong>of</strong> fixed commission rates.Despite <strong>the</strong> objections <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> NYSE, <strong>the</strong> Congress passed <strong>the</strong> SecuritiesActs Amendments <strong>of</strong> 1975. These reconfirmed that nonmembercommission rates were fully negotiable and made exchange floor119


ates fully negotiable by May 1976. The deregulation <strong>of</strong> fixed commissionrates illustrates <strong>the</strong> efficiency gains that follow deregulation.Since <strong>the</strong> total deregulation <strong>of</strong> commission rates, average commissionscharged to customers have decreased. Services which were previouslyprovided jointly whe<strong>the</strong>r customers used <strong>the</strong>m or not, arenow substantially unbundled.Financial DisclosureThe Securities Exchange Act <strong>of</strong> 1933 required financial disclosurefor corporations seeking to raise capital through <strong>the</strong> issuance <strong>of</strong> newsecurities. The Securities Exchange Act <strong>of</strong> 1934 required periodic financialdisclosure for corporations with publicly traded securities.One <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> motivations for this original legislation was a belief thatcorporations must be forced to disclose financial information inorder to protect <strong>the</strong> interests <strong>of</strong> investors. In recent years <strong>the</strong>re hasbeen concern that <strong>the</strong>se requirements have precluded new securityissues thus inhibiting <strong>the</strong> efficiency <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> capital market. Additionally,a growing body <strong>of</strong> scholarship has questioned whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong>se requirementshave served <strong>the</strong> interests <strong>of</strong> investors. Recently, some <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong>se stringent disclosure requirements were ended for certain types<strong>of</strong> corporations. Specifically, corporations with less than $3 million inassets and 500 stockholders are now exempt from <strong>the</strong> filing requirements<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Securities Exchange Act <strong>of</strong> 1934.The SEC has also recently allowed, on an experimental basis, somefirms issuing new securities to use "shelf registration'* forms, thuseliminating <strong>the</strong> requirement to file for each new security issue. Theinitiation <strong>of</strong> shelf registration is expected to reduce <strong>the</strong> costs <strong>of</strong> raisingequity capital, allowing firms to manage <strong>the</strong>ir risk more efficientlyby entering <strong>the</strong> capital markets more <strong>of</strong>ten.Industry StructureBefore 1980, stocks listed on stock exchanges could not be tradedby members <strong>of</strong> those stock exchanges in any o<strong>the</strong>r markets. This barrierto entry was partially lifted in June 1980, when <strong>the</strong> SEC approvedRule 19c-3. This rule allows members <strong>of</strong> stock exchanges totrade securities in o<strong>the</strong>r markets that were listed on those stock exchangesafter May 1979.Stock exchange members are now also allowed to execute trades in<strong>the</strong> "19c-3 securities" in markets o<strong>the</strong>r than <strong>the</strong> stock exchanges.The market share <strong>of</strong> non-19c-3 stocks on <strong>the</strong> Over-<strong>the</strong>-Counter(OTG) markets is considerably less than <strong>the</strong> OTC market share for19c-3 securities. This larger market share for <strong>the</strong> OTC in 19c-3 securitiessuggests that, for some exchange members, it is more efficientto execute orders on <strong>the</strong> OTC ra<strong>the</strong>r than on <strong>the</strong> stock ex-120


changes. That is, members can arbitrage price differentials that mayexist between <strong>the</strong> OTC market and <strong>the</strong> exchanges.Futures MarketsThe Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) has alsobeen very active in deregulation. In January 1982, <strong>the</strong> CFTC eliminated<strong>the</strong> 03 report, which had obligated large traders in future contractsto report <strong>the</strong>ir market positions daily to <strong>the</strong> CFTC. This actionreduced <strong>the</strong> filing costs <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se large traders by around 50 percent.In an effort to lessen <strong>the</strong> burden <strong>of</strong> Federal regulation on <strong>the</strong> futuresindustry, <strong>the</strong> CFTC's new legislation eases <strong>the</strong> disclosure, registration,and rule approval process.OPPORTUNITIES FOR FURTHER DEREGULATION IN THE FINANCIALINDUSTRYWhile <strong>the</strong> financial and securities markets <strong>of</strong> today operate relativelyunencumbered by unnecessary regulations, owing to <strong>the</strong> deregulatoryadvances discussed above, several opportunities for fur<strong>the</strong>r deregulationremain.Geographic Restrictions in BankingFederal laws, such as <strong>the</strong> McFadden Act <strong>of</strong> 1927 and <strong>the</strong> DouglasAmendment to <strong>the</strong> Bank Holding Company Act <strong>of</strong> 1956, continue toimpose geographic restrictions on commercial banking activities. Theformer law subjects <strong>the</strong> branching activities <strong>of</strong> national banks to <strong>the</strong>limits imposed by <strong>the</strong> States; <strong>the</strong> latter law prohibits bank holdingcompanies from engaging in interstate banking unless given specificState authorization to do so. Although <strong>the</strong>se prohibitions may reduce<strong>the</strong> concentration <strong>of</strong> financial resources on a national scale, <strong>the</strong>y mayalso increase market concentration and lessen competition in localbanking markets.Moreover, <strong>the</strong>se restrictions are effective only ins<strong>of</strong>ar as <strong>the</strong>y affect<strong>the</strong> taking <strong>of</strong> retail deposits. Loan production <strong>of</strong>fices, Edge Act corporations,personal finance companies, mortgage lending companies,and bank holding companies have long been <strong>the</strong> means used bybanks to conduct wholesale and retail business on an interstate basis.With <strong>the</strong> emergence <strong>of</strong> automatic teller machine networks, <strong>the</strong> electronicrevolution is incorporating even retail deposit-taking intolarge-scale operations. This process would be enhanced by exemptingautomatic teller machines from <strong>the</strong> existing restrictions on <strong>the</strong> establishment<strong>of</strong> branch <strong>of</strong>fices. It is time to reconsider <strong>the</strong>se geographicrestrictions because <strong>the</strong>y are probably not in <strong>the</strong> best interests<strong>of</strong> consumers or <strong>the</strong> more efficient financial institutions.121


Portfolio Restrictions in BankingThe prohibitions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Glass-Steagall Act have been eroded inrecent years as both banking organizations and securities firms haveattempted, ei<strong>the</strong>r directly or indirectly, to enter each o<strong>the</strong>rs' traditionallines <strong>of</strong> business. Moreover, Glass-Steagall now makes no importantcontribution to <strong>the</strong> protection <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> public against bank failureor undue concentrations <strong>of</strong> economic power. O<strong>the</strong>r governmentmeasures, such as Federal deposit insurance and broadened andstreng<strong>the</strong>ned Federal supervision, appear to have been more effectivein that role. The Administration has proposed an amendment to <strong>the</strong>Glass-Steagall Act that would authorize bank holding company subsidiariesto conduct two new activities immediately: (1) to underwriteand deal in municipal revenue bonds, and (2) to sponsor and underwriteshares <strong>of</strong> mutual funds. The Garn-St Germain Act authorizes anew account at banks and thrifts that is directly competitive withmoney market mutual funds. However, <strong>the</strong> act does not provide for<strong>the</strong> operation and sale <strong>of</strong> shares in mutual funds or <strong>the</strong> underwriting<strong>of</strong> municipal revenue bonds. Moreover, <strong>the</strong> act also extends <strong>the</strong> longstandingprotection <strong>of</strong> insurance companies against bank competition.Margin RequirementsMargin requirements presently exist in <strong>the</strong> stock, options, and futuresmarkets. In futures trading, <strong>the</strong> margin is a performance bondintended to protect o<strong>the</strong>r participants from <strong>the</strong> consequences <strong>of</strong> afailure to make good on a contractual obligation. Each futures exchangedetermines <strong>the</strong> margin without Federal regulation or oversight.In stock and options exchanges, <strong>the</strong> Federal Reserve Boardsets initial margin requirements, and <strong>the</strong> exchanges set maintenancemargins subject to SEC oversight. Margin practices in <strong>the</strong> stock andoptions markets may be less efficient than in futures markets, sinceregulation constrains decisionmaking by participants. It is now appropriateto review <strong>the</strong>se regulations.CONCLUSIONSFederal regulation <strong>of</strong> price and entry are products <strong>of</strong> an earlier era,when both economic conditions and perceptions <strong>of</strong> economic problemswere very different than <strong>the</strong>y are today. Federal regulation <strong>of</strong>railroads began nearly a century ago, when <strong>the</strong>re was no significantcompetition from o<strong>the</strong>r transport modes and political debate reflectedstrong populist sentiment. Most o<strong>the</strong>r Federal economic regulationsdate from <strong>the</strong> 1930s, when <strong>the</strong> severe economic problems, nowbelieved to be due to a collapse in aggregate demand, were per-122


ceived to be a consequence <strong>of</strong> excessive competition. The presentstructure <strong>of</strong> Federal regulation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> energy markets dates from <strong>the</strong>1970s and primarily reflects an attempt to protect consumers from<strong>the</strong> effects <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> large increase in oil prices originating abroad.These policies may or may not have been appropriate to <strong>the</strong>period in which <strong>the</strong>y were initiated. But both conditions and perceptionsare now very different. Increasing demand and changing technologyhave substantially reduced <strong>the</strong> initial monopoly power <strong>of</strong>many regulated firms. Our perceptions have also changed, largely inresponse to developing conditions during <strong>the</strong> long history <strong>of</strong> regulationand <strong>the</strong> encouraging developments during <strong>the</strong> more recentperiod <strong>of</strong> partial deregulation. There is now a more general perceptionthat <strong>the</strong> developments in regulated markets have largely outrun<strong>the</strong> present structure <strong>of</strong> economic regulation.As we approach <strong>the</strong> 100th anniversary <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> first broad body <strong>of</strong>Federal economic regulation, it is time for a comprehensive review <strong>of</strong>whe<strong>the</strong>r this form <strong>of</strong> regulation serves <strong>the</strong> interests <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> contemporaryeconomy. A resolution <strong>of</strong> this issue would <strong>the</strong>n permit greaterattention to <strong>the</strong> different and more complex issues affecting <strong>the</strong>recent Federal regulation <strong>of</strong> health, safety, and environmental conditions.123


CHAPTER 6Review <strong>of</strong> 1982 and <strong>the</strong><strong>Economic</strong> OutlookFOR THE U.S. ECONOMY, 1982 was a year <strong>of</strong> painful transitiontoward price stability. The momentum <strong>of</strong> high inflation, built up over<strong>the</strong> last 15 years, was broken and inflation was reduced to its lowestrate in a decade. Success in reducing inflation, however, was accompaniedby a recession that began in mid-1981 and lingered through1982. A drop in real exports, along with inventory adjustments, accountedfor <strong>the</strong> decline in U.S. production. Despite <strong>the</strong> recession,final sales to domestic purchasers increased. Expenditures for someinterest-sensitive goods, such as housing and consumer durablegoods, registered <strong>the</strong>ir first rise in recent years.<strong>Economic</strong> developments in 1982 clearly set <strong>the</strong> stage for a recoveryin 1983. The sizable slowdown in inflation contributed to <strong>the</strong> sharpdrop in interest rates in <strong>the</strong> summer <strong>of</strong> 1982. The inventory cyclethat held down production in 1982 is expected to turn around sometimein 1983. This development, combined with recovery in housingand durable consumer goods and continuing gains in defense spending,is expected to bring a moderate sustainable economic recovery.Prospects are good that this recovery can be maintained through <strong>the</strong>1980s without reigniting inflationary pressures.OVERVIEW OF 1982Real gross national product (GNP) in 1982 was no higher than in1979. After a surge <strong>of</strong> economic growth in 1978, <strong>the</strong> economy stalledin 1979. Cyclically volatile types <strong>of</strong> spending, such as auto sales andhousing starts, had peaked in 1978. Since 1978 <strong>the</strong> output <strong>of</strong> goodsand services in <strong>the</strong> United States has followed a saw-tooth pattern <strong>of</strong>alternating periods <strong>of</strong> growth and decline. The recessions <strong>of</strong> 1980and 1981-82 bracketed <strong>the</strong> shortest economic expansion in 50 years.Employment in 1982 was below its 1979 level.Production and employment remained sluggish for 4 years whilesupplies <strong>of</strong> labor and capital continued to grow, so that by <strong>the</strong> end <strong>of</strong>1982 <strong>the</strong> unemployment rate rose to nearly 11 percent—its highestlevel since <strong>the</strong> early 1940s—and <strong>the</strong> capacity utilization rate fell to its124


lowest point in <strong>the</strong> post-World War II period. With this high level <strong>of</strong>unused economic capacity, inflationary pressures subsided.The inflation rate fell dramatically in 1982 to its lowest level in adecade. The upward trend in inflation from 1976 through 1980streng<strong>the</strong>ned <strong>the</strong> Federal Reserve's determination to slow <strong>the</strong> growthin <strong>the</strong> monetary aggregates and contributed to high interest rates foran extended period. By mid-1982, when evidence <strong>of</strong> progress againstinflation and continued weakness in economic activity became clear,interest rates began to fall sharply. The ensuing decline reduced interestrates to <strong>the</strong>ir lowest levels in more than 2 years, as illustratedin Chart 6-1.Chart 6-1PERCENT PER YEAR22Interest Rates2018PRIME RATE16141978 1979 1980 1981 1982SOURCES: DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY AND BOARD OF GOVERNORSOF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM.The decline in interest rates brought much-needed relief to <strong>the</strong> interest-sensitive,cyclical sectors <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> economy. By <strong>the</strong> end <strong>of</strong> 1982,clear progress toward recovery had been made, as reflected in continuinggains in <strong>the</strong> composite index <strong>of</strong> leading indicators <strong>of</strong> economicactivity, as shown in Chart 6-2.125


Chart 6-2Index <strong>of</strong> Leading Indicators and Real GNP1967-100145BILLIONS OF 1972 DOLLARS1,520REALGNP(RIGHT SCALE}1,5001401,4801351,460130mmtINDEX OF LEADINGINDICATORS(LEFT SCALE)1,4401,4201251,400120I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I n1981 19821978 1979 1980SOURCE: DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE.MAJOR SECTORS OF AGGREGATE DEMANDReal output declined 1.2 percent from <strong>the</strong> fourth quarter <strong>of</strong> 1981to <strong>the</strong> fourth quarter <strong>of</strong> 1982. This was <strong>the</strong> fourth consecutive year <strong>of</strong>little change in economic activity (Table 6-1). Businesses liquidatedinventories in 1982, in contrast to <strong>the</strong> previous year when inventorylevels increased. Ano<strong>the</strong>r important factor in <strong>the</strong> decline was a sharpdrop in U.S. exports that reflected both <strong>the</strong> strong dollar and <strong>the</strong>worldwide recession. Real final sales to domestic purchasers increased1.3 percent in 1982, <strong>the</strong> largest increase in 3 years. Gains inpersonal consumption expenditures, residential investment, and Federalpurchases dominated a large decline in business capital spend-126


ing. Partly in response to <strong>the</strong> drop in interest rates, residential investmentincreased for <strong>the</strong> first time in 5 years, and consumer purchases<strong>of</strong> durable goods increased for <strong>the</strong> first time since 1978. State andlocal government purchases <strong>of</strong> goods and services were virtually unchangedover <strong>the</strong> year.TABLE 6-L—Growth in major sectors <strong>of</strong> real GNP, 1978-82[Change^ fourth quarter to fourth quarter and 5-year average]Component 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 *5-yearaverage'Percent change:Real gross national product5.81.4-0.70.7-1.21,5Personal consumption expendituresConsumer durablesBusiness fixed investmentResidential fixed investmentGovernment purchases <strong>of</strong> goods and services4.45.712.8—22.32.1-2.53.5-8.31.3.3-4.6-2.6-.12.7.74.7-19.42.92.66.5-8.44.52.62.1.13.3-8.01.6FederalDefenseState and local2.63.41.03.01.41.42.1.310.79.3-1.76.66.8.12.93.8.7Real final salesReal final sales to domestic purchasers 35.44.72.61.7-.4-.5.0.6.31.31.81.7Change in billions <strong>of</strong> 1972 dollars:Change in business .inventoriesNet exports <strong>of</strong> goods and services'Preliminary.2 Based on annual data.9 Final sales less exports plus imports.Source: Department <strong>of</strong> Commerce, Bureau <strong>of</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> Analysis.5.111.2-17.514.9-3.91.411.0-9.1-22.5-15.4-4.41.7PERSONAL CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURESDespite declines in production, employment, and real wage andsalary income, real disposable (after-tax) personal income increasedin 1982, due in part to <strong>the</strong> reduction in personal income tax ratesand an increase in transfer payments. The average effective Federalpersonal income tax rate fell from 12.5 percent to 11.4 percent between<strong>the</strong> third quarters <strong>of</strong> 1981 and 1982. Real personal consumptionexpenditures increased 2.6 percent in 1982 to reach <strong>the</strong>ir highestshare <strong>of</strong> real GNP since 1949. Although real personal saving declinedfrom its high level at <strong>the</strong> end <strong>of</strong> 1981, <strong>the</strong> personal saving ratein 1982 was higher than in any year since 1976, as shown in Table6-2.Consumer purchases <strong>of</strong> durable goods increased 6.5 percent inreal terms in 1982, <strong>the</strong> first increase since 1978. The turnaround occurredearly in <strong>the</strong> year, when auto sales rebounded from <strong>the</strong> depressedlevel <strong>of</strong> late 1981. Sales <strong>the</strong>n languished until late in <strong>the</strong>year, when <strong>the</strong>y again climbed, due in part to <strong>the</strong> decline in interestrates that produced lower financing costs. Never<strong>the</strong>less, domestic127


TABLE 6-2.—Real household income, consumption, saving, and residential investment, 1978-82[Percent change, fourth quarter to fourth quarter and 5-year average]Item 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 »5-yearaverage 1 *Income by type:Labor Income 3 .....O<strong>the</strong>r income *Net transfer payments'..,4.78.9-3.01.23.54.3-0.4-1.013.10.98.8-1.91U1.64.63.9Personal Income4.92.02.52.4Less.- Federal tax paymentsO<strong>the</strong>r tax and nontax payments*Disposable personal income10.95.44.4Personal consumption expenditures...Personal saving rate T 61Personal saving-5.3Housing starts 8Single familyMuftifamilyMobile home shipments'Residential investment....-3.32.3-7.5-.2-29.2=7.9-9.8-8.3-5.2-2.5-6.7-12.7-45.0-37.3-13.1-19.448.038.912.14.5-14.4-5.3-2.8=8.0'Preliminary.'Based on annual data.Wage and salary disbursements and o<strong>the</strong>r labor income.•Proprietors' income, rental income, personal dividend income, and personal interest income."Transfer payments less personal contributions for social insurance.'State and local tax and nontax payments plus Federal nontax payments.Annual average.•Units.Note.—Income items, consumption, and saving deflated by <strong>the</strong> personal consumption deflator; residential investment deflatedby <strong>the</strong> residential deflator.Sources: Department <strong>of</strong> Commerce (Bureau <strong>of</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> Analysis and Bureau <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Census) and Council <strong>of</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> Advisers.auto sales in 1982 for <strong>the</strong> entire year were lower than in any yearsince <strong>the</strong> early 1960s.The extended period <strong>of</strong> weakness in durable goods sales accompanieda reduction in <strong>the</strong> burden <strong>of</strong> consumer debt. Consumer installmentdebt repayments relative to disposable personal income fellsteadily from <strong>the</strong>ir 1978 peak to reach, by <strong>the</strong> third quarter <strong>of</strong> 1982,<strong>the</strong>ir lowest level since 1964, as illustrated in Chart 6-3. Total householddebt has also fallen sharply relative to households' net worth.RESIDENTIAL INVESTMENTAs indicated in Table 6-2,1982 showed <strong>the</strong> first rise in housing activityin 5 years. By <strong>the</strong> fourth quarter <strong>of</strong> 1982, housing starts rose to 1.25million at an annual rate, up nearly 45 percent from <strong>the</strong>ir trough <strong>of</strong>865,000 units in <strong>the</strong> fourth quarter <strong>of</strong> 1981. Starts averaged less than onemillion units until mid-1982 as interest rates on mortgage commitmentsstayed around 17 percent. In August, mortgage interest rates beganto fall, dropping below 14 percent by year-end. This drop encour-4.0-1.75.61.81.52.1-11.45.9-23.1.39.35.8-4.31.83.62.6.339.86.4-42.3= 5.53.5.62.6-22.76.544.53.63.12.32.14.16.1-11.6128


Chart 6-3Ratio <strong>of</strong> Consumer InstallmentCredit to Personal IncomeRATIO (PERCENT)15.014.5 -14.0 -13.5 "1977 1978 1979 1980 19811982SOURCES: DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS,aged <strong>the</strong> sale <strong>of</strong> houses, reduced <strong>the</strong> inventory <strong>of</strong> unsold new housesrelative to current sales, and spurred new construction.For <strong>the</strong> first time in recent years, house prices increased at aslower rate than general inflation. Moreover, <strong>the</strong> conventional measures<strong>of</strong> house price increases, which rose less than 3 percent, maywell have overstated <strong>the</strong> 1982 rise because increased builder andseller financing at below market rates is not fully captured in <strong>the</strong>price data. Lower interest costs and more moderate house price increaseshelped to hold down mortgage payments and, thus, mayfavor a recovery in housing investment.BUSINESS FIXED INVESTMENTReal business fixed investment peaked in <strong>the</strong> last quarter <strong>of</strong> 1981,having grown at a 5.2 percent annual rate from 1977 to 1981. From129


its 1981 peak to <strong>the</strong> last quarter <strong>of</strong> 1982, real business fixed investmentdropped 8.4 percent.The 1982 decline in capital spending was broadly based, affectingeven sectors that had fared well in previous years. Industrial andcommercial construction declined about 1 percent in real terms from<strong>the</strong> fourth quarter <strong>of</strong> 1981 to <strong>the</strong> fourth quarter <strong>of</strong> 1982 havinggrown at an annual rate <strong>of</strong> more than 10 percent from 1977 to 1981.Computer, communications, and instrumentation equipment investmentfell about 4 percent in 1982, a sharp contrast to over 9 percentannual rate <strong>of</strong> real growth from 1977 to 1981.In <strong>the</strong> energy area, real investment in coal mine development continuedto rise strongly in 1982. Real investment in oil field explorationand development dropped 15 percent between <strong>the</strong> fourth quarters<strong>of</strong> 1981 and 1982 as weak oil prices impaired cash flow in <strong>the</strong>petroleum industry. Reflecting <strong>the</strong> weakness in overall economicgrowth, investment in transportation equipment—autos, trucks, aircraft,ships, boats, and railroad equipment—continued to decline in1982.Business capital spending is likely to lag behind <strong>the</strong> recovery in <strong>the</strong>economy. Contracts and orders for new plant and equipment declinedabout 12 percent in real terms between <strong>the</strong> last quarters <strong>of</strong>1981 and 1982. In addition, a Department <strong>of</strong> Commerce survey <strong>of</strong>business spending plans indicated that real nonfarm investment willdecline about 5.2 percent in 1983.INVENTORY INVESTMENTSluggish sales and high carrying costs encouraged businessto pare inventories in 1982. A sharp drop in final sales in late1981 triggered a swing to inventory liquidation in <strong>the</strong> first half <strong>of</strong>1982. Even <strong>the</strong> more moderate sales forecasts for <strong>the</strong> second half <strong>of</strong>1982 proved overly optimistic, and inventory-sales ratios climbed,prompting fur<strong>the</strong>r cutbacks in production, employment, and inventories(Chart 6-4). Toward <strong>the</strong> end <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> year, inventories werebrought more in line with sales. Auto inventories, which accountedfor about one-third <strong>of</strong> inventory liquidation in <strong>the</strong> final quarter <strong>of</strong>1982, were especially lean, as <strong>the</strong> industry's aggressive pricing andmarketing efforts helped to increase sales.THE FARM ECONOMYTotal income per farm family in 1982 fell about 11 percent in realterms. Over two-thirds <strong>of</strong> farm family earnings came from <strong>of</strong>f-farmsources as income from farm sources declined.Net farm nominal income from farm operations declined from $25billion in 1981 to about $19 billion in 1982. Relatively tight meat130


Chart 6-4RATIO1.85Real Inventory/Sales Ratioand Industrial Production1967=1001601.80 -INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION,MANUFACTURING(RIGHT SCALE) .A- 1551.75 -1.70 -mm1.65 —1.60••t•tm»\\A\A**/9#*#0»#•#AT,A A/A / U *TVrVy ¥• * • /^ 1 1 f•A •-' -MA A f 1 1 •' if t v\ 1 /1 1 A • 1* 1 /L Wl • fa 1 /!• 1 • 1 ' II1 • 1••I/••1/\l / I If1I V\ / •I »\'\// '1


Lower crop prices, high mortgage rates, and lower inflation were<strong>the</strong> major factors leading to a decline in land values. Farm liabilitiescontinued to increase and farmers' debt-to-asset ratio is estimated tohave increased to about 20 percent, a significant rise from <strong>the</strong> 15 to17 percent range typical <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> late 1960s and 1970s.U.S. agricultural policies have once again become a major factor indetermining farm prices and incomes. Federal budget outlays forcommodity price support and related programs soared to $12 billionin fiscal 1982 from $4 billion in <strong>the</strong> previous fiscal year. A program<strong>of</strong> voluntary acreage controls, including payments to those who restrictproduction in <strong>the</strong> 1983-84 crop year, was adopted in 1982 andsupplemented by <strong>the</strong> addition <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> "payment-in-kind" option inearly 1983.Food prices rose about 4 percent in 1982, with marketing costsrising at more than twice <strong>the</strong> rate <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> farm value component <strong>of</strong>food prices.FOREIGN TRADEA reduction in U.S. trade was a key factor in <strong>the</strong> decline in aggregatedemand in 1982. The main causes <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> decline in net exportswere <strong>the</strong> strength <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> dollar and <strong>the</strong> worldwide recession. In December1982 <strong>the</strong> trade-weighted value <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> dollar was about 40percent above its low point in 1980. Because exchange-rate appreciationlowers import prices and affects trade volume with a substantiallag, it initially tends to improve <strong>the</strong> trade balance. By <strong>the</strong> second half<strong>of</strong> 1982, however, <strong>the</strong> reduced cost competitiveness <strong>of</strong> U.S. firmsbegan to overwhelm <strong>the</strong> short-term positive factors.A secondary cause <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> deteriorating trade balance was <strong>the</strong> internationaldebt problem. Some heavily indebted developing countries,especially in Latin America, experienced difficulty in attracting capitalinflows and were forced to cut imports sharply in 1982. Because several<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> major high-debt developing countries have close tradingties with <strong>the</strong> United States, a large proportion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> import cutscame out <strong>of</strong> U.S. exports.Cyclical factors had conflicting effects on <strong>the</strong> trade balance in1982. On one side, <strong>the</strong> recession in <strong>the</strong> United States tended toreduce import demand, so that import volume fell more than 4 percent.On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r side, <strong>the</strong> recession in o<strong>the</strong>r industrial countriescontributed to <strong>the</strong> 13 percent decline in real U.S. exports.GOVERNMENT PURCHASES OF GOODS AND SERVICESReal Federal, State, and local government purchases <strong>of</strong> goods andservices increased 2.6 percent from <strong>the</strong> fourth quarter <strong>of</strong> 1981 to <strong>the</strong>fourth quarter <strong>of</strong> 1982. Much <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> increase was attributable to a 6.8132


percent increase in real defense purchases. Federal nondefense purchasesrose in real terms, due to a large increase in real purchases <strong>of</strong>agricultural commodities by <strong>the</strong> Commodity Credit Corporation.State and local government purchases were virtually flat.LABOR MARKET DEVELOPMENTSAlong with output, employment declined 1 percent in 1982, asshown in Table 6-3. At <strong>the</strong> end <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> year, employment was 1.7million persons below <strong>the</strong> peak level reached in <strong>the</strong> second quarter<strong>of</strong> 1981. The reduction in employment predominantly occurredamong production workers and o<strong>the</strong>r blue-collar employees. Sales,clerical, and service workers' employment did not peak until September1982.TABLE 6-3.—Labor market developments, 1978-82[Fourth quarter <strong>of</strong> indicated year]Component 1978 | 1979 | 1980 | 1981 | 1982Change in civilian employment....Males 20 years and overFemales 20 years and over..Both sexes 16-19 yearsWhiteBlack and o<strong>the</strong>r...Unemployment rate 3 .Males 20 years and overFemales 20 years and over..Both sexes 16-19 yearsWhiteBlack and o<strong>the</strong>r..,Participation rate 4 .....Males 20 years and overFemales 20 years and over..Both sexes 16-19 yearsWhiteBlack and o<strong>the</strong>r..3.82.75.62.73.37.35.94.15.816.45.111.563.579.850.158.263.662.4Percent change from year earlier 12.31.54.0-.82.23.35.94.45.716.35.211.263.879.651.057.964.062.3-0.2-.61.6-6.6-.1-.6Percent 27.46.26.718.36.513.763.779.251.556.364.061.80.6.22.8-8.9.6-.18.37.17.221.27.315.363.878.852.354.664.261.4-1.0-1.5.7-8.0-1.2.410.710.09.024.39.518.664.178.852.954.164.562.01 1978 data adjusted to reflect changes in sample and estimation procedures, which increased employment and labor force by250,000 in January 1978.2 Seasonally adjusted.3 Unemployed as percent <strong>of</strong> civilian labor force.* Civilian labor force as percent <strong>of</strong> civilian noninstitutional population.Note.—Data relate to persons 16 years and over.Source: Department <strong>of</strong> Labor, Bureau <strong>of</strong> Labor Statistics.Generally speaking, <strong>the</strong> older <strong>the</strong> age cohort, <strong>the</strong> lower <strong>the</strong> unemploymentrate. For example, <strong>the</strong> unemployment rate for <strong>the</strong> 55 andover age group was 5.7 percent in <strong>the</strong> final quarter <strong>of</strong> 1982. Youngworkers experienced <strong>the</strong> highest unemployment rate. Employment <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> 16 to 19 year age group has dropped in every year since 1979.This decline was far faster than <strong>the</strong> decline in <strong>the</strong> number <strong>of</strong> persons133


in this age group. Women workers now have somewhat lower unemploymentrates than men, a reversal <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> historical relation.The labor force participation rate—<strong>the</strong> ratio <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> labor force to<strong>the</strong> population over 16 years <strong>of</strong> age—has experienced a modestupward drift as women workers continue to join <strong>the</strong> labor force. Thegrowth in adult women's labor force participation has been strong in<strong>the</strong> past. Declining participation has occurred among workers lessthan 20 years <strong>of</strong> age and among workers, especially males, over 55—who are likely to have an income cushion provided by social security,private pension plans, and savings.WAGES, PRODUCTIVITY, AND PRICESIn response to slack labor markets and lower rates <strong>of</strong> price inflation,wage increases slowed substantially in 1982. As shown in Table6-4, <strong>the</strong> rate <strong>of</strong> increase in several measures <strong>of</strong> wages and compensationdeclined about 2 percentage points from 1981. The 5.9 percentincrease in <strong>the</strong> hourly earnings index for private nonfarm workerswas <strong>the</strong> smallest since 1973. As measured by <strong>the</strong> employment costindex, wages and salaries <strong>of</strong> private industry workers increased 6.9percent between <strong>the</strong> third quarters <strong>of</strong> 1981 and 1982. The decelerationwas about <strong>the</strong> same for union and nonunion workers. A survey<strong>of</strong> major collective bargaining settlements reached in private industryshowed that in <strong>the</strong> first 9 months <strong>of</strong> 1982 <strong>the</strong> agreements providedwage adjustments that averaged 3.8 percent in <strong>the</strong> first contract year,exclusive <strong>of</strong> cost-<strong>of</strong>-living adjustments, compared with 8.3 percentwhen <strong>the</strong> same parties last bargained. Total labor compensation in<strong>the</strong> nonfarm business sector increased 6.7 percent, compared withAdjusted hourly earnings index 3 .Employment cost index *Union workersNonunion workers.Nonfarm business sector:*TABLE 6-4.—Changes in wages and compensation, 1978-82[Percent change, fourth quarter to fourth quarter and 5-year average]MeasureCompensation per hourReal compensation per hour..19798.4 8.07.7 8.78.0 9.07.6 8.59.0 9.4.0 -2.919809.69.010.98.010.6-1.719818.48.89.68.58.81982*5.9•6.95 7.46 6.66.62.05-yearaverage 1 *'Preliminary.* Based on annual data.'Private nonfarm employees.4 Wages and salaries, private nonfarm industry workers.•Third quarter 1981 to third quarter 1982.'All persons.Sources: Department <strong>of</strong> Commerce (Bureau <strong>of</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> Analysis), Department <strong>of</strong> Labor (Bureau <strong>of</strong> Labor Statistics), andCouncil <strong>of</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> Advisers.8.28.18.87.89.C134


8.8 percent in 1981. These declines in wage inflation provide a basisfor expecting that recent reductions in price inflation may be sustained.Real compensation per hour rose 2.0 percent in 1982 as pay increasedmore rapidly than consumer prices. This was <strong>the</strong> first rise inthis series since early 1978 and suggests that <strong>the</strong> historic trend <strong>of</strong>rising real wages and family incomes may resume.Even though output declined for <strong>the</strong> third straight year, as shownin Table 6-5, labor productivity in <strong>the</strong> nonfarm business sector experiencedits first substantial improvement since 1977. Lower rates <strong>of</strong>increase in hourly compensation and higher productivity growth toge<strong>the</strong>rresulted in labor costs per unit <strong>of</strong> output increasing only 4.6percent. This was less than half <strong>the</strong> rate <strong>of</strong> increase recorded in1980, when labor productivity was weaker and hourly compensationrose at double-digit rates. The 4.6 percent increase in unit laborcosts was associated with a rise <strong>of</strong> 4.3 percent in <strong>the</strong> nonfarm businesssector price deflator.TABLE 6-5.—Productivity, costs, and prices in <strong>the</strong> nonfarm business sector, 1978-82[Percent change, fourth quarter to fourth quarter and 5-year average]Item 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 > 5-yearaverage 1 2Output5.60.2-0.6-0.2-1.71.2Output per hour.3-1.9.3-.11.9.0Compensation per hour..9.09.410.68.86.69.0Unit tabor cost8.611.610.28.94.69.0Implicit price deflator8.28.510.79.64.38.31 Preliminary.2 Based on annual data.Note.—Data relate to alt persons.Source: Department <strong>of</strong> Labor, Bureau <strong>of</strong> Labor Statistics.By all o<strong>the</strong>r measures as well, <strong>the</strong> rate <strong>of</strong> inflation declined significantlyin 1982, as shown in Table 6-6. After increasing at doubledigitrates in 1980 and by nearly 9 percent in 1981, <strong>the</strong> broadestmeasures <strong>of</strong> inflation—<strong>the</strong> GNP fixed-weight price index and <strong>the</strong>GNP implicit price deflator—increased nearly 5 percent in 1982. Theall-urban consumer price index increased 4.5 percent, <strong>the</strong> slowestrate since 1972. Even when food and energy prices, which were especiallyweak, are excluded, consumer prices increased about 5 percent.Beginning in 1983, <strong>the</strong> homeownership component <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> consumerprice index for all-urban consumers will be computed on a rentalequivalence basis. On this conceptual basis, consumer prices increasedabout 5 percent in 1982.Producer prices <strong>of</strong> finished goods increased only 3.6 percent in1982, about <strong>the</strong> same as in 1972 and 1976. Price increases for bothconsumer finished goods and capital equipment showed a markeddeceleration.135


GNP price measures:Fixed-weighted index..Implicit deflatorConsumer prices:'All itemsAll items less food and energy...Producer prices—finished goods:Total..Consumer goodsCapital equipment..TABLE 6-6.—/Vire changes, 1978-82[Percent change, fourth quarter to fourth quarter and 5-year average]Item 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982'8.98.59.08.58.79.07.89.38.212.710.712.713.98.810.310.212.612.212.412.611.78.98.99.610.27.26.89.15.04.64.55.23.63.44.25-yearaverage l1 Preliminary.1 Based on annual data.8 All urban consumers.Source: Department <strong>of</strong> Commerce (Bureau <strong>of</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> Analysis) and Department <strong>of</strong> Labor (Bureau <strong>of</strong> Labor Statistics).8.68.29.89.49.19.28.7CREDIT MARKETSDuring <strong>the</strong> first three quarters <strong>of</strong> 1982 <strong>the</strong> total amount <strong>of</strong> fundsraised in U.S. credit markets averaged slightly more, at an annualrate, than <strong>the</strong> volume raised in 1981. As shown in Table 6-7, over<strong>the</strong> last 5 years <strong>the</strong> volume <strong>of</strong> funds raised by <strong>the</strong> nonfinancial sectorhas dropped from 18.6 percent to 13.6 percent <strong>of</strong> nominal GNP, areturn to <strong>the</strong> cyclical lows recorded in 1974 and 1975.TABLE 6-7.—Funds raised by <strong>the</strong> nonfinancial sector <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> economy, 1978-82[Billions <strong>of</strong> dollars, except as noted]Sector 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 •Total funds raised401.7402.0397.1406.9413.7Households169.3176.5117.5120.487.0Business........126.3146.9143.9149.5139.1Federal Government53.737.479.287.4139.1State and local government...19.120.227.322,337.2Foreign33.221.029.327.311.1Funds raised as percent <strong>of</strong> GNP....18.616.615.113.913.6'Average <strong>of</strong> first three quarters at seasonally adjusted annual rate.Note.—Detail may not add to total due to rounding.Sources: Department <strong>of</strong> Commerce (Bureau <strong>of</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> Analysis) and Board <strong>of</strong> Governors <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Federal Reserve System.Different sectors <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> credit market experienced widely differenttrends in 1982. High interest rates 1 in <strong>the</strong> first half <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> year andsluggish disposable income contributed to reduced borrowing for136


housing. Borrowing by <strong>the</strong> nonfinancial business sector also declinedduring <strong>the</strong> first three quarters <strong>of</strong> 1982. However, <strong>the</strong> easing <strong>of</strong> creditconditions in late summer encouraged an expansion in net corporatebond issues; <strong>the</strong> funds raised were used in part to pay <strong>of</strong>f short-termdebt.Combined borrowing <strong>of</strong> State and local governments and <strong>the</strong> FederalGovernment rose approximately 60 percent in <strong>the</strong> first threequarters <strong>of</strong> 1982 from 1981 levels, as <strong>the</strong> growth <strong>of</strong> tax receiptsslowed sharply relative to expenditures. For fiscal 1982, U.S. Treasuryborrowing totaled $135.0 billion, <strong>of</strong> which $23.4 billion was usedfor making direct loans. Federally guaranteed loans declined sharplyfrom 1981 levels, but borrowing by federally sponsored enterprisessurged. Total Federal and federally assisted borrowing climbed to48.9 percent <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> funds raised in U.S. credit markets, surpassing<strong>the</strong> previous peacetime peak <strong>of</strong> 41 percent reached in 1976.INTEREST RATESAs shown in Chart 6-1, interest rates rose in <strong>the</strong> first part <strong>of</strong> 1982but began to, decline sharply in <strong>the</strong> summer. The decline in interestrates partly reflected diminishing inflationary expectations that tendto be built into nominal interest rates.The yield on 3-month Treasury bills, which had averaged justunder 11 percent late in 1981, held in <strong>the</strong> 12 to 13 percent rangeuntil mid-1982 and <strong>the</strong>n fell to less than 8 percent in <strong>the</strong> closingmonths <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> year. The prime rate charged by commercial banksbegan <strong>the</strong> year at 15% percent, climbed to 17 percent in February,and <strong>the</strong>n in July began a steady fall to 11^ percent by December.The corporate Aaa bond rate, which peaked at 1534 percent in February,fell below 12 percent by November.The expected real after-tax interest rate is <strong>the</strong> correct measure <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> cost <strong>of</strong> credit to borrowers and lenders. It is approximately equalto <strong>the</strong> after-tax nominal interest rate less <strong>the</strong> anticipated rate <strong>of</strong> inflation.For example, with a 12 percent nominal interest rate, <strong>the</strong> aftertaxcost <strong>of</strong> credit to a borrower in <strong>the</strong> 30 percent marginal tax bracketis 8.4 percent. If a 5 percent inflation rate is anticipated, <strong>the</strong> expectedreal after-tax cost <strong>of</strong> credit is 3.2 percent.Because <strong>the</strong> tax brackets <strong>of</strong> borrowers differ widely and <strong>the</strong> expectedrate <strong>of</strong> inflation cannot be observed directly, <strong>the</strong> realized realpretax interest rate—-approximated by <strong>the</strong> nominal interest rate less<strong>the</strong> actual rate <strong>of</strong> inflation—is a more convenient measure <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> cost<strong>of</strong> credit. The nominal 3-month Treasury bill rate and <strong>the</strong> correspondingrealized real pretax rate are shown in Chart 6-5 for <strong>the</strong>period since 1955. The real pretax Treasury bill rate was abnormallylow in 1972-73 and 1976-77, tending to increase aggregate demand.137


It <strong>the</strong>n moved to relatively high levels from 1980 through <strong>the</strong> firsthalf <strong>of</strong> 1982, tending to reduce aggregate demand. By <strong>the</strong> end <strong>of</strong>1982, however, <strong>the</strong> real pretax Treasury bill rate had fallen to about<strong>the</strong> same level as its highs in <strong>the</strong> 1950s and 1960s.Chart 6-5Nominal and Real 3-Month Treasury Bill YieldPERCENT15 -10 ~1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980'CONVERTED TO EFFECTIVE ANNUAL YIELD FROM DISCOUNT BASIS.^EQUALS NOMINAL YIELD LESS ACTUAL RATE OF INFLATION, DEFINED BY PERSONALCONSUMPTION DEFLATOR, OVER THE PERIOD TO MATURITY. DEFLATOR FOR FIRSTQUARTER 1983 FORECAST BY COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS.SOURCES: DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVESYSTEM, AND COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS.The sharp run-up and subsequent decline in real pretax ratesduring <strong>the</strong> 1980-82 period probably reflect in part <strong>the</strong> adjustment <strong>of</strong>credit markets to <strong>the</strong> decontrol <strong>of</strong> interest rates. During <strong>the</strong> late1970s variable interest rate time and savings accounts were introducedby depository institutions, and <strong>the</strong> process <strong>of</strong> financial innovationspeeded up <strong>the</strong> movement <strong>of</strong> funds out <strong>of</strong> regulated, fixed-rateaccounts. In addition, <strong>the</strong> consumer has recently become a more vig-138


orous competitor for credit as usury laws have been eliminated. As aresult, <strong>the</strong> financial system now relies less on nonprice rationing <strong>of</strong>credit and may exhibit higher interest rates when credit is tight.Even though real short-term rates have returned more nearly to<strong>the</strong> levels <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1950s and 1960s, <strong>the</strong> equilibrium level <strong>of</strong> both longandshort-term rates may now be somewhat higher than before. To<strong>the</strong> extent that <strong>the</strong> accelerated cost recovery system in <strong>the</strong> <strong>Economic</strong>Recovery Tax Act <strong>of</strong> 1981 reduced <strong>the</strong> tax on earnings <strong>of</strong> depreciableproperty, it raised <strong>the</strong> real interest rate that business borrowersare willing to pay. In addition, large budget deficits in many countrieshave lowered national saving rates, tending to lead to higherreal interest rates worldwide.At <strong>the</strong> end <strong>of</strong>-1982, long-term interest rates were considerablyhigher than short-term interest rates, perhaps reflecting <strong>the</strong> concernthat-<strong>the</strong> inflation rate may be higher in <strong>the</strong> future than at present. To<strong>the</strong> extent that <strong>the</strong>se inflationary expectations decline, fur<strong>the</strong>r declinesin nominal long-term interest rates can be anticipated.MONETARY DEVELOPMENTSThe Administration's economic program includes support for apolicy <strong>of</strong> gradual reduction in <strong>the</strong> rate <strong>of</strong> monetary growth in orderto bring down inflation. Consistent with this policy, <strong>the</strong> Federal Reservereduced <strong>the</strong> Ml target growth rate range from 3.5 to 6 percentin 1981 to 2.5 to 5.5 percent in 1982. The target range for M2growth was kept at 6 to 9 percent.In its February 1982 review <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> tentative target ranges for 1982,established in July 1981, <strong>the</strong> Federal Open Market Committee recognizedthat <strong>the</strong> rapid increase <strong>of</strong> Ml in December 1981 and January1982 had already placed it well above <strong>the</strong> top <strong>of</strong> its target range.Judging that <strong>the</strong> rapid money growth was temporary and that nobasic change in <strong>the</strong> relation between <strong>the</strong> monetary aggregates andnominal GNP had occurred, <strong>the</strong> committee reaffirmed <strong>the</strong> tentativetargets for 1982.Consequently, <strong>the</strong> Federal Reserve slowed <strong>the</strong> growth <strong>of</strong> nonborrowedreserves during <strong>the</strong> first half <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> year, with a view to graduallybringing Ml and M2 back into <strong>the</strong>ir target ranges. By June, Mlwas within its target range, while M2 remained somewhat above <strong>the</strong>top <strong>of</strong> its range. Because Ml had shown virtually no growth sinceJanuary, resumption <strong>of</strong> growth implied a step-up in <strong>the</strong> provision <strong>of</strong>bank reserves. After midyear, continued weakness in <strong>the</strong> economy,and a more ample supply <strong>of</strong> reserves and money contributed to asharp drop in short-term interest rates. The 3-month Treasury billrate fell from about 12 percent in July to 9 percent in August. Aseries <strong>of</strong> reductions in <strong>the</strong> Federal Reserve's discount rate followed,139


maintaining its alignment with short-term market rates and preventingsharp changes in <strong>the</strong> incentive for banks to borrow from <strong>the</strong> FederalReserve.Starting in August, Ml growth began to speed up. By <strong>the</strong> fourthquarter <strong>of</strong> 1982, Ml had risen 8.5 percent above its level in <strong>the</strong>fourth quarter <strong>of</strong> 1981, well above <strong>the</strong> upper end <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1982 targetrange. Over <strong>the</strong> same period, M2 increased 9.8 percent, slightly morethan <strong>the</strong> top <strong>of</strong> its target range. These increases in <strong>the</strong> monetary aggregatesoccurred against <strong>the</strong> background <strong>of</strong> an economy that wasstill in recession.Part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> strength in Ml may be attributable to <strong>the</strong> effects <strong>of</strong> alarge volume <strong>of</strong> All-Savers Certificates maturing in <strong>the</strong> fourth quarter<strong>of</strong> 1982, as <strong>the</strong> maturing funds moved through checking accounts orwere temporarily "parked" <strong>the</strong>re. Federal Reserve analysis suggestedthat an additional factor was an unusual demand for liquidity. Much<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> increase in Ml was in interest-bearing negotiable order <strong>of</strong>withdrawal (NOW) accounts, which provide elements <strong>of</strong> both savingsand transactions accounts. From <strong>the</strong> fourth quarter <strong>of</strong> 1981 to <strong>the</strong>fourth quarter <strong>of</strong> 1982, checkable deposits o<strong>the</strong>r than demand depositsgrew about 35 percent. With market interest rates falling, <strong>the</strong>seinterest-bearing deposits, such as NOW accounts, provided a safeand convenient store <strong>of</strong> liquidity at a time <strong>of</strong> economic and financialuncertainty. Increased liquidity demand may also account for <strong>the</strong>above-target growth <strong>of</strong> M2.As discussed in Chapter 1, <strong>the</strong> behavior <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> "income velocity"measures—<strong>the</strong> ratios <strong>of</strong> GNP to <strong>the</strong> various monetary aggregates—was unusual in 1982. The velocity <strong>of</strong> Ml rose 3.2 percent a year onaverage over <strong>the</strong> 20 years ending in 1981, but in 1982 it declined 4.9percent. While a tendency toward slower velocity is not unusual in<strong>the</strong> midst <strong>of</strong> a recession when interest rates generally are falling, <strong>the</strong>only o<strong>the</strong>r fourth quarter to fourth quarter decline in Ml velocitysince <strong>the</strong> beginning <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> current series in 1959 was a 0.1 percentfall in 1967. The velocity <strong>of</strong> M2, which historically has been relativelytrendless, declined 6.0 percent in 1982; <strong>the</strong> largest previous declinewas 3.8 percent in 1976. Without some accommodation <strong>of</strong> monetarygrowth—particularly for M1 —to this drop in velocity, monetarypolicy would have been more restrictive than had been"intendedwhen <strong>the</strong> 1982 targets were established.The number, size, and rapidity <strong>of</strong> recent changes in <strong>the</strong> financialsector may well have affected <strong>the</strong> behavior <strong>of</strong> velocity. As indicated inTable 6-8, checkable deposits o<strong>the</strong>r than ordinary demand depositsaccounted for only 2.3 percent <strong>of</strong> Ml in December 1978. In December1980, just before NOW accounts were authorized nationally,o<strong>the</strong>r checkable deposits were 6.5 percent <strong>of</strong> Ml, but by December140


1982 <strong>the</strong>ir share had risen to over 21 percent. Because <strong>the</strong>se interestbearingdeposits may be regarded by <strong>the</strong>ir holders in part as savingsra<strong>the</strong>r than solely as transactions balances, <strong>the</strong> reported growth <strong>of</strong>Ml in 1981 and 1982 probably overstates <strong>the</strong> growth in transactionsbalances.TABLE 6-8.—Components <strong>of</strong> Ml and M2, 1978-82[Averages <strong>of</strong> daily figures; billions <strong>of</strong> dollars; seasonally adjusted, except as noted]Item19781979December198019811982 »CurrencyPlus* Demand deposits %Equals- MlO<strong>the</strong>r checkable depositsPlus* Savings deposits 3Small time depositsOvernight repurchase agreements (RPs) and overnight Eurodollars *...Equals- M2 9Money market mutual fund balances (excluding institution accounts)*97 4257 484363 2479 9533 924.0711,403.91061265 916 9389 04217652 626.334 41,518.91161271426 9414 5398.9751.735.061.91,656.21231240 777 0440 9343 6854 738.115121,822.7132 6244 61013478 5400 3904 245.6177 51,999.11 Preliminary.includes travelers checks.'Includes Money Market Deposit Account introduced December 14, 1982.4 Not seasonally adjusted.B M2 will differ from <strong>the</strong> sum <strong>of</strong> components by a consolidation adjustment that represents <strong>the</strong> estimated amount <strong>of</strong> demanddeposits and vault cash held by thrift institutions to service time and savings deposits.Source: Board <strong>of</strong> Governors <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Federal Reserve System.In general, <strong>the</strong> demand for any particular monetary aggregate—and hence its income velocity—depends in part on <strong>the</strong> difference betweenmarket rates <strong>of</strong> interest and <strong>the</strong> rates earned on <strong>the</strong> deposits inthat aggregate. Consequently, <strong>the</strong> increased portion <strong>of</strong> Ml depositsthat pay interest and <strong>the</strong> decline in market interest rates have combinedto lower Ml velocity.The rapid growth <strong>of</strong> general purpose and broker/dealer moneymarket mutual fund balances, which are included in M2 but not inMl, has tended to raise Ml velocity and to lower M2 velocity. FromDecember 1980 to December 1982 <strong>the</strong>se money market mutual fundbalances grew from $61.9 billion to $177.5 billion, which exceeded<strong>the</strong> growth in o<strong>the</strong>r checkable deposits by $41.2 billion. Althoughmost money market mutual fund balances are subject to transfer bycheck, <strong>the</strong> average turnover <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se accounts has been relatively low.Interpretation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> macroeconomic significance <strong>of</strong> changes in <strong>the</strong>monetary aggregates became more difficult in late 1982 when <strong>the</strong>Depository Institutions Deregulation Committee authorized two newaccounts. In mid-December, banks and thrift institutions introduced aMoney Market Deposit Account with limited transactions capabilitiesand no interest rate ceiling. Within about 2 weeks, <strong>the</strong>se accounts141


had attracted an astonishing $87 billion. The Depository InstitutionsDeregulation Committee also authorized a new super NOW accounteffective January 1983, with no transactions limitations and no interestrate ceilings, having <strong>the</strong> same $2,500 minimum balance as <strong>the</strong>Money Market Deposit Account.Financial deregulation and innovation favorably affect <strong>the</strong> efficiency<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> U.S. financial system but also complicate <strong>the</strong> implementation<strong>of</strong> monetary policy. Large asset reallocations caused by changesin <strong>the</strong> financial and regulatory system can have large and unpredictableeffects on Ml and M2 and on <strong>the</strong>ir relations to nominal GNP. Inlight <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> particular difficulties with regard to Ml, <strong>the</strong> FederalOpen Market Committee has voted to place greater emphasis on M2and M3 for an indefinite period. However, <strong>the</strong> broad framework <strong>of</strong>targeting <strong>the</strong> monetary aggregates has been retained, as have <strong>the</strong> reserveoperating procedures, for implementing it.PROSPECTS FOR 1983Assuming that <strong>the</strong> Administration's 1984 budget proposals are enactedand that <strong>the</strong> monetary aggregates grow within <strong>the</strong> Federal Reserve'starget ranges, <strong>the</strong> prospects for a moderate, sustainable economicrecovery beginning early in 1983 are good (Table 6-9). As wastrue in <strong>the</strong> early stages <strong>of</strong> previous recoveries, <strong>the</strong> unemploymentrate is likely to stabilize for several months before a downward trendbecomes evident. A pattern <strong>of</strong> reduced inflation in 1982 is expectedto continue in 1983. The sharp rise in <strong>the</strong> Federal budget deficit reflectsreduced receipts because <strong>of</strong> lower inflation, as well as <strong>the</strong> effects<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1981-82 recession.The expectation <strong>of</strong> economic recovery is based on <strong>the</strong> view thatcontinuing strength in household and defense spending will bring aturnaround in <strong>the</strong> inventory cycle. Cuts in production and increasesin sales brought business inventories more in line with sales by <strong>the</strong>end <strong>of</strong> 1982. Future sales gains are thus likely to be met by increasesin production, income, and employment, enhancing sales fur<strong>the</strong>r.Once even a moderate but sustained increase in sales is underway,this sequence <strong>of</strong> events may lead to a temporary surge <strong>of</strong> above-averageeconomic growth.Increases in sales will come primarily from households whoseincome will be bolstered by <strong>the</strong> third stage <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> personal incometax cut, whose debt burden has declined sharply relative to incomeand assets, and whose financial assets, in many cases, appreciated inrallies in <strong>the</strong> stock and bond markets. With continued moderate increasesin food and oil prices, more income will become available foro<strong>the</strong>r consumer purchases. Because outlays on durable consumer142


TABLE 6-9.—<strong>Economic</strong> outlook for 1983Item 19822 1 *1983forecastPercent change (fourth quarter to fourth quarter):Real gross national productPersonal consumption expenditures.,Nonresidential fixed investmentResidential investmentFederal purchasesState and local purchases6NP implicit price deflatorCompensation per hour 2Output per hour 2Level in fourth quarter: 3Unemployment rate (percent) *Housing starts (millions <strong>of</strong> units, annual rate)....-1.22.S-8.44.56.6.14.66.61.910.7n3.12.727*i1.2-2.05.66.02.210.41.5Preliminary.2 Nonfarm business, all persons.3 Seasonally adjusted.4 Actual rate for 1982 is percent <strong>of</strong> civilian labor force; forecast rate for 1983 is percent <strong>of</strong> total labor force including personsin <strong>the</strong> Armed Forces stationed in <strong>the</strong> United States.Sources: Department <strong>of</strong> Commerce (Bureau <strong>of</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> Analysis and Bureau <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Census), Department <strong>of</strong> Labor (Bureau <strong>of</strong>Labor Statistics), and Council <strong>of</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> Advisers.goods and houses have been depressed for <strong>the</strong> last 4 years, consumersare expected to devote increases in <strong>the</strong>ir income, and perhapssome <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> recent gains in <strong>the</strong>ir financial wealth, to replenishing<strong>the</strong>ir holdings <strong>of</strong> durable goods. The sharp easing <strong>of</strong> credit termsand lower house price increases have already encouraged morehouseholds to consider buying houses. This uptrend is expected tointensify in 1983. New house purchases are invariably followed by apickup in expenditures for furniture, appliances, and o<strong>the</strong>r housingrelatedgoods.The pace <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> recovery in 1983 will probably be moderate by historicalstandards. Low capacity utilization rates and <strong>the</strong> need to rebuildcorporate liquidity will restrain capital spending. The worldwiderecession and <strong>the</strong> lagged effect <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> appreciation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> dollarwill curtail <strong>the</strong> growth <strong>of</strong> exports. Continued reductions in <strong>the</strong> nondefensepublic sector will limit it as a source <strong>of</strong> increased aggregatedemand.PROSPECTS AND POLICIES BEYOND 1983<strong>Economic</strong> prospects for <strong>the</strong> rest <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1980s depend greatly on<strong>the</strong> economic policies that are followed. The Administration believesthat <strong>the</strong> four-point program it has pursued—reducing <strong>the</strong> growth <strong>of</strong>Federal outlays, taxes, regulation, and <strong>the</strong> money supply—constitutes<strong>the</strong> best approach for attaining and maintaining <strong>the</strong> economic goalsset forth in <strong>the</strong> Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act <strong>of</strong> 1978.143


The Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act calls for annualnumerical goals for several key economic indicators over a 5-yearperiod. The projections provided in Table 6-10 show gradual, steadyprogress toward our economic goals. These figures illustrate <strong>the</strong> Administration'sbelief, explained in Chapter 1, that policies based onconsistent, long-term objectives can simultaneously achieve full employment,price stability, and sustained growth in real income. Amajor cause <strong>of</strong> our present economic ills was <strong>the</strong> inclination in <strong>the</strong>past to pursue one economic goal single-mindedly, without adequateattention to <strong>the</strong> longer run consequences for o<strong>the</strong>r economic objectives.This Administration remains determined to avoid <strong>the</strong> errors <strong>of</strong>past policies.TABLE 6-10.—Projections <strong>of</strong> economic goals, 1983-88[Calendar years, except as noted]Item 1983 1984 1985 1986 19871988LevelEmployment (millions) 1101.5104.2107.0109.6112.3114.9"Jnemployment rate (percent) a .10.79.98.98.17.36.5: ederal budget outlays as percent <strong>of</strong> GNP (fiscal year basis).Consumer prices 325.24.924.3 24.1Percent change4.6 4.623.94.623.54.523.04.4Real GNP1.43.94.04.04.04.0Real compensation per hour *1.2.81.11.41.61.6Output per hour *2.11.91.61.71.61.71 Labor force series includes persons in <strong>the</strong> Armed Forces stationed in <strong>the</strong> United States.3 Unemployed as percent <strong>of</strong> total labor force. See footnote 1.3 Wage earners and clerical workers.•Nonfarm business, all persons.Source: Council <strong>of</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> Advisers.A major prerequisite for achieving our economic goals is control <strong>of</strong>inflation. Marked progress toward this end has been made in <strong>the</strong> last2 years. With continued moderate growth in <strong>the</strong> monetary aggregates,increased reliance on <strong>the</strong> private sector, and increased domesticand international economic competition, <strong>the</strong> prospects for sustainingand extending <strong>the</strong> progress against inflation are now quite favorable.An important factor in achieving and sustaining high real economicgrowth is a high level <strong>of</strong> capital formation. Chapter 4 <strong>of</strong> this volume,which fulfills <strong>the</strong> legislative requirement for an annual InvestmentPolicy <strong>Report</strong>, explains that lower inflation and <strong>the</strong> recently enactedtax incentives for saving and investment are <strong>the</strong> important first stepsin fostering capital accumulation. Controlling <strong>the</strong> Federal deficit isnow <strong>the</strong> single most important method <strong>of</strong> encouraging more capitalformation.144


A critical element in achieving healthy economic growth is maintaininga liberal worldwide trading system. As explained in detail in Chapter 3,<strong>the</strong> world's economies are now more integrated than ever before. Thissystem has recently experienced severe strains. It is <strong>of</strong> utmost importancethat <strong>the</strong>se challenges be met in a manner consistent with an open,growing, balanced network <strong>of</strong> international trade.Just as an open worldwide trading system is crucial for <strong>the</strong> freeworld economies, a competitive free market system unfettered by unnecessarygovernment regulation is essential for a strong domesticeconomy. As Chapter 5 points out, substantial progress toward reduction<strong>of</strong> traditional price and entry regulation has been made inrecent years, but fur<strong>the</strong>r opportunities for deregulation exist.The year 1983 is expected to be <strong>the</strong> first <strong>of</strong> many years <strong>of</strong> sustainedeconomic growth. Continued economic growth is <strong>the</strong> only wayto sustain progress in reducing unemployment. But macroeconomicpolicies alone cannot reduce structural unemployment and achieve anacceptable level <strong>of</strong> employment. Chapter 2 describes some <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>macroeconomic policies that, along with a sustained recovery, arenecessary to achieve noninflationary full employment. These policies aredesigned". . . to foster and promote free competitive enterprise . . ."as mandated in <strong>the</strong> Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act.One major remaining threat to a sustainable, balanced recovery is<strong>the</strong> danger that large Federal budget deficits would preclude <strong>the</strong> continuingdeclines in real interest rates that are necessary for healthygrowth in all sectors <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> economy. The Administration's 1984budget provides a plan which can lead to a steady decline in budgetdeficits and thus, ultimately, to a balanced Federal budget.145


Appendix AREPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON THE ACTIVITIESOF THECOUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS DURING 1982


LETTER OF TRANSMITTALCOUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS,Washington, D.C., December 31, 1982.MR. PRESIDENT:The Council <strong>of</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> Advisers submits this report on its activitiesduring <strong>the</strong> calendar year 1982 in accordance with <strong>the</strong> requirements<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Congress, as set forth in section 10(d) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> EmploymentAct <strong>of</strong> 1946 as amended by <strong>the</strong> Full Employment and BalancedGrowth Act <strong>of</strong> 1978.Sincerely,MARTIN FELDSTEIN, ChairmanWILLIAM A. NISKANENWILLIAM POOLE149


Council Members and <strong>the</strong>ir dates <strong>of</strong> service are listed below:NamePositionOath <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice dateSeparation dateEdwin 6. NourseLeon H. KeyserlingJohn D. ClarkRoy BloughRobert C TurnerArthur F. BurnsNeilH. JacobyWalter W. StewartRaymond J. SaulnierJoseph S. DavisPaul W McCrackenKarl BrandtHenry C. WallichWalter W. HellerJames TobinKermit GordonGardner AckleyJohn P. LewisOtto EcksteinArthur M OkunJames S. DuesenberryMerton J. PeckWarren L SmithPaul W. McCrackenHendrikS. HouthakkerHerbert SteinEzra SolomonMarina v.N. WhitmanGary L SeeversWilliam J FellnerAlan GreenspanPaul W. MacAvoyBurton G MalkielCharles L. SchultzeWilliam D. NordhausLyle E GramleyGeorge C. EadsStephen M. GoldfeldMurray L WeidenbaumJerry L. JordanWilliam A. NiskanenMartin FeldsteinWilliam PooleChairmanVice ChairmanActing ChairmanChairmanMemberVice ChairmanMemberMemberChairmanMemberMemberMemberChairmanMemberMember .MemberMemberChairmanMemberMemberMemberChairmanMemberMemberMemberChairmanMemberMemberMemberChairmanMemberMemberChairmanMemberMemberMemberMemberChairmanMemberMember . .ChairmanMemberMemberMemberMemberChairmanMemberMemberChairmanMemberAugust 9,1946August 9, 1946November 2. 1949May 10, 1950August 9. 1946May 10,1950June 29, 1950September8, 1952March 19, 1953September 15,1953December 2,1953April 4, 1955December 3,1956May 2,1955December 3,1956November 1, 1958May 7, 1959January 29, 1961January 29, 1961January 29, 1961August 3, 1962November 16, 1964May 17, 1963September 2, 1964November 16, 1964February 15, 1968February 2,1966February 15, 1968July 1, 1968February 4,1969February 4,1969February 4, 1969January 1,1972September 9, 1971March 13,1972July 23, 1973October 31, 1973September 4, 1974June 13, 1975July 22, 1975January 22, 1977March 18, 1977March 18,1977June 6, 1979August 20, 1980February 27, 1981July 14,1981June 12, 1981October 14, 1982December 10, 1982November 1, 1949.January 20, 1953.February 11,1953.August 20, 1952.January 20,1953.December 1,1956.February 9, 1955.April 29, 1955.January 20,1961.October 31, 1958.January 31,1959.January 20,1961.January 20,1961.November 15, 1964.July 31, 1962.December 27,1962.February 15, 1968.August 31, 1964.February 1,1966.January 20. 1969.June 30, 1968.January 20, 1969.January 20, 1969.December 31, 1971.July 15, 1971.August 31, 1974.March 26,1973.August 15, 1973.April 15, 1975.February 25,1975.January 20,1977.November 15,1976.January 20, 1977.January 20, 1981.February 4, 1979.May 27, 1980.January 20,1981.January 20,1981.August 25, 1982.July 31, 1982.150


<strong>Report</strong> to <strong>the</strong> <strong>President</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Activities <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Council <strong>of</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> Advisers during 1982The Employment Act <strong>of</strong> 1946 (P.L. 304-79th Congress), as amended,provides <strong>the</strong> statutory base for <strong>the</strong> activities <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Council <strong>of</strong><strong>Economic</strong> Advisers. The Council, through <strong>the</strong> Chairman, providesadvice to <strong>the</strong> <strong>President</strong> on a wide range <strong>of</strong> domestic and internationaleconomic policy issues.Martin Feldstein became Chairman on October 14, 1982, succeedingMurray L. Weidenbaum, who returned to Washington University(St. Louis). The Chairman is on leave from Harvard University,where he is a Pr<strong>of</strong>essor <strong>of</strong> <strong>Economic</strong>s. On July 31, 1982, Jerry L.Jordan resigned to return to <strong>the</strong> University <strong>of</strong> New Mexico, where heis a Pr<strong>of</strong>essor <strong>of</strong> <strong>Economic</strong>s at <strong>the</strong> Anderson Schools <strong>of</strong> Management.On December 10, 1982, William Poole became a Member <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Council. Mr. Poole is on leave from Brown University where he is aPr<strong>of</strong>essor <strong>of</strong> <strong>Economic</strong>s. William A. Niskanen continued to serve as aMember.MACROECONOMIC POLICIESAs is its tradition, during 1982 <strong>the</strong> Council devoted much <strong>of</strong> itstime to assisting <strong>the</strong> <strong>President</strong> in <strong>the</strong> formulation <strong>of</strong> broad economicpolicy objectives and <strong>the</strong> programs to carry <strong>the</strong>m out. The development<strong>of</strong> economic assumptions and monitoring <strong>of</strong> current developments,under Council Member Jordan and subsequently CouncilMember Poole, were an area <strong>of</strong> major interest. Monetary policy developmentsreceived especially close attention.Council Member Jordan and later Council Member Poole chaired<strong>the</strong> interagency subcabinet "Troika" forecasting group, consisting <strong>of</strong>representatives from <strong>the</strong> Department <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Treasury and <strong>the</strong> Office<strong>of</strong> Management and Budget, with participation by <strong>the</strong> Department <strong>of</strong>Commerce. The Chairman <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Council continued his responsibilityfor presenting to <strong>the</strong> <strong>President</strong> <strong>the</strong> economic assumptions developedwith <strong>the</strong> Office <strong>of</strong> Management and Budget and <strong>the</strong> Department<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Treasury.Council Members chaired or participated in numerous CabinetCouncil working groups dealing with such issues as economic statistics,Federal credit programs, alternatives to Federal regulation, andFederal housing programs.151


The Chairman actively participated during <strong>the</strong> early months <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>year, and <strong>the</strong>n during <strong>the</strong> late fall budget cycle, in Cabinet level reviews<strong>of</strong> agency budget requests and appeals.MICROECONOMIC POLICIESA wide variety <strong>of</strong> microeconomic issues received Council attentionduring <strong>the</strong> year. Council Member Niskanen chaired Cabinet Councilworking groups dealing with employee pension legislation and alternativesto Federal regulation. Trade issues were an area <strong>of</strong> continuingattention.The Council assisted in <strong>the</strong> preparation <strong>of</strong> agency guidelines forimplementing Executive Order 12291 dealing with Executive Officereview <strong>of</strong> agency regulatory proposals, and worked closely with <strong>the</strong>Office <strong>of</strong> Management and Budget on selected regulatory issues.PUBLIC INFORMATIONThe Council's Annual <strong>Report</strong> is <strong>the</strong> principal medium through which<strong>the</strong> Council informs <strong>the</strong> public <strong>of</strong> its work and its views. It is also animportant vehicle for presenting and explaining <strong>the</strong> Administration'sdomestic and international economic policies. Distribution <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><strong>Report</strong> in recent years has averaged about 50,000 copies. The Councilalso assumes primary responsibility for <strong>the</strong> monthly <strong>Economic</strong> Indicators,a publication prepared by <strong>the</strong> Council's Statistical Office, under<strong>the</strong> supervision <strong>of</strong> Ca<strong>the</strong>rine H. Furlong. The Joint <strong>Economic</strong> Committeeissues <strong>the</strong> Indicators, which has a distribution <strong>of</strong> approximately10,000 copies. Information is also provided to members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> publicthrough speeches and o<strong>the</strong>r public appearances by <strong>the</strong> Chairman,Members, and staff economists <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Council.ORGANIZATION AND STAFF OF THE COUNCILOFFICE OF THE CHAIRMANThe Chairman is responsible for communicating <strong>the</strong> Council'sviews to <strong>the</strong> <strong>President</strong>. This function is carried out through directconsultation with <strong>the</strong> <strong>President</strong> and through written memoranda andreports on economic developments and on particular programs andproposals. The Chairman exercises ultimate responsibility for directing<strong>the</strong> work <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>essional staff. He represents <strong>the</strong> Council atmeetings <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> full Cabinet and <strong>the</strong> various Cabinet Councils, and<strong>the</strong> Trade Policy Committee.COUNCIL MEMBERSThe two Council Members are responsible for all subject mattercovered by <strong>the</strong> Council, including direct supervision <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> work <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>essional staff. Members represent <strong>the</strong> Council at a wide vari-152


ety <strong>of</strong> interagency and international meetings and assume major responsibilityfor selecting issues for Council attention.In practice, <strong>the</strong> small size <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Council permits <strong>the</strong> Chairman andCouncil Members to work as a team in most circumstances. Therewas, however, an informal division <strong>of</strong> subject matter among <strong>the</strong>m in1982. Mr. Jordan and subsequently Mr. Poole, assumed primary responsibilityfor domestic and international macroeconomic analysis,economic projections, and monetary and financial issues. Mr. Niskanenis primarily responsible for microeconomic and sectoral analysis,international trade questions, and regulatory issues.PROFESSIONAL STAFFAt <strong>the</strong> end <strong>of</strong> 1982 <strong>the</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>essional staff consisted <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> SpecialAssistant to <strong>the</strong> Chairman, who also acts as staff director, <strong>the</strong> SeniorStatistician, a domestic policy economist, an international policyeconomist, 12 senior staff economists, 3 staff economists, and 6junior staff economists.The pr<strong>of</strong>essional staff and <strong>the</strong>ir special fields at <strong>the</strong> end <strong>of</strong> 1982were:Eric I. HemelSpecial Assistant to <strong>the</strong> ChairmanLawrence H. Summers Domestic Policy EconomistPaul R. Krugman , International Policy EconomistSenior Staff EconomistsLincoln F. AndersonGe<strong>of</strong>frey O. CarlinerDaniel J. FrischDavid R. HendersonThomas J. KniesnerEvan R. KwerelThomas S. McCalebStephen K. McNeesGlenn L. NelsonAdrian W. ThroopRobert S- VillanuevaBenjamin ZycherCa<strong>the</strong>rine H. Furlong<strong>Economic</strong> ForecastingInternational TradeTaxation and Social Insurance ProgramsHealth Policy and Social Insurance ProgramsLabor and Employment PolicyRegulatory Policies and Natural ResourcesTaxation and Public FinanceMacroeconomic PolicyAgricultural PolicyMonetary Policy and Financial RegulationCurrent <strong>Economic</strong> Conditions, Housing, and<strong>Economic</strong> ForecastingEnergy Policy and RegulationStatisticianSenior StatisticianStaff EconomistsLawrence B. Lindsey Taxation and Public FinanceN. Gregory Mankiw Macroeconomic Policy and Public FinanceRobert H. MeyerLabor and Employment Policy153


Junior Staff EconomistsChristopher B. Ballinger World Trade and International FinanceJohn H. CochraneMacroeconomic Analysis and ForecastingJohn S. EarlePublic Finance and Labor PolicyThomas W. Gilligan Transportation and Regulatory PolicyDavid S. Reitman Social Insurance Programs and GeneralBudget PolicyDan C. RobertsFinancial Institutions and MacroeconomicPolicyCa<strong>the</strong>rine H. Furlong, Senior Statistician, continued to be incharge <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Council's Statistical Office. Mrs. Furlong has primaryresponsibility for managing <strong>the</strong> Council's statistical informationsystem. She supervises <strong>the</strong> publication <strong>of</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> Indicators and <strong>the</strong>preparation <strong>of</strong> all statistical matter in <strong>the</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> <strong>Report</strong>. She alsooversees <strong>the</strong> verification <strong>of</strong> statistics in memoranda, testimony, andspeeches. Natalie V. Rentfro, Linda A. Reilly, and Barbara L. Sibelassist Mrs. Furlong.Serving as consultants during <strong>the</strong> year were Stephen H. Brooks(consultant), Jose A. Gomez-Ibanez (Harvard University), and RobertA. Leone (Harvard University).In preparing <strong>the</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> <strong>Report</strong> <strong>the</strong> Council relied upon <strong>the</strong> editorialservices <strong>of</strong> John Phillip Sawicki.SUPPORTING STAFFThe Administrative Office <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Council <strong>of</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> Advisersprovides general support for <strong>the</strong> Council's activities. Serving in <strong>the</strong>Administrative Office were Elizabeth A. Kaminski, Staff Assistant to<strong>the</strong> Council, and Ca<strong>the</strong>rine Fibich, Administrative Assistant.Members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> secretarial staff for <strong>the</strong> Chairman and CouncilMembers during 1982 were Patricia A. Lee, Susan A. Lindsey, GeorgiaA. O'Connor, and Alice H. Williams. Secretaries for <strong>the</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>essionalstaff were Carolyn L. Bazarnick, Bessie M. Lafakis, RosemaryM. Rogers, Margaret L. Snyder, and Lillie M. Sturniolo.DEPARTURESThe Council's pr<strong>of</strong>essional staff are in most cases on leave <strong>of</strong> absencefrom universities, o<strong>the</strong>r government agencies, or research institutions.Their tenure with <strong>the</strong> Council is usually limited to 1 or 2years. Senior staff economists who resigned during <strong>the</strong> year and <strong>the</strong>irsubsequent affiliations were James B. Burnham (The World Bank),William D. Dobson (Purdue University), Michele U. Fratianni (IndianaUniversity), Steven H. Hanke (Johns Hopkins University), Laur-154


ence J. Kotlik<strong>of</strong>f (Yale University), Michael J. McKee (Department <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> Treasury), David C. Munro (General Motors), Susan C. Nelson(Department <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Treasury), Allen M. Parkman (University <strong>of</strong> NewMexico), Paul H. Rubin (Baruch College), and Elinor Y. Sachse (consultant).Junior economists who resigned in 1982 were Robert G. Murphy(Massachusetts Institute <strong>of</strong> Technology), Chris P. Varvares (WashingtonUniversity, St. Louis), and F. Katharine Warne (Yale University).155


Appendix BSTATISTICAL TABLES RELATING TO INCOME,EMPLOYMENT, AND PRODUCTION


CONTENTSNATIONAL INCOME OR EXPENDITURE:PageB-l. Gross national product, 1929-82 163B-2. Gross national product in 1972 dollars, 1929-82 164B-3. Implicit price deflators for gross national product, 1929-82 166B-4. Fixed-weighted price indexes for gross national product, 1972weights, 1959-82 168B-5. Changes in gross national product and GNP price measures, 1929-82 169B-6. Gross national product by major type <strong>of</strong> product, 1929-82 170B-7. Gross national product by major type <strong>of</strong> product in 1972 dollars,1929-82 171B-8. Gross national product by sector, 1929-82 172B-9. Gross national product by sector in 1972 dollars, 1929-82 173B-10. Gross national product by industry, 1947-81 174B-l 1. Gross national product by industry in 1972 dollars, 1947-81 175B-12. Gross domestic product <strong>of</strong> nonfinancial corporate business, 1929-82 176B-l3. Output, costs, and pr<strong>of</strong>its <strong>of</strong> nonfinancial corporate business,1948-82 177B-14. Personal consumption expenditures, 1929-82 178B-15. Gross private domestic investment, 1929-82 180B-I6. Gross and net private domestic investment, 1929-82 181B-17. Inventories and final sales <strong>of</strong> business, 1946-82 182B-18. Inventories and final sales <strong>of</strong> business in 1972 dollars, 1947-82 183B-l9. Relation <strong>of</strong> gross national product, net national product, and nationalincome, 1929-82 184B-20. Relation <strong>of</strong> national income and personal income, 1929-82 185B-21. National income by type <strong>of</strong> income, 1929-82 186B-22. Sources <strong>of</strong> personal income, 1929-82 188B-23. Disposition <strong>of</strong> personal income, 1929-82 190B-24. Total and per capita disposable personal income and personal consumptionexpenditures in current and 1972 dollars, 1929-82 191B-25. Gross saving and investment, 1929-82 192B-26. Saving by individuals, 1946-82 193B-27. Number and median income (in 1981 dollars) <strong>of</strong> families and persons,and poverty status, by race, selected years, 1947-81 194POPULATION, EMPLOYMENT, WAGES, AND PRODUCTIVITY:B-28. Population by age groups, 1929-82 195B-29. Noninstitutional population and <strong>the</strong> labor force, 1929-82 196B-30. Civilian employment and unemployment by sex and age, 1947-82.. 198B-31. Selected employment and unemployment data, 1948-82 199B-32. Civilian labor force participation rate by demographic characteristic,1954-82 200159


B-S3. Civilian unemployment rate by demographic characteristic,1948-82 201B-34. Unemployment by duration, 1947-82 202B-35. Unemployment by reason, 1967-82 203B-36. Unemployment insurance programs, selected data, 1946-82 204B-37. Wage and salary workers in nonagricultural establishment, 1929-82 205B-38. Average weekly hours and hourly earnings in selected private non-B-39.agricultural industries, 1947-82 206Average weekly earnings in selected private nonagricultural industries,1947-82 207B-40. Productivity and related data, business sector, 1947-82 208B-41. Changes in productivity and related data, business sector, 1948-82. 209PRODUCTION AND BUSINESS ACTIVITY:B-42. Industrial production indexes, major industry divisions, 1929-82.... 210B-43. Industrial production indexes market groupings 1947-82 211B-44. Industrial production indexes, selected manufactures, 1947-82 212B-45. Capacity utilization rate in manufacturing, 1948-82 213B-46. New construction activity, 1929-82 214B-47. New housing units started and authorized 1959-82 216B-48.Nonfarm business expenditures for new plant and equipment1947-83 217B-49. Sales and inventories in manufacturing and trade, 1947-82 218B-50. Manufacturers' shipments and inventories, 1947-82 219B-51. Manufacturers' new and unfilled orders, 1947-82 220PRICES:B-52. Consumer price indexes, major expenditure classes, 1929-82 221B-53. Consumer price indexes, selected expenditure classes, 1939-82 222B-54. Consumer price indexes, commodities, services, and specialgroups, 1939-82.. 224B-55. Changes in consumer price indexes, commodities and services,1948-82 225B-56. Changes in special consumer price indexes, 1958-82 226B-57. Producer price indexes by stage <strong>of</strong> processing, 1947-82 227B-58. Producer price indexes by stage <strong>of</strong> processing, special groups,1974-82 229B-59. Producer price indexes by major commodity groups, 1940-82 230B-60. Changes in producer price indexes for finished goods, 1950-82 232MONEY STOCK, CREDIT, AND FINANCE:B-61. Money stock measures and liquid assets, 1959-82 233B-62. Components <strong>of</strong> money stock measures and liquid assets, 1959-82... 234B-63. Commercial bank loans and investments, 1939-82 235B-64. Total funds raised in credit markets by nonfinancial sectors, 1974-82 236B-65. Federal Reserve Bank credit and member bank reserves, 1929-82... 238B-66.Aggregate reserves <strong>of</strong> depository institutions and monetary base,1959-82 239B-67. Bond yields and interest rates, 1929-82 240B-68. Consumer credit outstanding and net change, 1950-82 242B-69. Consumer installment credit extended and liquidated, 1950-82 243160


B-70. Mortgage debt outstanding by type <strong>of</strong> property and <strong>of</strong> financing,1939-82 244B-71. Mortgage debt outstanding by holder, 1939-82 245GOVERNMENT FINANCE:B-72. Federal budget receipts, outlays, and debt, fiscal years 1973-84 246B-73. Federal budget receipts and outlays, <strong>of</strong>f-budget outlays, and debt,fiscal years 1929-84 248B-74. Relation <strong>of</strong> Federal Government receipts and expenditures in <strong>the</strong>national income and product accounts to <strong>the</strong> unified budget,fiscal years 1982-84 249B-75. Government receipts and expenditures, national income and productaccounts, 1929-82 250B-76. Federal Government receipts and expenditures, national incomeand product accounts, 1958-84 251B-77. State and local government receipts and expenditures, nationalB-78.income and product accounts, 1946-82 252State and local government revenues and expenditures, selectedfiscal years, 1927-81 253B-79. Interest-bearing public debt securities by kind <strong>of</strong> obligation, 1967-82 254B-80. Estimated ownership <strong>of</strong> public debt securities, 1967-82 255B-81.Maturity distribution average length and <strong>of</strong> marketable interestbearingpublic debt securities held by private investors, 1967-82, 256CORPORATE PROFITS AND FINANCE:B-82. Corporate pr<strong>of</strong>its with inventory valuation and capital consumptionadjustments, 1929-82 257B-83. Corporate pr<strong>of</strong>its by industry, 1929-82 258B-84. Corporate pr<strong>of</strong>its <strong>of</strong> manufacturing industries, 1929-82 259B-85. Sales, pr<strong>of</strong>its, and stockholders' equity, all manufacturing corporations,1950-82 260B-86. Relation <strong>of</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>its after taxes to stockholders' equity and to sales,all manufacturing corporations, 1947-82 261B-87. Relation <strong>of</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>its after taxes to stockholders' equity and to sales,all manufacturing corporations, by industry group, 1981-82 262B-88. Determinants <strong>of</strong> business fixed investment, 1955-82 263B-89. Sources and uses <strong>of</strong> funds, nonfarm nonfinancial corporate business,1946-82 264B-90. Current assets and liabilities <strong>of</strong> U.S. corporations, 1939-82 265B-91. State and municipal and corporate securities <strong>of</strong>fered, 1934-82 266B-92. Common stock prices and yields, 1949-82 267B-93. Business formation and business failures, 1929-82 268AGRICULTURE:B-94. Farm income, 1929-82 269B-95. Farm output and productivity indexes, 1929-82 270B-96. Farm input use, selected inputs, 1929-82 271B-97. Indexes <strong>of</strong> prices received and prices paid by farmers, 1940-82 272B-98. U.S. exports and imports <strong>of</strong> agricultural commodities, 1940-82 273B-99. Balance sheet <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> farming sector, 1929-83 274INTERNATIONAL STATISTICS:B-100. Exchange rates, 1967-82 275B-101. U.S. international transactions, 1946-82 276161


B-102. U.S. merchandise exports and imports by principal end-use category,1965-82 278B-103. U.S. merchandise exports and imports by area, 1973-82 279B-104. U.S. merchandise exports and imports by commodity groups, 1960-82 280B-105. International investment position <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States at year-end,selected years, 1970-81 281B-106. World trade: Exports and imports, 1965, 1970, 1975, and 1979-82 282B-107. World trade balance and current account balances, 1965, 1970,1975, and 1979-82 283B-108. International reserves, selected years, 1952-82 284B-109. Growth rates in real gross national product, 1960-82 285B-110. Industrial production and consumer prices, major industrial countries,1960-82 286B— 111. Unemployment rate, and hourly compensation, major industrialcountries, 1960-82 287General NotesDetail in <strong>the</strong>se tables may not add to totals because <strong>of</strong> rounding.Unless o<strong>the</strong>rwise noted, all dollar figures are in current dollars.Symbols used:p Preliminary,Not available (also, not applicable).162


NATIONAL INCOME OR EXPENDITURETABLE B-l.—Gross national product, 1929-82[Billions <strong>of</strong> dollars, except as noted; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]Year or quarterGrossnationalproductPersonalconsumptionexpendituresGrossprivatedomesticinvestmentNetexportsNet exports <strong>of</strong> goodsand servicesExports ImportsGovernment purchases <strong>of</strong> goods andservicesTotalFederalTotalNationaldefenseNondefenseStateandlocalFinalsalesPercent changefrom precedingperiod lGrossnationalproductFinalsales1929....1933....1939....1940....1941....1942....1943....1944....1945....1946....1947....1948....1949....1950....1951....1952....1953....1954....1955....1956....1957....1958....1959....I960....19611962....1963....1964....1965....1966....19671968196919701971....197219731974....1975....19761977....19781979198019811982"..1980:III.IllIV1981:III"111IV1982:I IIIllIV...103.455.890.9100.0125.0158.5192.1210.6212.4209.8233.1259.5258.3286.5330.8348.0366.8366.8400.0421.7444.0449.7487.9506.5524.6565.0596.7637.7691.1756.0799.6873.4944.0992.71,077.61,185.91,326.41,434.21,549.21,718.01,918.32,163.92,417.82,633.12,937.73,057.52,575.92,573.42,643.72,739.42,864.92,901.82,980.93,003.22,995.53,045.23,088.277.345.867.071.080.888.699.4108.2119.5143.8161.7174.7178.1192.0207.1217.1229.7235.8253.7266.0280.4289.5310.8324.9335.0355.2374.6400.5430.4465.1490.3536.9581.8621.7672.2737.1812.0888.1976.41,084.31,204.41,346.51,507.21,667.21,843.21,972.01,618.71,622.21,682.01,745.81,799.91,819.41,884.51,919.41,947.81,986.33,101.3 2,034.616.21.49.313.117.99.95.87.210.630.734.045.935.353.859.252.153.352.768.471.069.261.978.175.974.885.490.997.4113.5125.7122.8133.3149.3144.2166.4195.0229.8228.7206.1257.9324.1386.6423.0402.3471.5421.9424.0391.0384.1410.3455J475.5486.0468.9414.8431.5443.3397.91.11.21.81.5-L9-1.7~7.*811.96.96.52.24.43.21.32.53.05.37.33.31.45.56.66.47.610.18.86.56.34.34.26.74.1.714.213.426.813.8-4.0-1.113.225.226.116.514.024.239.023.531.223.725.923.531.334.96.9-6.97.02.44.65.46.15.04.65.57.415.120.217.516.314.419.719.118.018.721.025.028.124.224.828.929.931.834.238.841.144.647.352.457.565.768.877.5109.6146.2154.9170.9182.7218.7281.4339.2367.3349.7335.7337.3337.2346.7365.4368.9367.2367.9359.9365.8349.5323.75.92.03.43.64.74.86.57.27.97.38.310.59.812.215.315.916.716.218.019.820.821.023.423.423.325.426.628.832.338.141.048.153.359.064.776.795.4132.8128.1157.1186.7219.8268.1314.0341.3333.2321.7313.1298.2323.2334.2345.1341.3344.4328.6330.9342.5330.68.88.213.514.224.959.888.997.082.827.525.532.038.438.560.175.682.575.875.079.487.195.097.6100.3108.2118.0123.7129.8138.4158.7180.2199.0208.8220.1234.9253.1270.4304.1339.9362.1393.8431.9474.4538.4596.9647.1519.2536.0538.5559.8578.1583.2600.2626.3630.1630.9651.7675.71.42.15.26.116.952.081.389.474.617.612.716.720.418.738.352.457.547.944.545.950.053.953.953.757.463.764.665.267.378.890.998.097.695J96.2101.7102.0111.0122.7129.2143.4153.6168.3197.2228.9257.3189.6198.8193.3207.0217.0218.2230.0250.5249.7244.3259.0276.11.22.213.749.479.787.473.514.89.010.713.214.033.545.848.641.138.440.244.045.645.644.547.051.150.349.049.460.371.576.976.373.670.273.172.877.083.086.092.8100.3111.8131.4153.7178.5126.8130.0130.5138.1143.1150.5154.4166.9166.2176.2182.7188.93.93.93.22.61.62.01.12.83.76.07.24.74.86.58.96.86.05.75.98.38.39.310.412.714.316.217.818.519.521.221.222.226.028.529.133.939.743.250.653.356.565.875.278.862.868.862.868.973.967.775.783.683.568.276.387.27.46.18.38.18.07.87.57.68.29.912.815.318.019.821.823.225.027.830.633.537.141.143.746.550.854.359.064.671.179.889.3101.0111.2124.4138.7151.4168.5193.1217.2232.9250.4278.3306.0341.2368.0389.8329.6337.2345.2352.8361.1365.0370.1375.7380.4386.6392.7399.6101.757.490.597.8120.6156.7192.8211.6213.5203.5233.5254.8261.4279.7320.5344.8366.3368.4394.1417.0442.6451.2482.2503.6522.2558.8590.7632.1681.2741.9789.3865.5934.2989.51,070.01,175.71,307.91,420.11,556.11,706.21,895.32,137.42,403.52,643.12,917.33,078.92,576.62,573.92,664.82,757.12,852.72,877.22,949.12,989.93,031.13,061.43,083.53,139.86.6-4.27.010.025.026.721.39.6.9-1.211.111.310.915.55.25.4.09.05.45.31.38.53.83.67.75.66.98.49.45.89.28.15.28.610.111.88.18.010.911.712.811.78.911.64.112.2-.411.415.319.65.311.43.0-1.06.85.81.7-5.65.38.123.230.023.09.8.9-4.714.89.12.67.014.67.66.2.67.05.86.11.96.94.43.77.05.77.07.88.96.49.77.95.98.19.911.28.69.69.611.112.812.410.010.45.511.8-.414.914.614.63.510.45.75.64.12.97.5'Changes are based on unrounded data and <strong>the</strong>refore may differ slightly from changes computed from data shown here.Source: Department <strong>of</strong> Commerce, Bureau <strong>of</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> Analysis.163


TABLE B-2.—Gross national product in 1972 dollars, 1929-82[Billions <strong>of</strong> 1972 dollars, except as noted; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]Year orquarterGrossnationalproduct1929193319391940194119421943194419451946194719481949195019511952195319541955195619571958195919601961196219631964198519661967196819691970197119721973197419751978197719781979198019811982".1980:IIIIllIV1981:IIIIllIV1982:IIIIllIV"315.7222.1319.8344.1400.4461.7531.6569.1560.4478.3470.3489.8492.2534.8579.4600.8623.6616.1657.56/1.6683.8680.9721.7737.2756.6800.3832.5876.4929.3984.81,011.41,058.11,087.61,085.61,122.41,185.91,254.31,246.31,231.61,298.21,369.71,438.61,479.41,474.01,502.61,475.51,494.91,457.81,463.81,479.41,507.81,502.21,510.41,490.11,470.71,478.41,481.11,471.7PersonalconsumptionexpendituresTotalDurablegoods215.1170.5219.8229.9243.6241.1248.2255.2270.9301.0305.8312,2319.3337.3341.6350.1363.4370.0394.1405.4413.8418.0440.4452.0461.4482.0500.5528.0557.5585.7602.7634.4657.9672.1696.8737.1767.9762.8779.4823.1864.3903.2927.6930.5947.6957.1937.0915.8928.0941.0951.1944.6951.4943.4949.1955.0956.3968.0durable Services20.910.718.621.224.215.714.013.014.425.430.132.535.542.639.138.042.142.551.148.848.645.350.751.449.354.759.764.872.678.479.588.391.889.198.2111.1121.3112.3112.7126.6138.0146.8147.2137.1140.0138.7145.4128.9134.6139.5145.3138.6142.2134.1137.5138.3136.4142.8Nonlurablgoods98.182.9115.1119.9127.6129.9134.0139.4150.3158.9154.8155.0157.4161.8165.3171.2175.7177.0185.4191.6194.9196.8205.0208.2211.9218.5223.0233.3244.0255.5259.5270.5277.3283.7288.7300.6307.4302.5307.5321.9333.4344.4353.1355.8362.4365.2357.8352.7353.7359.0361.6361.7363.0363.1362.2364.5365.9368.296.176.986.188.891.895.5100.2102.8106.3116.7120.9124.7126.5132.9137.2140.9145.6150.5157.6165.0170.3175.9184.8192.4200.2208.8217.8229.8240.9251.8263.7275.6288.8299.3309.9325.3339.2348.0359.3374.7393.0412.0427.3437.6445.2453.2433.9434.3439.7442.5444.2444.3446.2446.2449.5452.2454.0457.0Gross private domestic investmentTotal55.88.433.644.555.829.518.119.727.770.970.082.165.493.593.983.085.383.1103.8102.697.087.5108.0104.7103.9117.6125.1133.0151.9163.0154.9161.6171.4158.5173.9195.0217.5195.5154.8184.5214.2236.7236.3208.4225.8196.9222.7201.9199.2209.6221.6229.5233.4218.9195.4202.3206.3183.6Fixed investmentTotal51.213.232.038.343.824.318.022.031.458.770.276.669.883.080.278.783.885.396.196.895.589.3100.9101.2100.9109.7117.5125.9140.1146.2142.7152.6160.4154.8165.8184.8200.4183.9161.5176.7200.9220.7229.1213.3216.9205.4225.3204.4207.8215.9219.2217.4216.9214.1210.8206.7202.9201.3NonresidentialTotal37.510.420.925.830.417.614.018.727.642.148.951.146.050.052.952.156.355.461.365.466.259.363.666.966.772.075.182.797.4108.0105.6109.5116.8113.8112.2121.0138.1135,7119.3125.6140.3158.3169.9166.1172.0165.4171.9162.4163.8166.4169.7170.1173.9174.2172.0166.7163.4159.6StructuresProducers'durableequipment21.15.08.710.012.06.84.25.58.318.917.418.417.919.220.720.622.623.625.428.328.426.827.429.530.231.631.934.440,643.442.042.845.043.942.844.147.443.638.339.540.444.649.148.551.653.251.148.547.147.549.551.052.553.353.553.753.052.716.45.512.115.818.510.99.813.219.223.231.532.628.130.832.231.533.731.835.937.037.832.536.237.436.540.443.148.356.864.563.666.871.869.969.376.990.792.181.186.199.9113.7120.8117.6120.4112.2120.8113.9116.7118.9120.1119.1121.4120.9118.5113.0110.4106.9ResidentialTotal13.72.811.112.513.36.74.03.43.816.621.325.623.833.027.326.627.529.934.831.529.230.037.434.234.337.742.543.142.738.237.143.143.641.053.763.862.348.242.251.260.762.459.147.244.940.053.442.044.049,549.647.342.939.938.940.139.541.7Nonfarmstructures13.02.510.411.612.36.03.53.03.415.319.723.822.131.325.725.126.128.533.530.027.828.635.932.932,836.340.941.541.236.635.441.341.739.251.661.559.945.339.848.757.959.556.344.342.137.149.939.441.546.647.044.639.936.736.037.036.638.8FarmstructuresProducers'durableequipment0.6Changeinbusinessinventories0.1.1.2.1.0.0.1.2.3.3.3.3.3.3.3.3.4.4.4.5.6.5.5.6.6.7.7.8.8.91.11.11.31.51.71.71.61.71.81.92.02.02.01.92.12.02.02.02.02.02.02.01.91.91.91.94.6=4.91.66.212.05.2~2!3~3.fi12.2.25.5-4.410.613.74.31.5-2.27.75.81.5= 1.87.03.53.07.87.57.111.816.81119.011.13.88.110.217.211.6-6.77.813.316.07.3-5.09.08.52.6--2.5-8.5-6.22.412.116.54.8= 15.44.43.4= 17.7See next page for continuation <strong>of</strong> table.164


TABLE B-2.—Gross national product in 2972 dollars, 1929-82—Continued[Billions <strong>of</strong> 1972 dollars, except as noted; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]Year or quarterNet exports <strong>of</strong> goods andservicesNetexportsExports ImportsTotalGovernment purchases <strong>of</strong> goods andservicesTotalFederalNationaldefenseNondefenseStateandlocalFinalsalesPercent changefrom precedingperiod 1GrossnationalproductFinalsales19291933193919401941194219431944 ..194519461947194819491950195119521953195419551956195719581959196019611962 ...19631964196519661967196819691970197119721973197419751976197719781979198019811982 p1980:IIIIIIIV1981:1IIIIIIV1982:|IIIIV *3.7.43.44.43.2-.6-59-6.2-3.713.218 910,810.75910.17.94.8697.310111.8562.7778.5759412.81016.55.41.9.93.916.715.527.832.225.422.024 037.250.642.030.350 553.253.145.648 244.239.236.536.935.727.521.116.79.114.315.516.411.49.810.513.827.332 226.325.823 628.627.926.627.830.735.338.033.233.838439.341.844 850.351.754.456.761.265.070.571.077.597.3108.5103.5110.1112.9126.7146.2159.2158.5147.5164 4161.2155.9155.1159 3159.7157.8156.9151.7154.4147.5136.412.98.610.9U.l13.212.015 716.817.514.013 315.515.217 718.520.021.820 923.425 226.127 631.130 730.934 335 437.541647.951.359.364.166.669 376.781.880.771.484.790.9102 7109.0108.6116.4117.2113 9108.0102.8109.6111 1115.5118.7120.4114.7118.7120.0115.341.042.963.065.397.8191.62713300.4265.493.175 784.796.8981133.7159.8170.1156.0152.3153.5161.2169.8170.6172 8182.9193.2197 6202.6209 8229.7248.5260.2257.4251.12501253.1253.3260.3265.2265.2269.2274.6278.3284.6287.1291.2284 7286.9283.4283.2286 8283.9286.4291.3289.2285.3291.1299.07.010.922.826.761,0157.4239 6269.7233.758.236.342.849.247 382.2107.2114.796188.286 890.693 491.490 495.3102 81018100.2100 3112.6125.1128.1121.8110.6103 7101.795.996.697.496.8100.4100 3102.1106.5110.4116.1106 4109.1105.5104.8107 9107.0110.7116.0114.4110.3116.2123.773.168.366.966.464.965.465 767.470.173.578.770 370.470.069.671072.974.376.174.578.280.681.3=28.527.629.731.031.835.034,734.836.436.837.436.138.735.535.236 934.136.539.939.832.135.542.433.932.040.338 636.834 331730.731.734.939441.947.550 851.552.755.359 964.166 770.676.479.282 487.590.495 8102.4109 5117.1123.4132.1135.6140.5146 4151.4157.4163.6167.8168.4168.8174.3176.2178.1176.7175.0178 3177.8177.9178.4179 0176.9175.7175.3174.9175.0174.9175.4311.0227.0318.2337.9388.4456.55315571.4564.0466.1470 6484.3496.6524 2565.6596.5622.1618.2649.8665.8682.2682.7714.7733 7753.7792.4825 0869.3917.5968.0999,21,049,11,076.61,081.81,114.31,175.71,237.11,234.71,238.41,290.41,356.41,422.61,472.21,479.01,493.71,484.01,497 51,460.31,472.31,485.71505 41,490.11,493.91,485.31,486.11,482.71,477.81,489.36.6-2.27.87.616.315.31517.1-1.5-14.7-174.1.5878.33.73.8-1.26.72.11.8-.46.02.22.65.84.05.36.06.02.74.62.8-.23.45.75.8-.6-1.25.45.55.02.8-.41.9-1.81.5-9.61.64.37.9-1.52.2-5.3-5.12.1.7-2.5-3.16.36.214.917 516 475-1.3-17 4102.92.51 Changes are based on unrounded data and <strong>the</strong>refore may differ slightly from changes computed from data shown here.Source: Department <strong>of</strong> Commerce, Bureau <strong>of</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> Analysis.567.95.54.3-65.1252.54.7272.75.1415.4555.53.25.02.6.5305.55.2-.2.34.25.14.93.5.51.0-.616-9.63.33.754-4.01.0-2.3-.9-1.33.2165


TABLE B-3.—Implicit price deflators for gross national product, 1929-82[Index numbers, 1972. 100, except as noted; quarterly data seasonally adjusted]Personal consumption expendituresGross private domestic investment lf'ixed investmentYear orquarterGrossnationalproduct»TotalDurablegoodsNondurablegoodsServicesTotalTotalNonresidentialStructuresTotalResidentialProducers'durableequipmentNonfarmstructuresFarmstructuresProducers'durableequipment192919331939 ..19401941 .1942194319441945194619471948 .. .....194919501951195219531954 .19551956 .19571958 .1959I9601961196219631964 .196519661967 .1968196919701971197219731974 .19751976 .197719781979 .198019811982 P1980:IIIllIV1981:| ||IIIIV1982:1||HIIV P32.7625.1328.4329.06312334.32361437.0137 9143.8849.5552.9852.4953.5657.0957 9258.8259.5560.8462.7964.9366.0467.6068.7069.3370.6171.6772.7774.3676.7679.0682.5486.7991.4596.01100.00105.75115 08125.79132.34140.05150.42163,42178.64195.51207.23172.31176.52180.60185.16190 01193.17197.36201.55203.68205.98208.51210.7335.926.930.530.933 236.740142.444147.852.956055.856.960.662 063.263.764.465.667.869.270.671.972.673.774.875.977.279.481.484.688.492.596 5100.0105.71164125.31317139.3149.1162.5179.2194.5206.0172.8177.1181.2185.5189 2192.6196.4199.8202.2204.0207.7210.244.232.535.936.740 043.746 751.355562167.870 370.572.276 376 777.275.075677.780 981.383.883.884.385.486.287.186.886.788.291.193.395.799 0100.01017108 2117.3123 9129.2136 4145.0156.3167 5174.9151.9154.4158 0161.1163 0166.2169.7171.3173 0174.0176.1176.338.426.830.530.933 639.143 746.247 852.158.762 360.360.765.866 566.366.666.367.369.471.071.472.673.373.974.975.877.380.181.985.389.493.696 6100.0108 51234132.5137 2143.6153 4169.9188.4202.7208.9181.9186.2190.5195.1199 3201.7204.2205.6206 8207.1210.0211.431.626.129.229.530 832.434 236.137 338.841.744 446.047.449.952 655.457.258460.162 264.166.067.969.070.471.772.774.276.478.781.986.090.595 6100.0104 7113 0121.61296139.31500162.3178.8196 3213.3172.2176.5180.9185.4189 6193.4198.6203.6207 4210.6215.3219.828.322.427.728.530 733.535 737.037 241.349.053.754.956.760.962 363.163.665.068.571.171.071.872.171.872.272.372.974.076.378.882.287.091.195.7100.0105.5116 7131.9139 2149.8163 2178.5193.3208.0215.8188.5191.5195.1198.3202 3207.4209.4212.9213 6216.6216.2216.828.322.928.229.131033.935 936.836 740.046.951.553.054.559.160161.261.762.967.371.070.972.272.572.072.573.173.874.776.979.582.886.791.396 2100.0103 81154132.2138 6146.3157 2170.8186.12013210.1181.0184.9187.9190.8194 5200.7203.0206.8207 6211.3210.7210.924.319.223.023.424 928.432 433.833 936.644.048.848.449.355.156 357.456.557.662.464.963.964.263.763.363.664.164.966.469.272.275.881.588.294 5100.0107.7128 2144.8149 0159.41764200.2227.72515266.4216.9224.9232.7237.22415249.1252.7261.9264 5267.6266.7266.733.426.232.032.834.937.337.338.037.942.848.653.056.057.861.762.663.865.566.671.175,576.678.379.479.379.479.780.180.682.184.387,289.993.297 2100.01018109 3126.21339141.0149 7158.8169.0179.8183.4165.8167.9169 9172.31751179.9181.4182.51819184.6183.8183.528.220.726.627.430 032.434 938.140844.653.758.158.760.064.466 466.967.168.771.071.471.271.171.471.371.570.971.272.374.677.080.787.790.594.8100.0109.1120 3131.0140.7158.0178.3200.5218.5233.6239.3212.5217.2221.8223.4229 0231.7235.8239.2240 5238.6238.8239.427.819.826.327.229 731.834.337.340.043.953.057.558.159.563.865.866.366.668.270.570.970.770.670.970.971.170.570.872.074.376780.587.590.394.7100.0109.4120.8131.6141.3159.0179.8202.7221.7237.1242.8215.2220.6225.2226.4232 2234.9239.4243.3244.3242.1242.3242.728.619.523.423.626 630.735 740.842 946.652.857.358.059.463.865 766.266.568.370.670.970.870.771.170.771.270.670.972.274.276.780.687.590.695.0100.0109.2120.5131.9140.7157.0180.0202.7218.8236.9242.6214.7219.1221.2224.3227 3233.4237.9242.7243.8242.0241.9242.977.258.861.159.663 871.371.475.084.695.2105.61U.5107.9107.4114.9114.6114.2112.4109.1104.3103.4101.9101.8100.899.096.895.394.392.190.891.093.595.797.899.3100.0100.6106.8116.9122.7126.7132.6140.3149.2159.4168.3145.2148.0150.8153.0155.4158.3161.3162.8165.7168.1169.4170.0See next page for continuation <strong>of</strong> table.166


1929193319391940194119421943194419451946194719481949195019511952195319541955195619571958195919601961196219631964196519661967196819691970197119721973197419751976197719781979198019811982 p1980:I .,IIIIIIV1981:IIIIIIV1982:IIIll ...IV PTABLE B-3.—Implicit price deflators for gross national product, 1929-82—ContinuedYear or quarter[Index numbers, 1972=100, except as noted; quarterly data seasonally adjusted]Exports andimports <strong>of</strong> goodsand services 1Exports42.226.532.134.937.343.646.851.953.655.462.866.563.161.068.868 667.567.268.571.074.073173.575.276176.076377.279.481983 585.588.593.297.0100.0112.7134 8149 6155.3161.9172.6192.5213.1231.8237.1204 2209.2216.3223.5229 3230.9232.6234.5237 3236 8236 9237.4Imports45.523.631.032.835.440 041.342 744.951.862.367.864.668.882.679 976.777.277.178.479.676175.276.175 574.275 276.877.779 479 981.183.288.693 3100.0116.7164 6179 6185.6205.5214.1246.1289.3293.1284.3282 5289.8290.1294.93007298.7287.7286.1286 4278 8285 4286.7Government purchases <strong>of</strong> goods and servicesTotal21.519.221.421725.531232.832 331.229 633.637.739.739.245.047 348.548.649.251.754.056057.258.059161.162 664.166.069 172 576.581.187.793 9100.0106 7116 8128 2136.6146.3157.3170.4189.2207.9222.3182 4186.8190.0197.72015205.5209.5215.0217 8221 1223 9226.0Total20.519422.722 727.833 034.033131.930 235.039 041.439.646.648 950.149.950.452.955.157 759.059.460 262.063 565167.170 072 776.580.186.692 7100.0106 3114 9126 0133.5142.8153.1164.8185.2207.4221.6178 2182.2183.3197.52012204.0207.8216.0218 3221 6223 0223.3FederalNationaldefenseioo.o106.6 115.1124 9132.4141.9152.7166.0187.4209.0226.9180 3184.6186.5198.42017206.4207.9219.5223 0225 2226 5232.4Nondefense100.0105.6114.2128 2135.7144.6153.8162.5181.0204.2210.41741177.9176.8195.7200 3198.9207.4209.4209 6212 6214 9205.9Stateandlocal21.819.120.720 921.722 823.724 825.828 532.436 437.838.942.344145.246.547.650.252.653 855.156.558 060.161663.164.968 272 476.482.088.694 7100.0107.0118.0129 4138.3148.4159.7173.7191.6208.2222.7184 8189.6194.0197.82017206.3210.7214.3217 5220 9224 5227.9Finalsales32.725.328.429 031.034 336.337 037.943 749.652 652.653.356.757 858.959.660.662.664.966167.568.669 370 571672.774.276 679 082.586.891.596 0100.0105.7115.0125 7132.2139.7150.3163.3178.7195.3207.51721176.3181.0185.6189 5193.1197.4201.3204 0206 5208 7210.8Percent changefrom precedingperiod 2GNPimplicitpricedeflator0.0-2.1-.8227.5995.3242.415 712.969-.92.16.6141.61.22.23.23.4172.41.691.8151.52.232304.45.15.4504.25.88.89.35.25.87.48.69.39.46.010.510.19.610.510 96.89.08.84.34.6504.3Finalsalesimplicitpricedeflator1 Separate deflators are not calculated for gross private domestic investment, change in business inventories, and net exports <strong>of</strong>goods and services.2 Changes are based on unrounded data and <strong>the</strong>refore may differ slightly from changes computed from data shown here. Quarterlychanges are at annual rates.Source: Department <strong>of</strong> Commerce, Bureau <strong>of</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> Analysis.-2.6-.9187.21065.6212.215 313.760.11.36.2201.91.21.83.33.6192.11.7101815152.132314.45.25.4504.15.78.8935.25.77.58.79.59.36.210.110.111.210.5877.89.38.15450434.2167


TABLE B-4.—Fixed-weighted price indexes for gross national product, 1972 weights, 1959-82[Index numbers, 1972=100, except as noted; quarterly data seasonally adjusted]Year or quarterGrossnationalproductGross private domesticinvestment 1TotalFixed investmentExports andimports <strong>of</strong> goodsand services 1ExportsImportsGovernment purchases <strong>of</strong> goods and servicesTotalTotalFederalNationaldefensePersonalconsumptionexpendituresNonresidentialResidentialNondefenseStateandlocalPercentchangefromingperiod,grossnationalproductfixedweightedpriceindex*195919601961196219631964196519661967196819691970197119721973197419751976197719781979198019811982"1980:IIIIIIV1981:IIllIV1982:|IllIV**69.870.871672.473.274.175 377579 883 187.391896 2100 0106 0115.9126.4133 7142.2153 3167.8184.4202 0214.6177 8182.1186 3191.3195.9199 9204,2208.4210 8213.0216.0218.873.174.174 875.576.377.278 280182 085088.792 796 6100 01061117.1126 3133 0141.21516166.3184.82021213.8178 2182.7187 0191.5196.6200 2203.9207.5209 9211.6215.4218.474.474.774 474.274.074.375 277 079 382587.391295 8100 0105 8117.9132.3140 215L8167 0185.4204.1220 9231.11971202.5207 5210.2215.0219 0223.2226.8229 2230.4232.0233.074.174.574 374.474.775.376 177 980 383 387.091696 3100 0104 0116 5132 91399148 5160 9177.2196.0213 5225.7188 7194.2199 2202.820712117215.6219.3222 0225.0227.4228.774.974.974 773.972.672.673 575 377 581087.890.694 9100.0109.2120.5131.2140 8158.0178.4200.8219.5235.0241.3213.2218.4223.0224.3229.9233 0237.5241.2242 7240.7240.7241.173.475.076.076.076.377.179 481883 385 588.593.197 0100.0112 6137.4151.8156 9164.0174.9197.2218.6239.3245.7210 4214.3221.2229.1235.4238 4241.1242.5245.6246.3245.2245.575.076.075 273.774.776.377 178 879 380.783.088.493.3100.0116.7161.5175.1178 7195.0210.1244.5303.7319.0315.52910300.6309.8314.6322.6323 4316.3314.03191313.6313.6315.356.958.359 561.362.864.466 269 272 476.481.387.994.0100.0106.9117.9129.2137.3147.0158.4173.2193.8212.2226.2186.6191.4195.1202.1206.0210 3213.6219.3222 4224.5227.2231.058.559.660 561.763.365.367169.671575.779.886.792.9100.0106.7117.0128.0135.4145.0155.4169.5192.7214.7230.1184.9189.5191.9203.9208.1212 2214.5223.92271228.4230.1234.9100.0106.9117.5127.9135.6145.5156.5171.7196.5219.7236.4188.2193.7196.1208.2211.6217 4219.6230.12334234.6236.3241.4100.01061115.6128.3135.0143.6152.6164.0182.8201.7214.0176.4178.7181.4192.7199.11988201.6207.92110212.6214.2218.255.857.458.961,062.563.965668.873176 982.388.794 8100.0107.0118.4130.0138.5148.4160.4175.7194.6210.6223.6187.7192.7197.2200.9204.62090212.9216.1219 2221.9225.2228.31 Separate deflators are not calculated for gross private domestic investment, change in business inventories, and net exports <strong>of</strong>goods and services.* Quarterly changes are at annual rates.Source: Department <strong>of</strong> Commerce, Bureau <strong>of</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> Analysis.1.5111.21.11.2172930415.05.2484.0609.49.15.86.37.89.59.99.66.210.510.09.411.210.08.48.98.54.84.15.95.2168


TABLE B-5.—Changes in GNP and GNP price measures, 1929-82[Percent change from preceding period; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]Gross national productPersonal consumption expenditures19291933193919401941194219431944194519461947194819491950195119521953195419551956195719581959I9601961196219631964196519661967196819691970197119721973197419751976197719781979 .198019811982 *1980:|||IIIIV1981:IIIIIIV1982:||IIIIV PPeriodCurrentdollarsConstant(1972)dollars6.6 6.6-4.2 -2.27.0 7.810 0 7625.0 16 326 7 15 321.3 15.19.6 7.1.9 -1512 -14 711.1 -1.7113 41-.5109 8715.5 8352 375.4 38.0 1290 675.4 2153 181.3 -.48.5 6.03.8 223.6 2.67.7 585.6 4.06.9 5.38.4 6.094 605.8 2.79.2 468.1 2.85.2 -.28.6 34101 5711.8 588.1 68.0 -1210 9 54117 5512.8 5011.7 2889 411.6 1.94.1 -1.812 2 15_ 4 9611.4 1.615.3 4319 6 7953 15114 223.0 -5.31.0 -5168 217581.725Implicitpricedeflator0.0-2.1-.82.27.59.95.32.42.415.712.96.9-.92.16.6141.61.22.23.23.41.72.41.6.91.81.51.52.23.23.04.45.15.45.0425.88.89.3525.87.48.6939.46.010.51019.610.510.968908.84.34.65.04.3Chainpriceindex1.61.21.41.31.41.93.13.04.35.05.34.94.16.09.19.25.76.17.68.99.09.46.49.0969.711.09.38.2928.45.04.66.05.2Fixed*weightedpriceindex(1972weights)1.51.11.21.11.21.7293.04.15.05.24.8406.09.49.1586.37.895999.66.210 510 09.411.210 084898.54.84.15.95.2Currentdollars-5.74.66013.89712.28.810.520.312.58.01.9787.9485.82.7764.95.43.27.44.53.16.05.56.97.58.15.49.58.46.98.19610.29.49.911011.111.811.910.610.67.010.7915.616.113.04.41133.47.66.18.110.1Constant(1972)dollars-2.05.3465.9-1.02.92.86.211.11.62.12.3561.3253.81.86.52.92.11.05.42.62.14.53.85.55.65.12.95.33.72.23.75.84.2-.72.25.65.04.52.7.31.81.0-.7-8.75.45.74.4-2.72.9-3.32.52.5.65.0Implicitpricedeflator-3.8-.7137.410.89.05.84.18.310.75.8206.5231.9.91.01.93.32.21.91.91.01.51.61.41.82.92.44.04.54.64.33.75.710.17.65.15.87.09.010.38.65.911.510.59.69.88.37.38.27.05.03.57.54.9Chainpriceindex1.71.1111.41.21.52.72.53.84.54.64.3366.110.47.7536.07.39.310 79.16.012.61019.810.010.37.4807.25.23.67.15.6Fixedweightedpriceindex(1972weights)1.5.991.21.11.32.42.43.64.44.54.2356.110.47.8536.27.49.711.29.35.813.410 49.810.110.97.7767.14.83.27.35.7Note.—Changes are based on unrounded data and may differ slightly from changes computed from data shown elsewhere in <strong>the</strong>setables.Source: Department <strong>of</strong> Commerce, Bureau <strong>of</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> Analysis.169


TABLE B-6.—Gross national product by major type <strong>of</strong> product, 1929-82[Billions <strong>of</strong> dollars; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]GoodsYear orquarterGrossnationalproductFinalsalesInventorychangeTotalTotalFinalsalesInventorychangeDurable goodsFinalsalesInventorychangeNondurable goodsFinalsaleslnven»torychangeServicesStructuresAutooutput192919331939194019411942194319441945..194619471948194919501951..1952195319541955195619571958 ..............19591960 .19611962..1963196419651966..19671968..1969197019711972..197319741975197619771978197919801981..1982 ".1980;||IllIV1981:||IllIV1982:||'IllIV ".103.455.890.9100.0125.0158 5192.12106212.4209.82331259.5258.3286.5330 8348.0366.8366 8400.0421.7444 0449.7487.9506 5524.6565 0596.7637.7691.1756 0799.6873 4944.0992.71,077.61185 9U26.41,434 21,549.21,718.01,918.3216392/17.82,633.12,937 73,057.52,575.92,573.42 643 72J39.42,864.92 90182 980 93,003.22,995.53 045 23 088 23ilO1.3101.757.490.597.8120.6156.7192.82116213.5203.5233.5254.8261.4279.7320.5344.8366.3368 4394.1417.0442.6451.2482.25036522.2558.8590.7632.1681.2741.9789.3865.5934.2989.51,070.01175.71,307.91,420.11,556,11,706.21,895.32137 42;403.52,643,12917.33iO78.92,576.62,573.92 664 82,757.12,852.72 877 22 94912,989.93,031.13 06143'083 53[l39.81.7-1.6.42.24.518-.6= 10-1.06.44.7= 3.16.810.33.1.4- 156.04.713-1.55.7302.3636.05.69.914110.3799.83.27.710 218.514.1=6.911.823.026 514.3= 10.020 5=21.4-.7= .4212-17.712.224 631813.2=35.6-16 247=38.556.127.049.056.072.593 7120.4132 3128.9125.3139.8154.4147.7162.4189.5194.6203.11961214.5223.3232 3228.2248.5254 2257.4278 5290.3309.8338.4375 0389.44213450.2459.9 456.6485.3 477.7529 6 5194604.1 585.6646 7 632.5694.0 700.9771.1 759.3855.0 832.09586 93211,065.6 1,051.31,141.91,289 21,280.61,125.21,114.5114041,187.41,265.3127611317 01,298.41,269.41,283 11295 5l|274.554.428.648.653.868.091.9121.0133.3129.9118.9140.3149.7150.8155.6179.2191.5202.7197 6208.5218.6231.0229.7242.92513255.0272.2284.3304.2328.5360.9379.1413.4440.41,151.91,268.71,302.01,125.81,114.911616l>05.11,253.1125141*285 11,285.21,305.01 299.3l'29O71J313.01.7= 1,6.42.24.51.8= .6-1.0-1.06.41.7=3.16.810.33.1.4-1.56.04.71.3-1.55.73.02.36.36.05.69.914.110.37.99.83.27.710.218.514.1=6.911.823.026.514.3= 10.020.5-21.4= .7— 4=2U= 17.712.224.631.813.2-35.6= 16.24.7= 38.516.15.412.415.423.834.554.258.550.131.844.448.050.056.266.472.577.873.981.485.991.384.490.893.392.7102.9109.4118.9131.6147.0153.5167.9178.5179.2187.1207.4237.6250.7279.4312.5354.9402.1454.3482.5519.4510.7488.1461.4481.2499.2519.8519.7527.5510.5513.2512.6506.8510.31.4=.5.31.23.11.0.0= .6-1.35.31.41.0-1.83.66.11.21.5-2.53.42.1=2.83.11.6=.13^42.74.06.710.25.54.76.4= .12.87.213.112.0-8.47.710.419.110.5= 5.28.7= 15.5-11.8= .5-13.14.62.218.519 8-5.6=30.96.610.1-34.738.323.236.238.444.257.466.874.879.887.195.9101.7100.999.4112.8119.0124.9123.7127.1132.7139.6145.3152.1158.0162.4169.3174.9185.3196.9213.9225.6245.5261,9277.5290.6312.0348.0381.8421.5446.7477.2530.1597.0669.4749.4791.3637.7653,5680.4705.9733.3731.7757.6774.7791.8786.7783.9802.70.3= 1.1.11.01.4-.6.21.1= 1.93.7= 1.33.24.22.0-1.11.02.62.6.81.32.51.32.42.83.31.63.23.94.93.13.43.34.83.05.32.21.54.212.67.33.8=4.811.7=5.911.1.08.1=22.310.06.112.018.9=4.8-9.6=-5.4-3.835,925.934.435.740.850.863.072.377.068.871.677.282.288.5103.5113.9121.6126.2136.1146.2158.7167.7179.8193.8207.0222.0237.1255.0273.3299.0326.5358.2391.9429.9472.0519.0571.5636.1705.2779.3867.2972.21,089.71,225.51,364.31.492.11,174.71,207.21,243.31,277.01,313.51,340.21,382.11,421.51,444.41,476.71,509.51,537.611.42.97.58.311.814.08.76.16.515.721.728.028.435.637.839.442.044.549.552.253,053.859.558.560.264.569.372.979.382.083.694.0101.8102.9120.3137.3150.8151.4150.0167.6196.1233.1262.5265.7284.2284.9276.0251.8259.9275.1286.1285.6281.9283.3281.7285.3283.2289.27"28.811.915.413.312.016.114.721.216.919.414.419.421.317.822.525.225.931.230.428.035.134.928.739.141.646.239.240.755.965.169.568.059.869.265.763.151.956.867.566.173.778.758.353.569.975,264.3Source: Department <strong>of</strong> Commerce, Bureau <strong>of</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> Analysis.170


TABLE B-7.—Gross national product by major type <strong>of</strong> product in 1972 dollars, 1929-82[Billions <strong>of</strong> 1972 dollars; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]Year orquarterGrossnationalproductFinalsalesInventorychangeGoodsTotalTotalFinalsalesInventorychangeDurable goodsFinalsalesInventorychangeNondurable goodsFinalsalesInventorychangeServicesStructuresAutooutput1929193319391940194119421943194419451946194719481949195019511952195319541955195619571958195919601961196219631964196519661967.196819691970197119721973197419751976197719781979 .198019811982 >1980:\\"""ZZIIIIV1981:IIIIllIV1982:I IIIllIV P.315.7222.1319.8344.1400.4461.7531.6569.1560.4478.3470.3489.8492.2534.8579.4600.8623.6616.1657.5671.6683.8680.9721.7737.2756.6800.3832.5876.4929.3984.81,011.41,058.11,087.61,085.61,122.41,185.91,254.31,246.31,231.61,298.21,369.71,438.61,479.41,474.01,502.61,475.51,494.91,457.81,463.81,479.41,507.81,502.21,510.41,490.11,470.71,478.41,481.11,471.7311.0227.0318.2337.9388.4456.5531.5571.4564.0466.1470.6484.3496.6524.2565.6596.5622.1618.2649.8665.8682.2682.7714.7733.7753.7792.4825.0869.3917.5968.0999.21,049.11,076.61,081.81,114.31,175.71,237.11,234.71,238.41,290.41,356.41,422.61,472.21,479.01,493.71,484.01,497.51,460.31,472.31,485.71,505.41,490.11,493.91,485.31,486.11,482.71,477.81,489.34.6-4.91.66.212.05.2.1-2.3-3.612.2-.25.5-4.410.613.74.31.5-2.27.75.81.5-1.87.03.53.07.87.57.111.816.812.29.011.13.88.110.217.211.6-6.77.813.316.07.3-5.09.0-8.5-2.6-2.5-8.5-6.22.412.116.54.8-15.4-4.43.4-17.7144.397.5154.3171.7198.6221.4263.3287.3278.5238.3237.7244.8240.3261.5283.7292.1306.8292.7316.7320.9321.7311.6332.5335.8338.0361.3372.2393.8422.6456.4463.4483.1496.0486.9497.2529.6572.3562.5547.4587.2628.1662.0677.7667.9689.5661.1682.5658.2659.5671.6692.8689.8697.2678.0661.8663.2665.1654.5139.7102.3152.7165.5186.6216.2263.3289.6282.2226.2237.9239.4244.7250.9270.0287.8305.3294.9309.0315.1320.2313.4325.5332.3335.0353.5364.7386.7410.8439.6451.2474.1484.9483.2489.1519.4555.1550.9554.2579.4614.8645.9670.4672.9680.5669.6685.1660.7668.0677.8690.4677.7680.7673.2677.2667.5661.7672.14.6-4.91.66.212.05.2-2.3-3.612.2-.25.5-4.410.613.74.31.5-2.27.75.81.5-1.87.03.53.07.87.57.111.816.812.29.011.13.88.110.217.211.6-6.77.813.316.07.3-5.09.0-8.5-2.6-2.5-8.5-6.22.412.116.54.8-15.4-4.43.4-17.740.417.535.543.157.875.7118.8135.9121.260.375.577.378.386.198.2107.9116.2109.0117.2117.8119.4109.2113.6115.6114.7125.7132.5143.0157.2174.0178.3187.4193.0187.5188.7207.4236.1234.1230.2242.7264.7285.4299.1290.8289.3273.3304.2279.8286.9292.4298.9290.5290.2277.6278.7274.9269.2270.63.5-2.1.73.48.23.5-1.8-3.710.81.41.6-2.95.59.01.72.3-3.74.52.9.9-3.43.92.0-.14.23.45.18.212.36.65.47.2.03.07.212.79.4-6.45.46.911.86.2-2.63.8-6.5-4.7-1.2-6.21.8.19.18.6-2.5-13.7-2.64.8-14.799.384.9117.2122.4128.7140.5144.4153.7161,0165.8162.4162.1166.4164.8171.8179.9189.1185.9191.9197.2200.8204.3211.9216.6220.3227.8232.2243.7253.6265.6272.9286.7291.9295.7300.4312.0319.0316.8324.0336.7350.1360.5371.3382.1391.2396.3380.8380.9381.1385.5391.5387.2390.5395.6398.5392.6392.5401.51.1-2.82.83.81.7-.6-.5U-1.63.8-1.55.14.72.6-.81.53.22.9.61.63.11.63.03.74.21.93.64.55.63.63.93.75.13.04.52.2~2A6.34.31.1-2.45.1-2.02.2-1.3-2.4-8.02.33.07.97.3-1.7-1.7-1,5-2.9127.4110.7135.2139.9158.5193.9242.0263.7263.0200.8188.1192.5198.3207.4231.3243.2247.5249.1260.1270.2282.4287.6299.4312.5326.9341.5356.2374.0390.7412.6434.1453.0469.2482.4497.8519.0542.8562.8575.9595.0617.3644.7670.7687.1695.6701.3684.2686.0690.0688.2693.1693.2697.5698.6697.0702.2703.6702.343.914.030.332.543.346.326.218.118.839.144.652.453.665.964.365.569.374.380.780.579.781.789.889.091.797.4104.1108.6116.0115.9113.9122.0122.5116.3127.3137.3139.1121.0108.3116.0124.4131.9131.0118.9117.6113.1128.3113.6114.3119.6121.9119.2115.7113,4111.9113.0112.5114.912.313.918.023.019.317.122.621.629.823.024.518.623.225.321.226.028.729.435.734.831.838.537.429.838.941.646.437.135.745.350.750.347.038.741.537.642.033.836.742.241.644.545.634.431.339.742.337.1Source: Department <strong>of</strong> Commerce, Bureau <strong>of</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> Analysis.171


TABLE B-8.—Gross national product by sector, 1929-82[Billions <strong>of</strong> dollars, except as noted; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]Year or quarterGrossnationalproductTotal 1TotalGross domestic productBusiness *Nonfarm 1FarmStatisticaldiscrepancyHouseholdsandinstitutionsTotalGovernmenFederal2StateandlocalRest<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>worldPercentfromprecedperiod,grossnationalproduct 319291933193919401941...19421943194419451946194719481949...1950...19511952...195319541955 ..19561957...19581959..1960..19611962...1963196419651966196719681969197019711972... , ..197319741975..197619771978.19791980..19811982 p .1980:IIIIIIV1981:1IIIllIV....1982:IIllIV P103455.890.9100.0125 0158.5192.1210.6212 4209.82331259.5258.3286 5330.8348 0366 8366.8400 0421.7444 0449.7487.9506 5524.6565 0596.7637 7691.1756 0799.6873 4944.0992 71,077.61185 91,326.41434 21,549.21,718.01,918.32,163.92,417.82,633.12,937.73.057.52,575.92,573.42,643.72,739.42,864.92,901.82,980.93,003,22,995.53,045.23 088 23,101.3102.655.590.599.6124.5157.9191.6210.1212.0209.0231.8257.9256.9284.8328.7345.7364.6364.5397.3418.5440.5446.6484.65029520.7560.5591.8632.3685.2750.3793.7866.7937.198541,068.51,175.01,310.41,414.41,531.91,697.51,894.92,134.32,375.22,587.02,888.53,011.92,527.22,526.62,597.82,696.52.817.92,855.22,931.22,949.82,949.62,995.73,041.63,060.595.449.180.689.4112.6139.9162.8174.2172.8183.8210 0234.9231.5257 5294.4307.3324 9323.9354 0372.1390 8393.1428.3442 0455.7490 6517.25516598.4652.6685.17454803.2837 3907.1998 61,118.71206 41,301.71,447.31,624.01,837.22,052.12,228.82,492.42,582.52,183.32,173.72,237.22,321.12,433.42,463.92 533.92,538.62,530.62,570.12,610.02,619.384.743.872.981.8103.1127.7149.3156.2152.7164.4188 2213.1212.2236 3268.3283 4302 3302.3333 9355.7373 7372.2410.6424 2435.74681495.0532 2577.76284663.3725 0782.18131875.4963 41,068.01155 01,247.31,396.31,574.21,781.01,982.12,159.52,418.52,507.62,106.42.108.62,168.02,255.22,357.52,394.62 454 72,467.42,465.12,494.42 530.22,540.69.74.66.36.48.913.015.315.316.018.820.223.318.820.022.922.220.319.718.818.618.420.719.020 220.220 420.519 321.922.822.122.625.125 827.631949.947 748.945.948.458.771.665.475.874.866.361.267.066.970.873.980.178.472.974.876.175.21.1.71.41.1.6-.8-1.82.74.1.51.5-1.6.6133.21.7232.013-2.1-12.21324-.1211.71-1.21.4.3-2.1-3.9154.133.8375.55.11.4-2.6-1.53.91.9.110.53.82.2-1.05.1-4.6= .8-7.2-7.5.83.63.62.S1.72.32.42.52.93.23.74.14.55.15.65.96.46.97.27.88.19.19.810.511.412.313 814.415.516.617.819.221.123.426.129.432.335.438.642.145.850.655.660.567.875.685.496.4106.781.584.086.589.792.995.297.1100.3103.3105.3107.9110.44.34.77.67.89.415.125.632.235.220.816 717.419.420.927.431.231932.534.236.639142.144.047150.554 358.062.967.676.585.195.2104.5115 8126.0137 8149.6162 2179.6194.6210.3229.3247.4272.82997322.7262.4269.0274.0285.8291.6296.2300.1310.9315.8320.3323.8330.80.91.23.43.55.010.620.927.229.814.69.48.910.010.716.218.918.617.818.419.019.620.520.921.722.624.125.227.028.332.435.639.341.944.846.850.151.954.959.062.466.371.775.782.992.399.879.881.481.688.789.990.591.097.998.698.999.1102.43.53.54.24.34.44.54.74.95.46.27.38.59.410.111.212.313 314.715.817.619 621.623.125.527.930.232.935.939.344.149.555.962.671179.387.797.7107.3120.6132.3144.0157.6171.8189.9207.4222.9182.7187.6192.4197.0201.7205.6209.2213.0217.1221.4224.7228.41 Includes compensation <strong>of</strong> employees in government enterprises.8 Compensation <strong>of</strong> government employees.3 Changes are based on unrounded data and <strong>the</strong>refore may differ slightly from changes computed from data shown here.Source: Department <strong>of</strong> Commerce, Bureau <strong>of</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> Analysis.0.8.3.5.4•5.5.4.81.21.61.41.62.12.3222.32.83.23.53.03.33.63.94.64.95.55.95.65.96.76.97.39.210.916.019.817.320.523.529.642.646.149.245.748.746.845.942.947.146.649.753.345.849.546.640.86.6=4.27.010.025.026.721.39.6.9-=1.211.111.3= .510.915.55.254.0905.45.31.38.53.83.67.75.66.98.49.45.89.28.15.28.610.111.88.18.010.911.712.811.78.911.64.112.215.319.65.311.43.0-1.06.85.81.7172


TABLE B-9.—Gross national product by sector in 1972 dollars, 1929-82[Billions <strong>of</strong> 1972 dollars, except as noted; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]Year or quarterPrrxeeUfOSSnationalproduct315.7222.1319.8344.1400.4461.7531.6569.1560.4478.3470.3489.8492.2534.8579.4600.8623.6616.1657.5671.6683.8680.9721.7737.2756.6800.3832.5876.4929.3984.81,011.41,058.11,087.61,085.61,122.41,185.91,254.31,246.31,231.61,298.21,369.71,438.61,479.41,474.01,502.61,475.51,494.91,457.81,463.81,479.41,507.81,502.21,510.41,490.11,470.71,478.41,481.11,471.7Gross domestic productTotal313.2220.9318.2342.8398.7460.1530.3567.7559.3476.4467.8486.8489.4531.8575.6596.9619.8612.1653.0666.5678.3676.2716.8732.0751.0793.8825.6868.9921.4977.51,003.91,050.01,079.71,077.61,112.81,175.01,239.21.229.01,217.81.282.61,352.81,418.71,453.21,447.91,477.21,453.21,466.41,431.01,438.11,456.01,482.81,477.81,485.01,463.31,448.01,454.11,458.61,452.2Business lTotal l271.5180.0261.0282.7327.6361.8385.6403.6397.9385.5393.8412.0409.8448.7478.0492.8515.6508.5547.0557.4566.1561.7600.0610.1625.1663.2691.6730.3777.7824.0842.0882.1907.1904.8938.6998.61,060.71,047.41,032.41,095.41,163.71,224.31,255.61,246.71,274.31,249.71,266.61,230.01,236.21,254.01,279.71,274.81,282.41,260.21,244.41,250.51,255.41,248.4Nonfarm 1244.7152.5231.3254.6299.8335.3362.1370.1362.8358.6367.0389.0383.4419.4447.2463.7484.3477.0516.0531.5539.5532.0574.0584.2596.3631.5659.7701.3749.6794.1812.8855.6881.9875.4901.7963.41,028.41,012.4994.51,059.51,129.51,193.51,222.41,210.31,236.81,210.11,224.91,192.61,200.91,222.61,242.91,240.91,241.91,221.51,210.01,212.21,214.41,204.0Farm23.624.925.224.526.228.627.727.125.625.824.025.825.627.025.826.427.728.429.328.928.229.327.829.228.928.829.628.829.828.229.529.029.531.132.631.931.631.833.632.133.132.634.234.238.439.635.635.334.032.034.136.340.942.338.138.039.342.8StatistiraiC3Idiscrepancy3.12.64.63.61.6-2.1-4.26.49.41.12.9-2.8.82.45.02.63.63.11.8-3.0-1.7.3-1.9-3.3-.22.92.3.2-1.61.7-.3-2.5-4.4-1.74.23.3.73.24.43.81.0-1.8-1.02.2-.9.06.12.11.2-.52.7-2.4-.4-3.6-3.7 .41.71.7Urn teanouseholdsandinstitutions15.612.215.116.115.916.415.215.115.015.116.016.717.318.318.718.619.319.421.422.523.124.224J26.627.028.128.929.830.932.634.335.437.036.737.638.639.439.340.540.941.543.344.645.846.948.145.345.446.046.446.846.746.747.447.847.948.048.6Government 2Total26.228.842.144.055.281.9129.4149.1146.475.958.058.162.364.779.085.585.084.184.686.789.190.392.295.398.9102.5105.2108.8112.7120.8127.7132.4135.7136.1136.7137.8139.1142.3144.9146.3147.7151.2153.0155.4156.0155.4154.4155.6155.9155.7156.3156.2155.9155.8155.7155.7155.2155.1Federal5.26.616.918.629.656.7105.0125.2121.849.729.829.231.332.746.251.649.647.245.945.645.844.544.545.246.248.348.248.548.753.057.258.058.255.252.550.148.248.548.448.548.649.349.049.549.749.849.049.849.849.449.649.749.849.849.849.849.849.9Stateandlocal21.022.125.225.425.625.224.523.924.626.228.229.031.032.032,833.935.436.938.641.043.345.847.750.152754.357.060.464.067.970.574.477.480.984.287.790.893.896.597.899.1101.9104.1105.9106.3105.6105.4105.8106.1106.3106.8106.5106.1106.0106.0105.9105.4105.3Rest<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>world2.41.31.61.41.71.51.31.41.11.82.53.02.73.03.73.93.74.04.55.15.54.64.95.25.76.56.97.57.97.47.58.27.98.09.510.915.117.313.815.616.919.926.326.125.422.228.626.825.723.425.024.425.426.722.724.222.519.5Percentchangefromprecedingperiod,grossnationalproduct 36.6-2.27.87.616.315.315.17.1-1.5-14.7-1.74.1.58.78.33.73.8-1.26.72.11.8-.46.02.22.65.84.05.36.06.02.74.62.8-.23.45.75.8-.6-1.25.45.55.02.8-.41.9-1.81.5-9.61.64.37.9-1.52.2-5.3-5.12.1.7-2.5192919331939194019411942194319441945194619471948....19491950195119521953195419551956195719581959....196019611962....1963196419651966....196719681969....197019711972....1973....197419751976....1977 ....1978....1979....1980....1981....1982 »..1980:I IIIllIV1981:if.'.'."'.IllIV1982:if.'."'.!IllIV..1 Includes compensation <strong>of</strong> employees in government enterprises.2 Compensation <strong>of</strong> government employees.3 Changes are based on unrounded data and <strong>the</strong>refore may differ slightly from changes computed from data shown here.Source: Department <strong>of</strong> Commerce, Bureau <strong>of</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> Analysis.173


TABLE B-10.—Gross national product by industry, 1947-81[Billions <strong>of</strong> dollars]Year19471948194919501951195219531954195519561957195819591960196119621963196419651966196719681969197019711972197319741975197619771978197919801981Grossnationalproduct233.1259.5258.3286.5330.8348.0366.8366.8400.0421.7444.0449.7487.9506.5524.6565.0596.7637.7691.1756.0799.6873.4944.0992.71,077.61,185.91,326.41,434.21,549.21,718.01,918.32,163.92,417.82,633.12,937.7AnrirnlAgriculture,forestry,andfisheries20.824.019.520.823.823.121.320.719.919.719.521.920.221.421.521.922.021.023.824.824.225.027.828.630.835.453.852.253.351.254.666.079.674.185.6Mining6.89.48.19.310.210.110.610.912.413.413.512.412.312.612.712.813.113.413.514.214.615.316.117.617.419.021.732.238.843.047.452.066.894.1127.2fVinconstruction9.111.511.513.015.416.617.117.218.520.621.421.022.823.224.025.727.429.832.835.937.541.346.348.953.659.466.369.269.976.686.6102.1115.7121.2127.2Gross domestic productManufacturingTotal66.274.772.183.798.7103.0112.1106.4120.9126.8131.4123.8141.3143.8144.4157.9167.4179.4197.7216.6222.3242.8256.7252.2265.6292.5326.1340.7358.2410.4464.8518.7563.2581.2644.0Durablegoods33.538.137.145.855.458.965.960.870.673.777.769.781.282.181.391.597.6105.3118.0130.4133.6146.0154.5146.2153.9173.2195.9201.3207.6240.0277.7316.7344.3347.8388.4Nondurablegoods32.736.535.037.943.344.146.245.650.353.253.754.160.061.763.166.469.874.279.786.388.796.8102.2105.9111.7119,3130.2139.4150.6170.4187.1202.0218.9233.4255.6Trans*portationandpublicutilities20.523.123.425.729.231.032.932.635.638.340.240.443.745.847.450.253.056.360.565.368.674.080.085.793.8104.3114.3122.9135.7152.6170.9193.3209.6232.4261.9Ulhnlownoiesaleandretailtrade44.248.448.051.356.458.559.860.866.270.473.975.281.984.286.392.196.1104.7112.6121.5130.1144.4157.0166.5181.4199.5221.5241.5266.2291.4322.3362.3401.5425.7472.7Finance,insurance,andrealestate23.226.228.631.935.238.742.846.550.053.557.662.467.371.675.480.685.391.098.0105.9114.2123.8133.6142.4156.4169.8184.9202.0216.2238.6275.5317.4358.3405.2448.2Services20.221.922.624.025.927.529.430.534.037.340.242.346.349.252.356.160.065.370.878.486.194.2105.3114.4123.6136.5153.1167.5186.2208.2234.3265.9302.4342.5386.9Governmentandgovernmententerprises19.320.222.523.830.835.336.436.938.540.744.047.150.053.456.761.165.971.276.786.496.3108.1118.2130.5141,8155.4167.8182.7202.0220.4237.2259.1279.6306.8336.7Statisti-Cdldiscrepancy1.51.6.61.33.2.1.72.32.01.3-2.1= 1.2.2-1.3-2.4= .12.11.7.1= 1.21.4— 3-2!l-3.9= 1.54.13.3.83.75.55.11.4=2,6= 1.53.9-1.9Daetnest<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>world1.21.61.41.62.12.32.22.32,83.23.53.03.33.63.94.64.95.55.95.65.96.76.97.39.210.916.019.817.320.523.529.642.646.149.2Note.—The industry classification is on an establishment basts and is based on <strong>the</strong> 1972 Standard Industrial Classification.Source: Department <strong>of</strong> Commerce, Bureau <strong>of</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> Analysis.174


TABLE B-ll.—Gross national product by industry in 1972 dollars, 1947-81[Billions <strong>of</strong> 1972 dollars]Gross domestic productYearGrossnationalproductTotalManufacturingAgriculture,forestry,andfisheriesMiningConstructionDurablegoodsNondurableTransportationandpublicutilitiesWholesaleandretailtradeFinance,insurance,andreatestateServicesGovernmentandgovernmententerprisesStatisticaldiscrepancyResidual'Rest<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>world19471948194919501951195219531954195519561957195819591960196119621963196419651966196719681969197019711972197319741975197619771978197919801981470.3489.8492.2534.8579.4600.8623.6616.1657.5671.6683.8680.9721.7737.2756.6800.3832.5876.4929.3984.81,011.41,058.11,087.61,085.61,122.41,185.91,254.31,246.31,231.61,298.21,369.71,438.61,479.41,474.01,502.626.328.228.029.328.429.230.531.332.131.731.132.230.632.131.831.732.531.832.831.332.632.132.734.435.935.435.335.837.135.836.937.038.939.143.410.811.39.911.112.111.912.211.813.213.913.812.713.313.513.613.914.515.115.716.517.017.618.218.918.419.019.219.218.919.119.520.120.821.622.322.926.526.529.332.533.834.836.038.240.940.942.145.546.146.748.449.952.254.454.653.456.955.853.457.959.460.153.348.352.855.058.858.253.352.0114.9121.4115.1131.1146.0150.8161.1149.6165.7166.9167.7153.3171.2171.8172.0186.7202.2216.7236.7254.9254.3268.2277.2261.2266.8292.5325.3311.7289.6317.4339.2357.2367.0351.2359.268.572.066.378.189.994.3102.691.7103.4102.5102.988.8100.9101.099.5110.0119.5129.8144.6157.3157.4165.5170.3155.2156.4173.2194.2186.3168.8187.2202.9217.4223.4210.0215.346.449.448.853.056.156.558.557.962.364.464.864.570.370.872.576.782.886.892.097.696.9102.7106.8106.0110.4119.3131.1125.3120.8130.1136.3139.8143.6141.2143.942.342.139.241.245.545.546.645.849.752.153.251.955.457.558.661.565.068.173.479.481.688.292.694.997.9104.3110.6111.9113.5118.6125.1134.2140.0140.8142.175.978.079.887.588.391.093.994.5103.1106.2107.9107.8115.4117.5118.7126.3131.1139.1148.2156.3160.1169.9173.6176,4185.5199.5211.1207.0209.7220.2231.0244.6250.7243.3250.454.756.659.863.966.770.973.977.381.885.889.893.498.5102.7107.3113.3116.8122.1128.5133.9139.4145.7152.9155.8162.6169.8177.2184.5187.9194.8207.2217.8229.4237.9243.655.957.557.659.760.861.662.762.967.670.974.176.280.883.586.690.394.098.8103.1109.0115.0118.8124.0126.7128.4136.5144.8147.9148.5154.7164.3174.2183.0189.0196.768.769.273.375.690.096.996.395.295.797.8100.4101.7104.0107.7111.6115.5118.7123.1127.8136.9144.1148.9152.5152.9153.9155.4157.2161.2164.3165.7167.5171.7174.3177.3178.12.45.02.63.63.11.8-3.0-1.7.3-1.91 Equals GNP in constant dollars measured as <strong>the</strong> sum <strong>of</strong> incomes less GNP in constant dollars measured as <strong>the</strong> sum <strong>of</strong> gross productby industry.Note.—-The industry classification is on an establishment basis and is based on <strong>the</strong> 1972 Standard Industrial Classification.Source: Department <strong>of</strong> Commerce, Bureau <strong>of</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> Analysis.-3.3-.22,92.3-1.61.7-lis-4.4-1.74.23.34.43.81.0-1.8-1.02.2-.9-7.4-1.2-.6.8.22.64.14.64.23.4.94.54.03.14.43.2-1.51.72.33.06.76.24.64.71.2.0-2.5-6.5-4.2-.26.04.9-8.1-7.7-9.72.53.02.73.03.73.93.74.04.55.15.54.64.95.25.76.56.97.57.97.47.58.27.98.09.510.915.117.313.815.616.919.926.326.125.4175


TABLE B-12.—Gross domestic product <strong>of</strong> nonfinancial corporate business, 1929-82[Billions <strong>of</strong> dollars; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]Year orquarter1929193319391940194119421943194419451946194719481949195019511952195319541955195619571958195919601961196219631964196519661967196819691970197119721973197419751976197719781979198019811982"1980:ll"Z!Z!IllIV1981:1nZZZIIIIV1982:1IIIllIV "GrossHnmacdomesticproduct<strong>of</strong>nonfinancialcorporatebusiness50.124.443.750.465.682.998.7102.195.399.3120.0137.3133.5151.9174.5182.3195.0191.9216.7231.6242.3236.3266.0277.0285.0311.3331.8358.4393.6431.5454.1500.2544.1563.7609.9678.0759.4818.9890.01,001.31,128.41,276.21,416.81,537.71.732.31,779.31,501.11,499 71,543.61,606.51,683.31,715.01,763.61,767.21,756.61,771.01,794.4Capitalconsumptionallowanceswithcapitalconsumptionadjustment5.54.34.84.95.46.16.26.36.57.69.310.911.712.614.615.816.817.919.121.823.824.825.826.827.528.429.430.832.735.638.942.647.152.257.362.667.979.594.9104.8115.7130.9149.6172.0195.8213.7162.7169.3175.4180.8186.3192.6199.1205.1207.8212.1216.0219.0Total44.520,239.045.460.276.892,495.888.891.8110.7126.4121.8139.3159.9166.6178.2174.0197.6209.8218.5211.6240.2250.2257.5283.0302.3327.6360.9395.9415.2457.6497.0511.4552.6615.5691.6739.4795.1896.51,012.71,145.31,267.31,365.71,536.51,565.61,338.41,330.51,368.21,425.71,497.01,522.41,564.51,562.01,548.81,559.01,578.4Indirectbusinesstax,etc. 13.43.85.15.56.46.87.38.18.910.111.212.112.614.115.216.818.217.419.220.822.422.825.428.330.133.035.638.441.142.945.851.558.063.470.576.783.789.797.1105.3112.6122.0130.5148.6178.3182.0138.4143.5151.3161.0172.9179.0179.9181.3176.3181.2184.2186.4Total41.216.333.940.053.870.085.287.779.981.699.6114.3109.2125.2144.7149.7160.0156.6178.4189.0196.1188.8214.8221.9227.3249.9266.8289.3319.8353.0369.5406.1439.1448.1482.1538.7607.9649.7697.9791.2900.11,023.31,136.71,217.11,358.21,383.61,200.01,186.91,216.91,264.71,324.01,343.41,384.51,380.81.372.41,377.81,394.2Compensation<strong>of</strong>employees32.316.728.231.239.851.062.265.161.967.279.187.885.394.7110.2118.3128.7126.5138.5151.4159.1155.9171.6181.1185.1199.8210.7226.3246.1273.5291.9322.8358.5378.4402.0447.0506.2556.5581.1654.4738.5844.3958.11,041.71,150.11,189.21,020.61,023.61,043.21,079.61,118.61,140.01,167.01,174.51,181.61,190.41,195.81,188.8Net domestic productDomestic incomeCorporate pr<strong>of</strong>its with inventory valuation and capitalconsumption adjustmentsTotal7.5-2.14.27.412.717.721.821.617.113.819.725.622.929.633.430.230.028.638.335.934.930.240.137.438.345.651.257.767.772.268.873.367.552.762.172.778.663.686.1107.3129.5142.1134.7123.0145.6121.9129.6112.8121.8127.7150.4142.1151.8138.2120.3114.8125.3Pr<strong>of</strong>itsPr<strong>of</strong>itsbeforetax8.4.66.1B.B16.420.123.622.217.822.029.131.824.938.539.133.834.932.142.041.839.833.743.139.739.544.248.955.465.270.366.372.969.456.865.476.696.0105.3107.3135.0156.5178.4191.8183.0186.6136.5201.6157.4181.3191.6202.5181.8191.5170.5134.8131.3139.8Pr<strong>of</strong>itstaxliability1.2.51.42.77.511.213.812.610.28.610.811.89.316.921.217.818.515.620.220.119.116.220.719.219.520.622.824.027.229.527.733.433.127.029.833.640.042.041.252.659.666.969.264.863.340.674.353.563.667.871.561.465.554.838.937.142.1Pr<strong>of</strong>its after taxTotal7.3.14.76.19.08.99,89.67.613.418.320.015.621.617.916.016.416.421.821.820.717.522.420.520.123.526.231.438.040.838.639.536.229.835.643.056.063.366.182.396.8111.5122.5118.2123.395.9127.3103.9117.7123.8131.0120.4126.0115.795.894.297.6Dividends5.12.03.33.53.93.73.94.14.14.85.56.06.07.57.17.17.37.48.59.09.39.310.010.610.611.412.613.715.616.817.519.119.118.518.520.121.121.425.730.131.937.739.842.452.961.038.342.743.544.949.451.254.456J58.059.762.663.8Undistributedpr<strong>of</strong>its2.2-1.91.42.65.05.25.85.63.58.612.814.09.614.110.88.89.19.013.412.711.48.212.49.99.512.213.517.722.424.021.220.417.111.317.122.935.041.940.452.264.973.882.875.870.334.989.061.274.278.981.669.271.658.937.834.535.0Inventoryvaluationadjustment0.5-2.1-.7=.2-2.5-1.2— 8-'.Z-.6-5.3= 5.9-2.21.9-5.0-1.2' 1.0-1.0= .3-1.7-2.7-1.5-.3-=.3-.2 .3.0.1=.5-1.2-2.1-1.6-3.7-5.9-6.6-4.6-6.6=20.0=40.0-11.6-=14.7= 16.2-24.0-43.1-43.0-24.6"9.4-57.2-28.2-41.1-45.5-35.5-22.8-23.0-17.1-4.4-=9.4= 10.3-13.4Capitalconsumptionadjustment= 1.4= .6= 1.1-1.2-1.3= 1.2-.9-.3= .2=3.03 5=3.9=3.9=4.6-4.5-3.9-3.2-2.0=3.2=3.4-3.2-2.7=2.1-1.51.42.32.93.73.94.04.04.02.41.32.72.6=1.8-9.7-13.0= 10.8-12.3= 13.9-17.0= 16.3-5.2-14.8 16.3-18.4= 18.4-16.6-16.9= 16.7= 15.1-10.0= 7.1=4.2.5 Netinterest1.41.71,51.41.31.31.11.01.0.7.8.91.0.91.11.21.31.51.61.72.22.73.13.53.94.54.85.36.17.48.710.113.117.018.019.123.029.630.829.532.136.943,952.462.572.549.850.551.857.555.061.265.768.170.572.673.173.81 Indirect business tax and nontax liability plus business transfer payments less subsidies.Source: Department <strong>of</strong> Commerce, Bureau <strong>of</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> Analysis.176


TABLE B-13.—Output, costs, and pr<strong>of</strong>its <strong>of</strong> nonfinancial corporate business, 1948-82[Quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]Gross domesticCurrent-dollar cost and pr<strong>of</strong>it per unit <strong>of</strong> output (dollars) 1Year orquarternonfinancialcorporatebusiness (billions<strong>of</strong> dollars)Currentdollars1972dollarsTotalcostandpr<strong>of</strong>it 2CapitalconsumptionallowanceswithcapitalconsumptionadjustmentIndirectbusinesstax,etc. 3Compensation<strong>of</strong>employeesCorporate pr<strong>of</strong>its withinventory valuation andcapital consumptionadjustmentsTotalPr<strong>of</strong>itstaxliabilityPr<strong>of</strong>itsaftertax 4NetinterestOutputper hour<strong>of</strong> allemployees(1972dollars)Compensationper hour<strong>of</strong> allemployees(dollars)19481949137 3133.5229 7219.90.598.6070 047.0530 053.0570 382.3880112.1040 051.0420 060.0620 004.004195019511952..19531954151.9174 5182.3195.0191.9247.52702275.2292.0283.4.614646.663.668.677.051054.057.058.063.057056.061.062.061.383408.430.441.446.120124.110.103.101.068079.065.063.055051045045.040.046.004004.004.004.00519551956195719581959.216.723L6242.3236.3266.0315.1324.1328.3313.4347.4.688.715.738.754.766.061.067.073.079.074.061.064.068.073.073.439.467.484.497.494.122.111.106.097.116.064.062.058.052.060057.049048.045.056.005.005.007.009.0095.2065.4332.5892.68419601961196219631964277.0285.0311.33318358.4358.4367.2399.74263455.6.773.776.779778.787.075.075.071069.068.079.082.083083.084.505.504.500494.497.104.104.114120.127.054.053.052053.053.051.051.062067.074.010.011.011Oil.0125.5365.7275 9976 2486.4692.7972.8872.9983 0893.21319651966..196719681969393.64315454.1500.2544.1495.2530.7543.0578.9604.0.795.813.836.864.901.066.067.072.074.078.083.081.084.089.096.497.515.538.558.594.137.136.127.127.112.055056.051.058.055.082080.076.069.057.012.014.016.017.0226.6736.7766.8477.0747.0923.3163.4923.6803.9454.20919701971197219731974563.7609.9678.0759.4818.9599.6626.8678.0731.9708.2.940.9731.0001.0381.156.087.091.092.093.112.106.113.113.114.127.631.641.659.692.786.088.099.107.107.090.045.047.049.055.059.043.052.058.053.030.028.029.028.031.0427.1157.4507.6647.8497.5554.4914.7785.0525.4295.93719751976197719781979890.0100131,128.41,276.21,416.8694.2745.5795.8846.3876.11.2821.3431.4181.5081.617.137141.145.155.171.140141.141.144.149.837878.928.9981.094.124144.163.168.154.059071.075.079.079.065073.088.089.075.044040.040.044.0507.7748 0028.1448.2178.2026.5077.0247.5588.1998.970198019811982*.1,537.71,732.31,779.3860.3881.3856.41.7871.9662.078.200.222.250.173.202.2131.2111.3051.389.143.165.142.075.072.047.068.093.095.061.071.0858.1698.3119.89110.8461980:IIIllIV1,501.11,499.71,543.61,606.5874.1847.3852.5867.41.7171.7701.8111.852.186.200.206.208.158.169.178.1861.1681.2081.2241.245.148.133.143.147.085.063.075.078.063.070.068.069.057.060.061.0668.1648.0898.1928.2359.5339.77110.02410.2491981:IIIIIIV1683 3l>15.01,763.61,767.2883 0884.2887.5870.41.9061.9401.9872.030211,218.224.236196.202.203.20812671.2891.3151.349170.161.171.159081.069.074.063089.091.097.096.062.069.074.0788 3288.3208.3248.27310 55110.72710.94711.1631982:\\ZZZZ.Ill1,756.61,771.01,794.4858.8857.9859.32.0452.0642.088.242.247.251.205.211.2141.3761.3881.392.140.134.146.045.043.049.095.091.097.082.085.0858.2798.3348.42911.39111.56411.7301 Output is measured by gross domestic product <strong>of</strong> nonfinancial corporate business in 1972 dollars.2 This is equal to <strong>the</strong> deflator for gross domestic product <strong>of</strong> nonfinancial corporate business with <strong>the</strong> decimal point shifted twoplaces to <strong>the</strong> left.3 Indirect business tax and nontax liability plus business transfer payments less subsidies.4 With inventory valuation and capital consumption adjustments.Sources: Department <strong>of</strong> Commerce (Bureau <strong>of</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> Analysis) and Department <strong>of</strong> Labor (Bureau <strong>of</strong> Labor Statistics).177


TABLE B-14.—Personal consumption expenditures, 1929-82[Billions <strong>of</strong> dollars; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]Durable goodsNondurable goodsYear or quarterDurablegoodsconsumptionexpendituresNondurablegoodsServicesMotorvehiclesand partsFurnitureandhouseholdequipmentO<strong>the</strong>rFoodClothingandshoes1929193319391940194119421943194419451946194719481949195019511952195319541955195619571958195977.345.867.071.080.888.6994108 2119 5143 8161 7174 7178 1192 0207 L217 L229 1235 8253 7266 0280 4289 531089.23.56.77.89.76.96.56.78015.820422.925.030829.829.132.531.838 637.939.336.842.437.722.335.137.042.950.858.664.371982.790.996.694.998 2108.8113.9116.5118.0122.9128.9135.2139.8146.430.320.125.226.228.231.034.337.139.645.350.455.358.263 068.574.080.686.192.199.2105.9112.8121.93.31.12.32.83.5.7.8.8104.16.68.010.613 712.211.313.913.017.815.817.214.818.94.71.93.43.84.84.63.93.8458.410.611.511.313.714.014.014.614.616.217.116.916.617.81.2.51.01.11.31.61.92.12.53.2333.43.2333.63.94.14.24.65.05.25.45.819.511.519.120.223.428.433.236.740647.452 354.252.553960.463.464.465.467.269.973.676.479.19.44.67.17.58.811.013.414.616 518.218 820.119.319 621.221.922.122.123.124.124.324.726.1I9601961196219631964196519661967196819691970197119721973197419751976197719781979198019811982 p1980:ItilIV1981:IIIIIIV1982:IIIIIIV P324 9335 0355.2374 6400 54304465. L490 3536 95818621.?672 2737 1812 0888 1976.41 084.31,204.41 346.51,507.21667 21,843.21,972.01618 71622 21682 01,745.81,799.91819 41,868.81,884.51919.41947 81,986.32,034.643.141.646.751.456.463 068.070.180 585.785.297.2111.1123.31215132.2156 8178.2200 2213.4214 3234.6242.7220 8199 0212 7224.7236 9230 4241.2229.6237.9240.7240.3251.71511155.3161.6167.1176.9188 6204.7212.6230 6247.8265.7278.8300.6333 4373 4407.34417478.8528 2600.0670.4734.5762.7650 6656 7673 7700.5720 6729 6741.3746.57491755 0768.4778.3130.7138.1147 0156.1167.1178 7192.4207.6225 8248.2270.8296.2325.3355 2393 2437.0485 7547.46180693.7782 5874.1966.6747 3766 6795 6820.6842 4859 4886.3908.3932.49521977.61,004.519.717.821.524.426.130 030.430.136 338.736.245.452.457.150 455.872 684.895.796.689.798.6106.297.979 288193.7102194 2104.093.9103.2103 3104.3114.117.717.918.920.322.824 727.729.532 334.135.237.241.747.150 653.559165.772.881.886.393.492.785 583 486 090.493193 393.893.391.093 292.794.05.85.86.36.77.68.39.910.511813.013.914.616.919.220 522.925.227.731.735.138.342.643.737.536 438 640.641.742 943.442.443.744.243.343.681.183.285.587.892.798.9106.6109.6118 7127.5138.9144.2154.9172.1193.7213.6230.6249.8275.9311.6343.7375.3397.8333.9336 4346 4358.0368.83721378.0382.3387.9395 0401.3406.826.727.428.729.531.933.536.638.242.145.546.850.655.461.464.869.675.382.692.499.1104.7114.6118.6103.0102 2104 8108.9112.3114 0115.9116.0117.5118 4119.1119.5See next page for continuation <strong>of</strong> table.178


TABLE B-14.—Personal consumption expenditures, 1929-82—Continued[Billions <strong>of</strong> dollars; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]Year orquarterNondurable goods-cont'dGasolineand oilFuel oiland coalO<strong>the</strong>rHousing 1TotalHousehold operationElectricityand gasServicesO<strong>the</strong>rTransportationTotalO<strong>the</strong>rMedicalcare19291933193919401941194219431944194519461947194819491950195119521953195419551956195719581959I9601961196219631964196519661967196819691970197119721973197419751976197719781979198019811982 p1980:|IIMlIV1981:1IIIIIIV1982:1IIIllIV1.81.52.22.32.62.11.31.41.83.44.04.85.35.56.16.87.4788.69.410.210.611.312.012.012.612.913.514.716.017.018.620.722 423.925.428.636.640.444.048.151.266.687.096.893.982.086.187.092.895.296.797.797.595.391.394.294.91.61.21.41.51.7192.0202.22.53.03.43.13.43.53.43.4353.83.94.14.24.0383.73.74.0414.44.74.84.74.5444.5506.27.78.29.810 711.916.119.019.717.618.818.619.319.220.019.919.919.217.317.318 417.65.43.55.35.66.4758.79610.811.312.814.114.715.817.618.319.319 220.321.623.024.025.927 529.031.132.834 637.240.943.046.549.653 255.559 865.070.575.582.187 696.9106.6116.0128.2134.8112.9113.4116.2121.6124.3127.0129.8131.5131.1133.1135 4139.611.78.19.49.710.411.211.812.312.814.216.017.919.621.724.327.029.832.234.336.739.342.045.048.151.254.758.061465.569.574.179.887.093 9102.7112.5123.8137.4149.8166.51859209.6236.0266.0295.3324.7254.8261.6269.6278.1284.4291.3298.7307.0314.5320.4328.2335.54.02.83.84.04.3485.2596.46.87.58.18.59.510.411.112.012 614.015.216.217.318.520121.022.223.424 826.328.030.032.235.037 741.045 249.655.263.371.681190.199.3111.7128.9144.1105.1108.9114.7118.2120.7125.2132.8136.9141.4140.7145.0149.31.21.11.41.51.5161.7181.92.12.32.62.93.33.74.14.5505.56.16.57.17.6838.89.49.910 410.911.512.213.114.215 417.018 820.524.029.232.938 542.947.856.666.875.250.954.859.261.461.964.669.471.275.172.675 277.82.91.72.42.62.7323.5414.54.75.15.45.66.26.77.07.5768.59.29.710.210.911812.212.813.614 415.416.517.819.220.822 224.026 429.131.234.138.742 647.251.555.162.168.954.254.155.556.858.860.763.565.766.368.169.971.52.61.52.02.12.4273.4374.05.05.35.85.96.26.77.17.8798.28.69.09.310.110 711.211.712.212 813.715.016.217.619.522 025.127 528.830.933.238.646.451.256.362.965.470.361.261.664.164.666.264.365.565.766.969.571.573.412.07.710.010.311.212 213.915 216.419.421.723.624.125.627.028.831.033 335.638.741.444.348.351754.858.362.568173.379.987.296.2106.8117 2127.41401153.0169.8190.7209.0234.1267.1302.0341.9384.4427.6326.2334.5347.2359.8371.1378.5389.3398.7409.6421.5432.9446.42.21.52.12.22.4262.9333.64.55.56.36.46.97.38.08.99710.311.012.013.114.315 416.418.019.522 323.926.028.431.436.541045.951457.464.573.783.396.5108.4124.1143.5170.9194.7134.7140.6145.9152.9159.7166.9175.6181.5186.4192.1197 9202.41 Includes imputed rental value <strong>of</strong> owner-occupied housing.Source: Department <strong>of</strong> Commerce, Bureau <strong>of</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> Analysis.179


TABLE B-15.—Gross private domestic investment, 1929-82[Billions <strong>of</strong> dollars; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]Fixed investmentChange inYear or quarterTotalTotalNonresidentialTotalResidentialGrossprivatedomesticinvestmentStructuresProducers'durableequipmentNonfarmstructuresinventoriesTotalFarmstructuresProducers'durableequipmentNonfarm1929.16.214.510.65.15.53.93.60.20.11.71.81933.1.43.02.41.01.4.6.5.0.0-1.6~ 1.41939.9.38.85.92.03.92.92.7.1.1.4.3194019411942194319441945194619471948194913.117 99.9587.210 630.734 045.935.310.91348.1648.111724.334 441.138.47.5946.05.06.910.116.923 026.324.42.33.01.91.41.92.86.97.79.08.75.2644.13.75.0739.915.317.315.73.44.02.21.41.31.57.411.414.913.93.23.61.91.21.11.46.710413.712.8.2.2.2.1.5.7.9.8.1.1.1.0.0.0.3.32.24.51.8=.6-1.0-1.06.4= .54.7-3.11.940.7= 6= .6- 66.4133.0=2.21950 . .195119521953195419551956.19571958.195953.859.252.153.352 768.471069.261.978.147.048.949.052 954 362.466367.963 472.527.331.331.334.534 238.544 047.042 045.99.511.411.612.913 414.617.718.417.217.617.819.919.721.520 823.926328.624 928.319.817.617.718.420123.922.320.921.426.618.616.416.517.319 022.821.219.720.325.3.8.8.8.8.7.6.7.7.7.7.4.4.4.4.4.4.5.5.5.66.810.33.1.4-1.56.04.71.3-1.55.76.09.12.11.1=•215.55.1.8=2.3571960.196119621963196419651966.19671968196975 974.885 490.997 4113.5125 7122.8133.3149.372 972 579 284.9917103.71116112.5125 4139.548 548.052 254.861072.783183.9907101.318 819.120.120.522 427.030.130.332.436.729 728.932134.438 745.853 053.758 264.624 524.527.030.130.730.928.528.634.838.223 323.225.828.929 429.627.127.233.336.5.6.6.7.6.7!6.5.5.5.6.67.7.91.03.02.36.36.05.69.914.110.37.99.8272,05.55.26.28.914.39.67.8971970.1971197219731974197519761977.1978.1979144 2166.4195.0229 8228.72061257.93241386 6423.01410158.8184 82113214 5213 0246.030103601408.8103 9107.91210143 3156.6157 7174.1205 22489290.238740.544.151055.955458.864.478 798.365 267.476992 3100.7102 3115.3140 81702191.937150.963.868 057.955.372.095.81112118.635.448.961.565 654.852.468.892.0107 0114.0.67.71.31.01.11.51.71.71.11.31.51.71.81.92.12.32.52.93.27.710.218.514.1-6.911.823.026.514.33.16.49.615.216.0 10.513.921.925.48.6198019811982"402.3471.5421.9412.4451.1443 3309.2346.1347.5110.5129.7141.7198.6216.4205.8103.2104.995.898.399.790.11.92.12.53.03.23.2= 10.020.5-21.4=5.715.0=21.61980:(||IIIIV424 03910384.1410.3424 63914405.3428.03112300 2307.8317.5110 91091109.5112.6200 21912198.2204.9113.591297.6110.5107 486 993.5105.43.1141.02.03.02.93.03.1= .7= 4-21.2= 17.7740-15.4= 12.31981:||IIIIV455 7475 5486.0468.9443 5450 9454.2455.7330 03413353.0360.2119 6127 0132.7139.6210 4214 3220.2220.6113 6109 5101.295.51091104 795.689.41.3162.42.93.23.23.23.212.224 631.813.210 019 324.66.01982:IIIIII.IV P414 8431.5443.3397.9450 4447.7438 6436.4357 0352.2344.2336.61414143.6141.3140.4215 6208.6203.0196.293 495.594.399.887 989.688.794.1242.82.42.43.13.23.23.2=35.6-16.24.7-38.5=36 0= 15.03739.0Source: Department <strong>of</strong> Commerce, Bureau <strong>of</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> Analysis.180


TABLE B-16.—Gross and net private domestic investment, 1929-82[Billions <strong>of</strong> dollars]Less:fIquals: Net private domestic investment9.77.48.79.110.011.211.511.712.214.017.320.221.823.527.229.331.032 734.838.741.743.544.946.347.549.050.652.956.060.765.972.180.088196.5106.4116.5136 0159.3175.0195.2222.5256.0293 2330.1356.8Total6.5-6.0.64.17.9-1.3-5 7-4.6-1616.616 625.613.530.332.022.822.420 033.632.327.518.433.229.627.336.540.344.557.565.057.061.269.356 269.988.6113 392 746.882.8128.9164.1167.01091141.465.1Total4.845.11.93.430-5.036-.610.317.120.916.623.521.719.721.921627.627.626.119.927.526.724.930.234.438.947.650.946.653.359.552 962.378.494 878 553.771.0105.9137.7152.7119.1121.086.5Total3.1-3.5Nonresidential6.72.0-2.5-3.5-1.7136.610211.38.19.610.79.110.89111.913.914.38.110.612.310.914.015.319.728.935.431.933.638.133 931.137.051949 230.334.350.773.689.077 382.960.91.716107-.317-2.6201.22.42.12.72.32.93.93.84.85.15.97.97.96.46.47.37.37.97.89.112.914.813.814.516.616 315.616.620.718 913.114.116.023.333.736.045.949.5fYet fixed investment1.418.31.4227_9.3244.2828.65.86.76.75.36.0406.06.06.41.84.25.03.66.17.510.616.020.618.219.121.517 615.520.431230 317.320.234.750.455.341.337.011.5Total1.710.81.215-.6-1.6-1.9-183.76.89.78.513.911.010.611.112.515.713.711.811.816.914.414.016.219.019.118.715.514.719.821.319.031.241.342.929.323.436.855.264.063.741.838.125.6ResidentialGrossprivateYeardomesticinvestment192916.219331.419399.3194013.1194117.919429.919435819447.2194510 6194630.7194734 0194845.9194935.3195053.8195159.2195252.1195353.3195452 7195568.4195671.01957.. . . 69.21958.. . . 61.91959...78.1196075.9196174.8196285.4196390.9196497.41965..113.51966125.71967122.81968 . . .. 133.31969149.31970144 21971166.41972195.01973229.81974228 71975206.11976257.91977324.11978386.61979423.01980402 31981471.51982 p 421.9consumptionallowanceswithcapitalconsumptionadjustmentStructuresProducers'durableequipmentNonfarmstructures1.79.81.114-.5-14-1.7-163.4649.17.913.410.610.310.812 215.613.411.711.616.714.313.916.118.818.918.615.314.519.621.018 930.940.942.528 423.136.554.563.363.241.437.725.1ChangeProducers'Farmstructuresequip-durablement-0.1 0.0-.1 -.0-.0 .0.0 .00-.1 -.0o_ l-.1 -.1_ 2 - 1.123.4 .2.4 .1.3 .2.3 .1.3,\2 ,1.0.1 .1.1 .1.1 .1.1 .2-.0 .1.1 .1.0 .1,0 .1.0-.0 .2.0.0 '.2-.1 A-.0A-.2-.2-.2 '.6-.4 .7 .2 .7-.2 .5-.2.1 .6 .1 .6-.2-.2 .6-.1 .5.2 .2businessinventories1.7-1.6.42.2451.8 6-1.0106.44.7-3.16.810.33.1A-1,56.04.71.3-1.55.73.02.36.36.05.69.914.110.37.99.83.27.710.218.514.1-6.911,823.026.514.3-10.020.5-21.4Source: Department <strong>of</strong> Commerce, Bureau <strong>of</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> Analysis.181


TABLE B-17.—Inventories and final sales <strong>of</strong> business, 1946-82[Billions <strong>of</strong> dollars, except as noted; seasonally adjusted]Inventories 1HonfarmYear and quarterTotal FarmTotalManufacturingWholesaletradeFourth quarter:194672.0 22 7 49.3 26 7 10.1194782.6 25.1 57.5 29.3 10.5194887.2 22 9 64.3 32.5 11.7194978.7 19.8 59.0 28.9 11.8195098 0 261 719 35 2 13.81951110.5 28.3 82.2 43.4 14.61952109 2 260 83.1 44 4 14.81953110.1 24.6 85.5 46.4 15.01954107.6 23.8 83.9 44.3 15.31955114 8 22 5 92.2 48 8 16.61956124.0 22.9 101.0 54.5 17.91957127 6 24 3 103.3 548 18.21958127.3 25.6 101.7 53.2 18.31959132.0 24.4 107.6 55.7 20.0I960136 0 25 6 1104 56 6 2041961137.9 25.9 112.1 57.7 , 20.91962144 6 27 3 117 3 60 9 21.51963150.4 27.6 122.7 62.9 23.11964156.2 26.5 129.7 66.4 24.41965170.5 29.9 140.6 71.5 26.31966187.4 296 157.8 817 29.91967199.4 29.5 169.9 88.7 32.41968213.5 306 1829 952 34.31969234.6 33.3 201.3 104.8 37.71970244.0 32.3 211.6 108.4 41.71971260.8 36.7 224.1 109.9 44.91972288 7 45 6 2431 116 8 4941973357.7 66.6 291.2 141.1 60.21974434.4 62.4 372.0 189.6 76.91975439.4 64 5 374.9 189 8 77.31976473 6 606 4130 207 5 86 91977519.5 59.9 459.6 224.7 98.71978602 3 739 528 3 254 2 114 61979705.0 81.9 623.1 306.6 135.71980776.0 86.9 689.1 342.6 153.01981822.4 818 740 5 366 4 163.01982 p806.1 80.6 725.5 346.9 162.11980:724.1 79.0 645.1 321.0 140.5II737 2 811 6561 3281 144 0Ill757.3 86.2 671.1 333.2 148.5IV776.0 86.9 689.1 342.6 153.01981:791.6 85.9 705.7 352.6 156.5•I804.2 86.5 717.7 357.2 158.1III814.3 81.5 732.8 365.1 159.5IV822.4 81.8 740.5 366.4 163.01982:| 809.7 84.5 725.2 358.1 158.4|| 812.5 86.4 726.1 352.7 160.8111816.0 83.5 732.5 351.3 161.9IV P 806.1 80.6 725.5 346.9 162.1Retailtrade11.413.115.114.017 518.017.718.318.520.921.722.922.923.925 324.926 327.629.031.934.635.339042.844.350.555 764.874.174 682 993.71090121.0127.7140 7141.8121.3122 4126.1127J129.0134.2139.1140.7137.6140.2145.6141.8O<strong>the</strong>r3.54.65.04.35.46.16.25.85.96.06.97.37.38.08.18.78.69.29.910.911.613.514.416.017.318.821225.031.333.335742.550.659.865.770.574.862.261563.465.767.668.369.170.571.172.473.774.8Finalsales •16018.319.619.521724.626,127.227.529.731.432.733.735.636938.841143.746.251.054.157.663 367.470.877.285 894.5102.0113.61241138.9159 5176.9194.92104221.5182.01812188.2194.9201.8203.3208.5210.4213.8215.5217.1221.5Inventory—finalsales ratioTotal4,504.514.444.034.534.494.184.053.913.863.953.903.773.713.693.553 523.443.383.343.463.463.373.483.453.383.373.794.263.873.823.743.783.993.983.913.643.984.074.023.983.923.963.913.913.793.773.763.64Nonfarm31 End <strong>of</strong> quarter.8 Quarterly totals at monthly rates. Business final sales equals final sales less gross product <strong>of</strong> households and institutions,government, and rest <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> world, and includes a small amount <strong>of</strong> final sales by farms.3 Ratio based on total business final sales, which includes a small amount <strong>of</strong> final sales by farms.Note.—The industry classification <strong>of</strong> inventories is on an establishment basis and is based on <strong>the</strong> 1972 Standard IndustrialClassification (SIC) beginning 1948 and on <strong>the</strong> 1942 SIC prior to 1948.Source: Department <strong>of</strong> Commerce, Bureau <strong>of</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> Analysis.3 083.143 273.023 323.343183.153.053103.223163.013.022992.892 852.812.812.762.922.952 892.992.992.902833.083.653.303 333.313.313.523.543.523.283.543 623.573.543.503.533.513.523.393.373.373.28182


TABLE B-18.—Inventories and final sales <strong>of</strong> business in 1972 dollars, 1947-82[Billions <strong>of</strong> 1972 dollars, except as noted; seasonally adjusted]Year and quarterTotalFarmTotalInventories'ftonfarmManufacturingWholesatetradeRetailtradeO<strong>the</strong>rFinalsales 2Inventory—finalsales ratioTotalNonfarm3Fourth quarter:19471948194919501951195219531954195519561957..195819591960196119621963196419651966196719681969197019711972..1973197419751976197719781979198019811982 p1980:11IMIV1981:NHIIV1982:ItIllIV116.11216117.2127.71414145.7147.2145.0152 8158.61601158.3165.3168.8171.8179.7187.2194.3206.1222.92351244.1255.1258 9267.0277 2294.4306.0299 2307 0320.3336 3343.6338 6347.6339.1342 9342.3340.2338 6339 2342.3346.4347.6343.7342 6343 5339.125.726 726.227.529130.430 231.131530.731432.432.432.833.234.535 735.136.236.036 837.037.337 739.239 842.141.843 041140.840 843.241143.243.343 042.441.741141241.742.443 243.343.143343.390.594 891.0100.2112 3115.4117.1114.01212127.8128.7125.9132.9136.1138.6145.2151.5159.2169.9186.8198 3207.0217.82212227.8237 4252.3264.2256 3265 9279.5295 5300.4297 5304.4295.7299.9299.9298.4297.5298 0300.6304.0304.4300.5299.5300.2295.747.448 846.249.360 062.764560.964369.168 766.169.169.971.775.678 282.087.097.21041108.4112.8112 9111.8114 41218130.912711309134.1139 8145.0145 9148.4141.0146.6147.4146.3145.9146 9147.5149.41484146.4144.6143.3141.01 End <strong>of</strong> quarter.2 Quarterly totals at monthly rates. Business final sales equals final sales less gross product <strong>of</strong> households and institutions,government, and rest <strong>of</strong> world, and includes a small amount <strong>of</strong> final sales by farms.3 Ratio based on total business final sales, which includes a small amount <strong>of</strong> final sales by farms.N Ote.—The industry classification <strong>of</strong> inventories is on an establishment basis and is based on <strong>the</strong> 1972 Standard IndustrialClassification {SIC) beginning 1948 and on <strong>the</strong> 1942 SIC prior to 1948.Source: Department <strong>of</strong> Commerce, Bureau <strong>of</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> Analysis.16.017 217.219.219 720.120320.622122.822 522.524.625.125.726.628429.931.635.337 838.941.244045.947 950.454.152 255559.763 564.765 066.565.764.664.965.065.064665.165.466 565.365.866.165.718.320319.823.023 023.023.623.726.526.827.827.528.730.329.831.633.034.537.440.040.043.045.946.151.254.658.858.355.858 863.167.366.163.066.165.464.263.763.563.062.864.665.966.165.165.467.265.48.7867.88.79.59.68.78.88.49.29.89.810.510.711.411.412.012.813.814.316.316.817.918.219.020.521.420.921.120.822.624.924.623.623.423.624.523.823.623.623.623.423.323.423.623.723.723.633.234 434.636.939 841.643.043.145 646.547.148.149.750.753.155.358 360.966.167.570173.874.775.278.984.787.285.088.192.297.6103.0105.4105.0104.6105.5105.8102.7103.7105.0106.4105.2105.5104.6105.0104.6104.3105.53.503 533.383.463 553.513423.363 353.413403.293.333.333.243.253 213.193.123.303 363.313.413443.383.273.383.603.403.333.283.273.263.223.323.213.243.333.283.223.193.253.283.323.273.283.293.212.732 762.632.722 822.782 722.642 662.752 732.622.682.682 612.622 602.612.572.772 832.812.922 942.892 802.893.112.912.882.862.872.852.832.912.802.842.922.882.832.802.862.882.912.862.862.882.80183


TABLE B-19.—Relation <strong>of</strong> gross national product, net national product, and national income, 1929-82[Billions <strong>of</strong> dollars; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]Year or quarterGrossnationalproductLess:CapitalconsumptionallowanceswithcapitalconsumptionadjustmentEquals:NetnationalproductIndirectbusinesstax andnontaxliabilityLess:BusinesstransferpaymentsStatisticaldiscrepancyPIUS:Subsidieslesscurrentsurplus<strong>of</strong>governmententerprisesEquals:Nationalincome1929103.49.793.77.10.61.1-0.284.8193355.87.448.47.1.7.7--.039.9193990.98.782.29.4.51.4.471.4194019411942194319441945 . . . . .19461947 ,19481949100.0125.0158.5192.1210.6212.4209.8233.1259 5258.39.110.011.211.511.712.214.017.320.221.891.0115.0147.3180.7198.9200.2195.8215.7239.3236.510.111.311.812.814.215.517.118.420.121.3.4.5.55.5.5.5.6.7.81.1.6=.8-=1.82.74.1.51.5=1.6.6.4.1.1.6.7.9-.2-.1= .379.7102.7135.9169.3182.1180.7178.6194.9219.9213.619501951195219531954 „„1955195S ...195719581959286.53308348.0366.8366.8400.0421.7444.0449.7487.923.527.229.331.032.734.838.741.743.544.9263.0303.6318.7335.8334.1365.3383.0402.3406.2443.023.425.311129.729.632.235.137.538.741.8.8.91.01.21.11.2141.51.61.81.33.21.72.32.01.3= 2.1= 1.2.2= 1.3.1= .1-.3-.5-,0.71.1237.6274.1287.9302.1301.1330.5349.4365.2366.9400.81960196119621963196419651966196719681969506 5524.6565 0596.7637.7691.1756 0799.6873 4944.046 347.549 050.652.956.060 765.972.180.0460 2477.05161546.1584.8635.06953733.7801.3864.045 448.051654.658.862.665 370.278986.6202.0212.42.72.8303.1343.9-2.4• = . 12.11.7.1= 1.21.4= .3-2.1=3.9.41.71.81.11.71.62.51.61.41.9415.7428.8462.0488.5524.9572.4628.1662.2722.5779.3197019711972197319741975 . .1976197719781979992 71,077.61185.91,326.41,434.21 549.21,718.01,918.32,163.92,417.888196.5106.4116.5136.0159.3175.0195.2222.5256.0904 7981.11 079.51,209.91,298.21 389.91,543.01,723.21,941.42,161.794 3103.7111.5120.9129.1140.1151.7165.7178.2189.6414.44.95.55.87.47.98.69.310.3•-1.54.13.3.83.75.55.11.4= 2.6-1.52.92.63.83.41.12.41.03.13.73.4810.7871.5963.61,086.21,160.71,239.41,379.21,550.51,760.31,966.7198019811982 p2 633.12,937.73,057.5293.2330.1356.82 339 92,607.62,700.8213.0251.3258.811412.413.73.9-1.9.15.56.68.32,117.12,352.52,436.51980:IIIllIV2,575.92 573 42*643 72J39.4278.4289,2298 6306.62,297.52 284 32 345 02,432.9200.1206.7216 3228.911.011311511.810.53.82.2-1.03.84.77.46.02,079.72,067.22,122.32,199.21981:ItIIIIV2 864.92 901.82,980.93,003.2315.4325 0335.2344.82 549.52 576 82,645.82,658.4244.6252 0253.3255.312 012 212.512.85.14.6-.8=7.25.87.26.57.02,293.72 324.42[387.32,404.51982:IIIIllIV "2,995.53,045.23 088.23J01.3348.7353.9359.4365.02,646.72,691.22,728.92,736.3250.2256.7261.7266.513.113.513.814.3-7.5.83.66.04.95.816.52,396.92,425.22,455.6Source: Department <strong>of</strong> Commerce, Bureau <strong>of</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> Analysis.184


TABLE B-20.—Relation <strong>of</strong> national income and personal income, 1929-82[Billions <strong>of</strong> dollars; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]Year or quarterNationalincomeLess:Corporatepr<strong>of</strong>itswithinventoryvaluationandcapitalconsumptionadjustmentsNetinterestContributionsforsocialinsuranceWageaccrualslessdisbursementsPlus:GovernmenttransferpaymentstopersonsPersonalinterestincomePersonaldividendincomeBusinesstransferpaymentsEquals:Personalincome1929193319391940194119421943194419451946194719481949195019511952195319541955195619571958195919601961196219631964196519661967196819691970197119721973197419751976197719781979198019811982 P1980:\\ZZIIIIV1981:IIIIV1982:IIIIllIV "...84.839.971.479.7102.7135.9169.3182.1180.7178.6194.9219.9213.6237.6274.1287.9302.1301.1330.5349.4365.2366.9400.8415.7428.8462.0488.5524.9572.4628.1662.2722.5779.3810.7871.5963.61,086.21,160.71,239.41,379.21,550.51,760.31,966.72,117.12,352.52,436.52,079.72,067.22,122.32,199.22,293.72,324.42,387.32,404.52,396.92,425.22,455.69.0-1.75.38.614.119.323.523.619.016.622.329.427.133.938.736.136.335.245.543.743.338.549.647.648.656.662.169.280.085.182.489.185.171.483.296.6108.394.9110.5138.1167.3192.4194.8181.6190.6161.1195.3172.2177.8181.2200.3185.1193.1183.9157.1155.4166.24.74.13.63.33.33.12.72.42.21.82.32.42.73.03.54.04.45.35.96.67.99.610.311.413.014.716.418.321.024.427.630.034.841.446.551.260.276.184.587.2102.5121.7153.8187.7235.7265.3175.7181.6190.4203.0217.6231.6244.0249.5258.7267.5268.1267.00.22.12.32.83.54.55.26.16.15.85.45.97.18.59.09.110.111.512.914.915.218.021.121.924.327.328.730.038.843.447.955.058.664.674.292.4104.3110.9126.0140.6161.8186.9204.0238.1253.7199.4200.5204.6211.3232.5236.2240.3243.5250.8253.0255.2255.80.0 0.91.52.52.72.62.72.53.15.610.811.210.611.714.411.612.112.915.116.217.320.124.325.227.030.831.633.434.837.641.649.556.462.876.190.099.8114.0135.4170.9186.4199.3214.6240.0285.8323.9360.8263.2271.9301.8306.5310.8314.8332.3337.9341.4351.7367.2382.96.95.55.45.35.35.25.15.25.96.67.68.18.79.710.511.212.513.714.916.718.820.322.525.026.429.032.235.639.744.448.353.461.169.474.880.993.9112.4123.2132.5152.8179.4218.7263.4329.0371.8249.1258.0266.4280.2304.7320.6339.6351.0359.7372.0378.2377.25.82.03.84.04.44.34.44.64.65.66.37.07.28.88.58.58.89.110.311.111.511.312.212.913.314.415.517.319.119.420.221.922.422.222.624.126.529.129.936.539.645.350.855.962.567.054.155.756.557.459.261.564.165.265.866.167.268.8.8.91.01.21.11.21.41.51.61.82.02.02.12.42.72.83.03.13.43.94.14.44.95.55.87.47.98.69.310.311.412.413.711.011.311.511.812.012.212.512.813.113.513.814.385.047.072.477.995.4122.6150.8164.5170.0177.6190.1209.0206.4227.2254.9271.8287.7289.6310.3332.6351.0361.1384,4402.3417.8443.6466.2499.25407588.2630.0690.6754.7811.1868.4951.41,065.21,168.61,265.01,391.21,540.41,732.71,951.22,160.42,415.82,569.72,086.82,109.62,185.32,260.02,330.02,380.62,458.22,494.62,510.52,55272,592.52.623.2Source: Department <strong>of</strong> Commerce, Bureau <strong>of</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> Analysis.185


TABLE B-21.—National income by type <strong>of</strong> income, 1929-82[Billions <strong>of</strong> dollars; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]Compensation<strong>of</strong> employeesProprietors' income with inventory valuation and capital consumptionadjustmentsYear orquarterNationalincome 1TotalWagesandsalariesSupplementstowagesandsalaries2TotalTotalFarmProprietors'income3TotalCapitalconsumptionadjustmentProprietors'Income4NonfarmInventoryCapitalconsumptionvaluationadjustmentadjustment19291933193919401941.194219431944194519461947194819491950195119521953195419551956195719581959I960196119621963196419651966196719681969197019711972197319741975197619771978197984 839 971.479 7102.7135 9169.31821180 7178 6194 9219.9213.6237.6274.1287.93021301.1330.5349.4365 2366.9400.84157428.8462.0488.5524.9572.4628.1662.2722.5779.3810.7871.5963 61,086.21,160 71,239.41,379 21,550.51,76031,966751.129 548.152164.885 3109.51212123.11181129.2141.4141.3154.8181.0195.7209 6208.4224.9243.5256 5258.2279.6294 9303.6325.1342.9368.0396.5439.3471.4519.9572.9612.0652.2718 0801.3877 5931.41,036 31,152.11,30111,458.150.529 046.049962.182,1105.8116 7117.5112 0123.1135.5134.7147.0171.3185.3198.5196.82117228.3239 3240.5258.92719279.5298,0313.4336.1362.0398.4427.0469.65157548.7581.5635 2702.6765 2806.4889 9983.21106 51,237.40.652.12327323.8455.6606.15.96.67.89,710.411011.613.215.217 217.720.623 024.127129.531.834.540.944.450.357.263.270.782 8987112 3125.0146 4168.9194 6220715.05911.813 017.524.229.130431.836 735.940.936.438.743.243.441.841.242.943.945 347.747.647 248.649 950.552.556.960.561.264.067.066.269.476993.888,790.0941103.9118,5132.16.12.54.44.46.410.112.012.012.414.915.117.612.813.716.115.113.1n'i11.2n.i13.210.911712.112 312.010.813.114.112.612714.614.315.018732.826 524.619.119.126 331.96.32.64.54.56.510.312.212.212.715.215.718.213.514.416.916.013.913.312.212.112.114.111.912.612.913.012.811.513.814.913.513715.715.616.420434.629.028.022.823.331.337.80.2-.0-.1-.2-.2=.3-.3-.3=.5-.6-.7= 7-.8-.8-.8-.9-.9-.9= 1.0-.9-.8-.8-7-.7-.7-.9-1.0-1.2-1.3-1.4-1.6-1.8-2.5-3.4-3.7-4.3-5.0-5.98.9337.48.611.114.117.118.419.421.820.823.323.625.027.228.228628731.432.734.234.536735.536.537.638.541743.846.448.651.352.551.954.458.161.062.265.475.084.892.2100.28.8397.68611714.417.118.319.323.321.823.122.225.126.426.927 627.630.531.833.133.235.334.235.336.437.240.242.745.347.550.651.951754.558.162.365.867.477.186.894.9103.2015•= 2»0= .6= 4=.2= 1=.1-1.7-1.5-1.1-.3= 2=.0= 3=.1= .0.0.0= .0= .0=.1l!2-.2=.'5= .'6=2.0-37-1.2-1.2= 1.2=2.0= 2.9=01o-.0o.01.2,2.22.5.6.91.01.01.11,21.21.21.41.41.41.41.31.21.21.41.51.31.31.31.11.1.8.4.8.6,1= 8-.9-.7= .1198019811982 P1980:||IllIV1981:IIIllIV1982:1.IllIV2,117.12,352.52,436.52.079 72,067.22,122.32,199.22,293.72,324.42,387.32,404.52,396.92,425.22,455.61,598.61,767.61,855.91,555 21,571.71,604.91,662.81,718.01.750.01,789.11,813.41,830.81,850.71,868.31,873.71,356.11,494.01,560.11319 51,332.11,361.01,411.71,452.81,479.41,512.61,531.11,541.51,558.61,570.01,572.3242.5273.6295.8235 7239.6243.9251.0265.2270.6276.5282.3289.3294.1298.3301.4116.3124.7120.1122 7108.9115.5118.0123.4123.8127.5124.1116.4117.3118.4128.119.424.018.622.115.920.319.221.622.527.124.617.817.416.622.626.431.826.828.722.927.526.529.130.335.132.826.025.524730.8-7.0-7.9-8.1-6.6-7.0-7.2-7.3-7.5-7.8-8.0-8.2-8.2-8.1-8.1-8.296.91007101.4100.593.095.198.8101.8101.2100.499.598.699.9101.7105.599.9100.394.6104.995.198.2101.4103.2100.999.397.793.894.594.4957-=3.1-1.64.3=2.0-3.1=3.0-2.5-1.4-1.2-1.2.0= 1.0-A.17.3.0-.2.0.51.21.82,33.0476.47.910.31 National income is <strong>the</strong> total net income earned in production, ft differs from gross national product mainly in that it excludesdepreciation charges and o<strong>the</strong>r allowances for business and institutional consumption <strong>of</strong> durable capital goods and indirect businesstaxes. See Table B 19.2 Employer contributions for social insurance and to private pension, health, and welfare funds; workmen's compensation; directors'fees; and a few o<strong>the</strong>r minor items.See next page for continuation <strong>of</strong> table.186


TABLE B-21.—National income by type <strong>of</strong> income, 1929-82—Continued[Billions <strong>of</strong> dollars; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]Year or quarterRental income <strong>of</strong> personswith capital consumptionadjustmentTotalRentalincome<strong>of</strong>personsCorporate pr<strong>of</strong>its with inventory valuation and capital consumption adjustmentsTotalPr<strong>of</strong>its with inventory valuation adjustment and withoutcapital consumption adjustmentTotalPr<strong>of</strong>itsbeforetaxesPr<strong>of</strong>itstaxliabilityPr<strong>of</strong>itsTotalPr<strong>of</strong>its after taxCapitalconsumptionadjustmentDividendsUndistributedpr<strong>of</strong>itsInventoryvaluationadjustmentCapitalconsumptionadjustmentNetinterest1929193319394.92.22.65.72.33.1-0.8-.1-.69.0175.310.5-1.26.510.01.07.21.4U8.6575.82.03.82.8-1.62.00.5-2.1-.7-1.4-.6-1.1474.13.619401941194219431944194519461947194819492.73.1404.4454.65.55.35.76.1333.9505.6596.2737.7858.9-.6-.8-1.0-1.2-1.4-1.6-1.8-2.5-2.8-2.88614.119 323.523 619.016 622.329427.19.815.420.524.524.019.319.625.933.431.110 017.921725.324.219.824.831.835 629.22.87.611.414.112.910.79.111.312.410.27.210.310.311.211.39.115.720.523 219.04.04.44.34.44.64.65.66.37.07.2325.8606.7674.510 214.216211.8-.2-2.5-12-.8-.6-5.3-5.9-2.21.9-12-1.312-1.0- 3-.2-30-3.640-3.9333.3312.7242.2182.3242.71950195119521953195419551956195719581959..7.17.78.810.011.011.311.612.212.913.610.011012.213414.414 815.215916.717.4-2.9-3 3-3.4-3 4-3.3-3 5-3.6-3.6-3.8-3.833.938 736.136 335.245 543.743 338.549.637.943.340.640.238.447.546.946.641.652.342.944 539.641238.749.249.648.141.952.617.922.619.420.317.622.022.021.419.023.625.021.920.220 921.127.227.626.722.928.98.88.58.58.89.110.311.111.511.312.216.213.411.812.111.916.916.615.211.616.7-5.0-1.21.0-1.0-17-2.7-1.5-.340-4 6-4.5-39-3.2-20-3.2-3.4-3.2-2.73.03.54.04.45.35.96.67.99.610.3I9601961196219631964196519661967 *.'.'."1968196914.515.015.816.517.118.018.719.719 519.618.018.419119.720.221.222.323.624 025.2-3.5-3.4-3 4-3.2-3.2-3.3-3.6-3.9-4 5-5.647.648 656 662.169.280.085.182.489185.149.750.055159.766.076.080.978.184 980.849.849.755 059.666.577.283.079.788 586.722.722.824 026.228.030.933.732.539.239.527.126.931133.438.546.349.447.249447.212.913.314.415.517.319.119.420.222.022.514.313.616 617.921.227.229.927.027.324.7-.2.0.1~\2-2.1-1.6-3.7-5.9-2.0-1.41.52.53.14.04.24.34.34.311.413.014.716.418.321.024.427.630.034.819701971197219731974 ..v1975197619771978197919.720.221022.623.523.023.524.826.627.925.827129 032.135.336 839.244.050.056 2-6.1-6.9-8 0-9.5-11.8-13 8-15.6-19.1-23.4-28 371.483 296 6108.394.9110 5138.1167.3192.4194 868.982.094 0105.696.7120.6151.6178.5205.1209.675.486.6100 6125.6136.71321166.3194.7229.1252.734.237.541.649.051.650.663.872.783.287.641.349.058 976.685.181.5102.5122.0145.9165.122.522.924.427.029.930.837.440.847.052.718.826.134.549.655.250.765.181.298.9112.4-6.6-4.6-6.6-20.0-40.0-11.6-147-16.2-24.0-43.12.51.32.72.7-1.8-10.1-13.5-11.3-12.7-14.841.446.551.260.276.184.587.2102.51217153.8198019811982"32.933.934.165.369.470.8-32.4-35.5-36.7181.6190.6161.1199.4207.5166.0242.4232.1175.484.781.258.8157.8150.9116.658.165.170.399.785.846.3-43.0-24.6-9.4-17.8-16.8-4.9187.72357265.31980:||IIIIV30.832.733.834.261.864.866.967.5-31.0-32.1-33.1-33.3195.3172.2177.8181.2211.0189.4197.0200.4268.2217.6238.1245.995.373.382.287.8172.9144.3155.9158.156757.858,759.6116.786.497.398.5-57.2-28.2-41.1-45.5-15.7-17.2-19.3-19.2175.7181.6190.4203.01981:IIIll(V34 434.033.633.668 768.969.570 5-34.3-34.9-35.9-36.9200 3185.1193.1183.9217.6202.6210.3199.4253.1225.4233.3216.591.579.282.471.6161.6146.2150.8144.961.564.066.868.1100.182.284.076.9-35.5-22.8-23.0-17.1-17.3-17.5-17.1-15.5217.6231.6244.C249.51982:I||IllIV*33.934.234.633.971.070.770.970.9-37.1-36.4-36.3-37.0157.1155.4166.2167.2162.2170.0171.6171.7180.356.755.360.9115.0116.3119.468.869.370.572.446.147.048.8-4.4-9.4-10.3-13.4-10.1-6.9-3.81.22587267.5268.1267.03 With inventory valuation adjustment and without capital consumption adjustment.4 Without inventory valuation and capital consumption adjustments.Source: Department <strong>of</strong> Commerce, Bureau <strong>of</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> Analysis.187


TABLE B-22.~$ourees <strong>of</strong> personal income, 1929-82[Billions <strong>of</strong> dollars; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]Year or quarterPersonalincomeTotalWage and salary disbursements 1CommodityproducingindustriesTotalManufacturingDistributiveindustriesServiceindustriesGovernmentandgovernmententerprisesO<strong>the</strong>rlaborincome 1Proprietors' incomewith invaluati sn andcap talconsurnptionadjustmpntcFarm Nonfarm192985.050.521.516.115.68.45.00.56.18.9193347.029.09.87.88.85.25.2.42,'53.3193972.446.017.413.613.37.18.2.64.47.4194019411942194319441945194619471948194977.995.4122.6150.8164.5170.0177.6190.1209.0206.449 962.1821105.6116.9117.5112.0123.1135.5134.819.727.539.149.050.445.946.054.261.157.815 621.730.940.942.938.236.542.547.144.614.216.318.020.122.724.831.035.237.537.77.58.19.09.910.911.914.316.117.918.58510.216.026.633.034.920.717.519.020.8.6.91.11.51.82.02.42.72.94.46.410.112.012.012.414.915.117.612.88.611.114.117.118.419.421.820.823.323.61950195119521953195419551956195719581959227.2254.9271.8287.7289.6310.3332.6351.0361.1384.4147.01713185.41986196.82117228.3239 3240.5258.964.876.382.089.685.793.1100.6104.2100.0109.650.359 364.171267.573 879.482 478.686.839.844.346.949.750.153.457.760.560.864.819.821.523.124.926.128.631.3.33.635.638.522.629.233.334.434.936.638.841.044.146.03.74.65.25.96.17.08.09.09.410.613.716.115.113.112.511.511.211.113.210.925.027.228.228.628.731.432.734.234.536.71960 . .. .196119621963196419651966196719681969402.3417.8443.6466.2499.2540.7588 2630.0690.6754.72719279.5298 0313 4336.1362 0398 4427.0469 6515.71131113.7121.8126 9135.4146.01610168.3183.4199.689 789.896 7100 6107.1115 5128 0134.1145 8157.568.269.372.876 381.487.294 4100.9110.0120.841.444.147.250.254.458.964.771.379.689.749.252.456.360064.969.978 386.496.6105.511.211.813.014.015.717.819.921.725.228.511.712.112.312.010.813.114.112.612.714.635.536.537.638.541.743.846.448.651.352.519701971 .. .19721973197419751976197719781979811.1868.4951.41,065.21168 61,265.01,391.21,540.41,732,71,951.2548.7580 9635.2702 7765 7806.48899983.21,106 31,237.6203.0208.3227.3254.3274 7275.0307.3343.6389.4438.4158.2160 3175.4196 22114211.0237 4266.0299.2333.9130.3139.4152.1168.3184 6195.6216.6239.5270.7303.498.3106.7118.2131.3145.6159.7177.4197.7226.6259.7117.1126.5137.5148.7160.9176.1188.7202.4219.5236.232.536.743.048.855.864.575.989.4102.5114.914.315.018.732.826.524.619.119.126.331.951.954.458.161.062.265.475.084.892.2100.2198019811982"2,160.42,415.82,569.71,356.11,493.91,560.1468.0510.8509.9354.4386.4382.6330.5361.4375.7297.4338.6372.3260.2283.1302.3127.2140.4153.819.424.018.696.9100.7101.41980:IIIHIIV2 086 82]lO9.62,185.32,260.01319 71,332.11,360.51,412.2462 7458.6465.6485.1350 3347.0352.8367.7323 2324.9331.9341.92834292.0301.4313.1250 4256.6261.6272.2123 2125.9128.4131.522.115.920.319.2100.593.095.198.81981:1||IIIIV2,330.02,380.62,458.22,494.61452 81479 41,512.31,531.2499.2507 2519.3517.7377 0386 9392.9388.7352.1358 7366.5368.3325.2333.7342.8352.8276 2279 8283.8292.4135.3138.4142.2145.821.622.527.124.6101.8101.2100.499.51982:1||IIIIV P2 510.52*552 72^592.52,623.2154161556 61,570.01,572.3514.3513 6510.2501.43851385 6383.8375.8371.4375 4378.4377.4359.5367.6377.8384.3296.5300 0303.5309.1149.1152 5155.5157.917.817.416.622.698.699.9101J105.51 The total <strong>of</strong> wage and salary disbursements and o<strong>the</strong>r labor income differs from compensation <strong>of</strong> employees in Tabfe 8-21 in that itexcludes employer contributions for social insurance and <strong>the</strong> excess <strong>of</strong> wage accruals over wage disbursements.See next page for continuation <strong>of</strong> table.188


TABLE B-22.—Sources <strong>of</strong> personal income, 1929-82—Continued[Billions <strong>of</strong> dollars; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]RentalTransfer paymentsYear or quarter<strong>of</strong>personswithcapitalconsumptionadjustmentPersonaldividendincomePersonalinterestincomeTotalOld-age,survivors,disability,andhealthinsurancebenefitsGovernmentunemploymentinsurancebenefitsVeteransbenefitsGovernmentemployeeretirementbenefitsAid t<strong>of</strong>amilieswithdependentchildren(AFDC)O<strong>the</strong>rLess:PersonalcontributionsforsocialinsuranceNonfarmpersonalincome 219294.95.86.91.50.60.10.80.119332.22.05.52.1.6.21.4.219391940194119421943194419451946 ..1947194819492.6273.14.0444.54.6555.3576.13.8404.44.34.44.64.65.66.37.07.25.4535.35.25.15.25.96.67.68.18.73.0313.13.13.03.66.211311.711312.50.00.1.2.3.4.5.60.45.4.4.1.1.41.1.8.91.9.55.51.03.0707.0595.3.33.3'AA.5.7.7.91.7171.81.81.82.02.021.34.52.52.93.3.67.81.21.82.22.3202.12.22.215991719188 2190.419501951195219531954195519561957195819597.1778.810.011.011311612.212 913.68.88.58.58.89.110.311111.511.312.29.710.511.212.513.714.916 718.820 322.515.212.613.114.116.217.518 721.625 927.01.01.92.23.03.64.9577.38510.21.5.91.11.02.21.5151.9412.87.74.64.34.14.24.4444.5474.61.01.11.21.41.51.7192.22.52.8.6.6.5.5.6.66.78.93.53.63.84.14.14.34.54.95.35.82.93.43.84.04.65.2586.76.97.9210.2235 4253.12713273.9295 5318 0336.6344 4369.8I9601961196219631964196519661967196819691970197119721973197419751976197719781979198019811982 '14.515015.816.517.118.018 719.719 519.619 720 221.022 623 523.023.524 826 627.932.933.934112.913.314.415.517.319.119.420.221.922.422.222 624.126.529.129.936.539.645.350.855.962.567.025.026429.032.235.639.744 448.353.461.169 474 880.993 9112.4123.2132.5152.81794218.7263.4329.0371.828.932 833.835.837.440.444 752.659 866.780194 4104.7119 5141.2178.3194.3207.9223 8250.3297.2336.3374.511.112.614.315.216.018.120 825.530.232.938.544.549.660.470.181.492.9104.9116.2131.8154.2182.0204.53.04.33.13.02.72.3192.22.12.24.0585.74.46.817.615.812.79.79.816.115.424.94.6504.74.84.74.9495.6596.77.7889.710.411.814.514.413.813.914.415.016.116.33.13.43.74.24.75.26.16.97.68.710.211.813.816.019.011126.129.032.736.943.049.254.01.01.11.31.41.51.7192.32.83.54.86.26.97.27.99.210.110.610.711.012.413.413.16.26.46.77.37.88.39.210.211.112.515.017.419.021.125.632.835.136.940.746.356.660.361.69.39.710.311.812.613.317.820.622.926.227.930.734.542.647.950.455.561.169.881.188.7104.9111.7386.7401.6427.1449.7483.7522.6568.9611.9672.1733.9790.0846.5925.31,023.71,131.81,229.11,359.31,506.51,689.71,899.32,117.32,364.12,518.91980:I||HIIV30.832.733 834 254.155.756.557.4249.1258.0266.4280.2274.2283.2313.4318.2142.1144.7163.4166.411.815.918.718.014.814.614.915.740.142.343.446.011.712.112.813.053.653.560.259.186.986.989.1.91.82,042.22,070.32,140.92.216.C1981:IIIllIV1982:|||IllIV P34.434.033.633.633 934.234.633.959.261.564.165.265.866.167.268.8304.7320.6339.6351.0359 7372.0378.2377.2322.8327.0344.8350.7354.6365.2381.0397.2171.0173.7190.6192.8194.7197.5209.2216.615.715.114.116.718.723.525.531.816.015.916.016.416.316.116.316.647.249.149.650.851.554.454.955.313.113.413.513.413.213.213.013.159.859.861.060.660.160.662.163.8102.5104.1106.1107.0110.6111.4112.4112.42,282.52,330.92,402.62,440.32,461.62,503.22,543.32,567.62 Personal income exclusive <strong>of</strong> farm proprietors' income, farm wages, farm o<strong>the</strong>r labor income, and farm net interestNote.—The industry classification <strong>of</strong> wage and salary disbursements and proprietors' income is on an establishment basis and isbased on <strong>the</strong> 1972 Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) beginning 1948 and on <strong>the</strong> 1942 SIC prior to 1948.Source: Department <strong>of</strong> Commerce, Bureau <strong>of</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> Analysis.189


TABLE B-23.—Disposition <strong>of</strong> personal income, 1929-82[Billions <strong>of</strong> dollars, except as noted; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]Year or quarter192919331939194019411942194319441945 ,.,1946194719481949195019511952 ....'.'.....'.* .*1953 . ..195419551956195719581959I9601961196219631964196519661967196819691970197119721973197419751976197719781979198019811982 p1980:IItHIIV1981:|||HIIV1982:1||III\M PPersonalincome85.047.072.477.9954122.6150 8164.5170.0177 6190.1209 0206.4227.2254.9271.8287 7289.6310 3332.6351.0361.1384.4402.3417 8443.6466 2499.2540.7588.2630.0690.6754.7811.1868.4951.41,065.21,168.61,265.01,391.21,540.41,732.71,951.22,160.42,415.82,569.72,086.82,109.62,185.32,260.02,330.02,380.62,458.22,494.62,510.52,552.72,592.52,623.2Less:Personaltax andnontaxpayments2614242.6335.917 818.920 818 721421018.520.628.934.035 532.535439.742 442.146.050 452156860 358.664.974.582197.2115.7115.8116 7141.0150.7170.2168.9196.82264258.7301.0336.3386.7397.2319.9328 6339.7357.1371.2384.23981393.2393.4401.2394.4399.7Equals:Disposablepersonalincome82.445.670.075.392 2116.6133 0145.61491158 9168.7188 0187.9206.6226.0237.7252 2257.1275 0292.9308 6319.0338.4352 0365838684059440.6475.8513.7547 9593.4638.9695.37518810.3914.5998.31,096.11,194.41,314 01,474.01,650.21,824.12,029.12,172.51,766.91,78101,845.51,902.91,958.71,996.52,060 02,101.42,117.12,151.52,198.12,223.5Total79.146.567.872.081.889.4100.1109.0120.4145 2163.51769180.4194.7210.0220.4233 7240.1258 5271.6286 4295.4317.3332.3342 7363.5384 0411.0442.1477.7503 6551.5598.3639.56911757.7835.5913.21,001.81,111.91,236 01,384.61,553.51,717.91,898.92,031.41,669.11,672 41,732.51,797.61,852.81,874.51,925.71,942.71,977.92,007.22,046.12,094.6Source: Department <strong>of</strong> Commerce, Bureau <strong>of</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> Analysis.Less: Personal outlaysPersonalconsumptionexpenditures77.345.867.071.080.888.699.4108.2119.5143.8161.7174.7178.1192.0207.1217.1229.7235.8253.7266.0280.4289.5310.8324.93350355.2374 6400.5430.4465.1490.3536.9581.8621.7672 2737.1812.0888.1976.41,084.31 204.41,346.51,507.21,667.21,843.21,972.01,618.71622 21,682.21,745.81,799.91,819.41,868.81,884.51,919.41,947.81,986.32,034.61.5.5.7.8.9ij.71.01.41.72.32.52.93.63.84.45.15.55.66.17.0737.8889.9U.I12.012.513.815.616.717.719.522.324.124.426.730.737.445.549.955.158.649.649.449.750.852.454.456.257.557.858.459.059.1Interestpaid byconsumerstobusinessPersonaltransferpaymentst<strong>of</strong>oreigners(net)Equals:Personalsaving0.3 3.3.2 -0.9.2 2.2.2 3.410.3.1 27.2.2 32.9.4 36.6.5 28.7.7 13 7J 5.2,7 11.1.5 7.5.4 11.9.4 16.1.4 17.4.5 18.5.5 17.0,4 16.4.5 21.3.5 22.3.4 23.6.4 21.1.4 19.7.4 23 0.5 23.3.6 219.6 29.6.7 33.7.7 36.0.9 44.3.8 41.9.9 40.61.1 55.81.1 60.71.1 52.61.3 79.01.0 85.1.9 94.3.9 82.5.9 78 0.8 89.4.8 96.7.8 106.2.6 130.2.9 141.1.7 97 9.7 108 6.8 113.1.9 105.3,5 105 9.8 122.0134 4.7 158.6.8 139.1.9 144.3.8 152.0.9 128.9Percent <strong>of</strong> disposablepersonal incorPersonal outlaysTotal96.0102.096.995.588.876.775.374.880.891.496.994.196.094.292.992.792.793.494.092.792.892.693.894.493.794.094.693.392.993.091.992.993.692.091.993.591.491.591.493.194.193.994194.293.693.594 593993.994.594.693.993 592.593.493.393.194.2PersonalConsumptionexpenditures93.8100.595.694.287.676.074.774.380.190.595.993.094.892.991.691.391.191.792.390.890.990.791.892.391.691.892.390.990.590.589.590.591.189.489.491.088.889.089.190.891.791.391.391.490.890.891691191.191.791991.190 789.790.790.590.491.5Personalsaving4.0=2.03.14.511.223.324.725.219.28.63.15.94.05.87.17.37.36.66.07.37.27.46.25.66.36.05.46.77.17.08.17.16.48.08.16.58.68.58.66.95.96.15.95.86.46.55.5616.15.5546.1657.56.66.76.95.8190


TABLE B-24.—Total and per capita disposable personal income and personal consumption expenditures incurrent and 1972 dollars, 1929-82[Quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates, except as noted]Disposable personal incomePersonal consumption expendituresYear or quarterTotal (billions <strong>of</strong>dollars)Currentdollars1972dollarsCurrentdollarsPer capita(dollars)1972dollarsTotal (billions <strong>of</strong>dollars)Currentdollars1972dollarsCurrentdollarsPer capita(dollars)1972dollarsPopulation(thousands)l1929...,1933...,1939....1940....1941...,1942....1943...1944....1945....1946....1947....1948....1949...,1950...,1951...,1952...,1953....1954...,1955...,1956...,1957...,1958....1959...,I960...,1961...,1962...,1963....1964....1965...,1966....1967...,1968...1969....1970...1971...1972...1973...1974...1975...,1976...1977...1978...1979...82.445.670.075.392.2116.6133.0145.6149.1158.9168.7188.0187.9206.6226.0237.7252.2257.1275.0292.9308.6319.0338.4352.0365.8386.8405.9440.6475.8513.7547.9593.4638.9695.3751.8810.3914.5998.31,096.11,194.41,314.01,474.01,650.2229.5169.6229.8244.0277.9317.5332.1343.6338.1332.7318.8335.8336.8362.8372.6383.2399.1403.2426.8446.2455.5460.7479.7489.7503.8524.9542.3580.8616.3646.8673.5701.3722.5751.6779.2810.3864.7857.5874.9906.8942.9988.81,015.76763635345706918659731,0521,0661,1241,1701,2821,2591,3621,4651,5151,5811,5831,6641,7411,8021,8321,9111,9471,9912,0732,1442,2962,4482,6132,7572,9563,1523,3903,6203,8604,3154,6675,0755,4775,9656,6217,3311,8831,3491,7541,8472,0832,3542,4292,4832,4162,3532,2122,2902,2572,3922,4152,4412,5012,4832,5822,6532,6602,6452,7092,7092,7422,8132,8653,0263,1713,2903,3893,4933,5643,6653,7523,8604,0804,0094,0514,1584,2804,4414,51277.345.867.071.080.888.699.4108.2119.5143.8161.7174.7178.1192.0207.1217.1229.7235.8253.7266.0280.4289.5310.8324.9335.0355.2374.6400.5430.4465.1490.3536.9581.8621.7672.2737.1812.0888.1976.41,084.31,204.41,346.51,507.2215.1170.5219.8229.9243.6241.1248.2255.2270.9301.0305.8312.2319.3337.3341.6350.1363.4370.0394.1405.4413.8418.0440.4452.0461.4482.0500.5528.0557.5585.7602.7634.4657.9672.1696.8737.1767.9762.8779.4823.1864.3903.2927.66343645115376056577277818541,0171,1221,1921,1941,2661,3421,3831,4391,4521,5351,5811,6371,6621,7551,7971,8231,9041,9792,0872,2142,3662,4672,6742,8703,0313,2373,5113,8314,1524,5214,9725,4686,0486,6951,7651,3561,6781,7401,8261,7881,8151,8441,9362,1292,1222,1292,1402,2242,2142,2302,2772,2782,3842,4102,4162,4002,4872,5012,5112,5832,6442,7512,8682,9793,0323,1603,2453,2773,3553,5113,6233,5663,6093,7743,9244,0574,121121,878125,690131,028132,122133,402134,860136,739138,397139,928141,389144,126146,631149,188151,684154,287156,954159,565162,391165,275168,221171,274174,141177,073180,760183,742186,590189,300191,927194,347196,599198,752200,745202,736205,089207,692209,924211,939213,898215,981218,086220,289222,629225,1061980...,1981...,1982 ",1,824.12,029.12,172.51,018.01,043.11,054.58,0128,8279,3624,4724,5384,5441,667.21,843.21,972.0930.5947.6957.17,3238,0188,4984,0874,1234,125227,654229,872232,0501980:IIIIII ....IV1981:IIIIll...,IV1982:Ii!Z1,766.91,781.01,845.51,902.91,958.71,996.52,060.02,101.42,117.12,151.52,198.12,223.51,022.81,005.51,018.21,025.71,035.01,036.61,048.81,051.91,046.91,054.81,058.31,057.97,7937,8348,0958,3258,5518,6988,9519,1079,1559,2859,4619,5464,5114,4234,4664,4874,5194,5164,5574,5594,5274,5524,5554,5421,618.71,622.21,682.01,745.81,799.91,819.41,868.81,884.51,919.41,947.81,986.32,034.6937.0915.8928.0941.0951.1944.6951.4943.4949.1955.0956.3968.07,1407,1367,3787,6387,8587,9268,1208,1678,3008,4068,5508,7354,1334,0294,0714,1174,1524,1154,1344,0884,1044,1214,1164,156226,727227,332227,978228,579229,053229,539230,145230,751231,246231,724232,320232,9101 Population <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States including Armed Forces overseas; includes Alaska and Hawaii beginning 1960. Annual data are forJuly 1 through 1958 and are averages <strong>of</strong> quarterly data beginning 1960. Quarterly data are average for <strong>the</strong> period. Data beginning 1970reflect results <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1980 census <strong>of</strong> population.Source: Department <strong>of</strong> Commerce (Bureau <strong>of</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> Analysis and Bureau <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Census).191


TABLE B-25.—Gross saving and investment, 1929-82[Billions <strong>of</strong> dollars; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]Gross savingGross investmentYear orquarterTotalGross private savingTotalPersonalsavingGrossbusinesssaving'Governrnent surplus or), national incomeand pr3duct accountsTotalFederalStateandtocalCapita)grantsreceivedby <strong>the</strong>unitedStates(net) 2TotalGrossprivatedomesticinvestmentNetforeigninvestment*Statisticaldiscrepancy19291933193919401941194219431944194519461947194819491950195119521953...1954195519561957195819591960196119621963196419651966196719681969197019711972197319741975197619771978197919801981...1982 p ,1980:|||IIIIV1981:(IIllIV1982:I||IllIV P15.9.98.813.518.610 7542.45.235.141.749.835.650 756.951.049.850.967.575.975.262.678.381.178.786.793.6104.0120.2127.3125 7136.0153.6148.9161.6186.6235.5227 8218.9257.9309.1374.8422.7406.2477.5413.9410.8395.8404.4414.0461.4482.4490.0476.3428.8441.5422.414.92.211.014.222.442.049 654.344.729.627.341.439.042 750.854.856.758.164.470.774.375.379.978.083.090.592.9106.3119.7128.6139 9142.0143.6158.6180.3189.2227.7234 5282.7294 4326.9374.0407.3438.3504.7529.9420.2438.8449.2445.1468.7488.9513.4547.7519.4529.0546.133-.92.23.410.327 232936.628.713.75.211.17.511916.117 418.517.016.421.322.323.621.119.723.023.321.929 633.736.044 341.940.655.860 752,679.085194.382 578.089 496.7106 2130.2141.197.9108.6113.1105.3105.9122.0134.4158.61391144 3152.0128.91163.18.810.812.114 816 717.616.015.922.130 231.530 734.837.438.241147.949.452.051758.758.360.067.271.076 786.092.795 6100.0103.0102.8119 7136.6148.71494188.42119248.9284 6310.63321374.5388.8322.3330.2336.1339.8362.8367.0379.0389.1380 3384 7394.110-1.4=2.27=3.8=314—44 1-51.8-39.55414.484-3.4806.1-38-6.9-713.152.9= 12 6-1.63.1-4.3-3.8-2 3.5-1.3— 142-6.09.9= 10.6= 19 4-3.37.8-4 7-63.8-36 5-17.8814.3-33 2=28.2= 116.1-10.6-44.2-45.9= 32.2-8.3-7.6-24.5-72.5=90 7—87 5= 123.71.2-1.3-2.2-1.3=5.1=33.1=46.6-54.5=42.13.513.48.3-2.69.26.5-3.7-7.1-6.04.46.12.3= 10.3-1.13.0= 3.9=4.2-13-l!8= 132-6.08.4"12.4-?2.0= 16.8= 5.6115-69.3-531-45.9-29.5-16.1-614=60.0= 147.9-39.7=67.5-73.1-65.2-39.7-40.5= 58.0= 101.7— 1184= 1196-156.0— 2= .1.0.61.31.8252.72.61.91.0,1-1.2= .4-.0-1.113-.9-1.4-2.4-.4.1= .4.510= .011.11.51.92613.513.4685.516 628.030 330.428231.731.929.123.327.133.031.332.933.529.121132132.3ZZZ40.9 .7.7.020.00.001.1121.1.01.21.21.21.21.11.11.11.100.0.017 01.610.314.719.298375.29.335.643.248.336.252.060.152.752.152.968.873.874.062.877.078.778.688.895.3104 2119.0128.7125 4133.9149.7147.4165 7189.9236.32315224.4263 0310.4372 3421.2410 2475.6414.0421.3399.6406.6413.0466.5477.8489.1469.04213442 3426.0366.316.21.49.313.117.99.9587.210.630.734.045.935.353.859.252.153.352.768.471.069.261.978.175.974.885.490.997.4113.5125.7122.8133.3149.3144.2166.4195.0229.8228.7206.1257.9324.1386.6423.0402.3471.5421.9424.0391.0384.1410.3455.7475.5486.0468.9414 84315443.3397.90.8.21.01.51.3=.121-2.0-1.34.99.32.4.9-1.8.9.6=1.3.42.84.8.9-1.22.83.83.44.46.85.43.02.6.6.43.2= 7516.52.918.35.1= 13.6= 14.3-1.87.84.1=7.9=2.68.622.52.810.82.33.16510 8= 17.3=31.71.1\A1.1 .6=.8182,74.1.51.5-1.6.61.33.21.72.32.01.3-2.1-1.2.2-1.3=2.4l.'l1.71 Undistributed corporate pr<strong>of</strong>its with inventory valuation and capital consumption adjustments, corporate and noncorporate capitalconsumption allowances with capital consumption adjustment, and private wage accruals less disbursements.2 Allocations <strong>of</strong> special drawing rights (SDRs), except as noted in footnote 4.3 Net exports <strong>of</strong> goods and services less net transfers to foreigners and interest paid by government to foreigners plus capital grantsreceived by <strong>the</strong> United States, net.4 In February 1974, <strong>the</strong> U.S. Government paid to India $2,010 million in rupees under provisions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Agricultural TradeDevelopment and Assistance Act. This transaction is being treated as capital grants paid to foreigners, i.e., a $2.0 billion entry incapital grants received by <strong>the</strong> United States, net.Source: Department <strong>of</strong> Commerce, Bureau <strong>of</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> Analysis.121.4=2.1= 3.9-1.54.13.3.8375.55.11.4=2.6= 1.53.9-1.910.53.82.2-1.05.1=4.6 g7 275 83.6192


Year or quarterTotalTotalTABLE B-26.—Saving by individuals, 1946-82 1[Billions <strong>of</strong> dollars; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]CheckabledepositsandcurrencyTimeandsavingsdepositsIncrease in financial assetsMoneymarketfundsharesGovernmentsecurities2SecuritiesCorporateequities3O<strong>the</strong>rsecurities*Insuranceandpensionreserves5O<strong>the</strong>rfinancialassets6Net investment 7OwneroccupiedhomesConsumerdurablesNoncor-poratebusinessassets8Less: tJet increase indebtMortgagedebt ConsumeronO<strong>the</strong>rnonfarmcreditdebt 8 8homes1946194719481949195019511952195319541955 .195619571958195919601961196219631964196519661967196819691970197119721973.197419751976197719781979198019811980:IIllIV1981:1 II..IllIV1982:II..Ill24.620.124.320.930 634.731.332.528.234.137.236.534.138.036 735 942.046.756.865 072.877.080.571.586.495 6109.3132 0128.3153 0165.1167 2200.6208.1250.5283.1242.9237.0263 62584256 0257.0320 4299.1300.5290.2335.918.813.29.19.913 719.123.222.822.228 030.228,631.637.432 135 440.146.655.758 857.969.875.665.281.51021131.5148 5147.3174 3210.5233 8274 4296.1337.5355.2347.9 8.1 96.8 61.3270 5 -11.1 81.83614 41 1 120 0 5.13701 -119 203 7 -11.9328 7365 4387 6339.0333 7357 7393.35.6-2.9-2.0264.61.61.02.21.21.8-.43.81.010_9-1.24.25.3762.49.911.1-2.58.912 213.914.17.469 83 415.7 107.5201 107 522.6 100 322,4 78.56.525.855 05942.732.8-3.91.76.33.42.22.6244.77.88.19.1869.411.913.911.012 018 326.126.226.127 819.035.331.19.143.667 774.463 655.7125.665.625 2 148 492 8 59.984 3 137.360.1 84.3131.4102 494.72.413-.0 26934.429.2107.541?86.5-1.51.61.31.8_ 1-.62.52.51.05.83.92.3-2.510.12.21.41.3.64.83.711.3-1.25.225.9-5.4= 12 22.724.228.325 011.718 233.655.540.557.365.7-6.640.162.751103.283.737.042.6105.268.91.11.11.0.7.71.81.61.0.81.02.01.51.5-.6.3-2.1-2.6—2-2.17-4.775-2.8-1.7-5.5-5.1-.6-3.8-4.63.5-15.92.1-31.6.6R91.515 529.0-55.0-26.8n n44-12.5-0.9-.8.0-.4-.7.3.0.3— 9.81.21.01.1— 32.4 ,1.11.4.41.32.45.27.910.06.9654.911.16.8448.64712.518.47.0-6.4.42.413.312.1-113-7.4-21.914.9-19.9-30.73.05.35.45.35.66.96.37.77.97.88.59.59.510.411.911.512.112.713.916.116.919.218.619.821.523.927.429.433.036.243 552.467.473.868.289.698.780.795.8100.181.984.6103.5113.393.690.6112.0104.42.82.42.21.6191.92.02.12.1212.52.83.53.33.6433.22.93.23.74.46.78.14.05.45811.48311.113 619.219229.834.636.938.334.342.2V\37 24?fi40133.2?9fi46.63.66.79.18.411.811.711.312.312.716.715.613.212.316.314.812.713.514.315.014.513.511.715.716.313.620.728.031.025.223 536.152.363.967.948.743.859.849.340.845.649.048.442.435.727.129.629.56.19.09.810.614 811.38.610.17.112 28.57.73.67.37.0438.511.815.020 223.121.127.026.320.026 634.640.428.426 540.049 652.532.438.246.4185VO45 74? 829.035 737 735.22.31.86.91.8684.52.31.01.9291.22.72.65.03.64.77.59.89.213.310.810.210.012.711.517.520.626.610.65.83.315.226.38.727.914.76013925.33? 9?9fi5,9783.64.74.64.4676.66.27.68.712 211.28.99.512.811.712 214.116.217.517 013.812.516.918.614.126 241.446.538.040661.4911111 ^121.31 Saving by households, personal trust funds, nonpr<strong>of</strong>it institutions, farms, and o<strong>the</strong>r noncorporate business.2 Consists <strong>of</strong> U.S. savings bonds, o<strong>the</strong>r U.S. Treasury securities, U.S. Government agency securities and sponsored agency securities,mortgage pool securities, and State and local obligations.3 Includes mutual fund shares.4 Corporate and foreign bonds and open market paper.s Private life insurance reserves, private insured and noninsured pension reserves, and government insurance and pension reserves.6 Consists <strong>of</strong> security credit, mortgages, accident and health insurance reserves, and nonlife insurance claims for households and <strong>of</strong>consumer credit, equity in sponsored agencies, and nonlife insurance claims for noncorporate business.7 Purchases <strong>of</strong> physical assets less depreciation.8 Includes data for corporate farms.9 O<strong>the</strong>r debt consists <strong>of</strong> security credit, policy loans, and noncorporate business debt.Source: Board <strong>of</strong> Governors <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Federal Reserve System.98.381.4123.783 794 491491.699 577 866 8SIR51.13.13.73.23.2481.65.34.21.5723.92.9.58.04.42.56.38.99.810 66.55.711.510.85.414.719.89.99.625.440.248 845.44.925.321.814126.53??34?8.3fi.68.2-0.42.22.82.2503.72.71.95.5643.23.86.07.24.9657.210.710.814 312.217.619.219.420.730 344.243 835.426 937.952 459.368.073.775.280.445.763.9104.774.793.270.162.828.565.462.8193


TABLE B-27.—Number and median income (in 1981 dollars) <strong>of</strong> families and persons, and poverty status,by race, selected years, 1947-81YearMedianincomeFamilies >TotalNumber(millions)NumhprDel Rate(millions)Below poverty levelFemale householderRatePersonsbelowpoverty levelNumber(millions)Number/millions)RateMedian income <strong>of</strong> persons 14 yearsold and over with income *AllpersonsMalesYearroundfull-timeworkersFerralesAllpersonsYearroundfulltimeworkersALL RACES1947195019551960196119621963196419651966 319671968196919701971197219731974 »19751976197719781979*19801981WHITE19701971197219731974 319751976197719781979*19801981BLACK19701971197219731974 •19751976197719781979*1980198137 239.942 945.546 447147.548 048.549.250.150 851652 253.354.455.155 756.256 757.257.859 660.361046 547.648 548949 449 950150 550952.252 753.34.95.25.35.45.55.65.85.85.96.26.36.4$12,34112,53915,00617,25917,43517,90718,56319,26220,05421,10821,60922,56623,40223,11123,09724,16624,66323,79523,18323,89824,02724,59124,54223,20422,38823,97523,96625,10725,77724,72824,11024,82325,12425,60625,61024,17623,51714,70714,46214,92214,87714,76514,83514,76614,35215,16614,50213,98913,2668.28.48.17.67.26.75.85.75.05.05.35.35.14.84.95.55.35.35.35.56.26.93.73.83.43.23.43.83.63.53.53.64.24.71.51.51.51.51.51.51.61.61.61.71.82.018.118.117.215.915.013.911.811.410.09.710.110.09.38.88.89.79.49.39.19.210.311.28.07.97.16.66.87.77.17.06.96.98.08.829.528.829.028.126.927.127.928.227.527.828.930.82.02.02.02.01.81.91.71.81.81.82.02.12.22.22.32.42.52.62.72.63.03.31.11.21.11.21.31.41.41.41.41.41.61.8.8.91.01.01.01.01.11.21.21.21.31.442.442.142.940.436.438.433.133.332.332.732.533.932.732.232.132.533.031.731.430.432.734.625.026.524.324.524.825.925.224.023.522.325.727.454.353.553.352.752.250.152.251.050.649.449.452.939.939.638.636.436.133.228.527.825.424.125.425.624.523.023.425.925.024.724.526.129.331.817.517.816.215.115.717.816.716.416.317.219.721.67.57.47.77.47.27.57.67.77.68.18.69.222.221.921.019.519.017.314.714.212.812.112.612.511.911.111.212.311.811.611.411.713.014.09.99.99.08.48.69.79.18.98.719.010.211.133.532.533.331.430.331.331.131.330.631.032.534.2$9,0809,71011,40512,53012,73513,14513,40013,62614,47914,87015,12615,63315,95015,62315,50216,19616,48715,58814,96015,05915,19315,24414,75913,83013,47316,42116,25216,98717,30016,32915,71515,87615,91315,96615,41814,71014,2969,7379,69210,28910,46410,1189,3959,5599,4439,5659,5448,8408,501$14,40516,68817,21717,51718,03118,42619,01919,49119,85520,42721,50421,51121,62822,90923,47022,43021,85622,14222,61722,39121,90121,16220,69222,12722,23723,73624,15022,86722,36122,80223,08022,80722,53421,76621,17815,07215,20516,02916,27616,38316,64116,33115,91217,46816,24015,31414,98454,1413,6013,8043,8733,8884,0354,0764,2494,3844,5904,9065,2785,2895,2405,4085,6505,7225,6845,7205,7135,9155,6715,4535,4305,4585,3075,4975,6875,7775,7495,7795,7616,0055,7395,5045,4605,5194,8324,8175,3135,2155,1905,2505,4295,1855,1685,0095,0554,903(9,28910,12210,15710,39410,56310,87811,00011,28311,43511,94212,59512,74212,80313,15913,27813,23113,04413,28013,22813,44013,19512,79312,45712,96712,95113,41813,50313,34313,07413,38213,31213,56713,31112,91712,6650,6241,4351,4791,4512,3142,4912,5112,4422,5742,1972,0471,4381 The term "family" refers to a group <strong>of</strong> two or more persons related by blood, marriage, or adoption and residing toge<strong>the</strong>r; all suchpersons are considered members 01 <strong>the</strong> same family. Beginning 1979 based on householder concept and restricted to primary families.3 Beginning 1979, data are for persons 15 years and over.'Based on revised methodology; comparable with succeeding years.* Based on 1980 census population controls; comparable with succeeding years.Note.—The poverty level is based on <strong>the</strong> poverty index adopted by a Federal interagency committee in 1969. That index reflecteddifferent consumption requirements for families based on size and composition, sex and age <strong>of</strong> family householder, and farm-nonfarmresidence. Minor revisions implemented in 1981 eliminated variations in <strong>the</strong> poverty thresholds based on two <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se variables, farmnonfarmresidence and sex <strong>of</strong> householder. The poverty thresholds are updated every year to reflect changes in <strong>the</strong> consumer price indexFor fur<strong>the</strong>r details see "Current Population <strong>Report</strong>s," Series P 60, No. 133.Source: Department <strong>of</strong> Commerce, Bureau <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Census.194


POPULATION, EMPLOYMENT, WAGES, AND PRODUCTIVITYTABLE B-28.—Population by age groups, 1929-82[Thousands <strong>of</strong> persons]July lTotalAge (years)Under 5 5-15 16-19 20-24 25-44 45-6465 andover1929193319391940194119421943194419451946194719481949195019511952195319541955195619571958195919601961196219631964196519661967196819691970197119721973197419751976197719781979198019811982121,767125,579130,880132,122133,402134,860136,739138,397139,928141,389144,126146,631149,188152,271154,878157,553160,184163,026165,931168,903171,984174,882177,830180,671183,691186,538189,242191,889194,303196,560198,712200,706202,677205,052207,661209,896211,909213,854215,973218,035220,239222,585225,055227,658229,807231,99011,73410,61210,41816,41017,33317,31217,63818,05718,56619,00319,49419,88720,17520,34120,52220,46920,34220,16519,82419,20818,56317,91317,37617,16617,24417,10116,85116;48716,12115,61715,56415,73516,06316,44816,93926,80026,89725,17910,57910,85011,30112,01612,52412,97913,24414,40614,91915,60724,81124,51624,23124,09323,94923,90724,10324,46825,20925,85226,72127,27928,89430,22731,48032,68233,99435,27236,44537,36838,49439,76541,20541,62642,29742,93843,70244,24444,62244,84044,81644,59144,20343,58242,98942,50842,09941,29840,42839,55238,81438,0409,1279,3029,8229,8959,8409,7309,6079,5619,3619,1199,0978,9528,7888,5428,4468,4148,4608,6378,7448,9169,1959,54310,21510,68311,02511,18012,00712,73613,51614,31114,20014,45214,80015,28915,68816,03916,44616,76917,01717,19417,27617,28817,24217,13116,67910,69411,15211,51911,68011,55211,35011,06210,83210,71410,61610,60310,75610,96911,13411,48311,95912,71413,26913,74614,05015,24815,78616,48017,20218,15918,15318,52118,97519,52719,98620,49920,94621,29721,60521,93835,86237,31939,35411,69011,80711,95512,06412,06212,03612,00411,81411,79411,70039,86840,38340,86141,42042,01642,52143,02743,65744,28844,91645,67246,10346,49546,78647,00147,19447,37947,44047,33747,19247,14047,08447,01346,99446,95846,91247,00147,19447,72148,06448,47348,93650,48251,74953,05154,30255,85257,56159,40061,37963,46565,48721,07622,93325,82326,24926,71827,19627,67128,13828,63029,06429,49829,93130,40530,84931,36231,88432,39432,94233,50634,05734,59135,10935,66336,20336,72237,25537,78238,33838,91639,53440,19340,84641,43741,99942,48242,89843,23543,52243,80144,00844,15044,28644,39044,48744,4716,4747,3638,7649,0319,2889,5849,86710,14710,49410,82811,18511,53811,92112,39712,80313,20313,61714,07614,52514,93815,38815,80616,24816,67517,08917,45717,77818,12718,45118,75519,07119,36519,68020,10720,56121,02021,52522,06122,69623,27823,89224,50225,13425,70826,2531 Not available.Note.—Includes Armed Forces overseas beginning 1940. Includes Alaska and Hawaii beginning 1950.Source: Department <strong>of</strong> Commerce, Bureau <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Census.195


TABLE B-29-—Noninstitutional population and <strong>the</strong> labor force, 1929-82[Monthly data seasonally adjusted, except as noted]Year or monthNoninstitutionalpopulation»ArmedForces lTotalTotalCivilian labor forceEmploymentAgriculturalNonagriculturalUnemploymentment rate(percent<strong>of</strong> civilianlaborforce)Civilian labor forceparticipation rate 2Total Males FemalesThousands <strong>of</strong> persons 14 years <strong>of</strong> age and overPercent1929..26049,18047,63010,45037,1801,5503.21933..25051,59038,76010,09028,67012,83024.91939,.1940..1941..1942..1943..1944..100,380101,520102,610103,660104,6303705401,6203,9709,02011,41055,23055,64055,91056,41055,54054,63045,75047,52050,35053,75054,47053,9609,6109,5409,1009,2509,0808,95036,14037,98041,25044,50045,39045,0109,4808,1205,5602,6601,07067017.214.69.94.71.91.255.756.057.258.758.683.784.385.686.487.01945..1946..1947..105,530106,520107,60811,4403,4501,59053,86057,52060,16852,82055,25057,8128,5808,3208,25644,24046,93049,5571,0402,2702,3561.93.93.957.255.856.884.882.684.0Thousands <strong>of</strong> persons 16 years <strong>of</strong> age and over1947....1948....1949....103,418104,527105,6111,5911,4561,61659,35060,62161,28657,03858,34357,6517,8907,6297,65849,14850,71449,9932,3112,2763,6373.93.85.958.358.858.986.486.686.41950....1951....1952....19533..1954....106,645107,721108,823110,601111,6711,6493,0983,5933,5473,35062,20862,01762,13863,01563,64358,91859,96160,25061,17960,1097,1606,7266,5006,2606,20551,75853,23553,74954,91953,9043,2882,0551,8831,8343,5325.33.33.02.95.559.259.359.058.958.886.586.386.085.51955....1956....1957....1958....1959....112,732113,811115,065116,363117,8813,0482,8562,7992,6362,55165,02366,55266,92967,63968,36962,17063,79964,07163,03664,6306,4506,2835,9475,5865,56555,72257,51458,12357,45059,0652,8522,7502,8594,6023,7404.44.14.36.85.559.360.059.659.559.385.385.584.884.283.7I960 3196119628196319641965...1966...1967...1968...1969...119,759121,343122,981125,154127,224129,236131,180133,319135,562137,8412,5142,5722,8272,7372,7382,7223,1223,4463,5343,50669,62870,45970,61471,83373,09174,45575,77077,34778,73780,73465,77865,74666,70267,76269,30571,08872,89574,37275,92077,9025,4585,2004,9444,6874,5234,3613,9793,8443,8173,60660,31860,54661,75963,07664,78266,72668,91570,52772,10374,2963,8524,7143,9114,0703,7863,3662,8752,9752,8172,8325.56.75.55.75.24.53.83.83.63.559.459.358.858.758.758.959.259.659.660.183.382.982.081.481.080.780.480.480.179.81970197119723....1973 3 ....19741975197619771978 3 ....1979140,272143,033146,574149,423152,349153.333158,294161,166164,027166,9513,1882,8162 t4492,3262,2292,1802,1442,1332,1172,08882,77184,38287,03489,42991,94993,77596,15899,009102,251104,96278,67879,36782,15385,06486,79485,84688,75292,01796,04898,8243,4633,3943,4843,4703,5153,4083,3313,2833,3873,34775,21575,97278,66981,59483,27982,43885,42188,73492,66195,4774,0935,0164,8824,3655,1567,9297,4066,9916,2026,1374.95.95.64.95.68.57.77.16.15.860.460.260.460.861.361.261.662.363.263.779.779.178.978.878.777.977.577.777.977.81980..1981..1982..169,848172,272174,4512,1022,1422,179106,940108,670110,20499,303100,39799,5263,3643,3683,40195,93897,03096,1257,6378,27310,6787.17.69.763.863.964.077.477.076.6See next page for continuation <strong>of</strong> table.196


TABLE B-29.—Noninstitutional population and <strong>the</strong> labor force, 1929-82—Continued[Monthly data seasonally adjusted, except as noted]Year or monthNoninstitutionalpopulation1ArmedForces lTotalTotalCivilian labor forceEmploymentAgriculturalNonagriculturalUnemploymentUnemploymentrate(percent<strong>of</strong> civilianlaborforce)Civilian labor forceparticipation rate 2Total Males FemalesThousands <strong>of</strong> persons 16 years <strong>of</strong> age and overPercent1980:JanFebMarMay".'.".'.'"".".'.JuneJulyAugSeptOctNovDec1981:JanFebMarAprMayJuneJulyAugSeptOctNovDec1982:JanFebMarAprMayJuneMyAugSeptOctNovDec168,625168,846169,073169,289169,494169,735170,030170,217170,419170,624170,814171,007171,229171,400171,581171,770171,956172,172172,385172,559172,758172,966173,155173,330173,495173,657173,843174,020174,201174,364174,544174,707174,889175,069175,238175,3802,0812,0862,0902,0922,0882,0922,0992,1142,1212,1212,1192,1242,1252,1212,1282,1292,1272,1312,1392,1602,1652,1582,1582,1642,1592,1682,1752,1762,1752,1732,1802,1962,1982,1882,1802,182106,546106,637106,394106,552106,892106,832107,169107,116107,148107,438107,596107,446108,012108,175108,471108,866109,101108,440108,602108,762108,375109,028109,254109,066109,034109,364109,478109,740110,378110,147110,416110,614110,858110,752111,042111,12999,87299,96399,67799,20498,92298,76998,81698,82999,10499,32799,56799,65099,964100,143100,504101,006100,968100,393100,748100,709100,104100,355100,22999,67799,68899,69599,59799,48499,99499,68199,58899,68399,54399,17699,13699,0933,3133,3873,4123,3183,3853,3093,3313,2473,4483,3623,3873,4863,4203,3403,3563,5193,3713,3603,3203,3963,3583,3743,3893,2193,3793,3673,3673,3563,4463,3713,4453,4293,3633,4133,4663,41196,55996,57696,26595,88695,53795,46095,48595,58295,65695,96596,18096,16496,54496,80397,14897,48797,59797,03397,42897,31396,74696,98196,84096,45896,30996,32896,23096,12896,54896,31096,14396,25496,18095,76395,67095,6826,6746,6746,7177,3487,9708,0638,3538,2878,0448,1118,0297,7968,0488,0327,9677.8608,1338,0477,8548,0538,2718,6739,0259,3899,3469,6699,88110,25610,38410,46610,82810,93111,31511,57011,90612,0361 Not seasonally adjusted.2 Civilian labor force as percent <strong>of</strong> civilian noninstitutional population.3 Not strictly comparable with earlier data due to population adjustments as follows: Beginning 1953, introduction <strong>of</strong> 1950 censusdata added about 600,000 to population and about 350,000 to labor force, total employment, and agricultural employment. Beginning1960, inclusion <strong>of</strong> Alaska and Hawaii added about 500,000 to population, about 300,000 to labor force, and about 240,000 tononagricultural employment. Beginning 1962, introduction <strong>of</strong> 1960 census data reduced population by about 50,000 and labor force andemployment by about 200,000. Beginning 1972, introduction <strong>of</strong> 1970 census data added about 800,000 to civilian noninstitutionalpopulation ana about 333,000 to labor force and employment. A subsequent adjustment based on 1970 census in March 1973 added60,000 to labor force and to employment. Beginning 1978, changes in sampling and estimation procedures introduced into <strong>the</strong>household survey added about 250,000 to labor force and to employment. Unemployment levels and rates were not significantlyaffected.Note.—Labor force data in Tables B-29 through B-35 are based on household interviews and relate to <strong>the</strong> calendar week including<strong>the</strong> 12th Of <strong>the</strong> month. For definitions <strong>of</strong> terms, area samples used, historic comparability <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> data, comparability with o<strong>the</strong>r series,etc., see "Employment and Earnings."Source: Department <strong>of</strong> Labor, Bureau <strong>of</strong> Labor Statistics.6.36.36.36.97.57.57.87.77.57.57.57.37.57.47.37.27.57.47.27.47.68.08.38.68.68.89.09.39.49.59.89.910.210.510.710.864.063.963.763.763.963.763.863.763.763.863.863.663.963.964.064.264.263.863.863.863.563.863.963.763.663.863.863.964.264.064.164.164.264.164.264.277.777.877.577.477.677.577.577.377.377.377.377.077.377.277.377.477.476.776.876.976.776.776.876.776.576.676.576.677.076.576.576.676.876.776.876.651.651.551.351.451.551.451.551.551.451.651.651.651.852.052.152.352.452152.152.151.752.252.352.052.152.352.352.452.752.752.952.952.852.752.853.0197


TABLE B-30.—Civilian employment and unemployment by sex and age, 1947-82[Thousands <strong>of</strong> persons 16 years <strong>of</strong> age and over; monthly data seasonally adjusted]Year ormonthCivilian employmentTotalMalesTotal16-19years20yearsandoverFemalesTotal16-19years20yearsandoverUnemploymentTotalMalesTotal16-19years20yearsandoverFemalesTotal16-1920yearsandover1947194819491950195119521953K..195419551956195719581959I960 1 .,.,19611962»....1963196419651966196719681969197019711972»...1973 >...19741975197619771978 »....19791980198119821981:JanFebMar...,May...,June..,July....Aug....fSzNov...,Dec...,1982:JanFebMar....fcJune..,July....Aug..Sept.Oct...Nov..Dec..57,03858,34357,65158,91859,96160,25061,17960,10962,17063,79964,07163,03664,63065,77865,74666,70267,76269,30571,08872,89574,37275,92077,90278,67879,36782,15385,06486,79485,84688,75292,01796,04898,82499,303100,39799,52699,964100,143100,504101,006100,968100,393100,748100,709100,104100,355100,22999,67799,68899,69599,59799,48499,99499,68199,58899,68399,54399,17699,13699,09340,99541,72540,92541,57841,78041,68242,43041,61942,62143,37943,35742,42343,46643,90443,65644,17744,65745,47446,34046,91947,47948,11448,81848,99049,39050,89652,34953,02451,85753,13854,72856,47957,60757,18657,39756,27157,35757,33757,55757,83757,73957,31457,61457,54057,40457,25757,06256,74656,66756,67056,49956,44456,72456,24956,12756,15956,07255,93255,89255,8092,2182,3442,1242,1862,1562,1072,1361,9852,0952,1642,1152,0122,1982,3612,3152,3622,4062,5872,9183,2533,1863,2553,4303,4093,4783,7654,0394,1033,8393,9474,1744,3364,3004,0853,8153,3793,9683,9333,9163,9813,8923,7363,7863,7963,7583,7503,6833,5783,5683,5403,4733,4203,5343,3063,2223,3273,2963,2833,3033,27538,77639,38238,80339,39439,62639,57840,29639,63440,52641,21641,23940,41141,26741,54341,34241,81542,25142,88643,42243,66844,29444,85945,38845,58145,91247,13048,31048,92248,01849,19050,55552,14353,30853,10153,58252,89153,38953,40453,64153,85653,84753,57853,82853,74453,64653!50753,37953,16853,09953,13053,02653,02453,19052,94352,90552,83252,77652,64952,58952,53416,04516,61716,72317,34018,18118,56818,74918,49019,55120,41920,71420,61321,16421,87422,09022,52523,10523,83124,74825,97626,89327,80729,08429,68829,97631,25732,71533,76933,98935,61537,28939,56941,21742,11743,00043,25642,60742,80642,94743,16943,22943,07943,13443,16942,70043,09843,16742,93143,02143,02543,09843,04043,27043,43243,46143,52443,47143,24443,24443,2841,6911,6821,5881,5171,6111,6121,5841,4901,5471,6541,6631,5701,6401,7681,7931,8331,8491,9292,1182,4682,4962,5262,6872,7352,7302,9803,2313,3453,2633,3893,5143,7343,7833,6253,4113,1703,5583,5383,5143,5453,5043,3833,4133,4433.3443,2633,2473,1943,2043,2003,2153,2133,2063,1783,1503,1563,1853,1323,1213,06914,35414,93615,13715,82416,57016,95817,16417,00018,00218,76719,05219,04319,52420,10520,29620,69321,25721,90322,63023,51024,39725,28126,39726,95227,24628,27629,48430,42430,72632,22633,77535,83637,43438,49239,59040,08639,04939,26839,43339,62439,72539,69639,72139,72639,35639,83539,92039,73739,81739,82539,88339,82740,06440,25440,31140,36840,28640,11240,12340,2152,3112,2763,6373,2882,0551,8831,8343,5322,8522,7502,8594,6023,7403,8524,7143,9114,0703,7863,3662,8752,9752,8172,8324,0935,0164,8824,3655,1567,9297,4066,9916,2026,1377,6378,27310,6788,0488,0327,9677,8608,1338,0477,8548,0538,2718,6739,0259,3899,3469,6699,88110,25610,38410,46610,82810,93111,31511,57611,90612,0361,6921,5592,5722,2391,2211,1851,2022,3441,8541,7111,8413,0982,4202,4862,9972,4232,4722,2051,9141,5511,5081,4191,4032,2382,7892,6592,2752>144,4424,0363,6673,1423,1204,2674^776,1794,4774,4484,3974,30044954,4394,2264,4444,4994,7645,0525,3965,3815,4865,6625,8565,9216,0766,2346,3456,7036,8447,0067,0462702563533181912051843102742693004163984264794085014874794324484264405996937116537579669398748138119139621,090958947955947883$9491,0261,0291,019L0861,1031,0601,0841,1131,1251,1301,1411,1371,4221,3052,2191,9221,0299801,0192,0351,5801,4421,5412,6812,0222,0602,5182,0161,9711,7181,4351,1201,0609939631,6382,0971,9481,6241,9573,4763,0982,7942,3282,3083,3533,6155,0893,4793,5003,4393,3533.5403,4923,3433.5133,5593,8154,0264,3674,3624,4514,6074,7704,8185,0165,1505,2325,5785,7145,8655,9096197171,0651,0498346986321,1889981,0391,0181,5041,3201,3661,7171,4881,5981.5811,4521,3241,4681,3971.4291,8552,2272,2222,0892,4413,4863,3693,3243,0613,0183,3703,6964,4993,5713,5443,5703,5603,6383:6083,6283,6093,7723,9093,9733,9933,9654,1834,2194,4004,4634,3904,5944,5864,6124,7324,9004,9901441532231951451401231911762091972622562863493133833853954053914124135065685985836658027807897697437558007627788058007927787617608198668688198568978178728958259229159029089119194755648418546895595109978238328211,2421,0631,0801,3681,1751,2161,1951,0569211,0789851,0151,3491,6581,6251,5071,7772,6842,5882,53522922,2762,6152,8953,6132,8092,7662,7652,7602,8462,8302,8672,8492,9533,0433,1053,1743,1093,2863,4023,5283,5683,5653,6723,6713,7103,8243,9894,0711 See footnote 3, Table B-29.Note.—See Note, Table B-29.Source: Department <strong>of</strong> Labor, Bureau <strong>of</strong> Labor Statistics.198


TABLE B-31.—Selected employment and unemployment data, 1948-82[Percent; monthly data seasonally adjusted]Civilian employment as percent <strong>of</strong> population 1Unemployment rate 2Year ormonthTotalBothsexes16-19yearsMales20yearsandoverFemales20yearsandoverWhiteBlackando<strong>the</strong>rAllworkersBothsexes18-19yearsBy sex and ageMales20yearsandoverFemales20yearsandoverBy selected groupsExperiencedwageandsalaryworkersMarriedmen,spousepresent»WomenwhomaintainfamiliesFulltimeworkers*Bluecollarworkers51948194955854.645543.083 981.630.730.63.85.99213.43.25.43.65.3436.83.55.4428.019501951....1952195319541955 "".19561957 .1958195955 255.755.455.353 855.156.155 754.254.843 844.944.143.940141.342.741137.638.181.981.680.880.678.880.080.880278.079.031.632.633.032.932 333.834.935.034.635.15.33.33.02.95.54.44.14.36.85.512.28.28.57.612.611.011.111615.914.64.72.52.42.5493.83.43.66.24.7514.03.22.955444.24.16.15.26.03.73.43.26.2484.44.67.35.7461.51.41.7402.62.32.85.13.6502.62.5523.83.7407.27.23.93.634 7.25.85.16.210.27.61960 .19611962196319641965196619671968196954 954.254 254.154 555.055 655.856.056.539.037.537 635.835 837.740740.440.642.178.777.677 477.377 777.977 677.477.176.935.735.535836.236937.638 639^340.041.154.054354.855 455.755.956.555.256156.857 256.956.656.75.56.7555.7524.5383.83.63.514 716.814 717.216 214.812 812.912.712.24.75.74.64.5393.2252!32.22.15.16.3545'.4524.5384.23.83.75.76.8565.6504.3353.63.43.33.74.6363.4282.4191.81.61.54.94.44.46.75.5494.235343.13.17.89.2747.3635.3424.44.13.9197019711972197319741975197619771978197956.155.556.056.957.055.356.157.158.659.241.240.442.644.845.042.343.245.147.447.776.175.375.876.375.772.973.273.774.574.741.240.841.342.242.742.343.544.746.547.656.255.756.457.357.555.956.857.959.360.055.553.853.254.053.350.451.051.553.754.04.95.95.64.95.68.57.77.16.15.815.316.916.214.516.019.919.017.816.416.13.54.44.03.33.86.85.95.24.34.24.85.75.44.95.58.07.47.06.05.74.85.75.34.55.38.27.36.65.65.52.63.22.82.32.75.14.23.62.82.85.47.37.27.17.010.010.19.48.58.34.55.55.14.45.18.17.36.65.65.36.27.46.55.46.711.79.48.16.97.019801981198258.558.357.145.843.740.872.972.370.248.048.548.359.459.358.252.451.449.87.17.69.717.819.623.25.96.38.86.46.88.36.97.39.34.24.36.59.210.411.76.97.39.610.010.34.21981:Jan....Feb....Mar...June..July...Aug...Sept..Oct....Nov...Dec...58.458.458.658.858.758.358.458.457.958.057.957.545.044.844.645.344.643.043.644.043.242.842.441.572.672.672.873.072.872.472.672.472.171.871.571.248.248.448.648.748.848.748.648.648.048.548.648.359.359.559.559.859.759.459.559.559.059.158.958.652.151.652.052.552.051.251.350.951.151.051.050.67.57.47.37.27.57.47.27.47.68.08.38.619.019.119.218.819.119.518.618.919.920.621.521.46.16.26.05.96.26.15.86.16.26.77.07.66.76.66.66.56.76.76.76.77.07.17.27.47.17.17.06.87.27.06.97.07.37.67.98.44.24.24.23.84.04.24.04.04.34.75.05.610.39.99.89.910.410.511.210.210.610.710.810.37.27.27.16.97.17.16.97.07.37.78.08.510.110.210.09.69.99.89.69.710.210.911.612.61982:Jan....Feb....Mar...May!"June..July...Aug...Sept..Oct....Nov...Dec...57.557.457.357.257.457.257.157.156.956.656.656.541.641.541.341.141.840.439.840.640.740.440.640.171.070.970.770.670.770.370.169.969.869.569.369.148.348.348.348.148.348.548.548.548.448.148.048.158.558.558.458.358.558.358.258.258.157.757.757.650.550.350.149.750.149.749.849.749.649.549.349.38.68.89.09.39.49.59.89.910.210.510.710.821.722.321.922.822.922.523.923.823.824.124.224.57.67.78.08.38.38.78.99.09.69.810.010.17.27.67.98.18.28.18.38.38.48.79.09.28.28.58.79.19.29.29.49.49.810.110.510.75.35.45.66.06.16.46.66.87.27.57.67.810.410.410.811.511.912.112.011.712.411.312.513.28.48.58.99.19.29.49.69.710.210.510.610.812.412.513.013.513.614.014.414.415.515.816.216.31 Civilian employment as percent <strong>of</strong> total noninstitutional population.2 Unemployment as percent <strong>of</strong> civilian labor force in group specified.3 Data for 1949 and 1951-54 are for April; 1950, for March.* Data for 1949-61 are for May.8 Includes craft and kindred workers, operatives, and nonfarm laborers. Data for 1948-57 are based on data for January, April, July,and October.Note—Data relate to persons 16 years <strong>of</strong> age and over. See footnote 3 and Note, Table B-29.Source: Department <strong>of</strong> Labor, Bureau <strong>of</strong> Labor Statistics.199


TABLE B-32.—Civilian labor force participation rate by demographic characteristic, 1954-82[Percent; 1 monthly data seasonally adjusted]Year or monthAllcivilianworkersTotalTotalMales16-19yearsWhite20yearsandoverTotalFemales16-19years20yearsandoverTotalTotalMales16-19yearsBlack and o<strong>the</strong>r20yearsandoverTotalFemales16-19years20yearsandover195419551956195719581959I960196119621963196419651966196719681969 ,19701971197219731974197519761977197819791980198119821981:JanFebMarApr!&:::::::JuneJulyAug ........SeptOctNovDec1982:JanFebMarJune ft :*:"Auc .....Sept


TABLE B-33.—Civilian unemployment rate by demographic characteristic, 1948-82[Percent; 1monthly data seasonally adjusted]Year or month194819491950195119521953195419551956195719581959I96019611962196319641965196619671968196919701971197219731974197519761977197819791980198119821981:JanMarAprMayJuneJulyAugSeptOctNovDec1982:JanFebMarAprMayJuneJulyAugSepto5 :NovDecAllcivilianworkers3.859533330295.54.4414.3685.55.56755575.24.5383.8363.54.9595.64.95.6857.7716.15.87.1769.77.5747372757.47274768.08.38.686889.09.394959.89910 210 510 710.8WhiteTotal3.556493.1282.75.03.9363.8614.85.0604.9504.64.13.43.43.23.14.5545.14.35.0787.0625.25.16.3678.66.66,56.464666.46.36366fi97.37.676777.98.384848.78.79.193969.7MalesTotal3.456472.625254.83.7343.6614.6485746474.13.6282.7262.54.0494.5384.4726.4554.64.561658.86464636 1656.35962646.87.27.876778.08.485868.99.1959810 010.116-19years13.411.310 511.515 714.014.015 713.715 914.712.910.510.710110.013.715114.212.313.518 317.315 013.513.916.217 921.717.418 017 917 017 617.816.716 717 817.919.720.220 620 420.421.920.921222.522.522.223.022 622.820yearsandover4.43.33.03.25.54.14.25.14.03.93.42.92.22.12.01.93.24.03.63.03.56.25.44.73.73.65.3567.85.55.45.45.25.55.35.15.35.45.96.26.86.66.77.07.37.57.77.98.08.68.89.19.2FemalesTotal3.857534.2333.15.54.3424.3625.35.3655.5585.55.04.34.64.34.25.46.35.95.36.1867.9736.25.96.5698.36.96.76.6676.96.76.86.5707.17.47.47.5777.88.18.28.18.38.38.58.79.09.216-19years10.49.19.79.512 712.012.714.812.815.114.914.012.111.512.111.513.415.114.213.014.517.416.415.914.414.014.816 619.015.516.015.916.216.616.316.315.717.217.518.317.718.119.017.918.818.718.019.118.919.119.919.820.420yearsandover5.13.9373.8564.74.6574.7484.64.03.33.83.43.44.45.34.94.35.1756.8625.25.05.6597.36.05.7565.65.95.75.85.66.06.16.36.46.4666.87.17.27.17.37.27.57.68.08.1Black and o<strong>the</strong>rTotal5.989905.3544.59.98.78.37.912 610.710.212.410.910.89.68.17.37.46.76.48.29.910.09.09.913.813.113.111.911.313.114.217.313.113.213.613.213.614.213714814.615?15?15.715.516.016.61fi817117117.417718118418*)18.8MalesTotal5.89.69.44.95.24.810.38.87.98.313.711.510.712.810.910 58.97.46.36.05.65.37.39.18.97.79.213.612.712.311.010.413.214.118.213.213.012.712.913.614.413.814.914.214 815.516.216.116.417.317.317.618.218.018.519.519.919.720.316-19years14.413.415.018.426 825.224.026 822.027 324.323.321.323.922.121.425.028.829.726.931.535.235.136.634.031.334.437.544.039.636.332.936.834.138.137.044.535.739.138.437.734.939.044.042.844.148.145.345.445.843.848.046.720yearsandover9.98.47.47.612 710.59.611.710.09.27.76.04.94.33.93.75.67.36.95.86.911.610.610.08.78.511.312.116.210.711.011.010.711.712.411.912.412.513.614.414.614.615.115.315.516.015.916.317.318.017.418.2FemalesTotal6179846.1574.19.28.5897.31089.49.411911.011210.79.2879.18.37.89.310.911.410.610.813.913.613.913.012.313.114.316.413.013.414.513.613.514.013 fi14 715 614815.114911S15.8lfi?16416016.7169Ififi18817?17.216=19years20.619.222 820.228 427.724.829 230.234 731.631.731.329.628.727.634.535.438.434.434.538.338.839.638.135.636.538.343.833.134.842.235.533.337.433.241.238.846.141.441.442.641.841.042.045.743.147.749.743.342.343.142.720yearsandover8.47.77864958.38310 694907.56671635.86.9878.88?8.511 511 311710.610.211 114 311411.81171??1??13313,013.113414.014414 314?14.414 314414915?15.31 Unemployment as percent <strong>of</strong> civilian labor force in group specified.Note.—See footnote 3 and Note, Table B-29.Source: Department <strong>of</strong> Labor, Bureau <strong>of</strong> Labor Statistics.201


TABLE B-34.—Unemployment by duration, 1947-82[Monthly data seasonally adjusted 1 ]Year or monthTotalunemploymentLess than5 weeksDuration <strong>of</strong> unemployment5-14weeks15=26weeks27 weeksand over1947194819491950195119521953195419551956195719581959196019611962196319641965196619671968196919701971197219731974197519761977197819791980198119821981:JanFebMarAprMayJuneJulyAugSeptOclNovDec1982:JanFebMarfcJuneJulyAugIt.:::NovDec2,3112,2763,6373,2882,0551,8831,8343,5322,8522,7502,8594,6023,7403,8524,7143,9114,0703,7863,3662,8752,9752,8172,8324,0935,0164,8824,3655,1567,9297,4066,9916,2026,1377,6378,27310,6788,0488,0327,9677,8608,1338,0477,8548,0538,2718,6739,0259,3899,3469,6699,88110,25610,38410,46610,82810,93111,31511,57611,90612,036Thousands <strong>of</strong> persons 16 years <strong>of</strong> age and over1,2101,3001>561,4501,1771,1351,1421,6051,3351,4121,4081,7531,5851,7191,8061,6631,7511,6971,6281,5731,6341,5941,6292,1392,2452,2422,2242,6042,9402,8442,9192,8652,9503,2953,44938833,2783,2843,2783,1673,3823,3423,3173,3413,5153,6963,8204,0403,8303,8073,8313,9303,8713,6053,9593,9334,0043,9303,9634,0197046691,1941,0555745164821,1168158058911,3961,1141,1761,3761,1341,2311,1179837798938108271,2901,5851,4721,3141,5972,4842,1962,1321,9231,9462,4702,5393,3112,3322,3902,4222,4452,5792,3902,3712,4932,5442,6772,8473,0283,0793,0683,0983,2553,2813,3983,2493,3463,5493,5113,5493,4601 Because <strong>of</strong> independent seasonal adjustment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> various series, detail will not add to totals.Note.=See footnote 3 and Note, Table B-29.Source: Department <strong>of</strong> Labor, Bureau <strong>of</strong> Labor Statistics.2341934284251661481324953663013217854695037285345354914042872712562424286686014835741,3031,0189137667061,0521,1221,7081,1231,0961,0561,0951,0631,1461,0851,0651,1301,1691,2181,2241,2091,4791,6051,5821,6331,6831,7801,8081,8301,9512,1912,12516411625635713784783173362322396675714548045855534823512391771561332355195663433811,2031,3481,0286485358201,1621,7761,2721,2431,2181,1331,1581,1311,0761,1481,1111,1231,1401,1831,1931,2711,3571,4981,6341,8341,7891,8292,0262,2162,3332,607202


TABLE B-35.—Unemployment by reason, 1967-82[Monthly data seasonally adjusted 1 ]Year or monthTotalunemploymentJob losers Job leavers ReentrantsNewentrantsThousands <strong>of</strong> persons1967....19681969....1970....1971197219731974....1975....19761977....19781979....1980....198119821982:Jan..Feb..Mar..May".June.July..Aug..Sept.Oct..Nov..Dec.2,9752,8172,8324,0935,0164,8824,3655,1567,9297,4066,9916,2026,1377,6378,27310,6789,3469,6699,88110,25610,38410,46610,82810,93111,31511,57611,90612,0361,2291,0701,0171,8112,3232,1081,6942,2424,3863,6793,1662,5852,6353,9474,2676,2685,2435,2465,6285,8895,9386,1816,3236,4466,9797,3257,3697,2954384314365505906416837688279039098748808919238408429428859018648268198147868037948269459099651,2281,4721,4561,3401,4631,8921,9281,9631,8571,8061,9272,1022,3842,1332,2722,2612,3422,3932,3782,4782,4402,4372,3222,5462,6293964074135046306776496818238959538858178729811,1851,0551,0961,0611,0961,1591,0911,2301,3041,3031,2961,2441,288Percent <strong>of</strong> civilian tabor force1967....1968....1969....3.83.63.51.61.31.20.6.5.51.21.21.20.5.5.519701971....197219731974....1975....1976....19771978....1979....4.95.95.64.95.68.57.77.16.15.82.22.82.41.92.44.73.83.22.52.5.7.7.7.8.8.9.9.9.9.81.51.71.71.51.62.02.02.01.81.7.6.7.8.7.7.9.91.0.9.81980....198119827.17.69.73.73.95.71.81.92.2.91.11982:Jan..Feb..Mar..Apr..May.June.July..Aug..Sept.Oct..Nov..Dec.8.68.89.09.39.49.59.89.910.210.510.710.84.84.85.15.45.45.65.75.86.36.66.66.62.02.12.12.12.22.22.22.22.22.12.32.41.01.01.01.01.11.01.11.21.21.21.11.21 Because <strong>of</strong> independent seasonal adjustment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> various series, detail will not add to totals.Note.—Data relate to persons 16 years <strong>of</strong> age and over.See footnote 3 and Note, Table B-29.Source: Department <strong>of</strong> Labor, Bureau <strong>of</strong> Labor Statistics.203


TABLB B-36.—Unemployment insurance programs, selected data, 1946-82Year or month194619471948194919501951195219531954195519561957195819591960196119621963196419651966196719681969197019711972197319741975197619771978197919801981 •>...1981:JanFebMar...,flfay"..June..July...Aug...NovDec1982:Jan,.Feb..Mar..fcJune..JulyAugSeptOcfNovDecCoveredemployment1Thousands31,85633,87634,64633,09834,30836,33437,00638,07236,62240,01842,75143,43644,41145,72846,33446,26647,77648,43449,63751,58054,73956,34257,97759,99959,52659,37566,45869,89772,45171,03773,45976,41992,06292,65993,300All programsInsuredunemployment(weeklyaverage)••2,8041,7931,4462,4741,6051,0001,0691,0672,0511,3991,3231.5712,7731,8602,0712,9941,9467 1,9731,7531,4501,1291,2701,1871,1772,0702,6082,1921,7932,5584,9373,8463,3082,6452,5923,8373,4104,6214,2643,9483,4533,1112,9493,0122,8742,6802,7533,2283,9354,6814,7234,8924,7604,3874,3284,4954,3984,2824,3914,635Totalbenefitspaid(millions<strong>of</strong>dollars) 2 *2,878.51,785.51,328.72,269.81,467.6862.91,043.51,050.62,291.61,560.21,540.61,913.04,290.62,854.33,022.84,358.13,145.13,025.92,749.22,360.41,890.92,221.52,191.02,298.64,209.36,154.05,491.14,517.36,933.916,802.412,344.810,998.99,006.99,401.316,175.415,283.51,740.91,567.81,663.71,453.31,192.71,191.31,187.71,098.41,088.21,064.41,146.21,666.91,835.11,904.52,295.22,141.11,871.92,003.91,929.22,033.02,003.71,927.32,044.5InitialclaimsState programsInsuredunemploymentExhaustions5Weekly average; thousands1,2959979801,9731,5139691,0449901,8701,2651,2151,4462,5101,6841,9082,2901,7837 1,8061,6051,3281,0611,2051,1111,1011,8052,1501,8481,6322,2623,9862,9912,6552,3592,4343,3503,048**3,0692,9882,9762,9262,8822,8242,8012,8672,9413,1273,4003,6133,5773,5823,7753,9823,9724,0113,9884,1364,3794,6154,6354,4281891872003402362082152183042262272703692773313503027 298268232203226201200296295261247363478386375346388488460425424420402401413411436472511542560563529574573579560539617654659618546Insuredunemploymentaspercent<strong>of</strong>coveredemployment4.33.13.06.24.62.82.92.85.23.53.23.66.44.44.85.64.44.33.83.02.32.52.22.13.44.13.52.73.56.04.63.93.32.93,93.5**3.53.43.43.43.33.23.23.33.43.63.94.14.14.14.34.64.54.64.64.75.05.35.35.1Benefits paidTotal(millions<strong>of</strong>dollars)*1,094.9775.1789.91,736.01,373.1840.4998.2962.22,026.91,350.31,380.71,733.93,512.72,279.02,726.73,422.72,675.42,774.72,522.12,166.01,771.32,092.32,031.62,127.93,848.54,957.04,471.04,007.65,974.911,754.78,974.58,357.27,717.28,612.913,761.113,257.81,419.61,315.31,394.71,226.71,006.21,009.81,062.01,006.61,001.2997.81,080.81,592.51,764.21,783.42,072.61,849.91,573.41,692.21,679.41,746.21,710.61,646.61,810.3Averageweeklycheck(dollars) s18.5017.8319.0320.4820.7621.0922.7923.5824.9325.0427.0228.1730.5830.4132.8733.8034.5635.2735.9237.1939.7541.2543.4346.1750.3454.0256.7659.0064.2570.2375.1678.7983.6789.6798.95106.54103.67104.48105.74105.98105.47104.59103.56106.02107.39108.92110.51112.89114.83117.05117.10117.61118.08118.64"117.28118.97120.78122.75123.22"Monthly data are seasonally adjusted.1 Includes persons under <strong>the</strong> State, UCFE (Federal employee, effective January 1955). and RRB (Railroad Retirement Board) programs.Beginning October 1958, also includes <strong>the</strong> UCX program (unemployment compensation for ex-servicemen).'Includes State. UCFE, RR, UCX, UCV (unemployment compensation for veterans, October 1952 January 1960), and SRA(Servicemen's Readjustment Act, September 1944-September 1951) programs. Also includes Federal and State extended benefitprograms. Does not include FSB (Federal supplemental benefits), SLlA (special unemployment assistance), and Federal supplementalcompensation programs.9 Covered workers who have completed at least 1 week <strong>of</strong> unemployment.4 Annual data are net amounts and monthly data are gross amounts.* Individuals receiving final payments in benefit year.6 For total unemployment only.7 Programs include Puerto Rican sugarcane workers for initial claims and insured unemployment beginning July 1963.H Latest data available for all programs combined. Workers covered by State programs account for about 97 percent <strong>of</strong> wage andsalary earners.Source: Department <strong>of</strong> Labor, Employment and Training Administration.204


TABLE B-37.— Wage and salary workers in nonagricultural establishments, 1929-82[Thousands <strong>of</strong> persons; monthly data seasonally adjusted]Year ormonthTotalwageandsalaryworkersTotalManufacturingIDurablegoodsNondurablegoodsMiningConstructionTransportationandpublicutilitiesWholesaleandretailtradefinance,insurance,andrealestateServicesGovernmentFederalStateandlocaf1929193319391940194119421943194419451946194719481949195019511952195319541955195619571958195919601961196219631964196519661967196819691970197119721973197419751976197719781979198019811982*31,32423,69930,60332,36136,53940,10642,43441,86440,37441,65243,85744,86643,75445,19747,81948,79350,20248,99050,64152,36952,85351,32453,26854,18953,99955,54956,65358,28360,76563,90165,80367,89770,38470,88071,21473,67576,79078,26576,94579,38282,47186,69789,82390,40691,10589,61910 7027,39710,27810,98513,19215,28017,60217,32815,52414,70315,54515,58214,44115,24116,39316,63217,54916,31416,88217,24317,17415,94516,67516,79616,32616,85316,99517,27418,06219,21419,44719,78120,16719,36718,62319,15120,15420,07718,32318,99719,68220,50521,04020,28520,17318,8494,7155,3636,9688,82311,08410,8569,0747,7428,3858,3267,4898,0949,0899,34910,1109,1299,5419,8339,8558,8299,3739,4599,0709,4809,6169,81610,40511,28211,43911,62611,89511,20810,63611,04911,89111,92510,68811,07711,59712,27412,76012.18712,11711,1145.5645,6226,2256,4586,5186,4726,4506,9627,1597,2566,9537,1477,3047,2847,4387,1857,3417,4117,3217,1167,3037,3377,2567,3737,3807,4587,6567,9308,0078,1558,2728,1587,9878,1028,2628,1527,6357,9208,0868,2318,2808,0988,0567,73510877448549259579929258928368629559949309019298988667917928228287517327126726506356346326276136066196236096286426977527798138519581,0271,1321,1221,5128241,1651,3111,8142,1981,5871,1081,1471,6832,0092,1982,1942,3642,6372,6682,6592,6462,8393,0392,9622,8173,0042,9262,8592,9483,0103,0973,2323,3173,2483,3503,5753,5883,7043,8894,0974,0203,5253,5763,8514,2294,4634,3464,1763,9123 9162,6722,9363,0383,2743,4603,6473,8293,9064,0614,1664,1894,0014,0344,2264,2484,2904,0844,1414,2444,2413,9764,0114,0043,9033,9063,9033,9514,0364,1584,2684,3184,4424,5154,4764,5414,6564,7254,5424,5824,7134,9235,1365,1465,1575,0576,1234,7556,4266,7507,2107,1186,9827,0587,3148,3768,9559,2729,2649,3869,74210,00410,24710,23510,53510,85810,88610,75011,12711,39111,33711,56611,77812,16012,71613,24513,60614,09914,70515,04015,35215,94916,60716,98717,06017,75518,51619,54220,19220,31020,55120,547149412801,4471,4851,5251,5091,4811,4611,4811,6751,7281,8001,8281,8881,9562,0352,1112,2002,2982,3892,4382,4812,5492,6292,6882,7542,8302,9112,9773,0583,1853,3373,5123,6453,7723,9084,0464,1484,1654,2714,4674,7244,9755,1605,3015,3503 4252,8613,5023,6653,9054,0664,1304,1454,2224,6975,0255,1815,2405,3575,5475,6995,8355,9696,2406,4976,7086,7657,0877,3787,6207,9828,2778,6609,0369,49810,04510,56711,16911,54811,79712,27612,85713,44113,89214,55115,30316,25217,11217,89018,59219,0005335659059961,3402,2132,9052,9282,8082,2541,8921,8631,9081,9282,3022,4202,3052,1882,1872,2092,2172,1912,2332,2702,2792,3402,3582,3482,3782,5642,7192,7372,7582,7312,6962,6842,6632,7242,7482,7332,7272,7532,7732,8662,7722,7332,5322 6013,0903,2063,3203,2703,1753,1163,1373,3413,5823,7873,9484,0984,0874,1884,3404,5634,7275,0695,3995,6485,8506,0836,3156,5506,8687,2487,6968,2208,6729,1029,4379,82310,18510,64911,06811,44611,93712,13812,39912,91913,17413,37513,25313,0511981:JanFebMarAprMayJuneJulyAugSeptOctNovDec90,90990,91391,01491,09991,13191,28691,39691,32291.36391,22490,99690,64220,17120,14820,19720,27520,33220,33420,37920,31120,26720,09719,90319,67612,12012,09712,14312,20112,23712,24612,26612,22812,18412,05911,90111,7248,0518,0518,0548,0748,0958,0888,1138,0838,0838,0388,0027,9521,1021,1131,1249789851,1371,1641,1801,1921,1951,2021,2064,3154,2404,2674,2814,2234,1854,1754,1464,1244,1014,0714,0265,1395,1455,1535,1635,1585,1625,1685,1685,1815,1625,1505,12820,38020,42220,43820,50820,54320,59020,62020,65020,66020,65420,62320,5245,2525,2645,2705,2865,2955,3025,3115,3195,3285,3255,3245,33118,35218,38218,41418,48018,51718,55618,61518,65418,70718,77318,81518,8342,7982,7892,7802,7742,7762,7772,7752,7692,7642,7572,7492,75613,40013,41013,37113,35413,30213,24313,18913,12513,14013,16013,15913,1611982:JanFebMarfc:JuneJulyAugSeptOctNov*Dec"90,46090,45990,30490,08390,16689,83989,53589,31289,26788,86088,68488,51819,51719,45419,31919,16919,11518,93018,81318,67218,57218,32518,18318,13411,62211,57511,49011,37511,33211,20311,13310,99310.90010,66610,55510,5337,8957,8797,8297,7947,7837,7277,6807,6797,6727,6597,6287,6011,2011,2031,1971,1821,1521,1241,1001,0861,0751,0581,0511,0363,9663,9743,9343,9383,9883,9403,9273,8993,8833,8563,8483,8185,1255,1155,1005,0945,1015,0785,0445,0255,0315,0074,9944,97920,63020,67020,65520,58420,65220,59520,61520,55020,49220,44120,39020,2975,3265,3265,3365,3355,3425,3525,3595,3605,3675,3575,3625,37618,83118,86718,90418,92918,96318,98819,04219,04819,08419,07419,12519,1432,7412,7372,7362,7302,7282,7392,7372,7392,7342,7232,7262,72813,12313,11313,12313,12213,12513,09312,89812,93313,02913,01913,00513,007Note.—Data in Tables B-37 through B-39 are baser! on reports from employing establishments and relate to full* and part-time wageand salary workers in nonagricultural establishments who worked during or received pay for any part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> pay period which includes<strong>the</strong> 12th <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> month. Not comparable with labor force data {Tables B-29 through B-35), which include proprietors, self-employedpersons, domestic servants, and unpaid family workers; which count persons as employed when <strong>the</strong>y are not at work because <strong>of</strong>industrial disputes, bad wea<strong>the</strong>r, etc., even if <strong>the</strong>y are not paid for <strong>the</strong> time <strong>of</strong>f; and which are based on a sample <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> working-agepopulation. For description and details <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> various establishment data, see "Employment and Earnings."Source: Department <strong>of</strong> Labor, Bureau <strong>of</strong> Labor Statistics.205


TABLE B-38.—Average weekly hours and hourly earnings in selected private nonagrieulturalYear ormonth194719481949195019511952195319541955195619571958195919601961196219631964196519661967196819691970197119721973197419751976197719781979198019811982"....1981:JanFebMartz.June....JulyAugNov."!.'.'Dec1982:JanFebMarMay'."."June....JulyAugSept....OctNov...Dec "...Totalprivatenonagricultural>40.340.039.439.839.939.939.639.139.639.338.838.539.038.638.638.738.838.738.838.638.037.837.737.136.937.036.936.536.136.136.035.835.735.335.234.835.635.235.335.435.435.235.335.235.035.135.135.034.435.034.934.935.034.934.934.834.834.734.734.61947-82[For production or nonsupervisory workers; monthly data seasonally adjusted, except as noted]Average weekly hours40.440.039.140.540.640.740.539.640.740.439.839.240.339.739.840.440.540.741.241.440.640.740.639.839.940.540.740.039.540.140.340.440.239.739.838.940.439.739.940.140.240.140.039.939.439.539.339.137.639.439.039.039.139.239.239.038.838.838.938.938.238.137.737.438.138.937.937.237.137.537.036.837.036.736.937.037.337.237.437.637.737.337.937.337.236.536.836.636.436.836.536.837.037.036.936.738.636.337.237.237.036.537.036.835.336.837.437.035.237.136.936.937.536.837.237.036.436.336.436.5ManufacturingConstructionWholesaleandretailtrade40.540.440.540.540.540.039.539.539.439.138.738.638.838.638.338.238.137.937.737.136.636.135.735.335.134.934.634.233.933.733.332.932.632.232.231.932.332.232.232.332.232.132.232.232.132.032.132.031.732.031.931.832.031.931.931.932.131.931.831.8Totalprivatenonagriculturalx$1,1311.2251.2751.3351.451.521.611.651.711.801.891.952.022.092.142.222.282.362.462.562.682.853.043.233.453.703.944.244.534.865.255.696.166.667.257.677.007.057.107.147.197.237.277.347.377.407.457.467.527.537.547.597.657.677.717.747.727.777.787.83Average gross hourly earnings,current dollars$1,2161.3271.3761.4391.561.641.741.781.851.952.042.102.192.262.322.392.452.532.612.712.823.013.193.353.573.824.094.424.835.225.686.176.707.277.998.507.697.757.817.907.947.998.038.098.148.168.208.208.388.348.378.448.488.528.568.578.568.568.618.62$1,5401.7121.7921.8632.022.132.282.382.452.572.712.822.933.073.203.313.413.553.703.894.114.414.795.245.696.066.416.817.317.718.108.669.279.9410.8011.5510.4010.4710.5310.5710.6410.7310.8210.9010.9511.0611.1411.2211.5211.3411.3911.4311.5411.5111.5611.5811.5611.7111.6011.82ManufacturingConstructionWholesaleandretailtrade$0,9401.0101.0601.1001.181.231.301.351.401.471.541.601.661.711.761.831.891.972.042.142.252.412.562.722.883.053.233.483.733.974.284.675.065.485.936.225.725.785.825.855.895.915.945.986.036.036.066.086.096.106.126.166.206.226.236.266.256.326.346.35industries,Adjusted hourly earnings, totalprivate nonagricultura! 2Index,1977^100Currentdollars21.623.424.525.427.328.730.331.332.434.035.737.238.539.841.042.443.644.846.448.450.853.957.561.365.769.874.180.086.792.9100.0108.1116.8127.3138.9148.4133.7134.8135.7136.6137.6138.4139.1140.5141.4142.0143.0143.5144.9145.0145.4146.3147.7148.1148.9149.9150.1150.8151.1151.91977dollars 358.558.962.364.063.665.568.770.573.375.976.978.080.081.483.085.086.387.589.090.392.294.095.095.798.3101.2101.198.397.699.0100.0100.597.493.592.693.392.892.792.793.093.092.992.292.592.192.192.392.392.992.893.393.793.793.193.093.293.293.293.394.0Percent changefrom a yearearlier 4Currentdollars1 Also includes o<strong>the</strong>r private industry groups shown in Table B-37.2 Adjusted for overtime (in manufacturing only) and for interindustry employment shifts.3 Current-dollar earnings index divided by <strong>the</strong> consumer price index for urban wage earners and clerical workers on a 1977=100base.4 Monthly data are computed from indexes to two decimal places and are based on data not seasonally adjusted.Note.—See Note, Table B-37.Source: Department <strong>of</strong> Labor, Bureau <strong>of</strong> Labor Statistics.8.34.73.77.55.15.63.33.54.95.04.23.53.43.03.42.82.83.64.35.06.16.76.67.26.26.28.08.47.27.68.18.09.09.16.89.99.99.49.59.48.93.89.39.38.68.48.28.37.57.27.27.37.17.16.66.16.25.65.9206


TABLE B-39.—Average weekly earnings in selected private nonagricultural industries, 1947-82[For production or nonsupervisory workers; monthly data seasonally adjusted, except as noted]Year or monthTotal privatenonagricultural *Currentdollars1977dollars 2Average gross weekly earningsManufacturing(currentdollars)Construction(currentdollars)Wholesaleand retailtrade(currentdollars)Percent change froma year earlier, totalprivatenonagricultural 3Currentdollars1977dollars194719481949195019511952195319541955.195619571958195919601961196219631964196519661967196819691970197119721973. .. .197419751976197719781979198019811982 p1981:JanFebMarAprMayJuneJulyAugSeptOctNovDec1982:JanFebMarAprMay .. ..June;. '. ZJulyAugSeptoct :Nov.DecII..$45 5849 0050.2453.1357.8660 6563.7664.5267 7270.7473 3375.0878.78806782.6085.9188 4691.3395 4598.82101.84107.73114.61119.83127 31136.90145 39154.76163 53175 45189.00203 70219.9123510255.20266.92249 20248.1625063252 76254.53254.5025663258 37257.95259.74261.50261.10258 69263 55263.15264.89267.75267.68269 08269 35268.66269.62269.97270.92$123 52123.43127.84133.83134.87138 47144.58145.32153.21157.90158.04157.40163.78164.97167.21172.16175.17178.38183.21184.37184.83187.68189.44186.94190 58198.41198.35190.12184.16186 85189.00189.31183.41172.74170.13167.87172.94170.56171.3117218171.98170.92170.18170 09168.05168.44168.82167.91165.93168 62168.90169.69169.89168.14167.97167.61166.87166.53166.75167.75$491353 0853.8058.2863.3466 7570.4770.4975 3078.78811982.3288.2689 7292.3496.5699.23102.97107.53112.19114.49122.51129.51133.33142 44154.71166 46176.80190 79209 32228.90249 27269.34288 62318.00330.65310 68307.68311.62316 79319.19320.4032120322 79320.72322.32322.26320.62315 09328 60326.43329.16331.57333.98335.55334.23332.13332.13334.93335.32$58 83652367.5669.6876.96828686.4188.5490.9096.38100 27103.78108.41112 67118.08122.47127.19132.06138.38146.26154.95164.49181.54195.4521167221.19235 89249.25266.08283 73295.65318.69342.99367 78398.52423.89401.44380.06391.72393 20393.68391.65400.34401 12386.54407.01416.64415.14405.50420.71420.29421.77432.75423.57430.03428.46420.78425.07422.24431.43$38 0740 8042.9344.5547.7949 2051.3553.33551657.4859 6061.7664.4166 0167.4169.91720174.6676 9179.3982.3587.0091.3996.0210109106.4511176119.02126 45133 79142.52153 64164.96176 46190.95198.42184 76186.12187.40188 96189.66189.71191.27192 56193.56192.96194.53194.56193.05195.20195.23195.89198.40198.42198.74199.69200.63201.61201.61201.93752.55.88.9485.11.2504.5372.44.9242.44.0303.2453.53.15.86.44.6627.56.26.45.7737.77.88.06.98.54.69.59.19.29.59.99.210.09.68.47.97.36.13.76.24.84.55.24.94.74.34.03.53.23.8013.64.7.8274.4.5543.1 1__ £,U7143.0171.827.6.21.5.9-1.3194.1- 0-4.1= 3 1151.2.2-3.1= 58-1.5-1.3-2.0-2.1-1.2- 4 .1-.3-.7-1.1-2.2-2.0-1.8-2.4=4.1-1.1-1.6-1.7-1.2-1.9-1.4-1.4-.9-1.4-1.2-.11 Also includes o<strong>the</strong>r private industry groups shown in Table B-37.2 Earnings in current dollars divided by <strong>the</strong> consumer price index on a 1977=100 base.3 Based on data not seasonally adjusted.Note.-See Note, Table B-37.Source: Department <strong>of</strong> Labor, Bureau <strong>of</strong> Labor Statistics.207


TABLE B-40.—Productivity and related data, business sector, 1947-82[1977=100; quarterly data seasonally adjusted]Year orquarterOutput per hour<strong>of</strong> all personsBusinesssectorNonfarmbusinesssectornesssectorOutput 1NonfarmbusinesssectorHours <strong>of</strong> allpersons 2BusinesssectorNonfarmbusinesssectorCompensation perhour 3nesssectorNonfarmbusinesssectorReal compensationper hour 4BusinesssectorNonfarmbusinesssectorUnit labor costnesssectorNonfarmbusinesssectorImplicit pricedeflator*nesssectorNonfarmbusinesssector1947.1948194943.746.046.749.952.053.135.037.236.534.036.035.380.280.778.168.169.266.617.018.418.718.520.120.646.146.447.650.150.552.538.940.040.137.038.638.938.140.840.336.639.139.41950195119521953195450.451.853.555.256.156.357.258.659.560.439.842.143.545.444.638.641.142.544.343.478.981.381.482.279.568.771.972.674.571.920.022.023.424.925.721.823.825.126.527.350.551.353.456.458.055.055.457.259.961.639.742.543.845.145.938.841.542.844.445.241.044.044.544.945.340.142.843.544.445.019551956.19571958195958.358.960,462.364.362.862.964.065.567.748.149.349.849.052.647.048.348.948.051.882.583.782.578.881.974.976.876.473.276.526.428.129.931.232.628.330.031.732.934.259.662.664.465.567.764.066.868.268.971.145.247.749.550.250.745.047.649.550.250.546.047.549.249.850.846.047.649.349.750.91960196119621963196465.267.369.972.575.668.370.372.875.178.153.554.457.459.963.552.553.556.659.162.882.080.882.182.683.977.076.177.878.780.533.935.236.838.240.235.736.838.339.641.469.571.373.775.578.473.074.676.778.480.952.052.352.752.653.152.252.452.652.753.051.651.852.653.253.751.651.952.753.353.91965196619671968.196978.380.782.585.385.580.582.584.086.886.567.871.573.176.879.067.271.272.776.678.886.688.688.690.192.583.586.386.588.291.141.744.647.050.754.242.845.447.951.554.880.183.385.388.389.682.284.786.989.690.653.355.356.959.463.453.255.057.059.363.454.756.457.960.263.254.856.358.160.463.31970197119721973197486.289.292.494.792.586.889.793.095.392.978.480.786.191.878.080.385.891.789.891.090.593.296.897.389.889.592.396.296.758.262.066.171.378.058.762.566.771.778.590.892.895.797.395.991.593.596.697.896.467.569.571.575.384.467.669.771.775.384.566.069.071.375.382.466.369.371.374.081.619751976.19771978197994.597.6100.0100.699.694.797.8100.0100.699.388.293.8100.0105.5107.887.893.7100.0105.7108.093.396.0100.0104.9108.292.795.8100.0105.0108.785.592.9100.0108.6119.186.093.0100.0108.6118.896.398.9100.0100.999.496.899.0100.0100.999.290.595.1100.0108.0119.590.895.1100.0108.0119.690.594.7100.0107.5117.290.094.6100.0107.1116.519801981198298.9100.7101.098.599.9100.0106.2108.9106.4106.3108.6105.9107.4108.2105.3108.0108.7105.9131.4144.1154.6130.9143.6154.096.796.097.096.395.796.7132.9143.1153.0133.0143.8153.9128.3140.4148.2128.3140.8149.01980:IIIIllIV99.398.238.999.398.797.698.49C.2107.9104.7105.3107.0107.9104.6105.3107.3108.7106.6106.5107.7109.3107.2107.0108.2126.7130.0133.1136.1126.2129.3132.6135.797.096.496.996.296.696.096.595.9127.6132.3134.7137.0127.8132.5134.7136.8123.7126.9129.9132.8123.6127.2129.9132.71981:II.'.""IllIV1982:I100.7100.7101.0100.2100.0100.3101.2102,2100.4100.0100.099.199.299.4100.3100.9109.1109.1109.6107.8106.3106.4106.7106.0109.2109.0109.1107.1106.0106.1106.3105.3108.3108.3108.5107.5106.3106.1105.4103.7108.8109.0109.1108.1106.8106.7106.0104.3140.0142.5145.6148.2150.9153.4155.7158.0139.5142.0145.1147.7150.4152.7155.1157.496.296.495.795.696.597.196.897.596.096.095.495.396.396.696.497.2139.0141.5144.2147.9150.9152.9153.8154.5139.0141.9145.1149.0151.6153.5154.7155.9136.5138.8141.9144.6146.0147.5149.1150.4136.5138.9142.3145.5146.6148.1149.8151.71 Output refers to gross domestic product originating in <strong>the</strong> sector in 1972 dollars.2 Hours <strong>of</strong> all persons engaged in <strong>the</strong> sector, including hours <strong>of</strong> proprietors and unpaid family workers. Estimates based primarily onestablishment data.3 Wages and salaries <strong>of</strong> employees plus employers' contributions for social insurance and private benefit plans. Also includes anestimate <strong>of</strong> wages, salaries, ana supplemental payments for <strong>the</strong> self-employed.4 Hourly compensation divided by <strong>the</strong> consumer price index.8 Current dollar gross domestic product divided by constant dollar gross domestic product.Source: Department <strong>of</strong> Labor, Bureau <strong>of</strong> Labor Statistics.208


TABLE B-41.—Changes in productivity and related data, business sector, 1948-82[Percent change from preceding period; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]YearOutput per houro1 all personssectorKonfarmbusinesssectorsectorOutput 1NonfarmlusirtesssectorHours <strong>of</strong> allsectorNonfarmbusinesssectorCompensation persectorN<strong>of</strong>ifarmbusinesssectorReal compensationper hour*sectorNonfarmbusinessUnit labor costNonfarmbusinesssectorImplicit pricedeflator^BusinesssectorNonfarmbusinesssector194819495.31.54.32.06.1-1.96.0-1.90.7-3.31.6-3.88.51.68.62.90.72.60.83.93.0.14.1.97.0-1.06.8.9195019511952195319547.92.83.23.21.66.01.72.31.71.49.15.83.34.3-1.89.46.53.44.2-2.01.12.9.11.0-3.33.14.61.02.5-3.47.19.86.46.43.25.88.85.55.63.26.01.74.15.72.84.8.73.24.82.7-.86.93.03.11.6-.26.93.13.91.71.67.41.1.91.01.76.61.82.01.4195519561957195819594.01.02.53.13.23.9.31.72.43.47.92.61.0-1.67.38.22.81.2-1.97.93.81.5-1.5-4.53.94.12.5-.5-4.24.42.56.56.54.44.33.66.05.73.84.02.84.92.91.63.53.94.42.21.03.21.45.53.91.31.0-.35.73.91.4.61.63.33.51.32.02.23.53.6.92.3196019611962196319641.53.33.83.74.3.82.93.63.23.91.61.75.54.36.01.51.85.84.46.4.2-1.51.6.61.6.6-1.12.21.12.44.23.84.63.75.24.33.24.03.54.52.62.73.42.53.82.72.12.82.23.22.7.5.7.03.5.3.4.21.4.61.51.11.01.5.61.51.21.2196519661967196819693.53.12.23.3.23.12.51.93.3-.36.85.52.25.12.96.95.92.15.32.93.22.3.01.72.63.73.4.32.03.23.97.05.37.87.03.46.05.57.56.52.24.02.43.51.51.73.02.63.21.1.33.83.04.46.7.33.53.54.16.81.93.02.74.04.91.62.83.24.04.719701971197219731974.83.63.52.6-2.4.33.33.72.4-2.5-.83.06.66.6-2.0-1.02.96.96.8-2.1-1.6-.53.03.9.4-1.3-.43.14.3.57.36.66.58.09.47.06.66.77.69.41.32.23.11.6-1.41.02.23.31.3-1.46.42.92.95.312,16.63.22.95.012.24.54.43.45.59.54.84.53.03.810.2197519761977197819792.23.32.4.6-.92.03.22.2.6-1.3-2.06.46.65.52.3-2.26.76.75.72.2-4.13.04.14.93.2-4.13.44.45.03.59.68.67.78.69.79.68.17.58.69.3.52.61.2.9=1.4.42.21.0.9-1.77.35.15.18.010.77.54.75.28.010.79.84.75.67.59.010.35.05.77.18.8198019811982 P-.71.8.4-.91.4.2-1.52.5-2.3-1.52.2-2.5-.7.7-2.6-.7.7-2.610.49.67.310.29.77.3-2.8— 71.1-2.9-.71.111.27.76.911.28.17.19.49.55.510.29.75.91980:Iin"'."'.'.";;;;iV.6-4.32.62.0-.4-4.63.43.1-11.42.16.8-.2-11.62.77.8-.4-7.4—54.7.2-7.4-.74.612.510.710.19.411.910.210.49.8-3.9-2.62.5-2.811.815.77.37.212.415.56.86.511.210.810.09.313.212.28.68.91981:itintiv5.6.01.1-2.94.9-1.3-.3-3.57.9-.11.9-6.47.2-.8.3-7.12.1-.1-3.62.2.5.6-3.711.77.59.07.411.87.19.07.3.2.5-2.6-.4.4.1-2.6-.55.77.57.810.66.69.311.211.66.69.38.012.17.110.29.21982:IIIllIV-1.01.43.64.1.6.83.42.7-5.5.61.1-2.5-4.2.6.7-3.8-4.5-.8-2.4-6.4-4.7-.1-2.7-6.37.36.96.16.07.76.16.66.03.92.2-1.43.34.31.4-.93.38.45.52.41.87.15.23.13.23.84.34.43.53.34.04.95.11 Output refers to gross domestic product originating in <strong>the</strong> sector in 1972 dollars.2 Hours <strong>of</strong> all persons engaged in <strong>the</strong> sector, including hours <strong>of</strong> proprietors and unpaid family workers. Estimates based primarily onestablishment data.3 Wages and salaries <strong>of</strong> employees plus employers' contributions for social insurance and private benefit plans. Also includes anestimate <strong>of</strong> wages, salaries, and supplemental payments for <strong>the</strong> self-employed.* Hourly compensation divided by <strong>the</strong> consumer price index.5 Current dollar gross domestic product divided by constant dollar gross domestic product.Note.—Data relate to all persons engaged in <strong>the</strong> sector. Percent changes are based on original data and <strong>the</strong>refore may differ slightlyfrom percent changes based on indexes in Table B-40.Source: Department <strong>of</strong> Labor, Bureau <strong>of</strong> Labor Statistics.209


PRODUCTION AND BUSINESS ACTIVITYTABLE B-42.—Industrial production indexes, major industry divisions, 1929-82[1967-100; monthly data seasonally adjusted]Year or monthTotalindustrialproductionTotalManufacturingDurableNondurableMiningiitilities1967 proportion100.0087.9551.9835.976.365.6919291933193919401941 ,„„194219431944194519461947194819491950195119521953 ,19541955195619571958195919601961196219631964196519661967196819691970197119721973197419751976197719781979198019811982 *1981:JanFebMarAprMayJune....JulyAm; ,Sept"mZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ.NovDec1982:JanFebMarAprMayJune ..JulyAugseptOct: ::.: ::: :::::..Nov"Dec "21.613.721.725.031.636.344.047.440.735.039.441.138.844.948.750.654.851.958.561.161.957.964.866 266.772.276.581.789.897.8100.0106.3111.1107.8109 6119.7129 8129.3117 8130.5138 2146.1152.5147.0151.0138.61514151.81521151.9152.7152.9153.9153 61516149.1146.3143.4140.7142.9141.7140.2139.2138.7138 8138.4137.3135.8134.8134.722.814.021.525.432.437.847.050.942.635.339.440.938.745.048.650.655.251.558.260.561.257.064.265.465.671.575.881.089.797.9100.0106.4111.0106.4108 2118.9129.8129.41163130.3138.4146.8153.6146.7150.4137.61511151.21516152.0152.8152.4153.2153.21511148.0145.0142.0138.5140.9140.1138.7137.9137.71381138.0137.1135.0134.0133.922 59.117.723 531.439954.259.945.231.637.739.335.743.548.951.958751.859.261.161.653.961.962 961.868673.178 389.0N 989100.0106.5110.6102.3102 4113.71271125.7109 3122.3130 0139.7146.4136.7140.5124.71410140.81421142.5143.5143.2143 6143 4140 9137.8134.4131.3127.1129.3128.2126 71261125.5125 9124.9123.5120.5119.3119.323 219.926.127 533.334 637.138.638.539.741.342.742.046.748.349.251,251.657.260.161.161.667.769.371.575.880.085.290.996.7100.0106.2111.5112.31166126.5133.8134.6126.4141.8150.5156.9164.0161.2164.8156.1165 6166.2165 3165.9166.4165.8167.1167 31659162.8160.3157.4155.1157.8157.3156.1155 0155.3155 7156.9156.7156.0155.2155.143.130.642.146.849.751.352.556.255.154.261.364.457.163.870 069.471269.977.982.082.175.378.780.380.883.186.489.993.298.2100.0104.2108.3112.2109 8113.1114.7115,3112.8114.2118.2124.0125.5132.7142.2126.1140 4143.1143 2135.2135.4141.7146.5146 01450145.3143.3142.6144.5142.4138.1134.1128.9123.5120.1116.9114.7116.4115.9118.0746.710.711.813.314.916.517.517.818.620.122.423.927.231033.736 539.343.948.251.553.959.363.467.072.077.083.688.795.5100.0108.4117.3124.5130 5139.4145.4143.7146.0151.7156.5161.4166.0168.3169.1169.0167 6166.4167 8167.6170,7172.7173.1171.9167 8168.1168.9168.2171.8170.4170.0171.0170.9169.4167 7168.5167.5167.8167.1165.5Source: Board <strong>of</strong> Governors <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Federal Reserve System.210


TABLE B-43-—Industrial production indexes, market groupings, 1947-82[1967=100; monthly data seasonally adjusted]Final productsMaterials 3Year or monthTotalindustrialproductionTotalTotalConsumer goods 1AutomotiveproductsHomegoodsEquipment •TotalBusinessIntermediateproductsTotalDurablegoodsNondurablegoods1967 proportion194719481949195019511952195319541955195619571958195919601961196219631964196519661967196819691970197119721973197419751976197719781979198019811982 P1981:JanFebMarAprMayJuneJulyAugSeptOctNovDec'"•1982:JanFebMarAprSTayJune .:.::....JulyAugSeptoc?.:::::::::::::::::::::::Nov.Deep100.0039.441.138.844.948.750.654.851.958.561.161.957.964.866 266.772 276.581.789.897.81000106.3111.1107 8109.6119.7129 8129.3117.8130.5138 2146.1152.5147 0151.0138.6151.41518152.1151.9152 7152.9153.9153.6151.6149 1146.3143.4140 7142 9141.7140.2139.2138.7138.8138 4137 3135.8134.8134.747.8238.640.038.843.747 250.754151.355.458.660.357.663.265 365.871475.579.787 695.91000106.2109.61053106.3115.7124 4125.1118.2127.6135 9142.2147.2145 3149.5141.3147 8148 2149.0149.91513151.4152.1151.5150.01489147.2146.3142 81441143.3142.6142.2142.1142.51412140 0138.6137.7138.127.6842.443.743.449.649.150.253.252.959.061.262.662.168.170 772.277181.385.992.697.3100.0105.9109.8109.0114.7124.4131.5128.9124.0137.1145 3149.1150.8145 4147.9142.6146 9147 8148.3148.9150.7150.3150.7149.6147.8146.5144.0142.0139.6141.8141.5142.1143.6144.8145.8144.1143.4142.2141.1141.42.8345.347.447.059.152347.159 555.473.660.663.550.563.372 566.180187.791.9113 3112.81000119.4118.198.8124.4141.4153 0132.8125.8155.7175 6179.9167.7132 8137.9129.6130 4133 9139.2142.91518153.1147.6137.6139.1132 8121.7119.2109 2117 5125.0129.9138.9143.0149J135.5135 5124.0121.4129.85.0637.539.136.249.943.043.048.644.953.055.754.551.459.059.461.366.571.878.488.997.9100.0106.4113.2110.2115.6129.5142.5136.8118.8134.1141.9147.7149.2138 9142.0129.3145.6145 2146.1145.0144.8145.0145.8145.3141.1138.2134.1125.4126.3130.6129.9131.1129.1129.9130.413141289128.6126.9125.920.1430.632.228.731.143 351.956349.350.455.357.551.556.558157.363 767.571.480 794.0100 0106.5109.3100194.7103.8114 5120.0110.2114.6123 0132.8142.2145 2151.8139.41491148 7150.0151.41521153.0154.1154.0152.91521151.5152.1147.2147.3145.9143.4140.4138.4138.0137.3135.2133.5133.0133.612.6338.039.534.537.045.251.253.346.850.858.861.151.557.959.457.762.765.873.784.497.7100.0105.5112.5107.0104.1118.0134.2142.4128.2135.4147.8160.3171.3173 2181.1157.3177.7177.5179.3181.0182.0183.6184.8184.4182.7180.5179.0179.0172.2171.6169.0164.9159.9156.7154.9153.9150.5146.4144.6144.112.8941.944.342.048.851350.954 554.361.764.464.463.069.570 071.475 779.985.290.696.2100.0106.3112.9112.9116.7126.5137.2135.3123.1137.2145.1154.1160.51519154.4143.4157.5157 7157.1156.3156.1154.9156.2156.8154.6151.4148.7145.9143.4146.3145.2143.7142.6141.9142.8144.7143.7142.4141.9141.039.2939.541.237.645.049 850.556151.861.362.862.856.565.266.166.272176.782.992.4100.7100.0106.5112.5109.2111.3122.3133.9132.4115.5131.71386148.3156.4147 6151.6133.8153 8154 3154.4152.9153.4154.0155.3155.2152.5148.5144.6139.0137.2140.4138.5136.2134.3133.5133.0132.8132.0130.3128.9128.420.3538.339.435.344.450 551.660 352.063.763 963.853 764.064 863.370475181.993 8103.3100 0106 2112.1103 8104.9117 7134 6132.7109.1128.01361149.0157.8143 0149.1125.31500150 6152.2151.8152.8152.4153.6154.3150.4145.6141.0134.0129.7132.4130.7128.1126.6126.6126.0125.1123.0119.3118.0117.310.47Z'.'Z45.952.554 954.754.462.163 265.871375.682.290 397.51000108.8115.71154120.2132.9142 2142.6126.6147.8155.6165.6175.91715174.6157.3180.2179.9177.5179.3179.0176.9176.5175.4175.5170.6164.7158.3156.8164.2162.0160.3156.6153.5152.3154.5158.5157.7155.5155.51 Also includes clothing and consumer staples, not shown separately.2 Also includes defense and space equipment, not shown separately.3 Also includes energy materials, not shown separately.Source: Board <strong>of</strong> Governors <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Federal Reserve System.211


TABLE B-44.—Industrial production indexes, selected manufactures, 1947-82[1967; -100; monthly data seasonally adjusted]Durable manufacturesNondurable manufacturesYear or monthTotalPrimarymetalsIronandsteelFabricatedmetalproductsNonelectricalmachineryElectricalmachineryTransportationequipmentTotalMotorVe arfd eSpartsLumberandproductsApparelproductsPrintingandpublishingChemicalsandproductsFoods1967 proportion1947194819491950195119521953195419551956195719581959I9601961196219631964196519661967196819691970197119721973197419751976197719781979198019811982 p .1981:JanFebMarAprMayJuneJulyAugSeptOct.NovDec1982:JanFebMarAprMayJuneJulyAucSeptOct..;;:::::Nov " ....Dec*6.5763.365.855.469.775 869.278 563.582.582.078 562.372.772 471.176 382.392.81021108.41000104.3113.8106.6100.2112.1126.7123.196.4109.7111 1119.9121.3102.3107.975.8114.1114 5114.9110.61119107.4109.4113.1108.6102.396.689.689.788 583.076.475.272.872.972.973 270 067165.94.2170.193.291.588 266.576.511174.277 384.395.9105 2108.4100 0103.2112.6104 796.11071122.3119.895.8104.8103 8113.2113.292.499.8108 71084108.0103.4105 698.599.7105.199.292.287.279.279 678 573.065.162.458.058.157 456 45415145.9349.950.845.856.159958.566 059.467.868.870 663.371.071169.475477.882.690897.2100 0105.6107.9102 4103.51121124.7124.2109.9123.91310141.6148.5134.1136.4114.8135 8137 6139.2139.5138 4139.3140.11400136.8133.8130.2126.1120 71214121.1119.1115.8115.0115 5114 3112 3108 5107 4106.59.1539.039.233.437.547 751.954 046.150.658.057 948.656.756955.462166.375.685 098.8100 0101.8109.3104 4100.2116 0133.7140.1125.1134.51436153.6163.7162.8171.2148.6167 3168 3169.2169.71721174.1176.71764173.9169.7167.9167.4160 9160 0157.3153.7150.0147.41471147 2144 9140 5138 0135.88.0522.223.021.629.629.834.039.034.739.943.142.839.247.651.654.862.964.768.481.797.9100.0105.5111.9108.1107.7122.2143.1143.8116.5134.8145 4159.4175.0172.8178.4169.2177.6174 9177.4178.8179.9180.1180.9182.6180.0179.6175.7170.7168.2172 9172.6172.2170.9170.8170.3169.7167.0165.7164 9164.59.2731.834.834.941.846.654.268.059.268.066.070.755.863.265.461.571.178.080.095.1102.0100.0111.1108.489.597.9108.2118.3108.797.4111.1122 2132.5135.4116.9116.1104.9117.41161119.5121.3123.7123.4119.8115.4114.2110.6106.1103.796 6102 0104.4105.9110.0111.6112.7107 0105.3100 8100 0103.74.5060.581.265.869.051.066.274.765.579.888.390.7115.9113.9100.0120.3116.592.3118.6135.8148.8128.2111.1142.01611169.9159.9119.0122.3109.8120.0119 9127.1130.7136 4137.5130.5123.1120.4113.8105.5100.490 498 6105.6110.7119.8124.0127.2116.7113.5103 01017108.81.6458.961.354.165.765.564.768.468.075.975.068869.979.374778.282.586.392.796.3100.0100.0105.5107.9105.6113.8120.8126.0116.2107.6123.2131.2136.3136.9119.3119.1127.4126 2125.6126.3126 2122.5122.9119.1113.2109.6104.7104.899 2104 9103.5106.2110.6112.2116.9120 31199117 2119 43.3157.860.359.764.363.166.367.266.473.375.074.972.880.181.782.285.589.192.297.499.9100.0102.9106.7101.4104.7109.4117.3114.3107.6125.7134.2134.2134.4127.0120.4123.81216120.2121.6122 6121.1122.6122.6122.5117.8113.8114.14.7243.345.446.648.949.749.752.054.159.563.265 463.968.271.071.373.977.882.687.994.6100.0103.2107.4107.0107.1112.7118.2118.2113.3122.5127 6131.5136.9139.6144.2144.3143.9144 8142.7141.61413143.1144.4146.1145.9145.6143.4145.3145 6146 4145.9144.2143.8142.6143 9145 3144 3142 61426144 07.7419.721.321.026.229 731.133.634,139.842.745246.654.356.459.265.771.878.887 895.71000109.5118.4120.4125.9143.6154.5159.4147.2170.9185 7197.4211.8207.1215.62189219 8218.5219.8220 6218.4221.5219.2216.3208.8204.6199.8196 72013200.3198.6193.6193.21941195 6196 4193 7192 88.7555.855.255.957.959 060.261462.766.370.171172.976.578.680.983486.490.492496.01000102.6106.1108.9112.8116,8120.9124.0123.4133.0138 8142,7147.5149.6152.11519152 5152.4151.9152 2151.3151.6151.9150.7151.4153.0152.815111517150.8149.7150.5151.01510150 7149 0150 6Source.* Board <strong>of</strong> Governors <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Federal Reserve System.212


TABLE B-45.—Capacity utilization rate in manufacturing, 1948-82FRB series >Year or quarterTotal Primarymanufacturiningprocess-194882.5 87.2194974.2 76.21950..82.8 88.5195185 8 90 2195285.4 84.91953892 89 41954 ..80.3 80.6195587.1 92.1195686.4 89.71957. ..83 7 84 7195875.2 75.4195981.9 83.4I96080.2 79.81961..77 4 77 9196281.6 81.61963 .83.5 83.8196485.6 87.8196589.6 91.1196691.1 91.4196786.9 85.71968.. . .87.1 87.7196986.2 88.51970 .. ..79.3 82 9197178.4 82.3197283.5 88.2197387.6 92.5197483.8 87.8197572.9 73.7197679.5 81.91977 ..819 84 0197884.4 86.9197985.7 88.1198079.1 78.5198178.5 78.41982"69.8 66.41978:j82.0 84.0II83 9 86 3III85 2 87 9IV86.4 89.51979:86.9 89.0||859 88 2III85 3 88 3IV84.4 86.91980:83.4 85.511 77.9 76.4HI75.9 73.1IV . .79.1 79.31981:I79.9 81.379.8 80.3HI ...79.3 79.4IV ..74.8 72.71982:71.6 69.1II 70.3 66.3III ..69.7 66.1IV p 67.6 64.3[Percent; quarterly data seasonally adjusted]Advancedprocessing80 073.379 883 485 989 380.184.384.583175.181.180.411181783.484.688.991.287.686 885.077 476.381.085.081.572.578.280883.084.379.478.571.680.982 783 784.685.784783 783.082.578.777.478 879.179.679.275.973.272.571.669.2Totalmanufacturing868684858581808386837781838483787684848384848382818076767878787672727169DurablegoodsCommerce series 2Nondurablegoods888783848478788285827681848483777584858385858482808074757877777470706865858685868683838586847982828382797883828283838282828178787879807875757674PrimaryprocesseprocessedAdvanced-goods goods89 8588 8587 8386 8487 8483 7982 8085 8289 8485 8276 7782 8183 8384 8484 8277 7876 7683 8484 8484 8285 8485 8484 8383 8183 8081 8075 7674 7778 7878 7878 7876 7671 7370 7366 7466 711 For description <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> series, see "Federal Reserve Measures <strong>of</strong> Capacity and Capacity Utilization," February 1978.2 Quarterly data are for last month in quarter. Annual data are averages <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> four indexes, except for 1965 (December index) and1966-67 (averages <strong>of</strong> June and December indexes). For description <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> series, see "Survey <strong>of</strong> Current Business," July 1974.Sources: Board <strong>of</strong> Governors <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Federal Reserve System and Department <strong>of</strong> Commerce (Bureau <strong>of</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> Analysis).213


TABLE B-46.—Neiv construction activity, 1929-82[Value put in place, billions <strong>of</strong> dollars; monthly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]Private constructionPublic constructionYear or monthTotalResidentialbuildings'Total 2housingunitsNonresidential buildings and o<strong>the</strong>rconstruction 1TotalTotalnewconstructionCommercial3IndustrialO<strong>the</strong>r*TotalFederal192910.88.33.63.04.71.10.92.62.50.2State andlocal 5 2.319332.91.2.5.3.8.1.2.51.6.51.119398.24.42.72.31.7.3.31.23.8.83.1194019411942194319448.712 014.1835.35.16.23.42.02.23.0351.79.82.63.01.4,7.62.12.71.71.11.4.3.4.2.0.1.4.8.32.21.31.51.2.91.13.65.810.76.33.11.2389.3562.52.42.01.3.7.6194519465.814.33.412.11.36.2.74.82.15.8.21.2.61.71.33.02.42.21.7.9.71.4New series19471948194920.026126.716.721420.59.913112.47.810.510.06.9828.01.0141.21.7141.04.2555.93.3476.38121.52.5354.81950195119521953195433.635.436.839141.426.726.226.027 929.718.115.915.816 618.215.613.212.913.414.98.610.310.211311.51.41.51.1182.21.12.12.3222.06.16.76.8737.26.99.310.811211.71.63.042413.45.26.36.6718.31955195619571958195946.547.649150,055.434.834.935134.639.321.920.219 019.824.318.216.114.715.419.212.914.716114.815.13.23.6363.63.92.43.1362.42.17.38.0908.89.011.712.714115.516.12.82.7303.43.78.910.011.112.112.31960196119621963196454.756 460.264 868.038.939.342.345.547.723.023125.227 928.017.317.119.421.721.815.916 217.217 619.74.2475.15.05.42.9282.82S3.68.98.79.29.710.715.917117.919.420.43.6393.9403.912.213.314.015.416.51965196619671968196974 176.878.587 594.352.052.852.959 966.327 925.725.630633.221.719.419.024 025.924 127.127.329 333.1789.4606.815 516.922124.025.527 628.0404.035343.318 020.022.124 224.61970197119721973197495.2110.3124.4138 4139.267.180.494.2105 9100.931.943.354.359 750.424.335.144.950 140.635.337.240.046 250.59.811.613.515 515.96.55.44.7627.919.020.121.824 526.728.129.930.232 538.33.34.04.4495.324.825.925.827 633.019751976197719781979135 9151.1173.8205.6230.4951112.0135.7159.7181.646 560.581.093.499.034 447.365.775.878.648 651.454.766.282.612 812.814.818.624.9807.27.711.015.027 831.532.236.742.740 939.138.245.948.8637.07.38.48.634 632.130.937.540.219801981230.7238.2175.7185.287.386.663.162.788.498.729.934.213.817.044.747.455.153.019.710.045.442.9See next page for continuation <strong>of</strong> table.214


TABLE B-46.—New construction activity, 1929-82—Continued[Value put in place, billions <strong>of</strong> dollars; monthly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]Year or monthTotalResidentialbuildings 1Total 2NewhousingunitsPrivate constructionNonresidential buildings and o<strong>the</strong>rconstruction >TotalTotalnewconstructionCommercial3IndustrialO<strong>the</strong>r*TotalPublic constructionFederalState andlocal 61981:JanFeb....Mar....Apr....May....June...July....Aug...,Sept...OctNov....Dec...,1982:JanFeb....Mar...,Apr...May...June...July...,Aug...Sept..,OctNov.255.4250.7249.4247.6240.9237.5238.1235.9233.5230.8230.0228.8225.1222.6224.6226.1228.7231.6227.6228.1228.1229.1237.2193.7191.7190.6192.1189.3185.9186.9185.2182.4180.0178.1176.6175.5173.0173.6175.1179.9182.7178.7176.6177.0177.7184.499.596.995.895.192.389.187.084.180.478.276.275.873.769.270.072.375.575.373.472.171.574.178.473.972.472.172.269.566.864.160.857.153.450.449.451.049.251.049.651.049.851.552.353.152.354.294.294.894.897.097.096.899.9101.1102.0101.8102.0100.7101.8103.9103.6102.8104.5107.4105.3104.5105.6103.6106.01 Beginning I960, farm residential buildings included in residential buildings; prior to 1960, included in nonresidential buildings ando<strong>the</strong>r construction.2 Total includes additions and alterations and nonhousekeeping units, not shown separately.3 Office buildings, warehouses, stores, restaurants, garages, etc.4 Religious, educational, hospital and institutional, miscellaneous nonresidential, farm (see also footnote 1), public utilities, and allo<strong>the</strong>r private.6 Includes Federal grants-in-aid for State and local projects.Source: Department <strong>of</strong> Commerce, Bureau <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Census.32.833.033.634.333.533.634.234.334.934.635.736.436.236.838.438.436.838.037.536.137.135.737.115.814.915.316.415.916.717.818.718.518.518.416.617.117.216.615.917.118.416.416.716.617.117.245.546.945.946.447.646.547.948.248.648.647.947.748.549.848.648.550.650.951.451.751.850.951.761.759.058.955.451.751.751.250.751.150.851.952.249.649.651.051.048.848.948.951.451.151.352.810.710.99.810.310.110.110.19.210.19.89.69.89.29.610.09.89.69.59.910.210.510.410.651.048.149,145.141.541.641.041.441.041.042.342.440.440.041.041.139.239.439.041.240.640.942.2215


TABLE B-47.—New bousing units started and authorized, 1959-82[Thousands <strong>of</strong> units]Year or monthPrivate and public 1Total(farm andnonfarm)NonfarmNew housing units startedTotalPrivate (farm and nonfarm)»1 unitType <strong>of</strong> structure2 to 4units5 unitsor moreNew private housing units authorized 2Total1 unitType <strong>of</strong> structure2 to 4units5 unitsor more1959196019611962..,.1963..,.1964....1965....1966....1967....1968....1969....1970....1971....1972197319741975....197619771978....197919801981....1982"..1981:JanFebMarAprMayJuneJulyAugSeptOctNovDec1982:JanFebMarAprMayJuneJulyAugSeptOctNovDec P.....1,553.71,296.11,365.01,492.51,634.91,561.01,509.71,195.81,321.91,545.41,499.51,469.02,084.52,378.52,057.51,352.51,171.41,547.62,001.72,036.11,760.01,312.61,100.31,070.485,272.5108.9124.0110.6107.0101.087.390.988.264.959.747.652.078.785.199.291.8107.297.2108.3111.7111.981.71,531.31,274.01,336.81,468.71,614.81,534.01,487.51,172.81,298.81,521.41,482.31,517.01,252.21,313.01,462.91,603.21,528.81,472.81,164.91,291.61,507.61,466.81,433.62,052.22,356.62,045.31,337.71,160.41,537.51,987.12,020.31,745.11,292.21,084.21,060.61,5851,2941,3181,3011,1721,0461,0409468998548608828859459318821,0669081,1931,0331,1291,1261,4041,2221,234.0994.7974.3991.41,012.4970.5963.7778.6843.9899.4810.6812.91,151.01,309.21,132.0892.21,162.41,450.91,433.31,194.1852.2705.4661.0974835863868776705696614623507554550592568621566631621628645677701883800283.0257.4338.7471.5590.8108.4 450.086.661.171.680.985.084.8120.3141.3118.368.164.085.9121.7125.0122.0109.591.180.7422.5325.1376.1527.3571.2535.9780.9906.2795.0381.6204.3289.2414.4462.0429.0330.5287.7319.01,208.3998.01,064.21,186.61,334.71,285.81,239.8971.91,141.01,353.41,323.71,351.51,924.62,218.91,819.51,074.4939.21,296.21,690.01,800.51,551.81,190.6985.5992.5Seasonally adjusted annual rates139114108971058988766278817470846764868310288926479864723453473362912522562562142692252582232932432523492044633003603614423361,2361,1961,1721,1861,1789869418788357387437978037928518799449291,0628881,0031,1721,1921,291938.3746.1722.8716.2750.2720.1709.9563.2650.6694.7625.9646.8906.11,033.1882.1643.8675.5893.61,126.11,182.6981.5710.4564.3540.071269968668265957354350545640041345445043646045048851650049756165172973277.164.667.687.1118.9100.884.861.073.084.385.288.1132.9148.6117.064.363.993.1121.3130.6125.4114.5101.888.613911511312311210998918185788868758176102918583968696111192.9187,4273.8383.3465.6464.9445.1347.7417.5574.4612.7616.7885.71,037.2820.5366.2199.8309.5442.7487.3444.8365.7319.4363.91 Units in structures built by private developers for sale upon completion to local public housing authorities under <strong>the</strong> Department <strong>of</strong>Housing and Urban Development "Turnkey" program are classified as private housing. Military housing starts, including those financedwith mortgages insured by FHA under Section 803 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> National Housing Act, are included in publicly owned starts and excluded fromtotal private starts.2 Authorized by issuance <strong>of</strong> local building permit: in 16,000 permit-issuing places beginning 1978; in 14,000 places for 1972 77; in13,000 places for 1967=71; in 12,000 places for 1963-66; and < in 10,000 places prior to 1963.» Not available separately beginning January 1970.Source: Department <strong>of</strong> Commerce, Bureau <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Census.385382373381407304300282298253252255285281310353354322477308346435367448216


TABLE B-48.—Nonfarm business expenditures for new plant and equipment, 1947-83[Billions <strong>of</strong> dollars; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]Plant and equipmentYear or quarterTotalPlantTotalManufacturingPnuintquipmentDurablegoodsNondurablegoodsTotalNonmanufacturingMiningTransportationPublicutilitiesTradeandservices1Communicationando<strong>the</strong>r 2194719481949..195019511952...1953195419551956195719581959218025.4623.5425.3230.83315933.5833.1336 5844.7648.1242.1744.788.4510.3510.2010.9413.0813.1413.8214.0915 9719.3420.9419.4119.89133515.1113.3414 3717.74184519.7619.0320 6025.4227.1922.7624.898.739.257.327.7311.0712.1212.4312.0012 5016.3317.5012.9813.763393.542.673 225.125 755.715.495 878.198.596.216.725345.714.644.515.956376.726.516 628.158.916.777.0413.0716.2116.2217.5919.7619.4721.1621.1324.0828.4330.6229.1931.020 69.93.88841.111211.251.291311.641.691.431.352 212.662.302 383.052 992.972.422 603.073.352.343.171.642.673.283.423.753.964.614.234 264.785.955.745.466136.927.138 378.838058.949.59114913.6413.6814.1115.402 403.042.632 583.033 253.383.604 425 305.965.585.63I960196119S219631964..1965196619671968196948 6347.82512853.2561.6670 4382.2283 4288.4599.5220.9421.1222.1222.2324.9627 2432.2132 2235.5140.5427 7026.70291631.0336.70431950.01512052.9458.9916.3615.5316.0317.2721.23254131.3732 2532.3436.278 287.437 818.6410.9813 4917.2317 8317.9319.978.088.108.228.6310.25119214.1514 4214.4016.3132.2832.2935.2535.9940.4345.0250.8451.1856.1163.251.291.261411.261.331361.421381.441.773.192.823.263.364.465 466.436346.797.045.405.205.125.335.806.497.829.3310.5211.70161516.53182718.5720.38221324.6923 0225.3128.316 256.487197.478.469 5810.49111112.0614.431970197119721973197419751976197719781979105 61108.53120 25137.70156.98157.7117145198.0823124270.4644 2446.6049 3556.6664.2965.21712080.3192 70105.736136619370 8981.0492.6992 50100 25117.77138 54164.7336 9933.6035 4242.3753.2154.9259 9569.2279 7298.6819 8016 7818 2222.7527.4426 3328 4734.04404351.07171916.8217 2019.6225.7628.59314735.1839 2947.6168 6274.9384 8295.33103.78102.79111.50128.87151.52171.772 022.672 883.314.626.107449.24102111.386955.936 727.418.238.688.899.4010.6812.3513.0314.7016.2617.9719.8319.9822.3726.7929.9533.9629 7734.20400045.5347.7946.2349.3056.5468.6679.2616 8517.43189621.1223.3021.8023.5126.9032.0234.83198019811982 31983 3295.63321.49319.99315.69117.55133.46178.08188 04115.81126.79122.67119.5258.91618457.9557.3556.9064.9564.7262.18179.81194.70197.32196.1613.5116.8616.0516.4512.0912.0511.8011.9235.4438.4041.6239.9881.7986.3386.4286.8636.9941.0641.4340.961981:||IIV312 24316 73328 25327.83128.5713105136 40136.67183 67185 6819185191.17124 50125 4913011126.916124631062 5860.7863 2762 4067 5366.14187.74191.24198.13200.9216 20168017 5516.8111.7411.7011.6113.1236.0537.8439.5539.7483.4385.8887.5588.3340.3239.0241.8942.921982:IIII327 72323.22315.79315.21139 49137.95135.14188 23185.28180.6512832123.77119.46120.5060 8459.0357.1455.8067 4864.7462.3264.70199.40199.46196.33194.7117.6016.5614.6315.5611.9912.3211.2811.8240.1241.4043.3841.6687.8088.8587.3182.0141.8940.3339.7343.651983:I sII 331640320.0012143123.4257 9058.3063 5465.12194.97196.5816.1817.3310.6311.6640.7640.3085.8785.8741.5341.431 Wholesale and retail trade; finance, insurance, and real estate; and personal, business, and pr<strong>of</strong>essional services.2 "O<strong>the</strong>r" consists <strong>of</strong> construction; social services and membership organizations; and forestry, fisheries, and agricultural services.3 Planned capital expenditures reported by business in late October-December 1982, corrected for biases.Source: Department <strong>of</strong> Commerce, Bureau <strong>of</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> Analysis.217


TABLE B-49.—Sales and inventories in manufacturing and trade 1947-82[Amounts in millions <strong>of</strong> dollars; monthly data seasonally adjusted]Year or monthTotal manufacturing andtradeSales 1Ratio 3Sales 1ManufacturingInventories*Merchant wholesalersRetail tradetories Inven-2 Ratio3 Sales 1tories Inven-2 Ratio3 Sales 1tories Inven-21947...1948...1949...1950...1951...1952...1953...1954...1955...1956...1957...1958...1959...1960...1961...1962...1963...1964...1965...1966...1967...1968...1969...1970...1971...1972...1973...1974...19751976197719781979198019811981:Jan..Feb..Mar..ftay...June....JulyAugSeptOcfNovDec1982:JanFebMar....June...July..Aug..SfcNov...35,26033,78838,59643,35644,84047,98746,44351,69454,06355,87954,20159,72960,82761,15965,66268,99573,68280,28387,18790,34898,104105,003107,448116,017130,030153,412177,625182,230204,277229,623259,046294,573321,504350,622347,858348,653350,281352,855353,698356,524355,236354,520353,725346,605344,943341,330334,579340,571342,121339,835349,096346,126344,603339,464339,470332,537335,93852,50749,49759,82270,24272,37776,12273,17579,51687,30489,05287,09392,12994,71395,594101,063105,480111,503120,907136,790144,796155,697169,343177,556187,766201,950233,237285,807288,375318,544351,176397,090444,132482,570519,394485,396490,291492,399494,177497,812501,531504,744510,099515,349518,241521,574519,394516,256513,906513,054515,074510,517512,981513,387514,554515,399514,224508,5531.421.531.361.551.581.581.601.471.551.591.601.501.561.541.501.491.471.451.471.561.541.551.621.581.491.411.451.571.481.461.441.431.451.431.401.411.411.401.411.411.421.441.461.501.511.521.541.511.501.521.461.481.491.521.521.551.5115,51317,31616,12618,63421,71422,52924,84323,35526,48027,74028,73627,24730,28630,87930,92333,35735,05837,33140,99544,87046,48750,22853,50152,80555,90663,02372,93784,79486,59598,802113,201126,953143,935154,249166,217163,902164,676165,936167,649168,073170,951170,333169,274168,156163,957161,442159,614155,023158,142157,517156,114160,828161,519161,382158,619159,278152,473152,34325,89728,54326,32131,07839,30641,13643,94841,61245,06950,64251,87150,24152,94553,78054,88558,18660,04663,40968,18577,95284,66490,61898,202101,651102,658108,238124,628157,792159,934175,193189,334210,679241,034264,016283,152266,798269,146271,062272,060274,196274,616276,983279,102282,209284,386285,784283,152281,155281,688280,065278,985276,449275,115274,914274,302272,474271,710269,2971.581.571.751.481.661.781.761.811.621.731.801.841.701.751.741.701.691.641.601.621.761.741.771.901.831.671.581.651.841.691.611.571.571.661.661.631.631.631.621.631.611.631.651.681.731.771.771.811.781.781.791.721.701.701.731.711.781.776,5147,6958,5978,7829,0528,9939,89310,51310,47510,25711,49111,65611,98812,67413,38214,52915,61116,98719,44820,84622,60923,94326,25729,58438,01447,74846,62350,69455,98765,03676,10987,93197,83999,85298,77698,21798,94499,26498,27497,61197,28597,74696,23596,76895,14494,23695,01097,36195,42797,42796,56593,77692,34390,86689,77490,9827,9577,7069,2849,88610,21010,68610,63711,67813,26012,73012,73913,87914,12014,48814,93616,04817,00018,31720,76524,83326,13428,62432,03835,04538,63345,37256,94856,69764,07872,31183,89193,870104,441110,549104,233105,027105,189105,149105,425106,904105,768107,656108,764108,491110,173110,549110,971108,823109,657112,913111,701113,515113,534113,101113,852113,886112,6691.131.191.071.161.121.171.181.131.191.231.241.151.221.201.161.151.141.151.151.241.231.221.271.271.241.111.071.211.191.211.211.181.131.091.041.061.071.061.061.091.081.111.111.131.141.161.181.151.131.181.151.181.211.221.251.271.2410,20011,13511,14912,26813,04613,52914,09114,09515,32115,81116,66716,69617,95118,29418,24919,63020,55621,82323,67725,33024,41327,03028,89330,70033,85337,42242,46245,08249,01254,78160,43567,05774,52979,32586,56684,10485,20186,12886,26386,36187,29987,29287,96187,82386,41386,73386,57285,32087,41887,24288,29490,84188,04289,44588,50289,32690,29092,61314,24116,00715,47019,46021,05021,03121,48820,92622,76923,40224,45124,11325,30526,81326,22127,94129,38631,09434,40538,07335,29938,94542,51743,86750,06355,07963,23771,06771,74479,27389,530102,520109,228114,114125,693114,365116,118116,148116,968118,191120,010121,993123,341124,376125,364125,618125,693124,131123,395123,332123,175122,367124,351124,939127,151129,073128,628126,5871 Monthly average for year and total for month.2 Seasonally adjusted, end <strong>of</strong> period.3 Inventory/sales ratio. For annual periods, ratio <strong>of</strong> weighted average inventories to average monthly sales; for monthly data, ratio* <strong>of</strong>inventories at end <strong>of</strong> month to sales for month.Note.—Earlier data are not strictly comparable with data beginning 1958 for manufacturing and beginning 1967 for wholesale andretail trade.The inventory figures in this table do not agree with <strong>the</strong> estimates <strong>of</strong> change in business inventories included in <strong>the</strong> gross nationalproduct since <strong>the</strong>se figures cover only manufacturing and trade ra<strong>the</strong>r than all business, and show inventories in terms <strong>of</strong> current bookvalue without adjustment for revaluation.Source: Department <strong>of</strong> Commerce (Bureau <strong>of</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> Analysis and Bureau <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Census).218


TABLE B-50.—Manufacturers' shipments and inventories, 1947-82[Millions <strong>of</strong> dollars; monthly data seasonally adjusted]Year ormonthShipments 1TotalDurablegoodsindustriesNondurableindustriesInventories 2TotalDurable goods industriesTotalMaterialsandsuppliesWorkinproc-FinishedgoodsNondurable goods industriesTotalMaterialsandsuppliesWorkinprocessFinishedgoods194719481949195019511952195319541955195619571958195919601961196219631964196519661967196819691970197119721.973197419751976197719781979198019811981:JanFebMarMay!'"!June....JulyAugSept....OctNovDec1982:JanFebMarMay!!"!June....JulyAugSept...,OctNov...15,51317,31616,12618,63421,71422,52924,84323,35526,48027,74028,73627,24730,28630,87930,92333,35735,05837,33140,99544,87046,48750,22853,50152,80555,90663,02372,93784,79486,59598,802113,201126,953143,935154,249166,217163,902164,676165,936167,649168,073170,951170,333169,274168,156163,957161,442159,614155,023158,142157,517156,114160,828161,519161,382158,619159,278152,473152,3436,6947,5797,1918,84510,49311,31313,34911,82814,07114,71515,23713,56315,60915,88315,61617,26218,28019,63722,22124,64925,26727,65929,43728,18829,95434,02439,68644,22843,65650,68959,26767,84876,06077,54083,41781,43682,17683,51084,78485,43986,89185,73985,22384,67181,26580,27979,13375,55177,97678,12477,13679,51878,88879,03677,24876,56272,34272,7088,8199,7388,9359,78911,22111,21611,49411,52712,40913,02513,49913,68414,67714,99615,30716,09516,77817,69418,77420,22021,22022,57024,06424,61725,95229,00033,25040,56742,93948,11353,93459,10467,87576,70882,80082,46682,50082,42682,86482,63484,06084,59484,05183,48582,69281,16380,48179,47280,16779,39478,97881,31082,63182,34681,37182,71680,13179,63525,89728,54326,32131,07839,30641,13643,94841,61245,06950,64251,87150,24152,94553,78054,88558,18660,04663,40968,18577,95284,66490,61898,202101,651102,658108,238124,628157,792159,934175,193189,334210,679241,034264,016283,152266,798269,146271,062272,060274,196274,616276,983279,102282,209284,386285,784283,152281,155281,688280,065278,985276,449275,115274,914274,302272,474271,710269,29713,06114,66213,06015,53920,99123,73125,87823,71026,40530,44731,72830,25832,07732,37132,54434,63235,86638,50642,25749,92055,00558,87564,73966,78066,28970,25081,398101,739102,874112,581121,737138,045160,601174,674188,429176,632177,725178,374179,301180,010181,125183,229185,022187,686189,461190,222188,429187,054187,121186,063185,916184,870184,289183,798183,550182,793181,843179,3248,9667,8949,19410,41710,60810,03210,77610,35310,27910,81011,06811,97013,32515,48916,45517,37618,69319,18219,75920,86026,02835,15133,92037,54840,35045,33452,80555,31058,46156,40956,75456,38256,75756,39457,01758,01658,12158,90859,11759,21658,46158,18457,99956,89756,94755,99655,64355,78155,19154,70354,27953,62410,7209,72110,75612,31712,83712,38713,06312,77213,20314,15914,87116,19118,07521,93925,00527,33630,40829,84828,65030,78835,54542,60343,36946,34550,62558,69469,21276,85182,81478,33778,66279,15979,73380,43580,36281,04181,63582,62183,58884,05882,81482,21182,09781,72981,56281,28481,30480,21680,45880,37980,56779,9956,2066,0406,3487,5658,1257,8398,2399,2459,0639,6629,92510,34410,85412,49113,54714,16315,63917,75117,88018,60119,82323,98525,58628,69030,76334,01838,58542,51347,15341,88742,30942,83542,81243,18043,74444,17245,26646,15846,75646,94647,15346,65947,02647,43547,40847,59047,34247,80147,90147,71146,99745,70512,83613,88113,26115,53918,31517,40518,07017,90218,66420,19520,14319,98320,86821,40922,34123,55424,18024,90325,92828,03229,65931,74333,46334,87136,36837,98843,23056,05357,06062,61267,59872,63480,43389,34194,72390,16691,42192,68892,75994,18693,49293,75494,08094,52394,92595,56194,72394,10094,56794,00293,07091,57990,82691,11690,75289,68189,86789,9738,3178,1678,5568,9718,7758,6629,0809,0829,4939,8139,97810,13110,44811,15511,71512,28912,72413,15013,68314,67618,13223,69923,54225,83327,39729,35432,47936,20838,01536,82037,05036,97437,20637,30537,07437,53137,44737,60637,72037,83438,01537,96137,89937,31737,48637,17236,71436,78936,44835,80035,63735,8142,4722,4402,5712,7212,8642,8282,9442,9463,1103,2963,4063,5113,8064,2044,4214,8485,1225,2745,6655,9826,7078,1758,8379,93310,98911,91313,71015,65616,19615,81816,12616,19416,26316,50916,16116,17416,25116,21315,91216,17416,19615,95915,79215,62915,60115,43815,55515,51915,52915,19214,85714,7937,4097,4157,6668,6228,6248,4918,8459,3809,73810,44410,79611,26111,67412,67313,52314,60615,61716,44817,01917,33018,39124,17924,68126,84629,21231,36734,24437,47840,51137,52838,24539,52139,29040,37240,25740,04840,38240,70541,29341,55540,51140,17940,87741,05739,98338,96938,55738,80838,77538,68939,37339,3661 Monthly average for year and total for month.2 Book value, seasonally adjusted, end <strong>of</strong> period.Note.—Data beginning 1958 are not strictly comparable with earlier data.Source: Department <strong>of</strong> Commerce, Bureau <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Census.219


TABLE B-51.—Manufacturers' new and unfilled orders, 1947-82[Amounts in millions <strong>of</strong> dollars; monthly data seasonally adjusted]New orders 1Unfilled orders'Unfitted orders—shipmentsratio 3Year or monthTotalDurable goodsindustriesTotalCapitalgoodsindustries,nondefenseNondurablegoodsindustriesTotalDurablegoodsindustriesNondurablegoodsindustriesTotalDurablegoodsindustries194719481949195019511952195319541955195619571958195919601961196219631964196519661967196819691970197119721973197419751976197719781979198019811981:Jan....Feb....Mar...May...June..July...Aug...Sept..Oct....Nov...Dec...1982:Jan....Feb....Mar...fcJune..July...Aug...Sept..Oct....Nov.15,25617,69315,61420,11023,90723,20423,58622,33527,46528,36827,55927,00230,72430,23531,10433,43635,52438,35742,10046,40247,05650,68753,95052,03855,98364,16776,25987,26885,14999,543115,027131,664147,354155,738166,015164,976165,375166,240169,422170,281171,022172,089168,797167,728159,558159,460156,660154,519155,984157,198154,995156,791157,058158,588154,380156,166149,696150,3626,3888,1266,63310,16512,84112,06112,14710,76814,99615,36514,11113,29016,00315,30315,75917,37418,70920,65223,27826,17725,82528,11629,87127,38829,99835,06442,93046,85342,01951,39861,07672,41079,39479,06083,27282,52882,69983,86286,41087,39686,91187,58284,81984,45677,19378,59276,42175,06176,30977,85976,19475,71074,55076,44672,98273,26670,6076,9037,6606,7387,4448,62210,97112,67311,01112,79915,27619,44423,20323,44924,06125,06321,85724,45625,68724,48824,03924,65524,86724,31222,52824,36922,13021,71721,56022,17422,60820,33219,27820,32218,89320,27320,18320,1738,8689,5668,9819,94511,06611,14311,43911,56612,46913,00313,44813,71214,72014,93215,34516,06116,81517,70518,82320,22521,23122,57124,07924,65025,98629,10433,33040,41543,13048,14553,95159,25467,96076,67882,74382,44782,67782,37883,01382,88584,11184,50783,97983,27282,36580,86880,23979,45879,67679,33978,80381,08182,50882,14281,39882,90080,09879,75534,47330,73624,04541,45667,26675,85761,17848,26660,00467,37553,18347,37052,73245,08047,40748,57754,32766,88280,07198,401104,547109,926115,422106,158107,147121,061161,256, 191,102173,829182,499204,880261,941303,178320,977318,621322,053322,749323,054324,826327,033327,105328,861328,384327,955323,556321,574318,621318,114315,957315,639314,521310,482306,032303,235299,001295,883293,107291,12828,57926,61919,62235,43563,39472,68058,63745,25056,24163,88050,35244,55949,37342,51444,37545,96551,27063,69176,29894,575100,576105,950111,250101,566102,119114,725153,876185,560165,930174,211196,417251,663291,883310,051308,370311,146311,666312,018313,642315,597315,618317,462317,057316,841312,769311,082308,370307,877306,211305,947305,004301,194296,866294,272290,011286,706283,960281,8615,8944,1174,4236,0213,8723,1772,5413,0163,7633,4952,8312,8113,3592,5663,0322,6123,0573,1913,7733,8263,9713,9764,1724,5925,0276,3367,380515427,8988,2888,46310,27811,29510,92610,25110,90711,08411,03611,18411,43611,48711,39911,32711,11410,78710,49210,25110,2379,7469,6929,5189,2889,1668,9638,9909,1779,1479,2671 Monthly average for year and total for month.3 Seasonally adjusted, end <strong>of</strong> period.3 Ratio <strong>of</strong> unfilled orders at end <strong>of</strong> period to shipments for period; excludes industries with no unfilled orders. Annual figures relateto seasonally adjusted data for December.Note.—Data beginning 1958 are not strictly comparable with earlier data.Source: Department <strong>of</strong> Commerce, Bureau <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Census.3.423.633.873.353.093.012.782.632.692.803.103.333.813.703.853.753.653.383.313.914.193.803.343.303.623.893.793.773.803.773.713.703.703.663.683.683.703.763.763.773.903.783.763.863.713.693.673.693.633.773.724.124.274.554.003.693.543.373.133.243.373.723.954.554.404.654.504.394,063.904.635.034.573.993.924.264.634.534.594.564.534.454.444.434.374.424.424.464.554.564.594.764.624.614.714.524.514.494.554.464.664.61220


Year or monthAllitemsPRICESTABLE B-52.—Consumer price indexes, major expenditure classes, 1929-82Food andbeveragesTotal*FoodTotal 2Rent,residentialHousing[1967^100]Fuel ando<strong>the</strong>rutilities 3ApparelandupkeepMedicalcareO<strong>the</strong>rgoodsandservicesHomeownershipTransportationEntertainmentEnergy419291933 ..19391940194119421943194419451946194719481949195019511952. .1953195419551956195719581959I96019611962196319641965196619671968... .19691970197119721973.,.197419751976197719781979...198019811982..!1981:JanFebMar ....AprMayJune 1ZJulvAugilZZSeptOctNov..Dec1982:JanFebMarJuneJulyAugSeptNovDec51.338.841.642.044148.851852.753.958.566.972.171.472.177.879.580.180.580.281484.386.687.388.789.690691.792 994.597 2100.0104.2109.8116.31213125.3133.1147.7161.2170.5181.5195.4217.4246.8272.4289.1260.5263.2265.1266.8269.0271.3274.4276.5279.3279.9280.7281.5282.5283.4283.1284.3287.1290.6292.2292.8293.3294.1293.6292.4100.0103 6108.8114.7118 3123.2139.5158.7172.1177.4188.0206 3228.5248.0267.3278.22614263.7265.0265.7265.4266.5268.9270.1270.7270.3269.9270.5273.6275.8275.6276.5278.1280.2280.8279.9280.1279.6279.1279.148.330.634.635.238 445.150349.650.758.170.676.673.574.582.884.383.082.881.682 284.988.587.188.089.189991.292 494.499.1100.0103.6108.9114.9118.4123.5141.4161.7175.4180.8192.22114234.5254.6274.6285.7268.6270.8272.2272.9272.5273.6276.2277.4278.0277.6277.1277.8281.0283.3283.0283.9285.5287.8288.5287.4287.6287.0286.4286.552.252.453 756.256 858.159.160.665.269.870.972.877.278.780.881.782.383 686.287.788.690.290.991792.793 894.997 2100.0104.0110.4118.2123 4128.1133.7148.8164.5174.6186.5202 8227.6263.3293.5314.7279.1280.9282.6284.8288.5292.2297.0299.7303.7303.5304.2305.2306.1307.3306.7309.4313.8317.5319.2320.1319.7320.7319.0316.376 054.156.056257 258.558 558.658859.261165.168 070473.276280.383 284.385987.589.190.491.792.994 095.095996.998 2100.0102 4105.7110.11152119.2124.3130.6137 3144.7153.5164 0176.0191.6208.2224.0200 9201.9203.0204.2205.9206.8207.8210.3211.9213.6215.0216.5217.8218.6219.6220.1221.8222.6224.8226.0226.9228.9230.2230.875.076.377.078381.783.584.486.386.987 989.090892.796.3100.0105.7116.0128.5133.7140.1146.7163.2181.7191.7204.9227,2262.4314.0352.7376.8335.8335.8336.8339.3345.0350.4358.0361.8367.8366.7367.2367.8367.5368.7365.7370.6377.4382.8384.5385.9383.0382.8379.5372.983.083.585.187.389.991.793.895.997.197 398.298.498.398.8100.0101.3103.6107.6115.0120.1126.9150.2167.8182.7202.2216.0239.3278.6319.2350.8296.7304.5308.4310.5314.9320.2325.1327.8331.1330.1329.8331.8336.2337.1339.3339.2345.4352.2354.7356.3359.5363.4362.2364.148 536.942.442 844852.354 658.561567.578.283.380179.086.185.384.684 584.185 887.387.588.289.690.490 991.992 793.7961100.0105.4111.5116.1119 8122.3126.8136.2142.3147.6154.2159 6166.6178.4186.9191.8181.1182.0185.1186.4186.4185.8184.7187.4190.7191.5191.3190.5187.3188.0191.1191.9191.5190.8189.7191.8194.9195.5195.4193.643.042.744 248.147 947.947.850.355.561.866.468.272.577.379.578.377.478.883.386.089.689.690.692.593.094.395.997.2100.0103.2107.2112.7118.6119.9123.8137.7150.6165.5177.2185.5212.0249.7280.0291.5264.7270.9273.5275.3277.8279.9282.6283.7285.2287.2289.1289.8289.9288.0285.1282.9285.6292.8296.1296.2295.3295.5295.8294.836.736.837 038.039 941.142144.448151.152 753 756.359 361.463464.867 269.973.276.479.181.483 585.687 389.593.4100.0106.1113.4120.6128.4132.5137.7150.5168.6184.7202.4219.4239.7265.9294.5328.7279.5282.6284.7287.0289.0291.5295.6299.3301.7304.8308.2310.2313.4316.2318.8321.7323.8326.4330.0333.3336.0338.7342.2344.3100.0105.7111.0116.7122.9126.5130.0139.8152.2159.8167.7176.6188.5205.3221.4235.8214.4216.7218.2219.2220.3220.8221.1222.3224.0225.5226.8227.3229.2231.2232.8233.9234.4235.6236,6237.4238.3240.3239.9240.1100.0105.2110.4116.8122.4127.5132.5142.0153.9162.7172.2183.3196.7214.5235.7259.9226.2227.4228.7229.9232.2233.4234.4235.6243.0245.2245.9246.7248.4250.3252.2253.8255.0255.8257.2258.3266.6271.2273.8276.690.190.391.894 294 494 795 094696 397.8100.0101.5104.2107.0111.2114.3123.5159.7176.6189.3207.3220.4275.9361.1410.0416.1381.7401.1409.3409.8411.3414.0415.7416.1417.1414.9414.1414.6416.4413.0406.1395.7402.1418.6424.5424.5424.2425.0422.6419.91 Includes alcoholic beverages, not shown separately.* Includes o<strong>the</strong>r items not shown separately. Series beginning 1967 not comparable with series for earlier years.• Fuel oil, coal, and bottled gas; gas (piped) and electricity; and o<strong>the</strong>r utilities and public services.4 Fuel oil, coal, and bottled gas; gas (piped) and electricity; and motor fuel, motor oil coolant, etc.Note.—Data beginning 1978 are for all urban consumers; earlier data are for urban wage earners and clerical workers.Source: Department <strong>of</strong> Labor, Bureau <strong>of</strong> Labor Statistics.221


TABLE B-53.—Consumer price indexes, selected expenditure classes, 1939-82[1967-100]Year or monthTotal 1Food and beverage >TotalFoodAthomeAwayfromhomeTotalHomeownersliipHomepurchaseFinancing,taxes,andinsuranceMaintenanceandrepairTotalFuel and o<strong>the</strong>r utilitiesTotalHousehold fuelsFuelcoal,andbottledgasGas(piped)andelectricityO<strong>the</strong>rutilitiesandpublicservices193919401941194219431944194519461947194819491950195119521953195419551956195719581959196019611962196319641965196619671968196919701971197219731974197519761977197819791980198119821981;JanFebMart :JuneJulyAugS5 1 :- :NovDec1982:JanFebMarApr«&.::JuneJulyAucSeptOctNov.....Dec100.01036108.8114 7118.3123.2139 5158.71721177 4188.0206 3228.52480267.3278.2273.6275.8275.6276.5278.1280.2280.8279.92801279 62791279.134 635 238445150349650 758170 676 673 574 582 884 383.082 881.682.284.988 587 188.089189.991.292 494 49911000103 6108.9114 9118.4123 51414161.71754180 8192 22114234.5254 6274.6285.7261.4 268.6263265.07 2708272 2265.7 272.9266.5265 4 272 5273.6268.9 276.2270.1 277.4270.7 278.0270 3 277 62699 2771270.5 277.8281.0283.3283.0283 9285.5287.8288.5287.4287 6287 0286 4286.573 579 876777 686387.886.285.884.184.487.291088 889.690 491.092.293 295.5100 3100.0103 2108.2113 7116.4121.61414162.4175.8179 5190.2210 2232.9251.5269.9279.2265.6267.3268.6268.7267 7268.7271.6272.8273.227212710271.7275.3278.0277.1277.9279.8282.6282.8280.8280.6279.4278 3277.868.970.170.872.274.977.279 381.483.285.487.388.990.995.1100.0105.2lll.G119.9126.1131.1141.4159.4174.3186.1200.3218.4242.9267.0291.0306.5280.9284.7286.1288.2289 3290.6292.4293.7294.82962297 2297.7299.8301.2302.4303 6304.8305.9307.6308.7309.8310 73114312.675.076.377.078.381.783.584486.386.987.989.090 892.796 3100.0105.7116.0128.5133.7140.1146 7163.2181.71917204.9227.2262.4314.0352.7376.8335.8335.8336.8339.3345 0350.4358.0361.8367.8366 7367 2367.8367.5368.7365.7370.6377.4382.8384.5385.9383.0382.8379.5372.986.587.187.387.690.091.391391.892.393.294.295 797.098 6100.0102 8109.5118 3124.8130.0132 7142.7160.3168 4179.5196.7223.1254.3267.7281.6266.2263.0261.1260.7263 0266.6271.4272.6274.5272 5270 2270.5269.3270.4269.2272.3279.3285.6287.7287.9286.8289.9290.4290.9100.01083123.7142 3143.5150.8160 6181.1201.9212 8227.2257.8308.9396.0472.5511.4435.2437.1441.1447.1458 3467.2480.0488.3501.85018505 6506.3506.0507.2500.9508.4516.2521.8524.3527.3519.9514.3504.8486.271.272.474.177.280.581.883.284.685.986.587.789.591.395.2100.0106.1115.0124.0133.7140.7151.0171.6187.6199.6214.7233.0256.4285.7314.4334.1296.8302.8306.1309.3312.9315.5319.3320.5321.6320.8322.8324.1326.7328.2327.2331.6334.5336.1334.7335.9338.4339.4339.0337.883.083.585.187.389.991.793.895.997.197.398.298.498.398.8100.0101.3103.6107.6115.0120.1126.9150.2167.8182.7202,2216.0239.3278.6319.2350.8296.7304.5308.4310.5314.9320.2325.1327.8331.1330.1329.8331.8336.2337.1339.3339.2345.4352.2354.7356.3359.5363.4362.2364.1100.0101.4103.4107.9115.3120.1128.4160.7183.8202.3228.6247.4286.4349,4407.0446.2375.4387.4393.7396.5403.3411.7417.2419.5422.4419.0417 6420.0426.9427.6430.5428.2438.0448.4452.0454.0458.5464.5461.9464.037.138.240.543.145.247.148.051.358.468.670.372.776.578.081.581.282.385.990.388.789.889.291.091.593.292.794.697.0100.0103.1105.6110.1117.5118.5136.0214.6235.3250.8283.4298.3403.1556.0675.9667.9625.9675.6693.4690.6685.8682.0677.9674.6673.4672.7676.1682.5686.0683.1664.0641.3644.6656.6659.9659.9662.8677.2691.3688.582.982.181.481.080.680.379.677.477.179.181.081.281.582.684.285.387.588.489.392.494.798.699.499.499.499.499.499.6100.0100.9102.8107.3114.7120.5126.4145.8169.6189.0213.4232.6257.8301.8345.9393.8318.5322 9326.7330.6339.6350.2357.6360.8364.5360.6358.3359.9367.4368.7375.9377.8389.0398.9402.1404.4409.2413.4407.6410.6100.0101.2104.0107.4114.7120.6124.1130.31371145.4152.0158.3159.5165.2181.0200.2171.9174.0173.6175.1176.2177.1180.61837187.4189.4190.7191.9192.7193.9195.0197.7198.9200.4201.4202.4203.6204.5205.1206.6See next page for continuation <strong>of</strong> table.222


TABLE B-53.—Consumer price indexes, selected expenditure classes, 1939-82—Continued[1967=100]TransportationMedical carYear or monthTotalTotalNewcarsPrivate transportationUsedcarsMotorfuel ^AutomobilemaintenanceandrepairO<strong>the</strong>rPublictransportationTotalMedicalcarecommoditiesMedicalcareservices1939194019411942194319441945194619471948 ....19491950195119521953 .195419551956195719581959196019611962196319641965196619671968 .196919701971197219731974197519761977 .197819791980198119821981:Jan FebMarAormr»jur&iir: :JulyAusSeptOctNovDec1982:JanFebMarAprNBWJuneJulyAuo ...Sept :OctNovDec43.042.744.248.147.947.947.850.355.561.866.468.272.577.379.578.377.478.883.386 089.689.690.692.593.094.395.997.2100.0103 2107.2112 7118.6119.9123.8137.7150.6165.5177 2185.5212.0249 7280 0291.5264.72709273 5275 3277.8279.9282.6283 7285 2287 2289.1289.8289 92880285.1282.9285 6292.8296.1296.2295.3295 5295 8294.844.243.645.952.351.451.451.354.361.568.272.372.575.880.882.480.378.980.184.787 491.190.691.393.093.494.796.397.5100.01030106.51111116.6117.5121.5136.6149.8164.61766185.0212.3249 2277 5287.5262.9269 4271.7273 4276.0277.9279.6280 52819283 9285.8286.5286 6284 5281.3278.8281.5288.9292.3292.4291.129112914290.443.243.346.669.275682.883.487.494.995894.390 993.59841015105.9104.5104 5104.1103.5103.2100999.1100.0102 8104.4107 6112.01110111.1117 5127.6135 71429153.8166.0179 3190 2197.6185 3184 8182 91861190.9192.2192 519191913192 5195.3197.0197 4195 5194.4196 0197 5198.1198.6198 7197 7197 7199 0200.189.2*75.971.869.177.480 289.583.686994.896.0100.199497.0100.0(3)103.1104 3110.2110 5117.6122 6146.4167,9182 8186.5201.02081256 9296.4234.0234 3235 42391245.2252.9260 3266 9272 8278 2281.4281.9280.5279 7280.9285.12914298.2302.4304.4304.6306 7310 5312.649.048.150.553.454.054.253.854.962.270.472.371.873.975.880.382.583.686.590.088 889.992.591.491.991.891.494 997.0100.01014104.7105 6106.3107.6118.1159 9170.8177.9188 2196.3265.63691410 9389.4385.2410.8420 7419 3416.5414.4412.9411.72411 1409 9409.5408.44061399 2384.1366.9370.6392.4400.2398.4394.2390.73883381.743.143.044.948.849.450.050.452.056.459.661.162.367.068.672.374.876.579.582.483 785.587.289.390.491.692.894.596.2100.0105 5112.2120.6129.2135.1142.2156.8176.6189.7203 7220.6242.6268 3293 6315.8282.7285.4287.7289 0290.8291.9293.5295.5298.73013302.8304.1305.5307 7310.2311.9313.6316.0318.0319.2320.6321.9322.3323.1103.41097119.2128.4129.1127.8132.4141.2163.1177.3184.6198.6222 62413257.8232.4234.2234.7236.3238.9241.0242.9243.0244.2247 5249.5250.6253.3253 4254.5255.1255.7258.7260.8260.8260.0261.4260.7259.633.133.133.133.333.433.533.534.436.040.745.248.954.057.561.365.567.470.011176178.381.084.687.488.590.191.995.2100.0104.6112.7128.5137.7143.4144.8148.0158.6174.2182.4187.8200.3251.6312 0346.0286.4288.1293.9297.2297.7303.9323.1326.5329.1330.8333.2333.8334.9336.8336.7339.3342.1345.6347.2348.1353.3356.3356.0355.636.736.837.038039.941142.144 448.151152.753.756359.361463.464 867.269973 276.479.181.483.585.687.389.593.4100.01061113.41206128.4132 5137.71505168.6184.7202 4219.4239.7265 9294 5328.7279.5282.6284.7287 0289.0291.5295.6299.3301.7304 8308.2310.2313.4316 2318.8321.7323.8326.4330.0333.3336.0338.7342.2344.371.170.871.473 073.574 374.876 281.886187.488.591091.892693.794 796.799 3102 8104.4104.5103.3101.7100.8100.5100.2100.5100.0100 2101.31036105.4105.6105.9109 6118.8126.01341143.5153.81681186 5205.7176.7179.2180.7182.4184.7186.3187.7189.4190.8192.1193.1194.9195.9197.7200.0202.4204.1205.6206.5208.2209.9211.6212.9213.732.532.532.733 735.436 937.940143.546 448.149.251755.057 058.760 462.865568772.074.977.780.282.684.687.392.0100.0107.3116.0124 2133.3138.2144.3159.1179.1197.1216 7235.4258.3287 4318 2356.0302.1305.2307.5309.8311.7314.4319.2323.4326.1329.7333.7335.7339.4342.4345.1348.0350.2353.0357.3361.0364.0366.9371.0373.41 Includes alcoholic beverages, not shown separately.2 Includes direct pricing <strong>of</strong> diesel fuel and gasohol beginning September 1981.3 Not available.Note.—Data beginning 1978 are for all urban consumers; earlier data are for urban wage earners and clerical workers.Source: Department <strong>of</strong> Labor, Bureau <strong>of</strong> Labor Statistics.


TABLE B-54.—Consumer price indexes, commodities, services, and special groups, 1939-82[1967-100]CommoditiesServicesSpecial indexesYear ormonthAllitemsFoodCommodities less foodAllDurableAllservicesRentAllcommoditiesNondurableServiceslessrentAllitemslessfoodAllitemslessenergyAllitemslessfoodandenergyEnergy1193919401941194219431944194519461947194819491950195119521953195419551956195719581959I96019611962196319641965 ....1966196719681969 „19701971197219731974197519761977197819791980198119821981:JanFebMarAprMayJuneJulyAugSeptOctNov .Dec1982:JanFebMarJuneJulyAugSeptOct.NovD€C41.642044.148851.852 753.958 566.972171.472177.879 580180580 281.484 386.687.388.789.690.691.792.994.597.2100 0104.2109.8116.3121.3125.3133.1147.7161.2170 5181.5195.4217.4246.8272.4289.12605283.2265.1266.8269.0271.3274.4276.5279.3279 9280.7281.5282.528342831284.3287.1290.6292,2292.8293.3294.1293.6292.440.240 643.349.654.054.756.362 475.080478.378885.987 086.785985.185.988.690.690.791.592.092.893.694.695.798.2100.0103.7108.4113.5117.4120.9129.9145.5158.4165.2174.7187.1208.4233.9253.6263.8245.4248.3249.8250.8251.9253.2255.0256.2257.7257.9258.0258.4258.8259.5258.8258.9261.5265.1266.5266.4266.6267.5267.8267.734.635238.445150.349650.758170.676 673.574 582.884 383.082881.682.284.988.587.188.089.189.991.292.494.499.1100.0103.6108.9114.9118.4123.5141.4161.7175.41808192.2211.4234.5254.6274.6285.7268.6270.8272.2272.9272.5273.6276.2277.4278,0277 6277.1277.8281.0283 3283 0283.9285.5287.8288.5287.4287.6287.0286.4286.547.748 050.456.058.461.664.168476.882.781.581.487.588 388.587 586.987.890.591.592.793.193.494.194.895.696.297.5100.0103.7108.1112.5116.8119.4123.5136.6149.11566165.1174.7195.1222.0241.2250.9232.4238.0239.6241.1242.6243.8245.5245.9246.2246.5245.9246 0245.2245.0247.8251,9253.5253.8253.9255.4256.0255.848.548151.458460.365 970.974180.386,287.488495.196495.793 391.591.594 495.997.396.796.697.697.998.898.498.5100 0103.1107.0111.8116.5118.9121.9130.6145.5154 3163.2173.9191.1210.4227.1241.12210220.3219.8221.1223.9226.6229.6230.9232.6232 9233.2233.7233.4233 72335235.8239.8243.2244.7244.6244.1246.0246.6247.344.344 746.751653.856 658.662972.277 876.376282.082483.183 583 585.387688.289.390791.291.892.793.594.897.01000104.1108.8113.1117.0119.8124.8140.9151.7158 3166.5174.3198.7235.2257.5261.62453253.2257.5258.1258.2258.0257.5258.4260.3260 7261.1261.1260.22601258 4255.0256.2261.2263.0263.6264.6265.7266.1264.743.543 644.245646.447 548.249151.154 356.958.761.864567.369 570.972.775.678.580.883.585.286.888.590.292.295.8100 0105.2112.5121.6128.4133.3139.1152.1166.6180 4194.3210.9234.2270.3305.7333.3287,7290.1292.5295.4299.6303.5308.8312.2317.3318 6320.6321.8323.9325 3325 5328.4331.8334.9337.0338.9339.7340.3338.6335.656.056.257.258.558.558.658.859.261.165.168.070.473.276 280.383 284 385.987.589.190.491.792.994.095.095.996.998.2100 0102.4105.7110.1115.2119.2124.3130.6137.3144 7153.5164.0176.0191.6208.2224.02009201.9203.0204.2205.9206.8207.8210.3211.92136215.0216.5217.82186219 6220.1221.8222.6224.8226.0226.9228.9230.2230.838.138,138,640.342.144.245.146749.051.954.556.059.362 264.866768.270.173.376.479.081.983.985.587.389.291.595.3100.0105.7113.8123.7130.8135.9141.8156.0171.9186 8201.6219.4244.9285.1324.3354.2304.2306.9309.5312.8317.4321.9328.1331.7337.5338 7340.8342.0344.2345.7345.7349.1352.8356.5358.5360.5361.3361.6359.3355.547.247 348.752153.655 756.959 464.969670.371175.777 579.079 579.781.183.885.787.388.889.790.892.093.294.596.7100.0104.4110.1116.7122.1125.8130.7143.7157.1167 5178.4191.2213.0244.0270.6288.4257.6260.4262.3264.2267.0269.5272.7274.9278.22790280.1280.8281.42821281 7282.9286.0289.7291.5292.5292.9294.0293.6292.183.986.387.083.389.390.491.692.994.397.3100.0104.4110.3117.0122.0126.1133.8146.9160.2169.2179.8193.8213.1238.0261.7279.3251.2252.5260.2263.5265.6268.6269 4270.4271.1272.1273.4273.6275.7278.3280.7282.0282.7283.1284.0283.6282.583 385.287.088389.390.591.693.094.396.6100 0104.6110.7117.6123.1126.9131.3142.2155.3165 5175.8188.7207.0232.8257.1276.1245.7246.8248.1255.6259.0261.3264.82659267.2267.9268.5269.5269.8272.2274.9277.3278.7279,8280.4281.5281,2279.990.190.391.894.294.494.795.094.696.397.8100.0101.5104.2107,0111.2114.3123.5159.7176.6189.3207.3220.4275.9361.1410.0416.1381.7401.1409.3409,8411.3414.0415.7416.1417.1414.9414,1414.6416.4413.0406.1395.7402.1418.6424.5424.5424.2425.0422.6419.91 fuel oil, coal, and bottled gas; gas (piped) and electricity; and motor fuel, motor oil, coolant, etc.Note.—Data beginning 1978 are for all urban consumers; earlier data are for urban wage earners and clerical workers.Source: Department <strong>of</strong> Labor, Bureau <strong>of</strong> Labor Statistics.224


TABLE B-55.—Changes in consumer price indexes, commodities and services, 1948-82[Percent change]194819491950195119521953195419551956195719581959I960. .1961196219631964 .196519661967196819691970197119721973197419751976197719781979198019811982Year or month1981:JanFebMarADrIvTayJune .JulyAusSeptOctNovDec1982:JanFebMar.AprMayJuneJulvAugSeptOctNovDecAlt itemsDec.toDec. 127185.85.9.9.6-.5.42.9301.81.51.571.2161.21.93.43.04.76.1553.4348.812.27.0486.89.013.312 48.93.90.81.07.6.8.91.1 81.0.2.3.34.3-.1.4101.26.2.2.3_ 2-.4Yeartoyear7.8101.07.92.2.8.5-.41.53.62.7.81.61.01.11.21.31.72.92.94.25.4594.3336.211.09.15.86.57.711.313 510.46.10.81.0.6.4.8.71.1.81.1.4.5,43.2-.31.01.06.3.2.53Dec.toDec. 11.7417.75.9-.6-1.4_.42.62.61.3.61.1o1.014.81.62.52.53.85.5402.93410.412.76.3336.18913.01116.03.6Total0.71.26.4.4..5,75.6!o,22.3~\o101.45-.0'.3-.0Yeartoyear7.2-2 6.69.01.3-.9-.9.93.12.3.1.9.5.9.91.11.22.61.83.74.54.73.43.07.412.08.94.35.87.111.412.28.44.0UnadjustedSeasonallyadjustedUnadjustedSeasonallyad-Justed0.61.1,40A.8.6A2.3.1-is191.36.0.2.6.3CommoditiesDec.toDec. 1-0.8-3 79.67.4-1.1-1.3-1.6-.93.12.82.2-.83.1= 91.5191.43.43.91.24.37.22.24.34720.112.26.5 68.011.810.210.24.33.1FoodYeartoyear8.5401.411.11.8-1.5-.2-1.4.73.34.2-1.61.01.3.91.41.32.25.0.93.65.15.53.04.314.514.48.53.16.310.010.98.67.94.0Commoditiesless foodDec.toDec 15.3485.74.6~.2-1.402.52.2.81.5-.3.6.71.2.71.93.13.74.54.82.32.55.013.26.25.14.97.714.311.56.73.8Change from preceding monthSeasonallyUnadjustedadjusted0.8 0.4 0.6.6 1.35 .3 7.4~X \\ .7A 2 .61.0 .7 .64 .5 5.2-.1 .3 .2-.2 .1 .1 .1 .112 7 - 2.8 .6 .0-.1 -.4 -.3.3 -.1.e .8 1.1.8 .6 1.72 .1 6-.4 3 .1.1.0.2 .6-2 .1 .2.0 1 -.1UnadjustedYeartoyear63483.2534.4433.3202.5403.82.93.3201.9201.92.2394.45.26.9815.6384.49.39.5837.78.511.015.413.19.01.1 881.01.31.117121.5.5.9.55!o.9.9.86.6.1.2-.1-.8Dec.toDec. 1Energy 2-0.74.31.5-112.1- 8-22.01.81.41.73.1453.12.816.821.611.66.97.28.037.418.111.91.33.15.120!4.7.41.22.14-.8-1.7= 2.61.64.11.40-.1.2-.6-.6Yeartoyear0.21.72.62.33-.41.81.62.21.52.72.73.92.88.029.310.67.29.56.325.230.913.51.5ServicesDec.Year toto Dec. 1year77 6115 3,6-.1 3.67.5 5.2.9 4.6.2 4.2-1.1 1.9_ 7 231.0 3.131 4.51.1 2.71.3 3.7.4 2.73 19.7 1.77 23.8 1.8.6 2.614 4.92.6 4.037 6.14.2 7.441 823.8 4.122 363.4 6.210.6 11.39.2 8.150 7.35.4 7.958 9.311.7 13.713 8 \A28.6 13.04.0 4.3SeasonallyUnadjustedadjusted0.7 1.112 88511.0.5 1.4.5 1.38 1.76 11.8 1.6.4 .4.2 .6.4 ,41 70 .4-.5 .1-.5 .9.9 1.01.5 .98 .6.2 .6.2 .2.8 .2.3 — 5.2 -.9SeasonallyadjustedUnadjustedSeasonallyadjusted1 Changes from December to December are based on unadjusted indexes.2 Fuel oil, coal, and bottled gas; gas (piped) and electricity; and motor fuel, motor oil, coolant, etc.Note—Data beginning 1978 are for all urban consumers; earlier data are for urban wage earners and clerical workers.Source: Department <strong>of</strong> Labor, Bureau <strong>of</strong> Labor Statistics.225


1958195919601961196219631964196519661967196819691970197119721973197419751976197719781979198019811982Year or month1981;JanFebMarAprMayJuneJulyAug...::::::::::::..Sept .........OctNovDec1982:JanFebMarApr(Jay..: 7JuneJulyAugSeptOctDecTABLE B-56.—Changes in special consumer price indexes, 1938-82[Percent change]All items lessenergyDec.toDec. 1191.414.8121.8131.93.5314.96.45.63.33.58.311.56.74.66.89.211.111.7864.2YeartoYear29.81511121.314153.2284.45.76.14.33.46.19.89.1566.37.810.011.710 06.7All items lessfood andenergyDec.toDec. 1182.281.5111.812153.3395.16.16.63.13.04.711.36.7616.48511.312.1964.5YeartoYearChange from preceding month0.6 5.5.9 91.3 .811.3.4.3.4.5.8 9.9.5.23- 1justed0.54.81.21.01.3.913.4.5.3.2.4.1.910 .9.5.4,2.4-.1=.52.32.1151.11.31.21.51.42.43.54.65.86.24.73.13.58.39.26.66.27.39.712.510.47.40.6.4.61.01.11.41.01.1.5.4.30.8.9.9.6.0.4-.1All iterns lessfood,< Jnergy,and homepurchaseandfina ice 1Dec. Yearto toDec. 1 Year4.65.25.73,42.94.011.16.36.85.56.97.59.99.46.00.5.8.'9.8.9.81.17.4,3,4.67.6.6.4.4.8.6.3YeartoYear3.74.4494.33.16.210.18.3576.4689.611.2956.1All items All items lessfoodDec. Year Dec. Yearto to to toDec. 1 Year Dec. 1 Year18 27 16 2.31.5 .8 2.3 1.915 16 10 177 10 1.1 1.012 11 12 1216 12 1.6 1.312 13 10 1319 17 1.6 1.43.4 2.9 3.3 2.330 29 3.5 3.447 4.2 4.9 4.46.1 5.4 5.7 5.55.5 5.9 6.5 6.03.4 4,3 3.1 4.63.4 3.3 3.0 3.08.8 6.2 5.6 3.912.2 11.0 12.2 9.97.0 9.1 7.1 9.348 58 6.2 6.66.8 6.5 6.3 6.59077 8.5 7,213.3 11.3 14.0 11.412.4 13.5 12.9 14.689 104 9.9 10.93.9 6.1 4.0 6.6SeasonallyUnadsonallySea-Unadjustedadjustejustejustedad-0.8 0.8 0.8 0.910 10 11 10s .64757.8 .8 1.1 .9.9 7 .9 .81.1 1.1 1.2 1.3.8 .8 .8 .810 11 12 12.4.'3 .5 .4 .6.3.2.4 .3 .2 .2.3 .2 .2 .2- 3 -.1 -2.4 .210 10 1*1 101.2 1.0 1.3 1.2.6 .6 .6 7.2 .423 2.1515 4= 2 1 — 1= .4= .5 •=.3UnadjustedSeasonallyUnadjustedSeasonallyadjustedUnadjustedSeasonallyadjustedAll itemsDec.toDec. 14.5 3.94.9 5.25.2 4.55.0 3.527 3.33.3 8.57.8 11.18.7 6.66.8 516.1 6.36,0 797.3 10.89.0 10.89.5 8.57.6 5.0Unadjusted0.6 0.9.8 13.6 .8.8 .67 .6.8 .61.0 .8.8 7.9 .8.8.6 .4.7 .4.5 .5.4.5 .2.671.0.6 7.4 .2.4 .57 .42 .1.5Seasonallyadjusted1 Changes from December to December are based on unadjusted indexes.2 All items less food, energy, and home purchase and financing, taxes, and insurance; estimated series.3 An experimental measure using a rental equivalence approach for homeownership costs. Effective with data for January 1983, <strong>the</strong>consumer price index for all urban consumers will incorporate a rental equivalence measure.Note.—Data beginning 1978 are for all urban consumers; earlier data are for urban wage earners and clerical workers.Source: Department <strong>of</strong> Labor, Bureau <strong>of</strong> Labor Statistics.0.710.8.4.5.876.6.4.1„, 21.08.364.3226


TABLE B-57.—Producer price indexes by stage <strong>of</strong> processing, 1947-82[1967=100]Finished goodsYear or monthTotalfinishedgoodsTotalConsumer foodsCrudeTotalFinished goods excluding consumer foodsTotalConsumer goodsDurableProcessedNondurableCapitalequipmentfinishedconsumergoods19471948..19491950195119521953195419551956195719581959I9601961196219631964196519661967196819691970197119721973.197419751976197719781979198019811982 *74.079977.679 086.586 085.185.385 587.991193.293.093.793 794 093.794195.798.8100 0102.8106.6110.3113 7117.2127 9147.5163 4170.61817195.9217.7247.0269 8280.682.890 483.184 795.294389.488.786.586.389 394.590.192.191792.591.491.995.4101.6100 0103.6110.0113.5115 3121.7146 4166.91810180.4189 9207.2226.2239.5253 6259.399.4107.1101.392.2105.9112.8105.294.798.898.797.4103.594.3100.696.197.095.598.298.6104.8100.0107.5116.0116.3115.8121.21607180.81812193.9201.0216.8233.1237.2263.8252.580.287.680.183.493.291.386.787.684.484.387.993.189.590.790.991.790.790.894.9101.0100.0103.0108.9113.1115.1121.7143 9164.61813177.8187 3204.6223.8237.8250.6257.7100.0102.6105.4109.1113.1115.4120.1139.3156 2166.1177 7190.7213.3247.8273.3285.779.084.082.283.589.588.389.189.490.192.394.694.795.996.396.296.096.095.996.698.1100.0102.1104.6107.7111.4113.5118.6138.61531162.6174 3186.7211.5250.8276.5287.874.679.781.882.788.288.989.690.391.294.397.198.499.699.298 898.397.898.297.998.5100.0102.2104.0106.9110.8113.3115.4125.9138 2144.5152.8166.9183.2206.2218.6226.780.785.882.383 690.087 888.688.989.491.193.292.694.094.794 794.895.194.895.997.81000102.2105.0108.3111.7113.6120.5146.8163 0174.8189.3200.0231.3283.9319.6333.555.460 463.464971.272 473.674.576 782.487 589.891.591.791892.292.493.394.496.8100 0103.5106.9112.0116.6119.5123.5141.0162 5173.4184.6199.2216.5239.8264.3279.680.586582.583 991.890 789.289.188.589.892.494.493.694.594394.694.194.396.199.4100 0102.7106.6109.9112.9116.6129.2149.3163.6169.7180.7194.9217.9248.9271.3280.91981:JanFebMarAorJune. Sri:::: :; :" :JulySectOctNovDec1982: >JanFebMarAprMay :.:.: :.:.:JuneJuly .".Aug......OctNovDec260.9263 3266 0268.5269.6270 52718271 52715274 3274.7275.4277.9277.9277 3277 3277 8279.92817282 328142841284 9285.1251.02513252 6251.9252.8253 8257 6256 3256 2254 0252.7252.9256.4258.225712600262 3263.4260.6259 7259 9257 8257 6258.2257.9265.6279 7279.3263.1258.9262.7256 9253 5253 8260.0273.9280.6282.5263.3266.6259.9254.7241.0239.2227.8232.0235.6247.2248.4247.92481247.4249.8251.3255.0254 2254 4252 0249.9249.0252.1254.0254.5257.3260.3262.0260.2259.4260.6258.0257.4257.1262.4265.5268 7272,1273.3274.1274.7274.6274 72791280.0280.9283.0282.4281.9281.1281.0283.4286.7287.9286.6290.8291.9292.0265.1268.5272 5276.1277.0277.7277.9277.7277 92816282.4283.2285.2284.9284.0282.3281.8284.8288.8290.2289.1293.3294.6294.3214.9215.1214 0216.6218.1218.2218.1218.3215 8224 5224.7225.4226.2224.0223.9224.1225.0225.9226.7227.5223.2231.1230.8231.5302.7308.4316 0320.4321.0322.0322.5322.1324 2324 3325.4326.3329.3330.3328.8325.7324.3328.7335.3337.2338.4339.7342.4341.4254.6258 1260.8262.5263.8265.4265.8265 32715273.0274.1276.2275.0275.8277.2278.1279.2280.2280.7279.5283.8284.0285.1262.5265.0268.2270.6271.5272.3273.5273.0273.12751275.2275.8278.3278.6nil 277.3217.1280.1282.1282.8282.0284.2285.2285.1See next page for continuation <strong>of</strong> table.227


TABLE B-57.—Producer price indexes by stage <strong>of</strong> processing,[1967-100]1947-82—ContinuedIntermediate materials, supplies, and componentsCrude materials for fur<strong>the</strong>r processingYear or monthTotalFoodsandfeeds 3O<strong>the</strong>rMaterials andcomponentsFormanufacturingtainersSuppliesTotalForconstructionProcessedfirolcandlubricantsFoodstuffsandfeedstuffsTotalO<strong>the</strong>rFuelO<strong>the</strong>r19471948194972.478.375.270.076174.272.177 874.566.073.173.285.596.988.266.869.870.177.581076.3101.2110996.0111.7120 8100.366.678778.390.6100791.61950195119521953195478.688.135.586.086.577 787.084 385.385.778188.584 886.286.377 084.383 785.185.589.993.992 893.493.372.084.579.980.081.578 988.888 884.386.3104 6120.1110 3101.9101.0107 6124.5117 2104.9104.977 979.479 982.779.0104 7120.7104 6100.198.21955195619571958195988.192.094.194.395.688.392.695.094.896.488.492.694.895.296.588.993.594.094.096.693.396.2101.996.095.682.688.692.594.794.284.887.188.090.091.297.197.699.8102.099.495.193.197.2103.096.278.884.489.290.391.9103.8107.6106.2102.2105.8I960196119621963::.:..:196495.695.094.995.295.5:::::::::::::96.895.595.395.095.696.595.394.794.995.995.994,694.294.595.498.299.499.098.196.095.594.795.994.794.090.791.893.895.294.397.096.597.595.494.595.193.895.792.990.8:;;:::;::;:::92.892.692.193.292.8101.4102.5102.0100.7102.41966:::::::::::::::::::19671968196996.899.2100.0102.3105.8100099.4102.796.998.9100 0102.5106.197.499.31000102.2105.896.298.8100 0105.0110.897.499.2100097.698.595.898.4100 0102.4106.395.299.4100 0101.0102.899.3105.71000101.6108.497.1105.9100 0101.3109.3100 0102.2106.893.596.3100.0102.3106.6104.5106.71000102.1106.919701971197219731974109.9114.1118.7131.6162.91091111.7118.51684200.2109 9114.3118.91281159.51100112.8117.0127 7162.2112,6119.7126.2136 7161.6105.0115.2118.91315199.1111.4116.6121.91292152.21080111.011561406154.51123115.1127.6174 0196.11120114.2127.5180 0189.4112.7117.0128.0162 5208.9122.6139.0148.7164 5219.4109.8110.7121.91615205.419751976197719781979180.0189.1201.5215.6243.2195.31853190.5203.1226.1178.61894202.3216.5244.4178.7185 4195.4208.7234.4176.4188.4203.4224.7247.4233.02501282.5295.3364.8171.4180 2188.3202.8226.8168.11790188.7198.5218.2196.9202 7209.2234.4274.3191.8190,2192.1216.2247.9206.9228.5245.0272.3330.0271.5305.3372.1426.6507.6188.3206.7212.2233.1284.5198019811982 l280.3306.0310.4252.6250,3239.6282 3310.1315.7265 7286.1290.1268 3287.6293.5503 0595.4591.8254 5276,1285.5244 5263.8272.2304 6329.0319.5259.2257.4247.8401.0482.3474.0615.0751.2866.3346.1413.7376.91981:JanFebMarAprMayJune296.1298.3302.0305.8306.7307.22709261.3255.6254.9253.1253.2298 0301.0305.4309.5310.7311.2279 6280.3281.6284.1285.1285.8279 2280.3282.7288.0288.5289.65519569.8598.3608.5608.7605.7264.6268.2270.9274.3276.4277.2257 8257.8258.9262.4264.0264.6328 0336.5334.2336.3334.4335.4270 7267,1262,1263.5260.6264.3450.1484.9488.4492.1492.4487.4677.4697.7703.6716.673B.4759,2391.0427.9430,9432.5428.3418.1JulyAugSeptNovDec308.5310.1309.7309.4309.0309.4251.1250.2243.5239.3235 2235.2312.7314.5314.6314.6314 5314.9287.9289.8290.2290.2289 5289.3290.4290.7290.0290.1290.2291.1602.0607.8601.4596.9595.1598.1278.8280.3280.6280.9280.6280.2266.0266.1267 2268.3337.3333.0327.4319 9313 9311.5267.2261.8253.4245.7238 3233.7487.2485.3486.0479.2476.3478.6781.2766.7788.7779.0792.5813.0413.1413.9410.2404.1397.8396.21982:»Jan .FebMarAprMayJune::;::::::::::::311.0311.1310.6309.9309.8309.9238.8239.4237.7240.92450245.1316.4316.4316.0315.1314 6314.7290.4290.9290.4290.62914289.8292.0293.0293.3294.0293 7294.5604.4596.8593.0579.9570.9581.1282.5285.5286.3287.0287.0286.5269.8270.4270,6272.12734273.4318.4321.6320.0322.6328 3325.6242.6248.3247.9254.4262 6259.9481.5479.3475.2469.9470 2467.7812.9824.5839.7851.28648C83.9399.53918387.1378.8376 6370.0JulySentOctNovDec.311.1310.8310.7310.0310.1310.2243.6240.2238 4234 8234.6235.4316.1316.0316 0315 5315.7315.7289.2288.7290 2289 5288.9288.7294.3293.5293.4293 2293.0294.5600.7603.8593.2590 2594.3593.6286.3285.4285.5285.1284.7284.6273.1272.6272 5272 3273.0273.2323.4319.8316 3312 2313.4312.6255.5249.6242.9236 3236.3237.0469.8471.0474.3475 4479.0475.0901.3906.9926.3919.4955.3949.5369.2369.5369.6372.2369.5366.01 Data have been revised through August 1982 to reflect <strong>the</strong> availability <strong>of</strong> late reports and corrections by respondents. All data aresubject to revision 4 months after original publication.* Intermediate materials for food manufacturing and feeds.Source: Department <strong>of</strong> Labor, Bureau <strong>of</strong> Labor Statistics.228


TABLE B-58.—Producer price indexes by stage <strong>of</strong> processing, special groups, 1974-82[1967=100]Finished goodsExcluding food andenergyIntermediate materials, supplies,and componentsCrude materials for furprocessing<strong>the</strong>rYear or monthTotalFoodTotalEnergyCapitalequipmentConsumergoodsexcludedandenergyTotalFoodsandfeeds 1O<strong>the</strong>rTotalEnergyFoodstuffsandfeedstuffsEnergyO<strong>the</strong>r197419751976197719781979198019811982 21981:JanFebMarAprMayJuneJulyAugSeptOctNovDec1982: 2JanFeb..MarApr«h» ::JuneJulyAugSeptOctNov...Dec147.5163 4170.6181.7195.9217.7247.0269.8280.6260.9263.3266.0268 5269.6270.5271.82715271.5274.3274 7275.4277.9277 9277.3277.3277.8279.9281.7282.32814284.1284 9285.1166.9181.0180.4189.9207.2226.2239.5253.6259.3251.0251.3252.62519252.8253.8257.6256.3256.2254.0252.7252.9256.4258.2257.1260.0262.3263.4260.6259.72599257.8257.6258.2215.2252 4282.3326.7347.7469.9701.3835.4823.4758.1790.2838.78539854.2857.3852.4842 0847.1841.6842 2846.6842.3832 6814.0775.3758.2789.8834.7844 3846 6841.7855 3845.9133.3148 5156.8166.3178.7194.7216.4235.1248.5228.2229.5230.2232 8234.0234.7235.5236.1235.8240.72416242.3244.7244 6245.2246.4247.3248.1248.8249.52480252.7253 0253.7141.0162 5173.4184.6199.2216.5239.8264.3279.6254.6256.7258.1260 8262.5263.8265.4265.8265.3271:5273.0274.1276.2275 0275.8277.2278.1279.2280.2280.7279 5283.8284 0285.1129.1141.0148.1156.6168.0183.3204.2220.1232.5214.4215.4215.82183219.3219.7220.3220.9220.7225.0225.7226.2228.6229.0229.5230.6231.5232.1232.6233.3232 0236.7237.0237.4162.9180 0189.1201.5215.6243.2280.3306.0310.4 .296.1298.3302.03058306.7307.2308.53101309.7309.4309 0309.4311.03111310.6309.9309.8309.9311.1310.8310 7310.03101310.2200.2195.3185.3190.5203.1226.1252.6250.3239.6270.9261.3255.6254.9253.1253.2251.1250.2243.5239.3235.2235.2238.8239.4237.7240.9245.0245.1243.6240.2238.4234.8234.6235.4188.72208236.8267.3280.3348.6484.9573.6570.9532.0548.8575.4585 3586.0583.4580.6585.9579.7575.7574 0576.8582.6575.7572.2560.2552.0561.4579.3582.2572 4569.2572.4571.2156.7174.7185.0196.1210.4234.2261.8283.4290.1274.3275.9277.82813282.6283.4285.5287.0287.7288.2288 2288.4289.4290.2290.2290.7291.1290.1289.6289.2290.3290.1290.0290.2196.1196.9202.7209.2234.4274.3304.6329.0319.5328.0336.5334.2336,3334.4335.4337.3333.0327.4319.9313.9311.5318.4321.6320.0322.6328.3325.6323.4319.8316.3312.2313.4312.6189.4191.8190.2192.1216.2247.9259.2257.4247.8270.7267.1262.1263.5260.6264.3267.2261.8253.4245.7238.3233.7242.6248.3247.9254.4262.6259.9255.5249.6242.9236.3236.3237.0223.02669283.1323.5362.5439.9586.1783.4801.7696.0782.67851790 5798,2793.5793.6786.4795.7786.87912800.6801.57969788.8778.5784.0792.0799.4801.7810.0816.7830.2820.1198.3165.0191.0190.1209.2253.0269.4266.0238.2274.1271.1275 5277 9272 7267.5267.0269.0263.3257.8249 3?4fi??%!249 9248.5246.8243.7?34 3232.9?m 233.2?30fi227.5227.61 Intermediate materials for food manufacturing and feeds.2 Data have been revised through August 1982 to reflect <strong>the</strong> availability <strong>of</strong> late reports and corrections by respondents. All data aresubject to revision 4 months after original publication.Source-. Department <strong>of</strong> Labor, Bureau <strong>of</strong> Labor Statistics.229


TABLE B-59.—Producer price indexes for major commodity groups, 1940-82[1967 = 100]Farm products and processedfoods and feedsIndustrial commoditiesYear or monthTotalFarmproductsProcessedfoods andfeedsTotalTextileproductsandapparelHides,skins,lea<strong>the</strong>r,andrelatedproductsFuels andrelatedproducts,andpower»Chemicalsand alliedproducts *194019411942194319441945194619471948194919501951 ...19521953195419551956195719581959 ,I96019611962196319641965196619671968196919701971197219731974197519761977 . .19781979198019811982 •1981:Jan ,.FebMar...AprMayJuneJulyAugOctNovDec1982: *JanFebMarAprMayJuneJulyAug , ,SeptOctNovDec94.3101.589.693.9106 9102.796 095.791290.693.798.193.593.793.794.793.893.297.1103 5100.0102 4108.01117113.9122.4159.1177.4184.2183.1188 8206.6229.8244.7251.5248.9257.9255.1253 5253.8252.9254.3256.8254 2250 3246.0242.5241.0246.0248.4247.5251.6255 8255.3252.4249.6247.5243.9244.0244.841.450.364.875.075.578.59091094117.5101.6106.7124 2117.2106 2104.798 296.999 5103.997.597.296.398 096.094.698.7105 9100.0102 5109.11110112.9125.0176.3187 7186.7191.0192 5212.5241.4249.4254 9242.3264.5262.4260 7263.3259.6260.7263 3257 92511243.1237.4234.6242.2247.1244.72506256 5252.7246.6240.8234.4229.1230.6232.582 988.780.683.492 791.687 488.985.084.987 491.889.489.591.091.992.592 395.51012100.0102 2107.31121114 5120.8148.11709182.6178.01861202 6222.5241.2248 7251.5253.3250.2248 5247.6248.2249.9252 22512248 9246.6244 3243.6247.1248.1248.125112544255.8254.6253.5253.6251.0250 4250.644.047 350.751.552.353.058070 876.975.378.086184.184 885.086 990.893 393.695.395.394.894.894.795296.498 5100.0102 5106.011001141117.9125.9153 8171.5182.41951209.4236.5274.83041312.3291.5295.7299 6303.5304.7305.1306 2307 2307 4309.0309 3310.0311.8311.63110309 9309 6310.6312.8313.2312.9314.4315.1315.0103.6108.198.9102.7114.6103.4100.898.698.798.798.897,098.499.597.798.698.599.299.8100.1100.0103.7106.0107.1109.0113.6123.8139.1137.9148.2154.0159.8168.7183.5199.7204.3193.1193.9195.2197.6199.2200.1201.3202.4202.9204.0203.6203.4205.0205.62054205.4205.0204.1204.2203.8202.6203.5202.445.248.452.852.752.252.961183.384.279.986.399.180.181.377.677.381.982.082.994.290.891.792.790.090.394.3103.4100.0103.2108.9110.3114.1131.3143.1145.1148.5167.8179.3200.0252.4248.9260.9263.0258.2257.7261.2263.5263.7261.6261.1261.3261.7260.0259.8260.7261.8261.6260.6263.4263.2261.8263.1262.0264.8264.7264.3265.251.454.656.257.859.560.164 476.990.586.287.190.390.192.691.391.294.099.195.395.396.197.296.796.393.795.597.8100.098.9100.9106 2115.2118.6134.3208.3245.1265.6302.2322.5408.1574,0694.5693.4634.6667.5696.5707.2709.0707.6704.9704.3703.5698.1698.1702.5705.1697.8689.7670.6662.2677.3701.1705.6701.8699.6707.3702.652.457.063.364.164.865.270 593.795.987.688.9101796.597 798.998.599.1101.2102.0101.6101.8100.799.197.998.399.099.4100.099.899.9102 2104.1104.2110.0146.8181.3187.2192.8198.8222,3260.3287.6292.4274.3277.6280.4286.0288.6290.5291.3293 3293 3292.4292.0291.8292.9293.6294.6294.3295.0293.3291.6291.6291.4290.4290.5289.3See next page for continuation <strong>of</strong> table.230


TABLE B-59.—Producer price indexes for major commodity groups,1940-82—ContinuedYear or monthRubberandplasticproductsLumberandwoodproducts[1967 = 100]Pulp,paper,andalliedproductsIndustrial commodities—ContinuedMetalsandmetalproductsMachineryandequipmentFurnitureandhouseholddurablesNonmetallicmineralproductsTransportationequipment:Motorvehiclesandequipment3Miscellaneousproducts19401941194219431944194519461947194819491950195119521953195419551956195719581959I9601961196219631964 . . .1965196619671968...19691970197119721973197419751976197719781979198019811982 21981:JanFebMarAprIVfayJun'e :JulyAiigSeotOcitNovDec1982: 2JanFebMarAprMayJuneJulyAugOctNovDec57 161571673.611170.570 870.572 870.585.9105.495.589.190.4102.4103 8103.4103 3102.9103199.296 396.895 595.997 8100.01034105.3108 31091109.31124136.2150 2159.2167 6174 8194.3217 4232 6241.6224.8226.4228 4230 82318233.423212341235 7237 3238.0238 3237 3239.3240.824112421242.5242.0242.6243 3243 0242 6243.027.432 735.637.740.641.247.273.484.077.789.397.294.494.392.697.198.593.592.498.895.391.091.693.595.495.9100.2100.0113.3125.3113.6127 3144.3177.2183.6176.9205.6236.3276 0300.4288.9292.8284.7296.5294.7294.4299.4298 4298.1296.5294.5289.3284.3282.1285.4285.5285.2285.3286.5284.6289.0288.6284.2283.0279.6279.9284.872.575.772.474.388.085.785.585.587.893.695.496.497.398.195.296 395.695 496.298.8100.0101.1104.0108.21101113.41221151.7170.4179.4186.4195 6219.0249 2273.8288.6264.4267.2269.027142721272.9274.9275.9277 8279 2280.4281.0285 5286.3287.4288.5289 6289.5289.1289.3289.2289.2289.6289.537 838 539.139.039 039.644.354.962.563.066.373.873.976.376.982.189 291.090.492.392 491.991291.393 896.498 8100.0102.6108.51166118 7123.5132 8171.9185 6195.9209.02271259.3286.4300 4301.8294.0294.0296.4298 82991298.4302.0304.1304 9305 3304.2303.3304 7304.2302.9303.1302 8299.3299.5299.2301.8302.13010300.941.442142.842.442.142.246.453.758.261.063.170.570.672.273.475.781.887.689.491.392.091.992.092.292.893.996.8100.0103.2106.5111.4115 5117.9121.7139.4161.4171.0181.7196.1213.9239.8263.3278.7253.3255.3257.5259.6260.7262.1264.8266.2268.1269.3270.4272.0274.1275.4276.2277.6278.2278.6279.6279.9280.3280.9281.3281.853 857 261.861.463163.267.177.081.682.984.791.890.191.992.993.395 898.399.199.399.098.497 797.097 496.998.0100.0102.8104.9107.5110 0111.4115.2127.9139.7145.6151.51604171.3187.7198.5206.8194.0195.2195.8196.4197 4197.3199.5199.6201.0201.3202.1202.9203.5204.6205.5206.0206.5207.0206.8208.1207.7208.4208.3208.649150 252 352.453 555.759 366.371673.575.480.180.183.385.187.591394.895.897.097 297.697 697.197 397.598 4100.0103.7107.7112.9122 4126.1130.2153.2174.0186.3200.5222 8248.6283.0309.5320.2296.6297.9300.9310.8312.0313.6314.3314.1313.2313.3313.7313.5315.6319.0319.9320.2321.2320.9321.1320.5320.2321.2321.5320.940.443 247.247.247 548.356.064.170.875.775.379.484.083.683.886.391295.198.1100.398.898.698.697.898.398.598.6100.0102.8104.8108.7114.9118.0119.2129.2144.6153.8163.7176.0190.5208.8237.6251.3229.0230.9229.5233.9236.0236.7237.4238.4232.8247.8248.9249.5250.8246.8246.8247.2249.2251.1252.0252.8245.0258.1257.5257.973.576 578.079.283 983.485 686.486 587 690.292 092.293 093.393 794.595 295.997 7100.0102.2105.2109.9112 9114.6119.7133.1147.7153.7164.3184.3208.7258.8265.7276.6264.3264.9264.0266.0266.9266.3263.2262.6267.0268.5267.5267.6268.3273.5272.7273.2272.2271.5273.4272.0280.3285.9285.7290.31 Prices for some items in this grouping are lagged and refer to 1 month earlier than <strong>the</strong> index month.2 Data have been revised through August 1982 to reflect <strong>the</strong> availability <strong>of</strong> late reports and corrections by respondents. All data aresubject to revision 4 months after original publication.3 Index for total transportation equipment is not shown but is available beginning December 1968.Source: Department <strong>of</strong> Labor, Bureau <strong>of</strong> Labor Statistics.231


Year or month1950195119521953195419551956195719581959I9601961196219631964196519661967196819691970197119721973197419751976197719781979198019811982 •1981:JanFebMarJuneJulySeptOctDec:....:::..:::..1982:»JanFebMarAprMay'::::::::::.::.JuneJulyAugsept'::.::OctNovDecTABLE B-60.—Changes in producer price indexes for finished goods, 1950-82TotalfinishedgoodsDec.toDec. 110.42.9=2.2.5= .1124.23.2= .418-.5.1—• 23322163.14.82.23.23811818.3663.76.99.212.811.87.13.51.4.91.0.9.5o 1.0.9_ o20.2.8.61.0Yeartoyear1.89.5-.6= 1.022.83.62.380=13.41732122.83.73.53.1319115.310 84.46.57.811.113.59.24.0UnadjustedSea-son-3justed1.2A.9.4 3.2.6.5— 2„ 1To.5-ll.5Finishedconsumerfoods[Percent change]-1.1 -1.6 1.2 1.2 1.4 1.4 .4 .4 5.7 5.7.5 .8 .2 .7 1.2 1.2-Is-lo -.4-.4 =.1 .3 .4— 8 -.2 1.5 1.5 .8 1.5 .2-.1-.2 .4 :9 .4 1.1 .1 .3.1 .0 .i -.1 -.1 .4 .6 -ill -'.7FinishedFinished goods excluding consumer foodsenergygoodsTotal Consumer Cap talDec. Yeargoods equipmentDec. Yearto toDec. 1Oec. Year Dec. Year Dec. Yearto toyear to to to to to to Dec. 1yearDec. 1 year Dec. 1 year Dec. 1 year13,35.31.912.48.2.91.67.210.33.42.49.7-5.9 =.9-1.1 -1.3 .8 1.7«2.2 -5.21.6 .9 2.3 1.7-1.9 =.8.31.1 1.229 -2517 8 56 303.6 -.22.5 2.4 8.3 7.45.3 3.51.7 2.5 4.3 6.24 582 .1 1.3 2.6=3.752-4.722.841.341.0.11.92= 1.8= .3 -.1 .2 .1.9-.2 .3 .4-1.2 :i 0.2.4 .5i _ l .9 1.091 389 .7 1.5 1.21.4 6.51.7 1.6 3.9 2.54 162.1 19 3,1 3.34.88.2=2.55.93.66.23.21.62.43.44.32.12.62.73.53.72.02.93.92.02.12.43.03.43.04.64.92.43.53.34.84.180 56 2 1 20 20 19 20 2522 5 20 3 66 41 74 45 53 3313.055-2 56.914.084— 35.321.2726.26.916.01216.37.020.567606.716.910 56.27.222.68.26.47.314.215.26.76.516.411.512.117.311.815.7117 9.1 8.3 7.3 8.5 7.1 7.9 7.9 8.57.4 9.2 14.8 11.9 17,5 13.3 8.8 8.7 58.06.435.17.5 5.9 13.3 16.2 14.2 18.6 11.4 10.8 27.8 49.21.4 5.9 8.8 10.3 8.5 10.2 9.2 10.22.1 2.2 4.0 4.5 3.9 4.1 4.0 5.814.1 19.1-1.4Percent change from preceding monthSea-Sea-Sea-Sea-Sea-son-UnadjustejustejustedUnad-sonsonallsonallyUnad-Unadjustedadjustejusted3Unadjustesonad-3 3justed justedjusted0.7 0.6 1.6 1.4 1.6 1.4 1.5 1.2 2.2 1.9.1 -.1 1.2 1.0 1.3 1.1 .8 .9 4.2 3.8.51.2 1.2 1.5 1.46.1 S.8-.3 2 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.2 llọ 1.8 1.32 .4 .2 .3 .0 7 > .0 -.8.5 .3 .6 .3 .5 .5.4 .41.5 .8 .2 .2 .1 .1 .6 .6 .6 -.55 1_ i 21.2 = 11=-.0.0.1 .5 2.6= .9 -2 1.6 .8 1.3 .8 2.3 1.0=-.1-.5 =.7 .3 .8 .3 .9 .6 .71.4.1.3 .4.4 .6 .5 .91.4 1.1 .7 .4 J .4 .8 .5 =.5 -.974 5-.1 -.3 -.4 = .4 -1.2 -1.6- 1 = 2 = .1 -.3 -4 .3 .5 -2.2 -2.61.1 1.7 -.3 = .4 —6 —.7.3 =4.8 =5.2.9 .6 -.0-.213 .4 -2.2 -3.0.5.9 111 1.1.4 .7 4.2 4.2Finished goodsexcluding foodand energyDec.toDec. 16.15.66.38.39.410.77.84.71.5.6Is.3.3.12.1.'31.0= .0A.31.9.3Yeartoyear11.45.66.17.59.011.18.65.7UnadjustedSeasonallyadjusted1.2.5ill.4.6.4.6.31.0.2.7-.1.3.5.2.6.4.6— 1Is1 Changes from December to December are based on unadjusted indexes.z Oata7iave been revised through August 1982 to reflect <strong>the</strong> availability <strong>of</strong> late reports and corrections by respondents. All data aresubject to revision 4 months after original publication.Source: Department <strong>of</strong> Labor, Bureau <strong>of</strong> Labor Statistics.232


MONEY STOCK, CREDIT, AND FINANCETABLE B-61.—Money stock measures and liquid assets, 1959-82[Averages <strong>of</strong> daily figures; billions <strong>of</strong> dollars, seasonally adjusted]Year and monthMlSum <strong>of</strong>currency,demanddeposits,travelers'checks, ando<strong>the</strong>rcheckabledeposits


TABLE B-62,—Components <strong>of</strong> money stock measures and liquid assets, 1959-82[Averages <strong>of</strong> daily figures; billions <strong>of</strong> dollars, seasonally adjusted, except as noted]PeriodCurrencyDemanddeposits1O<strong>the</strong>rcheckabledepositsOvernightrepurchaseagreements(RPs)(net)NSANSAMoneymarketmutual fund(MMMF)balancesOvernightEurodollarsGeneralpurposeandbroker/dealerNSAInstitutiononlyNSASavingsdepositsSmalldenominationtimedeposits2Largedenominationtimedeposits2Termrepurchaseagreements(RPs)NSATermEurodollars(net)NSASavingsbondsShorttermTreasurysecuritiesBankers'acceptancesCommercialpaperDecember:1959I9601961196219631964196519661967196819691970197119721973197419751976197719781979198019811982"28.9?9 029.6W fi32.534.336.340 443.446.1491WIVift61 567.873 880 688 697 4106.1116?123.1132.6111.6112 5116.5118.1121.7127.0132.5134.6143.9155.1158.8166.3176.8193.6202.5207.42141224.42396253.9262.2267 2236.4240.20.00.00.112.49?7428.416.926977.0101.30.00.0 0.0.0.0111.62.5142.5316.87.27513717 822122,730531.439.50.0o.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0o.0o.0.0o.0102.03.60.0n.0.0 n.0.0n.0.0no i2.1i??8?97134.445 8196.7 151.26.1 177.50.0o.0o .0.0•f).0.0.0on on469319.313933.743.1146.01587175.0194.3213.9234.8256.5?5?K263.3268.5263.2259.3?908320 21?S9337.6387 74*tl7490 4479.9421.73989343.6400.311.812 915.220726.229.935.255.9790101.9121.7153 6192.0233 9267.6290.03409396545415339652.67517854.7904.21.2203.96.910.715.221.223.131.037.420.445 057.673 2111.2144.41298118.21452194 6221.8257 9300.3332.60.00.00!c.0101.52.4142.5337.18.49015.021027 530.237 835.433.60.781.41.61.92.41.72.12.12.92.72.22.73.65.48.09.713.118729.942.948.466.746.145746.546948.149,049.6SO?51251.851.752 0VH57 660 463.267 271776480.379.672367.738.636 737.039 840.738.540.743?38.746.159.549 2W341150 053.677.1811899128.51567176.50.581.010n1.21.51.61.72.23.23.33.53.34.710.68.48.811.821.426.531.839.73.6515.2687.79.110.214.417822.534.034 532.735241.950.148051.762979.297.0981104.21981:JanFeb .MarAprMavJune116?117?117.81191119.4119.7July120.5Aug1?0 7Sept .... 121.1Oct121.3Nov121.8Dec123.1254.1244 8243.0243.5240.4237.7236.7236.6234.7235.7235.7236.443 253359.566565.266.768.169 571.271.674 777.030 630431.931834.536.535.435 332.730.230 431.452 6S849 7S?4.6 85.4506.5 %n98.86.4 102.96.9 112.878 1???6.9 130.65.9 137.365 144 96.7 151.215017 320.221319.520.121.623 326.629.432 033.7384 5378 5378.53788373.5366.8361.03509343.1339.6340 9343.676817757782.07841795.8805.5814.08308839,7849.8856.6854.7267.52717269.8267.6278.3285.6293.1299 8302.3302.2300.6300.339238136.136 737.738.837.233433.833.435 635.450.252252.152.657.057.958.761.061.263.465.566.771771070.670370.069.769.468968.467.967 767.7161.1163 6161.9157.6158.2160.3161.8164.1168.1176.0179.9176.532.432.533.334.535.636.437.137.337.637.138.139.797.797 096.194.297.1100.3100.8102.4103.8104.4103.7104.21982:JanFebMarAprMayJuneJutyAugiNovDec"123.8124.6125.1126.31?7 4128.4128.8I?*) 1 )no 5W ?Wfi132.6239.3234.5233.0233.02327231.0230.6231.1232 6236.22383240.281.183.885.888.687087.587.490293 096 51007101.335.735.636.734.635 836.036.437 636839 740639.57.5 154.97.3 156.16.3 159.45.8 162.170 164 67.0 168.97.0696562666.1171.7180 618? 51841186 6177.532.530.531.531.532833.736.743143 944 845343.1348.8348.6350.7350.53509349.9344.0342 0342 43526362 3400.3'Demand deposits at all commercial banks o<strong>the</strong>r than those due to domestic banks, <strong>the</strong> U.S. Government, and foreign banks and<strong>of</strong>ficial institutions less cash items in <strong>the</strong> process <strong>of</strong> collection and Federal Reserve float.2 Small denomination and large denomination deposits are those issued in amounts <strong>of</strong> less than $100,000 and more than $100,000,respectively.Note, NSA indicates data are not seasonally adjusted.Travelers checks are a component <strong>of</strong> money stock but are not shown here.See also Table B-61.Source: Board <strong>of</strong> Governors <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Federal Reserve System.852.3859.4869.9881.6894.1900.9919.7930.6932.6923.8923 0904.2302.6308.0312.6317.23216328.3335.8339 6339 3342 53404332.632.532.531.534.232631.229.332130 531333 533.669.973.874.478.583 384.884.281.567.867.867.767.767 767.867.767 6180.3186.4191.0191.71919194.8199.9200.540.237338.339.940.340.840.2105.5108.4110.3109.71121115.7118.7112.0234


TABLE B-63.—Commercial bank loans and investments, 1939-82[Billions <strong>of</strong> dollars]Year and monthTotal loansandinvestmentsTotalLoansCommercialandindustrialUS.TreasurysecuritiesInvestmentsO<strong>the</strong>rsecuritiesLoans plusloans soldto bankaffiliatesEnd <strong>of</strong> month >1939- Dec1940- Dec1941- Dec1942- Dec1943- Dec1944- Dec1945- Dec1946- Dec1947: Dec1948: Dec1948- Dec1949- Dec1950- Dec1951- Dec.1952: Dec1953- Dec1954: Dec1955: Dec1956- Dec1957: Dec1958- Dec1959- DecI960- Dec1961- Dec1962- Dec1963: Dec1964: Dec1965: Dec1966- Dec1967: Dec1968: Dec1969- Dec1970: Dec1971: Dec1972- DecAverage formonth 21972- Dec1973- Dec1974- Dec1975- Dec1976: Dec1977: Dec1978- Dec1979- Dec.1980: Dec1981- Dec1982- Dec1982:JanFebMarJuneJulvA UgSeptOctNovDec40.743950 767.4851105.5124 0114 0116.3114.3113.0118.7124.7130 2139.11431153.1157.61616166.41812188.7197 4212.82312250.2272.3300.13161352.0390.2401.7435.5485.7558.0572 6647 8713.6745 2804.6891.51,013.51,135.91,239.61316 31,412.4132011332 41342 51,352.51,362.01,368.813761138311,389.41397 51398 51,412.417.218 821.719.219.121.626131.138.142.541.542.051.156.562.866.269.180.688.191.595.6110.5116.7123.6137.3153.7172,9198.2213.9231.3258.2279.4292.0320.9378.9390 5460.5520.1517.4555.0632.5747.0849.9915.1973.91,042.3974.5985.2995.01,002.01,010.81,017.11 023.71028 31,033.51,038.11 036.41,042.3Seasonally adjusted39.442143.947 652.158.469.578 686.295.9105.7110.0116.2130.4137 5165 4196.91896190.9210.9245.9291.2326.8358 0392.4360.3365.53700373.1378.9383.4386.7387 9392.5394.8392.0392.416.317 821841.459877.690674 869.262.662.366.461.160.462.262 267.660.357.256.965157.759 965.364.761.560.757.153.559.460.751.257.860.662.665 858.553.682.2100.899.893.894.5110.0111.0130.9114.1115.1114.4116.6116.3115.8116.5117.8118.2122.3126.4130.97.174726.86.16.3738.19.09.29.210.312.413.414.214 716.416.816.317.920.520.520.823.929.235.038.744.848.761.371.371.185.7104.2116.5116.3128.8139.9145.6148.8159.3172.8191.5214.4231.4239.2231.5232.0233.1234.0234.9235.9235.9237.1237.6237.2235.8239.2283.3294.7323.7381.5393.1464.8524.8521.8558.7637.1750.7852.9917.8976.71,045.2977.4988.0997.81,004.81,013.51,020.11,026.51,031.11,036.41,040.91,039.31,045.21 Data are for December 31 call dates.2 Data are prorated averages <strong>of</strong> Wednesday figures for domestically chartered banks and averages <strong>of</strong> current and previous month-enddata for foreign-related institutions. Lease financing receivables are included in total loans and investments and in total loans.Note, —Beginning December 1981, levels have been reduced because <strong>of</strong> shifts from U.S. banking <strong>of</strong>fices to International BankingFacilities «


TABLE B-64,—Total funds raised in credit markets by nonfinancial sectors, 1974-82[Billions <strong>of</strong> dollars; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]Item 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981Total funds raised by nonfinancial sectorsU.S. GovernmentForeignPrivate domestic nonfinancial sectorsCorporate equitiesDebt instrumentsDebt capital instrumentsState and local government obligations.Corporate bondsMortgagesHomeMulti-family residentialCommercialFarmO<strong>the</strong>r debt instrumentsConsumer creditBank loans n.e.cOpen-market paperO<strong>the</strong>rBy borrowing sector: TotalState and local governmentsHouseholdsNonfinanciai businessFarmNonfarm noncorporateCorporateDebt instrumentsEquitiesTotal funds supplied to nonfinancial sectorsFinanced directly or indirectly by:Private domestic nonfinancial sectorsDeposits and currencyCheckable deposits and currencyTime and savings depositsMoney market fund sharesSecurity repurchase agreementsForeign depositsCredit market instrumentsCorporate equitiesForeign fundsAt banksCredit and equity instruments ,U.S. Government-related loans, net „.,U.S. Government cash balancesPrivate insurance and pension reservesO<strong>the</strong>r sources.. ,193.9 214.411.8 85.414.8 11.5167.4 117.54.1 9.9163.3107.5100.6 100.916.5 16.119.7 27.264.4 57.637.3 42.06.9 -.015.1 11.05.0 4.662.7 6.69.9 9.632.6 -10.56.6 -2.613.5 10.1167.4 117.515.5 13.753.9 52.198.0 51.67.8 8.520.2 12.569.9 30.765.9 20.84.1 9.9193.9 214.4123.5 148.173.7 101.28.5 15.665.3 83.32.4 1.3-2.2 .2-.250.4 50.7-.6 -3.821.8 2.110.1 -=-8.711.7 10.819.1 23.2-4.6 2.833.4 39.7.8 -1.6273.569.019.6184.910.5174.3123.615.722.885.163.93.911.65.750.725.44.44.016.9184.915.289.580.210.215.454.544.010.5273.5173.5133.417.8111.7= .02.31.744,7-4.613.2-4J17.920.43.047.715.7334.356.813.9263.62.7260.9169.821.921.0126.994.37.118.47.191.140.226.72.921.3263.615.4137.3110.912.328.370.467.62.7334.3184.0148.525.5119.3.22.21.339.0-3.543.51.242.317.6.960.727.5401.753.733.2314.83R9198.728.420.1150.2112.19.221.77.2116.248.837.15.225.1314.819.1169.3126.314.632.479.379.4-.1401.7219.7152.325.6110.36.97.52.072.5= 5.146.76.340.527.23.766.637.8402.037.421.0343.6-7.8351.5216.029.822.5163.7120.17.823.911.8135.545.449.211.129.7343.620.2176.5146.921.434.491.299.0-7.8402.0258.9151.927.282.234.46.61.5122.9-15.922.725.6=2.931.8.560.028.1397.179.229.3288.712.9275.8204.135.933.2135.196.78.820.29.371.74.935.46.624.9288.727.3117.5143.914.433.895.782.812.9397.1271.1179.214.5127.829.26.51.189.72.15.6-23.028.629.0-3.680.814.2406.987.427.3292.3-11.5303.7175.032.923.9118.378.64.625.39.8128.825.351.119.233.1292.322.3120.4149.516.440.592.6104.1-11.5406.9291.3221.027.882.9107.52.5101.9-31.613.6-8.822.334.288.5-20.8See next page for continuation <strong>of</strong> table.236


TABLE B-64.—Total funds raised in credit markets by nonfinancial sectors, 1974-82—Continued[Billions <strong>of</strong> dollars; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]Item1981I II III IVI1982Total funds raised by nonfinancial sectorsU.S. GovernmentForeignPrivate domestic nonfinancial sectorsCorporate equitiesDebt instrumentsDebt capital instrumentsState and local government obligations....Corporate bondsMortgagesHomeMulti-family residentialCommercialFarmO<strong>the</strong>r debt instrumentsConsumer creditBank loans n.e.cOpen-market paperO<strong>the</strong>rBy borrowing sector: TotalState and local governmentsHouseholdsNonfinancial businessFarmNonfarm noncorporateCorporateDebt instrumentsEquitiesTotal funds supplied to nonfinancial sectorsFinanced directly or indirectly by:Private domestic nonfinancial sectorsDeposits and currencyCheckable deposits and currencyTime and savings depositsMoney market fund sharesSecurity repurchase agreementsForeign depositsCredit market instrumentsCorporate equitiesForeign fundsAt banksCredit and equity instrumentsU.S. Government-related loans, netU.S. Government cash balancesPrivate insurance and pension reserves. O<strong>the</strong>r sourcesSource: Board <strong>of</strong> Governors <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Federal Reserve System.431.9111.333.6287.05.2281.8192.736.025.0131.893.44.425.38.589.126.522.811.328.5287.027.1135.0125.019.237.168.763.55.2431.9309.3284.069.739.2148.416.99.740.9-15.521.8-25.447.227.214.179.3-19.7444.552.535.7356.3-3.4359.7200.334.224.5141.696.95.729.49.5159.432.272.610.144.5356.323.1147.1186.120.546.5119.1122.5-3.4444.5278.3153.2-5.2108.359.9-1.6-8.2154.2-29.055.024.031.023.3-2.594.7-4.3380.862.718.9299.2-24.6323.8156.926.319.5111.172.54.123.710.8166.834.266.032.933.8299.214.8128.1156.416.140.1100.2124.8-24.6380.8285.5217.5-6.6103.8137.3-13.8-3.2123.0-55.03.211.9-8.737.4-7.295.0-33.0370.6123.020.9226.7-23.0249.7150.035.026.488.651.64.222.610.299.68.343.222.325.9226.724.371.7130.79.638.582.5105.5-23.0370.6291.9229.253.280.284.38.62.889.5-26.8-25.7-45.619.949.0-3.885.3-26.1361.894.815.5251.5-5.3256.8159.738.320.3101.267.26.220.57.397.16.669.912.28.4251.525.682.1143.85.628.0110.2115.5-5.3361.8242.6205.327.3148.237.6.3-8.148.3-11.0-32.9-46.013.010.023.284.234.7399.5101.416.5281.65.0276.6153.657.516.779.451.83.920.13.6123.025.486.6-5.316.4281.646.997.2137.411.332.893.388.35.0399.5296.5149.7-9.5112.141.21.74.1151.2-4.423.7-16.340.010.1-29.699.1-.4479.7221.21.3257.2.0257.2172.954.342.576.251.47.111.06.684.38.246.6-.930.4257.239.281.6136.512.525.998.098.0.0479.7329.9204.6-5.8123.586.57.6-7.2137.8-12.5-40.8-61.720.953.242.385.49.7237


TABLE B-65.—Federal Reserve Bank credit and member bank reserves, 1929-82[Averages <strong>of</strong> daily figures; millions <strong>of</strong> dollars]Reserve Bank credit outstandingMember bank reserves 1Year and monthTotalU.S.Governmentand FederalagencysecuritiesMember bankborrowingsTotalSeasonalO<strong>the</strong>rTotalRequired1929: Dec.1933: Dec.1939: Dec.1940: Dec.1941: Dec.1942: Dec.1943: Dec.1944: Dec.1945: Dec.1946: Dec.1947: Dec.1948: Dec.1949: Dec.1950: Dec.1951: Dec.1952: Dec.1953: Dec.1954: Dec.1955: Dec.1956: Dec.1957: Dec.1958: Dec.1959: Dec.I960: Dec1961: Dec1962: Dec1963: Dec1964: Dec1965: Dec1966: Dec1967: Dec1968: Dec1969: Dec1970: Dec1971: Dec1972: Dec1973: Dec....1974: Dec1975: Dec1976: Dec1977: Dec1978: Dec1979: Dec1980: Dec1981: Dec1982: Dec...1982:Jan..Feb..,Mar..fcJune..JulyAugSept....OctNovDec P....1,6432,6692,6122,3052,4046,03511,91419,61224,74424,74622,85823,97819,01221,60625,44627,29927,10726,31726,85327,15626,18628,41229,43529,06031,21733,21836,61039,87343,85346,86451,26856,61064,10066,70874,25576,85185,64293,96799,651107,632116,382129,330139,896143,250151,920159,968152,297150,554146,815150,361151,333152,140153,468153,903153,324153,666156,151159,9684462,4322,5102,1882,2195,54911,16618,69323,70823,76721,90523,00218,28720,34523,40924,40025,63924,91724,60224,76523,98226,31227,03627,24829,09830,54633,72937,12640,88543,76048,89152,52957,50061,68869,15871,09479,70186,67992,108100,328107,948117,344126,276127,895137,796146,358136,657136,050133,635136,649138,809139,814141,623141,791140,962141,443143,442146,358801953354902653341572241341181426571,593441246839688710557906871493043272434545572387651,0863211071,0491,298703127625588741,4731,6176426991,5261,7131,6111,5811,1051,205510976455579396142991141804826586547028227298426071,1191,3801,3061,0271,1541,4121,7031,4941,5431,4931,7251,9702,3682,5542,5042,5142,5472,1393,3165,5144,6994,9904,70841 4,64332 6,58513 7,41612 7,24254 7,876134 11,11282 12,147116 13,73853 13,48233 12,91175 14,114132 12,791174 11,569167 12,131237 11,419239 11,121225 11,176119 11,602102 11,38686 11,76847 12,13033 12,9112,3952,58811,47314,04912,81213,15212,74914,16816,02716,51717,26119,99016,29117,39120,31021,18019,92019,27919,24019,53519,42018,89918,93219,28320,11820,04020,74621,60922,71923,83025,26027,22128,03129,26531,32931,35335,06836,94134,98935,13636,47141,57243,9723 40,09741,91842,17243,21041,28039,23039,55839,55239,56739,86440,17739,96340,58741,19942,1722,347* 1,8226,4627,4039,42210,77611,70112,88414,53615,61716,27519,19315,48816,36419,48420,45719,22718,57618,64618,88318,84318,38318,45018,51419,55019,46820,21021,19822,26723,43824,91526,76627,77428,99331,16431,13434,80636,60234,72734,96436,29741,44743,57840,06741,60641,35442,78540,98138,87339,28439,19239,25739,57339,86639,57940,18340,79741,3541 Beginning December 1959, part <strong>of</strong> currency and cash held by member banks allowed as reserves; beginning November 1960 all suchcurrency and cash allowed.Beginning November 1972, includes reserve deficiencies on which Federal Reserve Banks were allowed to waive penalties for atransition period In connection with bank adaptation to Regulation J as amended effective November 9, 1972. Transition period endedafter second quarter 1974.Effective November 1975, includes reserve deficiencies on which penalties are waived over a 24-month period when a nonmemberbank merges into an existing member bank, or when a nonmember bank joins <strong>the</strong> Federal Reserve System.2 Data are for licensed banks only.3 Includes all reserve balances <strong>of</strong> depository institutions plus vault cash at institutions with required reserve balances plus vault cashequal to required reserves at o<strong>the</strong>r institutions.4 Reserve balances with Federal Reserve Banks plus vault cash used to satisfy reserve requirements less required reserves. (Thismeasure <strong>of</strong> excess reserves is comparable to <strong>the</strong> old excess reserves concept published historically.)Source: Board <strong>of</strong> Governors <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Federal Reserve System.238


TABLE B-66.—Aggregate reserves <strong>of</strong> depository institutions and monetary base, J959-82[Averages <strong>of</strong> daily figures; billions <strong>of</strong> dollars]Adjusted for changes in reserve requirements'Year and monthSeasonally adjustedReserves <strong>of</strong> depository institutionsTotal*RequiredNonborrowedMonetarybase 3Not seasonally adjustedReserves <strong>of</strong> depository institutionsTotal 2RequiredNonborrowedMonetarybase 31959- Dec .I960- Dec1961- Dec1962- Dec1963- Dec1964- Dec1965- Dec1966: Decig67- Dec1968- Dec .. .1969- Dec1970- Dec1971- Dec1972: Dec1973- Dec . .1974- Dec1975- Dec1976* Dec1977- Dec1978- Dec1979* Dec1980- Dec1981* Dec1982- Dec"1981:Jan .FebMarMavJuneJulySeDtOctNovDec1982:Jan ....FebMar . .AprMayJuneJulyAucSeDtOctNov0ec p14.9415.1315.6716.0416.4617.0717.7717.8319.5120.7021.0122.1323.5826.3227 6329.2529.2929.8631.1732.8234.2636.4637.9940.9136 5236.5236 8537.02371837.2037 2837 3437.7237 6037 6237.9938.7138 2638 3638 4338.5038.5838 5238 8039.5739.8840.4640.9113.9915.0615.5415.7816.1316.8017.3317.3019.2819.9619.8921.8023.4525.27263328.5229.1629.8130.6031.9532.7934.7737.3540.28351235.2235 8535.6834 9535.1735 60359236.2736 42369537.3537.2036 4736 8036 8737.3937.3737 8338 2938.6339.4039.8440.2814.4314.3915.0915.4715.9716.6617.3517.4919.1420.2820.7221.8823.3926.0327 3328.9929.0229.5930.9832.5933.9335.9537.6740.39361436.1736 5736.8536 9236.8636.9437 0537.3137 3337 2737.6738.3037 9637 99381638.1538.2738 2138 4939.1839.4740.0640.3944.344.545.747.149.451.954.756.860.564.867.972.077.184.290.398.3104.5112.0121.4132.2142.5155.0162.7175.1155.4156.0156.7158.0158.5158.9159.61600160.6160.81612162.7164.3164.7165.2166 5167.7168.8169.2170.1171.9172.8173.7175.115.2215.4215.9616.3116.7117.3218.0618.1619.8220.7221.0022.1423.6326.3527.8529.5929.7030.2731.6733.3734.8337.1138.6641.5938.0136.2836.2436.8836.8936.6837.2437.0637.5237.7037 7838.6640.0438.0537.8038 3338.1938.0738.4338.5139.3540.0040.6841.5914.2815.3415.8216.0516.3817.0617.6217.6319.5919.9719.8821.8123 5125.3026 5528.8629.5730.2231.1132.5033.3535.4238.0340.9636.6234.9735.2435.5434.6634.6535.56356436.0636.5237.1238.0338.5236.2636.2436.7637.0736.8637.7438.0038.4239.5240.0640.9614.7214.6715.3715 7416.2216.9217 6417.82194520.2920.7221.8923 4526.0627 5529.3329.4330.00314833.1334.5036.5938.3441.0737 6435.9335.9636.7136.6336.3536.9036 7737.1137.4237 4438.3439.6237.7537.4438.0637.8337.7638.1238.2038.9739.5940.2841.0745.245 546.748150.452.955857961865.868.873.078285.4917100.0106 3114.1123 7134.8145.4158 0165.8178.4156 5154.3154 9157.0157.9158.4160 5160 3160.2160 8162 6165.8165.3162.9163.3165 6167.1168.2170.0170 4171.4172.9175.1178.4Reserve aggregates include required reserves <strong>of</strong> member banks and Edge Act corporations and o<strong>the</strong>r depository institutions.Discontinuities associated with <strong>the</strong> implementation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Monetary Control Act, <strong>the</strong> inclusion <strong>of</strong> Edge Act corporation reserves, ando<strong>the</strong>r changes in Regulation D have been removed. Beginning with <strong>the</strong> week ended December 23, 1981, reserves aggregates have beenreduced by shifts <strong>of</strong> resemble liabilities to international banking facilities (IBFS), On <strong>the</strong> basis <strong>of</strong> reports <strong>of</strong> liabilities transferred toIBFS by U.S. commercial banks and U.S. agencies and branches OT foreign banks, it is estimated that required reserves were lowered onaverage by $10 to $20 million in December 1981 and $40 to $70 million in January 1982.2 Reserve balances with Federal Reserve Banks (which exclude required clearing balances) plus vault cash at institutions with requiredreserve balances plus vault cash equal to required reserves at o<strong>the</strong>r institutions.3 Includes reserve balances and required clearing balances at Federal Reserve Banks in <strong>the</strong> current week plus vault cash held twoweeks earlier used to satisfy reserve requirements at all depository institutions plus currency outside <strong>the</strong> U.S. Treasury, Federal ReserveBanks, <strong>the</strong> vaults <strong>of</strong> depository institutions, and surplus vault cash at depository institutions.Source: Board <strong>of</strong> Governors <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Federal Reserve System.239


TABLE B-67.—Bond yields and interest rates, 1929-82[Percent per annum]Year ormonthU.S. Treasury securities(new3-month6-monthConstantmaturities 2yearsyearsCorporatebonds(Moody's)AaaBaaHighgrademunicipalbonds(Standard&Poor's)PrimecommercialmonthsPrime ratecharged bybanks *Discountrate,FederalBank <strong>of</strong>New York*Federalfundsrate*1929..1933..1939..1940..1941..1942..1943..1944..1945..1946..1947..1948..1949..1950..1951..1952..1953..1954..1955..1956..195719581959196019611962196319641965..1966..1967..1968..1969..1970..1971..1972..1973..1974..1975..1976..1977..1978..1979..1980..1981..1982..0.515.023.014.103.326.373.375.375.375.5941.0401.1021.2181.5521.7661.931.9531.7532.6583.2671.8393.4052.9282.3782.7783.1573.5493.9544.8814.3215.3396.6776.4584.3484.0717.0417.8865.8384.9895.2657.22110.04111.50614.07710.6863.8323.2472.6052.9083.2533.6864.0555.0824.6305.4706.8536.5624.5114.4667.1787.9266.1225.2665.5107.57210.01711.37413.81111.0842.471.632.473.193.982.844.463.983.543.473.674.034.225.235.035.687.027.295.655.726.957.827.496.776.698.299.7211.5514.4412.922.852.402.823.183.653.324.334.123.883.954.004.194.284.925.075.656.677.356.166.216.847.567.997.617.428.419.4411.4613.9113.004.734.493.012.842.772.832.732.722.622.532.612.822.662.622.862.963.202.903.063.363.893.794.384.414.354.334.264.404.495.135.516.187.038.047.397.217.448.578.838.438.028.739.6311.9414.1713.795.907.764.964.754.334.283.913.613.293.053.243.473.423.243.413.523.743.513.533.884.714.735.055.195.085.024.864.834.875.676.236.947.819.118.568.168.249.5010.619.758.979.4910.6913.6716.0416.114.274.71ZM2.502.102.362.061.861.671.642.012.402.211.982.002.192.722.372.532.933.603.563.953.733.463.183.233.223.273.823.984.515.816.515.705.275.186.096.896.495.565.906.398.5111.2311.575.895.825.816.256.466.977.808.457.747.607.968.929.009.009.029.5610.7812.6614.7015.145.851.73.59.56.53.66.69.73.75.811.031.441.491.452.16• 2.332.521.582.183.313.812.463.973.852.973.263.553.974.385.555.105.907.837.715.114.738.159.846.325.345.617.997 10.9112.2914.7611.895.50-6.001.50-4.001.501.501.501.501.501.501.501.501.50-1.751.75-2.002.002.072.563.003.173.053.163.774.203.834.484.824.504.504.504.504.545.635.616.307.967.915.725.258.0310.817.866.846.839.0612.6715.2718.8714.865.162.561.001.001.00M.00•1.008 1.00•1.00•1.001.001.341.501.591.751.751.991.601.892.773.122.153.363.533.003.003.233.554.044.504.195.165.875.954.884.506.447.836.255.505.467.4610.2811.7713.4211.021.782.733.111.573.303.221.962.683.183.504.075.114.225.668.207.184.664.438.7310.505.825.045.547.9311.1913.3616.3812.26See next page for continuation <strong>of</strong> table.240


TABLE B-67 .—Bond yields and interest rates, 1929-82—Continued[Percent per annum]Year ormonth3-monthBills(newissues) 1U.S. Treasury securities6-monthConstantmaturities 23years10yearsCorporatebonds(Moody's)AaaBaaHighgrademunicipalbonds(Standard&Poor's)Newhomemortgageviews(FHLBB) 3Primecommercialpaper.monthsPrime ratecharged bybanks(high-low) 4Discountrate,FederalReserveBank <strong>of</strong>New York(high-low)*Federalfundsrate 51980:JanFebMar ...Apr.;;;; ...May.... ...June...12.03612.81415.52614.0039.1506.99511.85112.72115.10013.6189.1497.21810.8812.8414.0512.029.448.9110.8012.4112.7511.4710.189.7811.0912.3812.9612.0410.9910.5812.4213.5714.4514.1913.1712.717.218.049.098.407.377.6011.8711.9312.6213.0313.6812.6612.6613.6016.5014.939.298.0315.25-15.2516.75-15.2519.50-16.7520.00-19.5019.00-14,0014.00-12.0012.00-12.0013.00-12.0013.00-13.0013.00-13.0013.00-12.0012.00-11.0013.8214.1317.1917.6110.989.47July....Aug....Sept...OctNovDec8.1269.25910.32111.58013.88815.6618.1019.44310.54611.56613.61214.7709.2710.6311.5712.0113.3113.6510.2511.1011.5111.7512.6812.8411.0711.6412.0212.3112.9713.2112.6513.1513.7014.2314.6415.148.088.628.959.119.5510.0912.4812.2512.3512.6113.0413.288.299.6111.0412.3214.7316.4912.00-11.0011.50-11.0013.00-11.5014.50-13.5017.75-14.5021.50-17.7511.00-10.0010.00-10.0011.00-10.0011.00-11.0012.00-11.0013.00-12.009.039.6110.8712.8115.8518.901981:JanFebMartzz:June14.72414.90513.47813.63516.29514.55713.88314.13412.98313.43415.33413.94713.0113.6513.5114.0915.0814.2912.5713.1913.1213.6814.1013.4712.8113.3513.3313.8814.3213.7515.0315.3715.3415.5615.9515.809.6510.0310.1210.5510.7310.5613.2613.5414.0214.1514.1014.6715.1014.8713.5914.1716.6615.2221.50-20.0020.00-19.0019.00-17.5018.00-17.0020.50-18.0020.50-20.0013.00-13.0013.00-13.0013.00-13.0013.00-13.0014.00-13.0014.00-14.0019.0815.9314.7015.7218.5219.10JulyAugSeptOctNovDec14.69915.61214.95113.87311.26910.92614.40215.54815.05714.01311.53011.47115.1516.0016.2215.5013.1113.6614.2814.9415.3215.1513.3913.7214.3814.8915.4915.4014.2214.2316.1716.3416.9217.1116.3916.5511.0312.1312.8612.6711.7112.7714.7215.2715.2915.6516.3815.8716.0916.6215.9314.7211.9612.1420.50-20.0020.50-20.5020.50-19.5019.50-18.0018.00-16.0015.75-15.7514.00-14.0014.00-14.0014.00-14.0014.00-14.0014.00-13.0013.00-12.0019.0417.8215.8715.0813.3112.371982:JanFebMar....ApeMay,...June...12.41213.78012.49312.82112.14812.10812.93013.70912.62112.86112.22012.31014.6414.7314.1314.1813.7714.4814.5914.4313.8613.8713.6214.3015.1815.2714.5814.4614.2614.8117.1017.1816.8216.7816.6416.9213.1612.8112.7212.4511.9912.4215.2515.1215.6715.8415.8915.4013.3514.2713.4713.6413.0213.7915.75-15.7517.00-15.7516.50-16.5016.50-16.5016.50-16.5016.50-16.5012.00-12.0012.00-12.0012.00-12.0012.00-12.0012.00-12.0012.00-12.0013.2214.7814.6814.9414.4514.15July....Aug....Sept...OctNovDec11.9149.0068.1967.7508.0428.01312.23610,1059.5398.2998.3196.22514.0012.6212.0310.629.989.8813.9513.0612.3410.9110.5510.5414.6113.7112.9412.1211.6811.8316.8016.3215.6314.7314.3014.1412.1111.1210.619.599.979.9115.7015.6814.9814.4113.8113.7013.0010.8010.869.218.728.5016.50-15.5015.50-13.5013.50-13.5013.50-12.0012.00-11.5011.50-11.5012.00-11.5011.50-10.0010.00-10.0010.00-9.509.50-9.009.00-8.5012.5910.1210.319.719.208.951 Rate on new issues within period; bank-discount basis.3 Yields on <strong>the</strong> more actively traded issues adjusted to constant maturities by <strong>the</strong> Treasury Department.'Effective rate (in <strong>the</strong> primary market) on conventional mortgages, reflecting fees and charges as well as contract rate andassuming on <strong>the</strong> average, repayment at end <strong>of</strong> 10 years. Rates beginning January 1973 not strictly comparable with prior rates.«For monthly data, high and low for <strong>the</strong> period. Prime rate for 1929-33 and 1947-48 are ranges <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> rate in effect during <strong>the</strong>period.6 Since July 19, 1975, <strong>the</strong> daily effective rate is an average <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> rates on a given day weighted by <strong>the</strong> volume <strong>of</strong> transactions at<strong>the</strong>se rates. Prior to that date, <strong>the</strong> daily effective rate was <strong>the</strong> rate considered most representative <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> day's transactions, usually<strong>the</strong> one at which most transactions occurred.8 From October 30, 1942, to April 24, 1946, a preferential rate <strong>of</strong> 0.50 percent was in effect for advances secured by Governmentsecurities maturing in 1 year or less.7 Beginning November 1979, data are for 6-months paper.Sources: Department <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Treasury, Board <strong>of</strong> Governors <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Federal Reserve System, Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB),Moody's Investors Service, and Standard & Poor's Corporation.241


TABLE B-68.—Consumer credit outstanding and net change, 1930-82[Millions <strong>of</strong> dollars]Amount outstanding (end <strong>of</strong> month)Net change from preceding periodYear and monthTotalTotalInstallment credit lAutomobileRevolving2TotalInstallmentcredit»TotalNoninstallmentMobilehome 8 O<strong>the</strong>r credit 4AutomobileNoninstallmentcredit 41950: Dec1951: Dec1952: Dec1953: Dec1954: Dec1955: Dec1956: Dec1957: Dec1958: Dec1959: DecI960: Dec1961: Dec1962: Dec1963: Dec1964: Dec1965: Dec1966: Dec1967: Dec1968: Dec1969: Dec1970: Dec1971: Dec1972: Dec1973: Dec1974: Dec1975: Dec1976: Dec1977: Dec1978: Dec...1979: Dec1980: Dec.1981: Dec1981:JanFebMar....%~June...July...,Aug....Sept...OctNovDec1982:JanFebMar...,AprMay....June...July....Aug....Sept...OctNov25,64127,26832,55136,73638,19245,34849,26852,19152,70260,74165,10467,63573,91782,80592,591103,207109,749115,430126,949137,742143,113157,795177,639203,077213,427223,140248,916289,133337,917383,363388,239413,544384,847383,232385,685388,857391,077394,531397,210401,449406,234406,670407,970413,544409,444406,682406,520408,109409,500412,599413,366415,140417,624417,422419,76815,50316,22020,47024,25424,89130,26933,17135,44335,33941,12345,05146,02750,99457,82965,57273,88179,33983,14891,681101,161105,528118,255133,173155,108164,594171,996193,525230,564273,645312,024313,472333,375310,760309,385311,071313,669315,679318,792320,656324,161328,187328,652329,053333,375330,135327,435327,131328,363329,338331,851332,471333,808335,948334,977336,9916,0155,9587,6359,6859,74713,47114,48415,47214,25816,63218,08317,59919,92422,84225,81729,35530,99231,13134,34836,94636,32540,51947,86253,77254,26657,24267,70782,911101,647116,362116,838126,431115,778116,195118,049119,076119,582120,400121,476123,481125,703126,344126,385126,431125,525125,294125,559126,201127,220128,415128,359128,281129,085128,619129,5942,1053,7205,1288,5289,70011,70913,68115,01917,18939,27448,30956,93758,35263,04957,55656,04755,35655,71655,82056,79856,76457,28058,31858,45158,92363,04961,43359,51458,49158,64158,64759,30259,82460,47560,93260,91761,5002,4617,2269,52613,58014,64214,43414,57314,94515,23516,83817,32218,48617,20217,11317,16217,34217,57617,70417,76017,95918,12418,30018,38018,48618,39718,34318,36318,40218,47918,54318,60118,74118,77818,81418,8219,48810,26212,83514,56915,14416,79a18,68719,97121,08124,49126,96828,42831,07034,98739,75544,52648,34752,01755,22860,49561,61461,98266,08576,04782,00585,30194,05693,434108,454121,887120,960125,409120,224120,030120,504121,535122,701123,890124,656125,441126,042125,557125,365125,409124,780124,284124,718125,119124,992125,591125,687126,311127,153126,627127,07610,13811,04812,08112,48213,30115,07916,09716,74817,36319,61820,05321,60822,92324,97627,01929,32630,41032,28235,26836,58137,58539,54044,46647,96948,83351,14455,39158,56964,27171,33974,76780,16974,08773,84774,61475,18875,39875,73976,55477,28878,04778,01878,91780,16979,30979.24779,38979,74680,16280,74880,89581,33281,67682,44582,7774,7891,6275,2834,1851,4567,1563,9202,9235118,0394,3632,5316,2828,8889,78610,6166,5425,68111,51910,7935,37114,68219,84425,43810,3509,71325,77640,21748,78445,4463,2717174,2503,7846375,3782,9022,272-1045,7843,9289764,9676,8357,7438,3095,4583,8098,5339,4804,36712,72714,91821,9359,4867,40221,52937,03943,08138,3791,537-571,6772,050623,7241,013988-1,2142,3741,451-4842,3252,9182,9753,5381,6371393,2172,598-6214,1947,3435,9104942,97610,46515,20418,73614,7154,876 1,448 47625,305 19,903 9,5931,7041,9623,2083,5182,0782,7082,7912,5573,4305841,2124321,620-5165542,0582,0012,279992-1491,138542,656Seasonally adjusted s1,2061,8452,9712,7221,5712,0311,5512,4282,9751,002600-33443759901,1751,3991,349570661,092-3242,523318311,526648-1141491,0561,8592,0791,024564 68-121-56-2823395965561-402505-781,8161,5189101,0334018191,7781,0186516152,2554351,5551,3152,0532,0432,3071,0841,8722,9861,3131,00419554,9263,5038642,3114,2473,1785,7037,0673,4285,4024981172377965076771,240129455-4186124651,177-591-436883602930422-215463781331 Installment credit covers most short* and intermediate-term credit extended to individuals through regular business channels,usually to finance <strong>the</strong> purchase <strong>of</strong> consumer goods and services or to refinance debts incurred for such purposes, and scheduled to berepaid (or with <strong>the</strong> option <strong>of</strong> repayment) in two or more installments. Credit secured by real estate is generally excluded.a Consists <strong>of</strong> credit cards at retailers, gasoline companies, and commercial banks, and check credit at commercial banks. Prior to1968, included in "o<strong>the</strong>r," except gasoline companies, included in noninstallment credit prior to 1971. Beginning 1977, includes openendcredit at retailers, previously included in o<strong>the</strong>r. Also beginning 1977, some retail credit was reclassified from commercial intoconsumer credit.4 Because <strong>of</strong> inconsistencies in <strong>the</strong> data and infrequent benchmarking, series on noninstallment credit is no longer published by <strong>the</strong>Federal Reserve Board on a regular basis. Data are shown here as a general indication <strong>of</strong> trends.o For installment credit, computed as <strong>the</strong> difference between extensions and liquidations (both seasonally adjusted); see also TableB-69. For noninstallment credit, computed as <strong>the</strong> change from one month to ano<strong>the</strong>r in <strong>the</strong> seasonally adjusted amount outstanding.Source: Board <strong>of</strong> Governors <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Federal Reserve System.242


TABLE B-69.—Consumer installment credit extended and liquidated, 1950-82[Millions <strong>of</strong> dollars; monthly data seasonally adjusted]Year or monthTotalAutomobileRevolving *Mobile home 2O<strong>the</strong>rExtendedLiquidatedExtendedLiquidatedExtendedLiquidatedExtendedLiquidatedExtendedLiquidated1950...1951...1952...1953...1954...,1955....1956....1957....1958....1959...,22,13024,58330,61632,57932,26540,26340,88643,10140,95649,13418,86123,86726,35528,79431,62534,88237,89940,75941,29043,3958,4458,95111,61012,74011,74116,73215,57216,55414,28718,0086,9069,0089,93210,68911,67913,00814,55915,56715,50115,63813,68515,63219,00619,83920,52423,53125,31426,54726,66931,12611,95514,85916,42318,10519,94621,87423,34025,19225,78927,7571960...1961....1962...1963...1964...1965...1966...,1967...,1968....1969...,50,82750,59857,56264,66072,44579,91883,82189,058101,426109,42247,02249,73552,60157,82264,61671,61678,36585,19492,07599,94518,11216,47720,16422,61724,79227,91327,84427,62332,22833,68616,66116,96017,84019,69921,81524,38626,20627,48229,01331.0903,4816,1822,7264,56732,71534,12137,39842,04347,65352,00555,97761,43565,71769,55430,36132,77534,76138,12342,80147,23052,15957,71260,33664,2881970...,1971...,1972...1973....1974...,1975...,1976...,1977...,1978...,1979...115,007138,046152,275173,035172,765180,083210,740257,600297,668324,777110,352127,789136,787152,817163,276172,675189,179222,138254,589286,39630,85736,70643,70249,60646,51452,42063,74375,64187,98193,90131,41432,51238,08143,69646,01949,44453,27860,43769,24579,1868,68921,86224,65928,70233,21336,95643,93487,596105,125120,1747,27820,81823,48526,69931,24335,61641,76481,34896,090111,5466122,5215,1217,0615,7884,3264,8595,7125,4126,4714781,7542,9754,1844,7204,5364,7205,3415,1264,86874,84976,95778,79387,66687,25086,38198,20488,65199,150104,23171,18872,70572,24678,23881,29483,07989,41775,01284,12890,7961980...,1931...,306,076336,341304,628316,44783,45494,40482,97784,809128,068140,135126,653135,4385,0936,0284,6104,86789,46195,77490,38891,3331981:Jan..,Feb..Mar.,feJune,July.Aug.SeptOct..Nov.Dec.1982:Jan..Feb..Mar.Apr..May.JuneJuly.Aug.SeptOct..Nov.27,46628,68229,37029,27128,37729,22328,29028.32329,40626,83627,37026,65626,88827,15027,46228,68429,19729,73727,51427,57928,26828,06231,61026,26026,83726,39926,54926,80627,19226,73925,89526,43125,83426,77026,68926,44527,07526,47227,50927,79828,38826,94427,51327,17628,38629,0877,3438,2298,4997,4597,3847,5158,0598,3969,0007,4908,0737,3527,4747,2837,1837,8718,4298,1827,3327,1127,5467,97010,3297,3127,3986,9736,8117,4987,3667,0036,5376,9216,4667,5097,2847,5957,3397,2117,6387,4707.5277,2717,5147,0418,0488,51311,53511,73811,62012,38311,87612,65811,70611,66312,26311,75311,37911,59211,07011,73012,14312,41612,52813,36112,55112,49712,46412,34012,48910.94411,41911,11011,44311,52011,65111,59011,48611,69211,42911,35811,53311,26611,88511,83611,91711,99112,85411,93912,35412,25412,23212,3823924056165936205094455205324754795084343644115444784594415814524764844514925524103723993863643753534043654604083964934083923784404424804448,1968,3108,6358,8368,4978,5417,7447,6117,1187,4397,2047,9107,7737,7257,8537,7627,7357,1907,3897,8067,2768,3087,5537,5287,7647,8857,4167,7767,7607,5087,4437,5867,4997,5077,1247,4437,0297,4617,9297,6157,3567,2057,4397,6267,7481 Consists <strong>of</strong> credit cards at retailers, gasoline companies, 2nd commercial banks, and check credit at commercial banks. Prior to1968, included in "o<strong>the</strong>r," except gasoline companies, included in noninstallment credit prior to 1971. Beginning 1977, includes openendcredit at retailers, previously included in ''o<strong>the</strong>r/' Also beginning 1977, some retail credit was reclassified from commercial intoconsumer credit.2 Not reported separately prior to July 1970.Note.—Installment credit covers most short- and intermediate-term credit extended to individuals through regular business channels,usually to finance <strong>the</strong> purchase <strong>of</strong> consumer goods and services or to refinance debts incurred for such purposes, and scheduled to berepaid (or with <strong>the</strong> option <strong>of</strong> repayment) in two or more installments. Credit secured by real estate is generally excluded.Liquidated credit includes repayments, charge<strong>of</strong>fs, 2nd o<strong>the</strong>r credit.See also Table 6-68.Source: Board <strong>of</strong> Governors <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Federal Reserve System.243


TABLE B-70.—Mortgage debt outstanding by type <strong>of</strong> property and <strong>of</strong> financing, 1939-82[Billions <strong>of</strong> dollars]Nonfarm propertiesNonfarm properties by type <strong>of</strong> mortgageEnd <strong>of</strong> yearor quarterAllpropertiesTotal1- to 4-familyhousesFarmpropertiesMultifamilypropertiesCommercialproperties1Total 2Government underwritten1- to 4-family housesTotalFHAinsuredVAguaranteedConventional 3Total1- to 4-familyhouses193935.56.628.916.35.67.01.81.81.827.114.51940..,..194119421943194436.537.636.735.334.76.56.46.05.44.930.031.230.829.929.717.418.418.217.817.95.75.95.85.85.66.97.06.76.36.22.33.03.74.14.22.33.0374.14.22.33.03.74.14.227.728.227.125.825.515.115.414.51371371945194619471948194935.541.848.956.262.74.84.95.15.35.630.836.943.950.957.118.623.028.233.337.65.76.16.67.58.66.47.79.110.210.84.36.39.813.617.14.36.19.312.515.04.1373.85.36.9I0.22.45.57.28.126.530.634.137.340.014.316.918.920.822.61950195119521953195472.882.391.4101.3113.76.16.77.2778.266.775.684.293.6105.445.251.758.566.175.710.111.512.312.913.511.512.513.414.516.322.126.629.332.136.218.822.925.428.132.18.59710.812.012.810.313,214.616.119.344.749.154.961.569.326.328.933.238.043.619551956195719581959129.9144.5156.5171.8190.89.09.810.411.112.1120.9134.6146.1160.7178.788.299.0107.6117.7130.914.314.915.316.818.718.320.723.226.129.242.947.851.655.259.338.943.947.250.153.814.315.516.519.723.824.628.430.730.430,078.086.894.6105.5119.449.355.160.467.677.019601961196219631964207.5228.0251.4278.5305.912.813.915.216.818.9194.7214.1236.2261.7287.0141.9154.6169.3186.4203.420.323.025.829.033.632.436.541.146.250.062.365.669.473.477.256.459.162.265.969.226729.532.335.038.329.729.629.930.930.9132.3148.5166.9188.2209.885.595.5107.1120.5134.119651966196719681969333.3356.5381.2410.9441.421.223.125.127.429.2312.1333.4356.1383.5412.2220.5232.9247.3264.8283.237.240.343.947.352.254.560.164.871.476.981.284.188.293.4100.273.176.179.984.490.242.044.847.450.654.531.131.332.533.835.7231.0249.3267.9290.1312.0147.4156.9167.4180.4193.019701971197219731974474.2526.5603.4681.6744.330.332.235.841.346.3443.8494.3567.7640.3698.0298.1328.3372.2415.5451.260.170.1B2.S93.1100.085.695.91127131.7146.9109.2120.7131.1135.0140.297.3105.2113.0116.2121.359.965.768.266.265.137.339.544.750.056.2334.6373.5436.5505.3557.8200.8223.1259.2299.2329.919751976197719781979806.1893.01,022.61,173.61,337.751.156.663.670.882.7755.0836.4958.91,102.81,255.1495.0560.7657.8770.6891.1100.6104.5111.5120.7128.4159.3171.2189.6211.4235.6147.0154.1161.7176.4199.01277133.5141.6153.4172.966.166.568.071.481.061.667.073.682.092.0608.0682.3797.2926.41,056.1367.3427.1516.2617.3718.1198019811980:IIIIllIV1,471.81,583.51,371.11,398.11,435.51,471.892.0101.786.089.090.692.01,379.81,481.81,285.11,309.01,344.91,379.8987.01,060.5914.3931.6960.7987.0137.1141.4130.0132.4134.6137.1255.7279.9240.9245.1249.6255.7225.1239.0207.5211.6218.9225.1195.2207.6180.8184.1190.0195.293.6101.386.087.490.693.6101.6106,294.896799.4101.61,154.71,242.81,077.61,097.41,126.01,1547791.8852.9733.4747.5770.7791.81981:|II .."IIIIIV1,497.61,533.21,561.61,583.594.597.5100.0101.71,403.11,435.71,461.61,481.81,004.01,028.31,047.61,060.5138.1139.3140.2141.4261.0268.1273.7279.9229.1233.6237.0239.0198.8202.7205.9207.695.798.1100.0101.3103.1104.6105.9106.21,174.01,202.01,224.61,242.8805.2825.68417852.91982:in""!!!;1,602.81,624.21,635.8103.6105.5106.71,499.21,518.71,529.11,071.91,085.21.092.3142.9143.8144.7284.4289.7292.2240.6209.0102.0107.01,258.6862.91 Includes negligible amount <strong>of</strong> farm loans held by savings and loan associations.2 Includes FHA insured multifamily properties, not shown separately.8 Derived figures. Total includes multifamily and commercial properties, not shown separately.Source: Board <strong>of</strong> Governors <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Federal Reserve System, based on data from various Government and private organizations.244


TABLE B-71-—Mortgage debt outstanding by bolder, 1939-82[Billions <strong>of</strong> dollars]Major financial institutionsO<strong>the</strong>r holders19391940194119421943194419451946194719481949195019511952195319541955195619571958195919601961196219631964196519661967196819691970197119721973197419751976197719781979198019811980:I.||IllIV1981:IIIIllIV1982:End <strong>of</strong> yearor quarter35.536.537.636 735.334.735.541.848 956.262.772.882 3914101.3113.7129 9144.515651718190.8207 5228.0251.4278 5305.9333 3356.5381.24109441.4474 2526 5603.4681.6744 3806.1893 01,022.61,173.61,337.71,471.81,583.51,371.11,398.11,435 51,471.81,497.61,533.21,561.61,583.51,602.81,624.21,635.8||HITotalTotal18.619.520.720.720.220.221.026.031.837.842.951.759.566.975.185.799.3111.2119.7131.5145.5157.6172.6192.5217.1241.0264.6280.8298.8319.9339.1355.9394.2450.0505.4542.6581.2647.5745.0848.2938.6997.21,040.6951.2958.8977.5997.21,006.91,023.11,033.81,040.61,041.51,042.71,028.83.84.14.64.64.64.85.47.18.910.311.613.715.618.422.026.131435.740.045.653.160168.878.890.9101.3110 3114.4121.8130.8140.2150.3174.3206.2231.7249.3278.6323.0381.2432.8475.7503.2518.4479.0481.1492.1503.2507.6515.3518.8518.4515.9512.7495.4Mutualsavingsbanks4.84.94.84.64.44.34.24.44.95.86.78.39.911.412.915.017.519.721.223.325.026.929.132.336.240.644.647.350.553.556.157.962.067.673.274.977,281.688.195.298.999.9100.099.299.299.399.999.7100.010O.O100.097.596.394.2Savingsand loanassociationsCommercialbanks i4.34.64.94.74.54.44.87.29.410.911.613.714.715.916.918.621.022.723.325.528.128.830.434.539.444.049.754.459.065.770.773.382.599.3119.1132.1136.2151.3179.0214.0245.2263.0284.5250.7253.0258.0263.0266.7273.2279.0284.5289.4294.0298.3Lifeinsurancecompanies5.76.06.46.76.76.76.67.28.710.812.916.119.321.323.326.029.433.035.237.139.241.844.246.950.555.260.064.667.570.072.074.475.576.981.486.289.291.696.8106.2118.8131.1137.7122.4125.6128.1131.1132.9134.7136.0137.7138.8139.5140.8Federalandrelatedagencies2 5.04.94.74.33.63.02.42.01.81.82.32.83.54.14.64.85.36.27.78.010.211.512.212.611.812.213.517.520.925.131.138.346.454.664.882.1101.0116.6f40.3170.4215.7256.6289.1228.6238.2247.1256.6263.5271.4279.9289.1301.0315.1333.2Individualsando<strong>the</strong>rs11.912.012.211.711.511.512.113.815.316.617.518.419.320.421.723.225.327.129.132.335.138.443.146.349.552.755.258.261.465.971.279.985.998.9111.4119.7123.8128.9137.2155.0183.4218.1253.8191.4201.1210.9218.1227.2238.6247.9253.8260.3266.4273.81 Includes loans held by nondeposit trust companies, but not by bank trust departments.2 Includes former Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA) and new Government National Mortgage Association (GNMA), as wellas Federal Housing Administration, Veterans Administration, Public Housing Administration, Farmers Home Administration, and in earlieryears Reconstruction Finance Corporation, Homeowners Loan Corporation, and Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation. A!so includes GNMAPools and U.S.-sponsored agencies such as new FNMA, Federal Land Banks, and Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation. O<strong>the</strong>r U.S.agencies (amounts small or current separate data not readily available) included with "individuals and o<strong>the</strong>rs.Source: Board <strong>of</strong> Governors <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Federal Reserve System, based on data from various Government and private organizations.245


GOVERNMENT FINANCETABLE B-72.—Federal budget receipts, outlays, and debt, fiscal years 1973-84[Millions <strong>of</strong> dollars; fiscal years]Description197319741975Actual^1976Transitionquarter19771978BUDGET RECEIPTS AND OUTLAYS:Total receiptsFederal fundsTrust fundsInterfund transactionsTotal outlaysFederal fundsTrust fundsInterf und transactionsTotal surplus or deficit (-)Federal funds230,799161,35790,76621,325245,647186,95180,021-21,325= 14,849=25,59310,745263,224181,219103,138-21,133267,912199,91889,126= 21,133-4,68814,011279,090187,505116,683-25,098324,245240,081109,261-25,098-=45,154-52,5767,422298,060201.099131,750-34,789364,473269,921129,341-=34,789= 66,413-68,8222,40981,23254,08531,530-4,38394,18865,08833,482-4,383-12,956-11,004-=1,952355,559241,312150,560= 36,313400,506295,756141,063-36,313=44,948=54,4449,496399,561270,490165,568=36,498448,368331,991152,874-36,498=48,807=61,50112,694Trust fundsOUTSTANDING DEBT, END OF PERIOD:Gross Federal debtHeld by Government agenciesHeld by <strong>the</strong> publicFederal Reserve SystemO<strong>the</strong>rBUDGET RECEIPTSIndividual income taxesCorporation income taxesSocial insurance taxes and contributionsExcise taxesEstate and gift taxesCustoms dutiesMiscellaneous receipts:Deposits <strong>of</strong> earnings by FederalReserve SystemAH o<strong>the</strong>rBUDGET OUTLAYSNational defenseInternational affairsGeneral science, space, and technol-, ogyEnergyNatural resources and environmentAgricultureCommerce and housing creditTransportation...Community and regional development..Education, training, employment, andsocial servicesHealthIncome securityVeterans benefits and servicesAdministration <strong>of</strong> justiceGeneral governmentGeneral purpose fiscal assistanceNet interestAllowancesUndistributed <strong>of</strong>fsetting receiptsComposition <strong>of</strong> undistributed <strong>of</strong>fsettinereceipts:Employer share, employee retirementRents and royalties on <strong>the</strong> OuterContinental Shelf468,426125,381343,04575,181267,863230,799103,24636,15363,11516,2604,9173,1883,495425245,64774,5414,0664,0301.1794,7634,8529249,0654,59512,73517,40572,96512,0132,1312,568735117,346-6,882-2,927-3,956486,247140,194346,05380,648265,405263,224118,95238,62075,07116,8445,0353,3344,845523267,91277,7815,6813,9778375,6702,2273,9259,1724,13412,34420,36484,43713,3862,4623,2436,89021,449-10,068=3,319-6,748544,131147,225396,90684,993311,913279,090122,38640,62184,53416,5514,6113,6765,777935324,24585,5526,9223,989MS 1,6595,60710,3883,73815,87025,742108,57616,5972,9423,1337,18723,244=6,408-3,980-2.428631,866151,566480,30094,714385,586298,060131,60341,40990,76916,9635,2164,0745,4512,576364,47389,4305,5544,3703,1278,124215023,79213,4354,76718,73731,503127,39018,4323,3202,9487,23526,711^6,904-4,242=2,662646,379148,052498,32796,702401,62581,23238,8018,46025,2194,4731,4551,2121,50011194,18822,3072,1911,1617942,5325841,3923,3041,3405,1628,18132,7973,9628598832,0926,946-2,296=985-1,311709,138157,295551,843105,004446,839355,559157,62654,892106,48517,5487,3275,1505,908623400,50697,5014,8194,6774,17210,0005,5269814,6366,34820,98536,582137,90018,0383,6003,1699,49929,877-6,922-4,548-2,374780,425169,477610,948115,480495,468399,561180,98859,952120,96718,3765,2856,5736,641778448,368105,1865,9224,7425,86110,9257,7313,33115,44511,07026,46341,232146,18018,9743,8023,7069,60135,435- 7,242-4,983=2,259See next page for continuation <strong>of</strong> table.246


TABLE B-72.—Federal budget receipts, outlays, and debt, fiscal years 1973-84—Continued[Millions <strong>of</strong> dollars; fiscal years]DescriptionActual1979 1980 1981 1982Estimates1983 1984BUDGET RECEIPTS AND OUTLAYS:Total receipts463,302517,112599,272617,766597,494659,702Federal fundsTrust fundsInterfund transactions..316,366186,988-40,052350,856210,930-44,674410,422239,413-50,563409,253268,407-59,894376,945314,755-94,206404,745330,210-75,253Total outlays..490,997576,675657,204728,375805,202848,483Federal fundsTrust fundsInterf und transactions....362,396168,653-40,052419,220202,129-44,674475,171232,596-50,563526,113262,155-59,894603,047296,361-94,206610,467313,269-75,253Total surplus or deficit (-)..-27,694-59,563-57,932-110,609-207,708-188,781Federal funds...Trust fundsOUTSTANDING DEBT, END OF PERIOD:-46,03018,335-68,3648,801-64,7496,817-116,8606,252-226,10218,393-205,72116,941Gross Federal debt833,751914,3171,003,9411,146,9871,383,7441,606,339Held by Government agencies..Held by <strong>the</strong> publicFederal Reserve System..O<strong>the</strong>r189,162644,589115,594528,996199,212715,105120,846594,259209,507794,434124,466669,968217,560929,427134,497794,929239,3171,144,427258,9121,347,427BUDGET RECEIPTS...463,302517,112599,272617,766597,494659,702Individual income taxesCorporation income taxesSocial insurance taxes and contributionsExcise taxesEstate and gift taxesCustoms dutiesMiscellaneous receipts:Deposits <strong>of</strong> earnings by FederalSystemAllo<strong>the</strong>rBUDGET OUTLAYS..Reserve217,84165,677138,93918,7455,41174398,327925490,997244,06964,600157,80324,3296,3897,17411,767981576,675285,91761,137182,72040,8396,7878,08312,834956657,204297,74449,207201,49836,3117,9918,85415,186975728,375285,19435,286210,31337,2576,1148,81913,4061,105805,202295,58951,770242,93740,3535,9029,13712,8191,195848,483National defenseInternational affairsGeneral science, space, and technologyEnergy .\Natural resources and environmentAgricultureCommerce and housing creditTransportationCommunity and regional developmentEducation, training, employment, and social services,HealthIncome securityVeterans benefits and servicesAdministration <strong>of</strong> justiceGeneral governmentGeneral purpose fiscal assistanceNet interestAllowancesUndistributed <strong>of</strong>fsetting receipts117,6816,0915,0416,85612,0916,2382,57917,4599,54229,68546,962160,15919,9284,1534,0938,37242,606-8,538135,85610,7335,7226,31313,8124,7627,78821,12010,06830,76755,220193,10021,1834,5704,5058,58452,458-9,887159,76511,1306,35910,27713,5255,5723,94623,3819,39431,40265,982225,10122,9884,6964,6146,85668,726-16,509187,4189,9827,0704,67412,93414,8753,86520,5607,16526,30074,017248,34323,9554,6714,7266,39384,697-13,270214,76911,9397,7594,50612,08721,0751,92821,8767,37326,67682,362282,47224,4115,2735,7946,38288,936-20,414245,30513,2508,2503,3069,83212,15041325,1456,95125,25690,647282,42225,7245,4915,9936,968103,180949-22,750Composition <strong>of</strong> undistributed <strong>of</strong>fsetting receipts:Employer share, employee retirementRents and royalties on <strong>the</strong> Outer ContinentalShelf-5,271-3,267-5,787-4,101-6,371-10,138-7,020-6,250-8,214-11,793-9,853-11,895Note.—Under provisions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Congressional Budget Act <strong>of</strong> 1974,1... , ........fiscal year 1977. Through fiscal year 1976, <strong>the</strong> fiscal year was on a July 1-June 30 basis. Beginning October 1976 (fiscal year 1977).<strong>the</strong> fiscal year is on an October 1-September 30 basis. The period July 1,1976 through September 30, 1976 is a separate fiscal periodknown as <strong>the</strong> transition quarter.Refunds <strong>of</strong> receipts are excluded from receipts and outlays.See "Budget <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States Government, Fiscal Year 1984" for additional information.Sources: Department <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Treasury and Office <strong>of</strong> Management and Budget.247


TABLE B-73.—Federal budget receipts and outlays, <strong>of</strong>f-budget outlays, and debt, fiscal years 1929-84[Billions <strong>of</strong> dollars]Fiscal yearReceiptsBudgetOutlaysSurplus ordeficit(->Off-budgetoutlaysBudgetand <strong>of</strong>fbudgetsurplus ordeficit(->Gross Feder. il debt (end<strong>of</strong>pe rlnA\TotalHeld by<strong>the</strong> public1929193319391940194119421943194419451946 . . .1947194819491950195119521953195419551956195719581959I96019611962196319641965196B1967196819691970197119721973197419751976Transition quarter..1977197819791980198119821983*1984*3.92.05.06.48.614.423.644.345.239.338.441.839.439.551.666.269.669.765.574.580.079 679.292 594,499.7106.6112.7116 81309148 9153.0186.9192 81871207.3230.8263.2279.1298181.23556399.6463.3517.1599.3617.8597 5659.73.14.68.89.513.635.178.591.392.755.234.529.838.842.645.567.776.170.968.570.576.782.692.192 297.8106.8111.3118.6118 4134 7157 6178.1183.61957210.2230.7245.6267.9324.2364.594.24005448.4491.0576.7657.2728.4805.2848.5.7=2.6-3.931-5.0-20.8-54.947 0-47.5-15.93.912 0.6316.1= 15=6.5-1.2=3 04.13.2=-2 9-12.93=3.4-71 48-5.916-3 887-25.23.22823 0-23.4-14.8=4.7=45.266413.0449-48.827.7-59,6-57.9110 6207 7-188.80.11.48.1731.88710.412.514.221.017.317.014.0-14.9=6.1-53.2=73.7= 14.7= 536= 59.240.2-73.878.9-127.9=224.8=202.8U6.9*22.548.250.757.579.2142.6204.12601271.0257.1252 0252.6256.9255.32591266.0270.8274 4272.8272.42797287.8290 9292.9303.3310.8316.8323 2329 53413369.8367.13826409.5437.3468.4486.2544.1631.9646.47091780.4833.8914.31,003.91,147.01,383.71,606.341.442.848.267.8127.8184.8235.2241.9224.3216 3214.3219.0214.3214 8218.4224.5226.6222.2219.4226 4235.0237.2238.6248.4254.5257.62616264.7267 5290.6279.5284 9304 3323.8343.0346.1396.9480.3498.35518610.9644.6715.1794.4929.41,144.41,347.41 Not strictly comparable with later data.* Estimates.Note.—Under provisions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Congressional Budget Act <strong>of</strong> 1974, <strong>the</strong> fiscal year for <strong>the</strong> Federal Government shifted beginning withfiscal year 1977. Through fiscal year 1976, <strong>the</strong> fiscal year was on a July 1-June 30 basis; beginning October 1976 (fiscal year 1977),<strong>the</strong> fiscal year is on an October 1-September 30 basis. The 3-month period from July 1, 1976 through September 30, 1976 is aseparate fiscal period known as <strong>the</strong> transition quarter.Data for 1929-39 are according to <strong>the</strong> administrative budget and those beginning 1940 according to <strong>the</strong> unified budget.Refunds <strong>of</strong> receipts are excluded from receipts and outlays.See "Budget <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States Government, Fiscal Year 1984" for additional information.Sources: Department <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Treasury and Office <strong>of</strong> Management and Budget.248


TABLE B-74.—Relation <strong>of</strong> Federal Government receipts and expenditures in <strong>the</strong> national income andproduct accounts to <strong>the</strong> unified budget, fiscal years 1982-84[Billions <strong>of</strong> dollars; fiscal years]Receipts and expenditures 19821983EstimateTotal budget receipts....RECEIPTSGovernment contribution for employee retirement (grossing)..O<strong>the</strong>r netting and grossingAdjustment to accrualsGeographic exclusions ...O<strong>the</strong>rFederal sector, national income and product accounts, receiptsTotal budget outlaysEXPENDITURESLending and financial transactionsGovernment contribution for employee retirement (grossing)...Defense timing adjustmentBonuses on Outer Continental Shelf land leases..Geographic exclusionsO<strong>the</strong>rFederal sector, national income and product accounts, expenditures..617.810.79.3-18.2-1.6.2618.2728.4-5.310.79.3-1.22.7-4.6-.3Note.-See Note, Table B-73.See Special Analysis B, "Special Analyses, Budget <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States Government, Fiscal Year 1984" for description <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>secategories.Sources: Department <strong>of</strong> Commerce (Bureau <strong>of</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> Analysis), Department <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Treasury, and Office <strong>of</strong> Management andBudget.739.7597.512.211.78.2-1.7.0627.9805.2-3.812.211.7-1.78.3-4.81.9829.0659.714.013.9-.3-1.9.2685.6848.5-3.814.013.9-2.57.9-4.94.2877.3249


TABLE B-75.—Government receipts and expenditures, national income and product accounts, 1929-82[Billions <strong>of</strong> dollars; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]Total governmentFederal GovernmentState and localgovernmentCalendar year or quarterReceiptsSurplus ordeficitnationalincomeandproductaccountsReceiptsSurplus ordeficitnationalincomeandproductaccountsReceiptsExpendituresExpendituresExpendituresSurplus ordeficitnationalincomeandproductaccounts192911.310.31.03.82.61.27.67.8-0.219339.310.7-1.42.74.0= 1.37.27.2=,1193915.417.6-2.26.78.9=2.29.69.6.0194019411942194319441945194619471948194917.725.032.649.251.253.251.056.958955.918.428.864.093.3103 092.745 642.550559.3=.7=3.8=31.4=44.1= 51.8= 39.55414.484=3.48.615.422.939.341.042.539.143.243,238.710.020.556.185.895.584.635.629.834.941.3= 1.3= 5.1= 33.146.6-54.54213.513.48.3=2.610.010.410.610.911.111.613.015.417.719.59.39.18.88.48.59.011.114.417.620.2.61.31.82.52.72.61.9l.C= .7195019511952195319541955195619571958195969.085 290.194 689.91011109.7116 2115.0129.461.079 293.9101697.098 0104.51152127.6131.08.061-3.8-69-7.1315.29= 12.6'••-1.650.064367.370 063.772 678.081978.789.840.857 871.177169.868171.979 688.991.09.265-3.7-7.1=6,04.46.12.3-10.3= 1.121.323425.427.429.031.735.038.542.046.422.523925.527.330.232.935.939.844.346.9= 1.2= 4= .0.11.3= 9=1.4=2.4=.4I96019611962 ,1963196419651966196719681969139.5144.8156.7168.5174.0188.3212 3228.22631296.7136.4149.1160.5167.8176.3187.8213 6242.42691286.83.1=4.3= 3.8-2.3-1*3-14.2=609.996.198.1106.2114.4114.9124.31418150.5174 4196.993.1101.9110.4114.2118.2123.8143 6163.7180.5188.43.0=3.9=4.2= 3.3= 1.8= 13.2-6.08.449.954.058.563.269.575.184.893.6107.3120,249.854.458.062.868.5.75.184.394.7107.2118.7.1.51.0=.C= 1.11.51970197119721973197419751976197719781979198019811982 p302.8322.6368 3413.1455 2470.5538.4605 46819765,1838.0957.3968.4313.4342.03716405.3460 0534.3574.9623 36811750.8871.2985.51,084.5= 10.6= 19.47.8=4 7=63.8=36.5-47 8 814.3=33.2-28.2116.1191.9198.6227 5258.6287 8287.3331.8375 24316493.6540.7628.2614.7204.3220.6244 3264.2299 3356.6384.842114610509.7602.1688.2762.6= 12.4=22.0-16.8=5.6= 11.5=69.3=53.1-45.9-29 516.1=61.4-60.0-147.9135.4153.0178.3195.0211.4237.7267.8297.7m385.9416.8437.3133.5150.4164.8181.6204.6232.2251.2269.7297.3321.5357.8385.0405.41.92.613.513.46.85.516.628.030.330.428.231.731.91980:1IllIV814.6809.2842.8885.2825.2853.4888 8917.4-=10.6=44.2=45 932 2525.7520.2542.4574.6565.4587.7615.4639.9-39.7-67.5-73.1=65.2374.5376.6389.3403.3345.3353.3362.2370.329.123.327.133.01981:||IIIIV939.8951.5974.3963.6948.1959.1998 71,036.1-8.3-7.6=24 5-72 5620.0627.0640.2625.7659.7667.5698.2727.4-39.7-40.558.0-101.7410.0415.2420.3421.5378.6382.2386.9392.431.332.933.529.11982:||IllIV951.1966.2972 21,041.81053.71095 91,146.790.7-87.5123 7609.9617.0613.7728.3736.6769.7815.9-118.4-119.6-156.0424.2434.3440.5396.5402.2408.2414.927.732.132.3Note.—Federaf grants-fn-aid to State and local governments are reflected in Federal expenditures and State and local receipts. Totalgovernment receipts and expenditures have been adjusted to eliminate this duplication.Source: Department <strong>of</strong> Commerce, Bureau <strong>of</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> Analysis.250


TABLE B-76.—Federal Government receipts and expenditures, national income and product accounts,1958-84[Billions <strong>of</strong> dollars; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]Year or quarterTotalPersonaltax andnontaxreceiptsReceiptsCorporatepr<strong>of</strong>itstaxaccrualsIndirectbusinesstax andnontaxaccrualsTotal 1ContributionsforsocialinsurancePurchases<strong>of</strong> goodsandservicesExpendituresTransferpaymentsTopersonsT<strong>of</strong>oreignersGrantsin-aidtoStateandlocalgovernmentsNetinterestpaidSubsidieslesscurrentsurplus<strong>of</strong>governmententerprisesSurplusordeficitnationalincomeandproductaccountsFiscal year: 219581959196019611962196319641965196619671968196919701971197219731974197519761977197819791980198119821983 31984 3 ZCalendar year:19581959I9601961196219631964196519661967196819691970197119721973197419751976197719781979198019811982 p ,1981:IIIIIIV1982:IIllIVP78.185494 895.0104 0110.01156120.0132 7146.0159 9189.8194 8192.4213.4240.727162834314.9365.9414 3480.85251614 7618.2627.9685.678 789.896.1981106.2114 4114 9124 31418150.5174.4196.91919198 6227.5258.6287 8287 33318375.2431.64936540.7628 2614.7620.0627 0640 2625.7609.9617.0613 736.338.242 543.647 349.650.751.457.564.471.490.294.087.9100.5107.4122.7127 5137.2166.3186.5222.625012917303.0293.1304.136 839.943.644748.651.548 653.961767.579.795.192.690 3108.2114.7131.3125 8147 3170.1194.9230.6257.52981300.1286.4297.0307.9300.92999305.8295.6299.317.921422 320.022 723.325 727.130 830.333136.832 931.934.241.243.441852.558.967 376.170070 950.150.559.418 022.521.421522.524 626128931430.036.136130 633 536.643.345143 654 661.671.374 270.367 348.176.165 668 459.146.545.249.811.612.013 213.314.215.015.616.915.515.817.118.619.220.019.920.721.422 224.324.527.229.134 755750.755.259.311512.513.413 614.615.316 216.515 616.318.019.019 320 420.021.221.723.923 425.028.129.438.958 550.057.561.557.857.248.749.850.850.712.313.916.718.119.922.123.624.528.935.538.344.248.852.658.971.584.291.9101.0116.2133.3153.1170.3196 3214.4229.1262.812 414.917.618.320.523.124 025.033136.740.746.749.354462.779.589.894.1106.5118.5137.2159.5174.1204.3216.5199.9202.8206.1208.4214.9216.2217.5217.482.891.291398.1106.2111.7117.2118.5132.7154.9172.2184.6195.5212.9232.7255.7278.2328 8370.7411.2450.4495.6577 0666 5739.7829.0877.388 991.093.11019110.4114.2118 2123.8143 6163.7180.5188.4204.3220 6244.3264.2299.3356.6384 8421.1461.0509.7602.1688.2762.6659.7667.5698.2727.4728.3736.6769.7815.951.154.852 955.861.063.765.964.672.486.095.098.097.194.9100.6101.1104.5117 9125.1139.8150.4164.1189.82181250.1279.0302.553 953.953.757 463.764.665 267.378 890.998.097.695.796 2101.7102.0111.0122.7129.2143.4153.6168.3197.2228.9257.3217.0218.2230.0250.5249.7244.3259.0276.117.819.920 623.625126.527.428.431.837.242.748.755 067.776.187.2101.81314153.8166.6178.7197.8234 62734304.8342.2350.919 620.121.625 025.627.027 930.333 540.146.050.661372 780.593.3114.5146.3158.8169.6181.8205.0246.2280.9315.7268.8271.9289.0294.0297.2307.0321.8337.01.71.8182.12.12.12.22.22.32.22.12.22.02.32.82.73.0313.03.23.54.14.8576.06.46.51.81.81.92.12.22.22.22.2232.22.12.12.22.62.72.63.23.13.23.33.84.25.25.76.15.24.86.16.66.05.85.67.04.76.2696.97.68.39.810.912.714.817.819.222.626.832.640.441.648.457.566.374.779.186.790.183.486.990.15.66.86.57.28.09.110.411.114.415.918.620.324.429.037.540.643.954.661.167.577.380.588.787.783.690.290.686.383.683.085.082.084.25.45.6686.46.47.1778.28.79.610.411.913 514.014.015.719.621725.228.440.6SO 666 282.592.4106.65.26.26.86.2688.084929.8in14.113.814 4180?0 726.835?4? 453.171.984.866 358374 079.079 68? 888 788.22.425243.3414.0414.3485.2414.755• 7.06.59.276606.26.99.79.910 513112.822.120.7282.12.6404.23.9454.6554.74.55.26.5637.97.85.56.95.88.29.59.211.713.115.112,2 -39.713.7 =-40.513.0 -58.013.6 -101.712.711.612.623.4-4.7-5834-3.1-22-1.7-15 1.40-8.9-12 35.2-20.5-19.2-14.9-6.6-45 4-55.8-45.3-36.1-14,8-51.9-519-121.5-201.1-191.7-103-1.13.0-3.9-4.2.3-33-18-13.2-6.08.4-12.4-22.0-16.8-5.6-11.5-69.3-53.1-45.9-29.5-61.4-60.0-147.9-118.4-119.6-156.01 Includes an item for <strong>the</strong> difference between wage accruals and disbursements, not shown separately.2 Under provisions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Congressional Budget Act <strong>of</strong> 1974, <strong>the</strong> fiscal year for <strong>the</strong> Federal Government shifted beginning with -fiscalyear 1977. Through fiscal year 1976, <strong>the</strong> fiscal year was on a July 1-June 30 basis; beginning October 1976 (fiscal year 1977), <strong>the</strong>fiscal year is on an October 1-September 30 basis. The 3-month period from July 1, 1976 through September 30, 1976 is a separatefiscal period known as <strong>the</strong> transition quarter.3 Estimates.Sources: Department <strong>of</strong> Commerce (Bureau <strong>of</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> Analysis) and Office <strong>of</strong> Management and Budget.251


TABLE B-77.—State and local government receipts and expenditures, national income and product accounts,1946-82[Billions <strong>of</strong> dollars; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]Calendar yearor quarterReceiptsTotalPersonaltax andnontaxreceiptsCorporatepr<strong>of</strong>itstaxaccrualsIndirectbusinesstax andnontaxaccrualsContributionsforsocialinsuranceFederalgrants-inaidExpendituresTotal 1Purchases<strong>of</strong>goodsandservicesTransferpaymentstopersonsNetinterestpaidlessdividendsreceivedSubsidieslesscurrentsurplus<strong>of</strong>governmententerprises19461947194819491950195119521953195419551956195719581959196019611962196319641965196619671968196919701971197219731974197519761977 .19781979198019811982 *1980:I||III ;.:IV1981:• ii ;*" ;*IILZI:;iv1982:ItIllIV*13.015.417.719.521.323.425.427.429.031.735.038.542.046.449.954.058.563.269.575.184.893.6107.3120.2135.4153.0178.3195.0211.4237.7267.8297.7327.6352.0385.9416.8437.3374.5376.6389.3403.3410.0415.2420.3421.5424.2434.3440.51.51.72.12,42.52.83.03.23.53.94.55.05.46.1677.48.28.810.010.912.814.617.520.623.226.432.836.039.043.149.656.363.870.478.888.697.175.577.379.682.784.887.290.392.393.695.498.8100.51.01.01.01.01,21.21.31.51.71.82.02.22,53.13.43.54.15.05.86.57.19.311.111.913.414.413.910715.912.514.215.015.413.614.012.510.110,211.29.310.712.213.314.615.917.418.819.921.623.825.727.229.332.034.437.039.442.646.149.754.060.967.675.083.391.599.7107.4116.2128.3140.7150.0160.2174.1192.8208.8168.8170.5176.1181.2187.1190.4195.5198.0201.5206.9210.9215.80.6.7.8.91.11.41.61.72.02.12.32.62.83.13,43.73.94.24.75.05.76.77.28.39.210.211.513.014.616.819.522.124.727.429.933.837.228.728.830.631.632.533,434.235.136.036.937.738.41.11.72.02.22.32.52.62.82.93.13.34.25.66.86.57.28.09.110.411.114.415.918.620.324.429.037.540.643.954.661.167.577.380.588.787.783.685.5»7.688.992.790.290.686.383.683.085.082.084.211.114.417.620.222.523.925.527.330.232.935.939.844.346,949.854.458.062.868.575.184.394.7107.21187133.5150.4164.8181.6204.6232.2251.2269.7297.3321.5357.8385.0405.4345.3353.3362.2370.3378.6382.2386.9392.4396.5402.2408.2414.99.912.815.318.019.821.823.225.027.830.633.537.141.143.746.550.854.359.064.671.179.889.3101.0111.2124.4138.7151.4168.5193.1217.2232.9250.4278.3306.0341.2368.0389.8329.6337.2345.2352.8361.1365.0370.1375.7380.4386.6392.7399.61.72.33.03.03.63.13.33.53.63.83.94.34.85.15.45.86.06.46.97.38.19.410.512.214717.319.320.720.924.627.629.732.835.039.643.045.137738.940.541.442.042.843.343,944.344745.446.00.2.1.1.1.1.0.0.0,1-.3-7-.9-1.1-1.4-2.0-1.7= 1.9-3.3-5.0-5.1-4.5-5.3-7.9-13.8-16.9-19.5^227-16.1-16.7-17.3-177-18.1-19.1-20.1=20.7=21.5-22.4-23.2=23.8=-07-.9-1.0-1.1-1.2-1.3-1.5-1.6-1.7-1.7-2.0=2,2=2.3-2.5-2.8-2.8-3.0-3.0-3,1-3.2-3.3-3.6-3.7=4.2-4.3-4.5-4.8-5.1-5.7-5.9-6.2-6.5-6.8-6.0-6.1-6.2-6.3=6,4-6.46.5=6.6-6.6676.7-68-6,91 Includes an item for <strong>the</strong> difference between wage accruals and disbursements, not shown separately.Source: Department <strong>of</strong> Commerce, Bureau <strong>of</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> Analysis.252


TABLE B-78.—State and local government revenues and expenditures, selected fiscal years, 1927-81Fiscal year l General revenues by source 2192719321934193619381940194219441946194819501952195319541955195619571958195919601961196219631962-63 6 ..1963-64*..1964-65 S ..1965-66 5 ...1966-67 5 ..,1967-68 5 ..1968-69 5 ..1969-70*..,1970-71 6 ...1971-72"...1972-73 5 ...1973-74 5 ..1974-75 s ..1975-76 5 ..1976-77 s ..1977-78°..1978-79 s ..1979-80 5 ...1980-81 s ..Total7,2717,2677,6788,3959,2289,60910,41810,90812,35617,25020,91125,18127,30729,01231,07334,66738,16441,21945,30650,50554,03758,25262,89062,26968,44374,00083,03691,197101,264114,550130,756144,927166,352190,214207,670228,171256,176285,796315,960343,278382,322423,404Propertytaxes4,7304,4874,0764,0934,4404,4304,5374,6044,9866,1267,3498,6529,3759,96710,73511,74912,86414,04714,98316,40518,00219,05420,08919,83321,24122,58324,67026,04727,74730,67334,05437,85242,13345,28347,70551,49157,00162,53566,42264,94468,49974,969Salesandgrossreceiptstaxes4707521,0081,4841,7941,9822,3512,2892,9864,4425,1546,3576,9277,2767,6438,6919,4679,82910,43711,84912,46313,49414,45614,44615,76217,11819,08520,53022,91126,51930,32233,23337,48842,04746.09849,81554,54760,59567,59674,24779,92785,971Individumcometaxes7074801532182242763424225437889981,0651,1271,2371,5381,7541,7591,9942,4632,6133,0373,2693,2673,7914,0904,7605,8267,3088,90810,81211,90015,23717,99419.49121,45424.57529,24533,17636,93242,08046,426[Millions <strong>of</strong> dollars]Corporationnetincometaxes9279491131651562724514475925938468177787448909841,0181,0011,1801,2661,3081,5051,5051,6951,9292,0382,2272,5183,1803,7383,4244,4165,4256,0156,6427,2739,17410,73812,12813,32114,1431162321,0169488009458589548551,8612,4862,5662,8702,9663,1313,3353,8434,8656,3776,9747,1317,8718,7228,66310,00211,02913,21415,37017,18119,15321,85726,14631,25339,25641,82047,03455,58962,57569,59275,16483,02990,294RevenuefromFederalGovernmentGeneral expenditures by function 2Allo<strong>the</strong>r 3 Total EducationHighwaysPublicwelfare1,7931,6431,4491,6041,8111,8722,1232,2692,6613,6854,5415,7636,2526,8977,5848,4659,2509,69910,51611,63412,56313,48914,85014,55615,95117,25019,26921,19723,59826,11829,97132,37435,82640,21046,54151,73557,19161,67368,43679,86495,466.11,5997,2107,7657,1817,644.8,7579,2299,1908,86311,02817,68422,78726,09827,91030,70133,72436,71140,37544,85148,88751,87656,20160,20664,81663,97769,30274,54682,84393,350102,411116,728131,332150,674166,873181,227«89592,2352,3111,8312,1772,4912,6382,5862,7933,3565,3797,1778,3189,39010,55711,90713,22014,13415,91917,28318,71920,57422,21623,77623,72926,28628,56333,28737,91941,15847,23852,71859,41364,88669,71475,83387,85897,216102,805110,758119,448133,211145,7841,8091,7411,5091,4251,6501,5731,4901,2001,6723,0363,8034,6504,9875,5276,4526,9537,8168,5679,5929,4289,84410,35711,13611,15011,66412,22112,77013,93214,48115,41716,42718,09519,01018,61519.94622,52823,90723,10524,60928,44033,31134,6031514448898271,0691,1561,2251,1331,4092,0992,9402,7882,9143,0603,1683,1393,4853,8184,1364,4044,7205,0845,4815,4205,7666,3156,7578,2189,85712,11014,67918,22621,07023,58225,08528,15532,60435,94139,14041,89847,28854,121Alto<strong>the</strong>r 43,0153,2692,9523,2153,5473,8623,8893,7374,5917,1708,86710,34210,61911,55712,19713,39914,94016,54717,87619,32521,06322,54924,42323,67825,58627,44730,02933,28136,91541,96347,50854,94061,90769,31678,09692,180103,004112,537122,476137,731155,277172,9411 Fiscal years not <strong>the</strong> same for all governments. See footnote 5.2 Excludes revenues or expenditures <strong>of</strong> publicly owned utilities and liquor stores, and <strong>of</strong> insurance-trust activities. Intergovernmentalreceipts and payments between State and local governments are also excluded.3 Includes licenses and o<strong>the</strong>r taxes and charges and miscellaneous revenues.4 Includes expenditures for health, hospitals, police, local fire protection, natural resources, sanitation, housing and urban renewal,local parks and recreation, general control, financial administration, interest on general debt, and unallocable expenditures.6 Data for fiscal year ending in <strong>the</strong> 12-month period through June 30. Data for 1963 and earlier years include local governmentamounts grouped in terms <strong>of</strong> fiscal years ended during <strong>the</strong> particular calendar year.Note.—Data are not available for intervening years.Source: Department <strong>of</strong> Commerce, Bureau <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Census.253


TABLE B-79.—Interest-bearing public debt securities by kind <strong>of</strong> obligation, 1967-82[Millions <strong>of</strong> dollars]End <strong>of</strong> yearor monthTotalinterestbearingpublicdebtsecuritiesTotalMarketableTreasuryTreasurynotesTreasurybonds'TotalU.S.savingsbondsNonmarketableForeigngovernmentandpublicseries 2GovernmentaccountseriesO<strong>the</strong>r*Fiscal year:196)1968196919701971197219731974322,286344,401351,729369,026396,289425,360456,353473,238* 210,672226,592226,107232,599245,473257,202262,971266,57558,53564,44068,35676,15486,67794,648100,061105,01949,10871,07378,94693,489104,807113,419117,840128,41997,41891,07978,80562,95653,98949,13545,07133,137111,614117,808125,623136,426150,816168,158193,382206,66351,21351,71251,71151,28153,00355,92159,41861,9211,5143,7414,0704,7559,27018,98528,52425,01156,15559,52666,79076,32382,784101,738115,4422,7312,8283,0514,0685,7593,6543,7014,28919751976197719781979532,122619,254697,629766,971819,007315,606392,581443,508485,155506,693128,569161,198156,091160,936161,378150,257191,758241,692267,865274,24236,77939,62645,72456,35571,073216,516226,673254,121281,816312,31465,48269,73375,41179,79880,44023,21621,50021,79921,68028,115124,173130,557140,113153,271176,3603,6444,88316,79727,06727,400198019811982906,402996,4951,140,883594,506683,209824,422199,832223,388277,900310,903363,643442,89083,77296,178103,631311,896313,286316,46172,72768,01767,27425,15820,49914,641189,848201,052210,46224,16423,71824,0851981:JanFebMarAprMayJuneJulyAugSeptOctNovDec1982:JanFebMarJuneJulyAugSept....OtiNovDec929,825946,455963,207962,779964,792969,921972,053978,920996,495999,4511,011,9361.027,3001,032,6781,042,1981,059,8151,064,5381,066,4101,078,4311,083,2961,108,1311,140,8831,136,8261,160,4891,195,496628,482642,905661,142657,906656,185660,769666,405673,765683,209689,578704,819720,293726,542737,532752,620755,833755,688763,995774,077801,427824,422824,662852,463881,476220,423228,972235,315225,849224,514218,786217,532219,854223,388229,061233,905245,015250,562254,037256,212254,880256,114256,007262,009273,066277,900283,923293,531311,820321,176324,540336,505341,052338,419348,788354,005357,603363,643362,649370,794375,332374,357382,070395,042399,700398,408406,925411,070427,426442,890438,068454,229465,03086,88389,39389,32391,00693,25293,19694,86896,30896,17897,867100,11999,946101,623101,426101,366101,253101,166101,063100,998100,935103,631102,672104,702104,627301,343303,550302,065304,873308,608309,152305,647305,155313,286309,874307,117307,007306,136304,666307,195308,705310,722314,436309,218306,704316,461312,164308,026314,02071,05770,44370,05769,51869,22968,93468,71968,35568,01767,71867,73967,83767,58167,37867,16367,03467,08267,12267,13267,14867,27467,51467,80167,71923,80423,98624,16224,41124,78923,51421,94321,43120,49920,47120,30919,02518,92018,38419,64119,44618,39517,45716,64315,60614,64114,62714,86314,691182,197185,020183,833186,979190,839192,962191,647192,060201,052198,053195,541196,665196,393195,722196,707198,538201,290205,954201,502199,896210,462205,717199,903205,42724,28724,10224,01523,96523,75023,74123,33923,31023,71823,63223,52923,48023,24323,18223,68423,68723,95523,90223,94124,05424,08524,30525,45926,1831 Includes Treasury bonds and minor amounts <strong>of</strong> Panama Canal and postal savings bonds.3 Nonmarketable certificates <strong>of</strong> indebtedness, notes, bonds, and bills in <strong>the</strong> Treasury foreign series <strong>of</strong> dollar-denominated and foreigncurrencydenominated issues.3 Includes depository bonds, retirement plan bonds, Rural Electrification Administration bonds, State and local bonds, and specialissues held only by U.S. Government agencies and trust funds and <strong>the</strong> Federal home loan banks.4 Includes $5,610 million in certificates not shown separately.Note.—Through fiscal year 1976, <strong>the</strong> fiscal year was on a July 1-June 30 basis; beginning October 1976 (fiscal year 1977) <strong>the</strong> fiscalyear is on an October 1-September 30 basis.Source: Department <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Treasury.254


TABLE B-80.—Estimated ownership <strong>of</strong> public debt securities, 1967-82[Par values;' billions <strong>of</strong> dollars]1'ublic debt securitiesHeld by private investorsEnd <strong>of</strong> year or monthTotal 2Held byGovernmentaccountsHeld byFederalReserveBanksTotal 3Commercialbanks 4MutualsavingsbanksandinsurancecompaniesCorporations6State andlocalgovernments6Individuals7Miscellaneousinvestors38Fiscal year:196719681969322.9345.4352.971.876.184.846.752.254.1204.4217.0214.055.559.755.313.212.511.611.012.011.123.625.126.470.474.277.330.733.432.319701971197219731974370.1397.3426.4457.3474.295.2102.9111.5123.4138.257.765.571.475.080.5217.2228.9243.6258.9255.652.661.060.958.853.210.410.310.29.68.58.57.49.39.810.829.025.926.928.828.381.875.473.275.980.735.049.163.276.074.219751976197719781979 .. .533.2620.4698.8771.5826.5145.3149.6155.5167.9187.784.794.4104.7115.3115.5303.2376.4438.6488.3523.469.092.599.894.492.510.616.020.521.221.513.824.721.218.122.131.739.348.263.866.586.896.2106.5113.9115.591.3107.7142.4176.9205.3198019811982907.7997.91,142.0197.7208.1216.4120.7124.3134.4589.2665.4791.2109.7112.224.326.225.937.877.086.2123.0140.3229.3262.71981:JanFebMarAprMayJune . .- 934.1950.5964.5964.0968.5971.2189.5192.0190.9193.9197.8199.9117.2118.9119.0119 7118.3120.0627.4639.6654.6650.4652.3651.2117.2116.4117.5113.5113.2113.325.525.323.723.725.324.030.435.240.040.438.838.777.380.482.383.685.183.0134.2136.2138.6138.2139.9139.6242.8246.1252.5251.0250.0252.6JulyAugSept ....OctNovDec973.3980.2997.91,005.01,013.31,028.7198.6199.0208.1204.9202.1203.3123.4124 5124.3123.0126.5129.9651.3656.7665.4677.2684.6694.5114.2115.0112.2111.3110.0109.425.426.126.224.724.624.337.838.037.838.638.337.886.086.286.288.387.585.6139.5140.2140.3141.0141.6143.7248.4251.2262.7273.3282.6293.71982:JanFebMarAprMayJune1,038.41048.21 061.31 065.71 071.71,079.6202.82011202.5204.3206 7211.7128 3126 2125 6134 3129 8127.0707.3720 8733.3727.1735.2740.9111.41118114.3110.1109.4117.024.924 125.626.827.227.937.937.537.536.538.838.986.288.288.388.591.891.2144.1144.7146.5145.7146.2146.2302.8314.5321.1319.5321.8319.7JulyAug ..sept ..::::;•;OctNovDec1,089.61,109.21,142.01,142.81,161.71,197.1206.3206.5216.4211.0203.9209.4133.8132.9134.4132.1137.7139.9749.6769.8791.2799.7820.1849.4110.028.239.988.7146.4336.41 U.S. savings bonds, series A-F and J, and U.S. savings notes are included at current redemption value.2 As <strong>of</strong> July 31, 1974, public debt outstanding has been adjusted to exclude <strong>the</strong> notes <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> International Monetary Fund to conformwith <strong>the</strong> Budget presentation. This adjustment applies to <strong>the</strong> 1967-82 data in this table.3 For comparability with 1975-82 published data, published data for 1967-74 have been adjusted to exclude notes <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>International Monetary Fund. These adjustments amounted to $3.3 billion in 1967, $2.2 billion in 1968, and $0.8 billion in each year1969 through 1974. These adjustments were necessary in order to add to <strong>the</strong> total public debt figures as published by <strong>the</strong> Department<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Treasury. The Treasury Survey <strong>of</strong> Ownership on which private investor group estimates were based was discontinued in July 1982.4 Includes commercial banks, trust companies, and stock savings banks in <strong>the</strong> United States and Territories and island possessions;figures exclude securities held in trust departments.5 Exclusive <strong>of</strong> banks and insurance companies.8 Includes trust, sinking, and investment funds <strong>of</strong> State and local governments and <strong>the</strong>ir agencies, and <strong>of</strong> Territories and possessions.7 Includes partnerships and personal trust accounts.6 Includes savings and loan associations, nonpr<strong>of</strong>it institutions, corporate pension trust funds, dealers and brokers, certajngovernment deposit accounts and government-sponsored agencies, and investments <strong>of</strong> foreign balances and international accounts in<strong>the</strong> United States.Note.—Through fiscal year 1976, <strong>the</strong> fiscal year was on a July 1—June 30 basis; beginning October 1976 (fiscal year 1977), <strong>the</strong>fiscal year is on an October 1—September 30 basis.Source: Department <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Treasury.255


TABLE B-81.—Maturity distribution and average length <strong>of</strong> marketable interest-bearing public debt securitiesheld by private investors, 1967-82End <strong>of</strong> year or monthAmountoutstanding,privatelyheldWithinlyearIto5yearsMaturity class5 to 10years10 to 20years20 yearsand overAverage lengthMillions <strong>of</strong> dollarsYearsMonthsFiscal year:1967196819691970197119721973197419751976197719781979198019811982150,321159,671156,008157,910161,863165,978167,869164,862210,382279,782326,674356,501380,530463,717549,863682,04356,56166,74669,31176,44374,80379,50984,04187,150115,677151,723161,329163,819181.883220,084256,187314,43653,58452,29550,18257,03558,55757,15754,13950,10365,85289,151113,319132,993127,574156,244182,237221,78321,05721,85018,0788,28614,50316,03316,38514,19715,38524,16933,06733,50032,27938,80948,74375,7496,1536,1106,0977,8766,3576,3588,7419,9308,8578,0878,42811,38318,48925,90132,56933,01712,96812,67012,3378,2727,6456,9224,5643,4814,6116,65210,53114,80520,30422,67930,12737,058543333222233315286311187113790111981:JanFebMarMay"!!"!!!JuneJulyAugSeptOctNovDec502,248515,178532,800528,992529,057531,525533,778540,228549,863558,169569,534580,670247,958256,007263,208254,533258,101252,489251,307251,533256,187263,717266,163275,322156,845160,163167,226167,570167,865172,784171,504180,669182,237177,834189,570188,42243,96943,38246,78649,61643,84247,03250,24245,29748,74352,20147,61550,85127,24128,69028,66228,58730,29630,26830,17232,60232,56932,53634,16434,05526,23526,93626,91828,68528,95328,95230,55330,12730,12731,88132,02232,020433333334491091011110100 101982:JanFebMarMayJuneJulyAugSeptOctNovDec590,139604,671619,030613,576618,699628,997634,556660,583682,043685,969708,769736,148284,171290,697295,476289,000290,476293,266295,118309,446314,436321,081327,565346,321183,843194,457200,544199,278203,612207,106206,380217,258221,783218,673235,443239,26254,37049,12052,61255,32954,36158,42563,02266,34775,74975,94472,64477,57034,06935,81935,82235,56535,70135,65135,58333.09733,01733,06535,75035,67733,68634,57834,57634,40434,54934,54934,45334,43537,05837,20637,36737,31844 4 44 333330100 1001111101110Note.—All issues classified to final maturity.Through fiscal year 1976, <strong>the</strong> fiscal year was on a July 1—June 30 basis; beginning October 1976 (fiscal year 1977), <strong>the</strong> fiscal yearis on an October 1—September 30 basis.Source: Department <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Treasury.256


CORPORATE PROFITS AND FINANCETABLE B-82.—Corporate pr<strong>of</strong>its with inventory valuation and capital consumption adjustments, 1929-82[Billions <strong>of</strong> dollars; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]Year or quarterCorporatepr<strong>of</strong>its withinventoryvaluationand capitalconsumptionadjustmentsCorporatepr<strong>of</strong>its taxliabilityPr<strong>of</strong>its after tax with inventory valuation andcapital consumption adjustmentsTotalDividendsUndistributedpr<strong>of</strong>its withinventoryvaluationand capitalconsumptionadjustments19299.01.47.75.81.91933-1.7.5-2.32.0-4.319395.31.43.93.8.1194019411942194319448.614.119.323.523.62.87.611.414.112.9586.57.99.510.7404.4434.44.6182.1365.06.11945194619471948194919.016 622.329427.110.79111.312.410.28.47511.017.016.94.65 66.37.07.23.8194.710 09.71950195119521953195433.938.736.136.335.217.922.619.420.317.616.016.116.716.017.58.88.58.58.89.17.27.68.27.28.41955195619571958195945 543.743 338.549.622 022.021419.023.623.421.821.819.526.010.311.111.511.312.213110.710.38.213.81960196119621963196447 648.656.662169.222 722.824.026 228.024.925.832.635941.212.913.314.415.517.312.112.518.220.423.91965196619671968196980 085.182 489 185.130 933.732 539 239.549151.449.950.045.619.119.420.222.022.530.032.029.727.923.1197019711972 .1973197471.483.296.6108.394.934.237.541.649.051.637.245.755.059.343.322.522.924.427.029.914.822.830.532.313.419751976197719781979110.5138.1167.3192.4194 850.663.872.783.287.659.974.394.6109.1107.230.837.440.847.052.729.136.953.762.254.5198019811982*181.6190.6161.184.781.258.897.0109.5102.358.165.170.338.944.432.11980:1IIIll(V195 3172.2177.8181.295.373.382.287.8100.098.995.693.356.257.858.759.643.941.036.933.71981:111tilIV200 318511931183.991.579.282.471.6108.9105.9110,7112.361.564.066.868.147.342.043.944.31982:j||t||157 1155.4166.256.755.360.9100.4100.0105.368.869.370.531.630.734.8Source: Department <strong>of</strong> Commerce, Bureau <strong>of</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> Analysis.257


TABLE B-83.—Corporate pr<strong>of</strong>its by industry, 1929-82[Billions <strong>of</strong> dollars; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]Corporate pr<strong>of</strong>its with inventory valuation adjustment and without capital consumption adjustmentDomestic industriesYear orquarterTotalTotalTotalFinancial >FederalReservebanksO<strong>the</strong>rTotalManufacturing2 5.2NonfinancialTransportationandpublicutilitiesWholesafeandretailtradeO<strong>the</strong>rnot.+Kesi<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>world192919331939194019411942194319441945 ..19461947194819491950195119521953195419551956195719581959196019611962196319641965196619671968196919701971197219731974..19751976197719781979198019811982"1980:1II.HIIV1981:1||IllIV1982:|.||Ill10.5-1.26.59.815.420.524.524.019.319.625.933.431.137.943.340.640.238.447.546.946.641.652.349.750.055.159 766.076.080.978.184.980.868.982.094.0105.696.7120.6151.6178.5205.1209.6199.4207.5166.0211,0189.4197.0200.4217.6202.6210.3199.4167.2162.2170.010.2-1.26.19.615.020.124.123.518.918.924.932.229.936.741.538.738.436.445.144,143.539.149.646,746.851.555.861.871.576.773.779.774.662474.985 392.080.4107.6137.4163 4185.4179.0169.1184.6149.6175.9157.8167.5175.5193 8181.7189.3173.7150.3144.1153.71.3.3.81.01.11.21.31.61.72.11.72.63.13.13.64.04.54.64.85.05.25.76.87.27.07.3686.97.5859.010.411.112114.115315.915.011.817.123131.030.329.222.722.531.528.627.229.426 822.720 820.420.022.224.20.0.0.0.0.0.0.01111.2.2.2.3,4.4.3.3.5.6.6.71.0.8.9101.11.4172.02.53.1363.3344.55.75.76.0627.79.611.914.515.711.612.511.412.213 214.215 215.616.116.015.81.3.3.3.91.01.21.31.61.62.01.62.32.93.03.33.74.14.34.54.54.65,16.06.26.36.4585.86.2687.07.98.08610.711911.49.36.211.116 923.320.717.28.16.819.916.115.817.113 68.6554.83.96.28.48.9-1.55.38.614.018.922.821.917.316.823.229.626.833.537.934.733.931.840.339.138.333.542.939.539.844.249 054.964.068 264.869.363.550260.870076.065.495.8120.3140 3154.4148.6140.0162.0127.1144.4129.2140.3146.1167 0159.0168 5153.31 Consists <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> following industries: Banking; credit agencies o<strong>the</strong>r than banks; security and commodity brokers, dealers, andservices; insurance carriers; regulated investment companies; small business investment companies; and real estate investment trusts.' See Table B-84 for industry detail.Note.—The industry classification is on a company basis and is based on <strong>the</strong> 1972 Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) beginning1948, and on <strong>the</strong> 1942 SIC prior to 1948.Source: Department <strong>of</strong> Commerce, Bureau <strong>of</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> Analysis,258130.4121,9129.5-.43.35.59.511.813.813.29.79.013.617.616.220.924.621.722.019926.024.724.019.426.423.623.326.029 332.339.341938.541.236.626634.140 745.539.052.669.278 386.985.674.586.359.885.264.770.078.190 388.992 273.757.756.662.71.8.01.01,32.03.44.43.92.71.82.23.03.04.04.64.95.047 5.65.95.85.97.07.47.88.49310.011.011810710.810.3828.5908.76.110.014.517 820.615.917.419.118716.813.921.517.520115.619621.218.818,519.21,0-.571.21.42.23.03.23.33.84.65.54.55.05.04.83.8385.04.54.44.65.94.95.05.859 7,58.1829.110.410.59511,713 413.912.521.322.426 626.927.124.633.428.119.727.124.427.333 032.133035731.926.827.40.9= 7.3.61.11.51.61.61.52.12.93.63.13.63.73.33.1343.64.14.03.63.63.63.73.9445.15.6636.56.96.1596.5698.07.911.914.217 620.020.123.423.120.622723.524.323.323622.523 722.721.920.020.30.2.0.3.3.4.4.4.4.371.01.31.11.3171.91.8202.42.83.12.5273.03.23.6394.24.5424.45.26.1657.18613.716.313.014,315119.730.630.322.816.435.131729.624.92382Q.B21025716.918.216.3


Year or quarterTABLE B-84.—Corporate pr<strong>of</strong>its <strong>of</strong> manufacturing industries, 2929-82[Billions <strong>of</strong> dollars; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]Corporate pr<strong>of</strong>its with inventory valuation adjustment and without capital consumption adjustmentTotalDurable goodsTotalmanufacturingPrimarymetalindustriesFabricatedmetalproductsMachinery,exceptelectricalElectricandelectronicequipmentMotorvehiclesandequipmentO<strong>the</strong>rTotalNondurable goodsFoodandkindredproductsChemicalsandalliedproductsPetroleumandcoalproductsO<strong>the</strong>r192919331939194019411942194319441945194619471948194919501951 . ...1952195319541955195619571958195919601961196219631964 . .1965196619671968196919701971197219731974197519761977197819791980 ...19811982"1980:||IIIIV1981:II .HIIV1982:ItlMl5.243.35.59511.813.813 29.79013.617.616.220.924.621722.019926.024 724.019426.423 623.326.029.332.339341.938.541.236.626 634.140.745.539.052.669.278.386.985.674.586.359.885.264.770.078.190.388.992.273.757 756.662.72.641.73.1647.28.1744.5245.87.58.112.013.211711.910 514.312 813.39313.711611.414.016.317.923023.820.922.218.910 216.322.424.313.218.930.438.144.337.120.728.411.425.512.418.226.532.135.227.418.99112.712.21.61.52.33.1192.5172.9303.0192.3201.6162.02.5313.62.71.91.481.62.25.42.92.11.13.53.52.94.1-5.14.72.6,1427.04.74.1.7-31-6.5-5.4.81.11.3101.0 91.0111.1 91.181.0111.31.4202.42.42.32.0111.52.12.51.63.03.84.44.95.24.44.94.45.42.84.35.04.76.05.43.44.43.84.71.21.31.62.3231.9171.7212.0142.1181.9232.53.3394.54.14.13.7292.94.34.62.94.76.38.89.48.97.29.35.17.27.07.47.28.49.29.69.98.34.83.7.7.81.21.31.51.41.21.11.21.51.31.7131.31.51.61.72.73.02.92.82.31.21.92.83.02.13.45.66.55.14.45.13.55.23.54.34.56.24.94.84.33.63.73.21.42.13.12.4242.62.14.12.22.6.93.0302.54.04.94.7625.13.95.54.71.25.05.95.71.97.29.48.94.7-5.0-1.11.1-3.7-10.6-4.1-1.4-2.62.6-2.8-1.8Note.—The industry classification is on a company basis and is based on <strong>the</strong> 1972 Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) beginning1948, and on <strong>the</strong> 1942 SIC prior to 1948.Source: Department <strong>of</strong> Commerce, Bureau <strong>of</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> Analysis.-4.13.33.21.81.72.62.8262.62.93.53.23.12.93.5273.1354.04.45.15.24.95.74.92.94.35.76.22.94.37.68.811.09.86.86.22.36.77.16.37.18.47.86.32.4.03.52.72.6o172.4314.65.7595.26.67.810.08.18.911.49910.19.411.811910.710012.712.011.912.013.114.416.318.117.619.117.716.517.818.321.225.833.638.840.242.648.453.857.948.459.652.351.851.658.253.764.854.748.643.950.51.91.61.61.4171.8162.2181.8212.4222.32.32.72.72.83.23.23.23.03.23.52.92.42.88.66.96.86.05.76.28.76.56.65.54.97.610.48.57.78.16.76.37.01.71.82.32.82.32.22.23.02.82.82.53.53.13.23.23.64.04.64.94.35.24.53.94.45.26.05.66.58.37.98.37.16.78.25.77.45.56.67.49.47.58.07.86.55.85.12.81.92.32.7232.82.73.03.32.62.12.52.52.22.22.12.42.93.23.93.73.23.53.53.05.010.59.612.611.613.820.728.026.624.431.529.127.723.523.523.335.124.725.420.425.93.72.82.74.4363.32.93.64.13.63.34.34.24.14.34.65.36.06.86.37.06.95.96.47.27.86.68.911.013.814.514.813.014.411.714.112.212.712.914.914.414.114.110.011.412.5259


TABLE B-85.—Sates, pr<strong>of</strong>its, and stockholders 1 equity, all manufacturing corporations, 1950-82[Billions <strong>of</strong> dollars]All manufacturing corporationsDurable goods industriesNondurable goods industriesYear orquarterSales(net)Beforeincometaxes 1Pr<strong>of</strong>itsAfterincometaxesStockholders'equity*Sales(net)Beforeincometaxes'Pr<strong>of</strong>itsAfterincometaxesStockholders'equity 8Sales(net)Beforeincometaxes>Pr<strong>of</strong>itsAfterincometaxesStockholders'equity"1950..181.91951..245.01952.,250.21953.,265.91954,,248.51955.,278.41956.,307.31957.,320.01958305.31959338.01960345.71961356.41962389.41963412.71964443.11965492.21966554.21967575.41968631.91969694.61970708,81971751.11972849.51973 1,017.21973: IV 275.1New series:1973: IV 236.61974 1,060.61975.. 1,065.21976.. 1,203.21977.. 1,328.11978.. 1,496.41979.. 1,741.81980.. 1,912.81981.. 2,144.71979:I406.6II436.4III..., 437.5IV.... 461.21980:I465.7II466.3464.2IV516.61981:520.8n'Z! 549.6Ill539.9IV534.41982:"Z501.0520.1507.123.227.422.924.420.928.629.828.222.729.727.527.531.934.939.646.551.847.855.458.148.152.963.281.421.420.692.179.9104.9115.1132.5154.2145.8158.536.542.638.236.839.535.933.237.239.045.640.034.028.930.927.812.911.910.711.311.215.116.215.412.716.315.215.317.719.523.227.530.929.032.133.228.631.036.548.113.013.258.749.164.570.481.198.792.6101.322.726.824.724.524.822.421.024.424.428.925.222.919.020.017.883.398.3103.7108.2113.1120.1131.6141.1147.4157.1165.4172.6181.4189.7199.8211.7230.3247.6265.9289.9306.8320.8343.4374.1386.4368.0395.0423.4462.7496.7540.5600.5668.1743.4576.2592.5609.2624.0643.9658.1670.5699.7718.4739.4753.5762.3756.5764.1774.3116.8122.0137.9122.8142.1159.5166.0148.6169.4173.9175.2195.3209.0226.3257.0291.7300.6335.5366.5363.1381.8435.8527.3140.1122.7529.0521.1589.6657.3760.7865.7889.1979.5207.5222.6213.6221.9219.8218.7212.6238.0234.1257.2245.1243.0226.4240.3225.312.915.412.914.011.416.516.515.811.415.814.013.616.818.521.226.229.225.730.631.523.026.533.643.610.810.141.135.350.757.969.672.457.467.218.821.616.415.715.813.511.916.216.720.716.413.410.812.78.56.76.15.55.85.68.18.37.95.88.17.06.98.69.511.614.516.414.616.516.912.914.518.424.86.36.224.721.430.834.841.845.235.641.711.413.310.310.19.78.27.210.410.112.710.38.56.88.25.339.947.249.852.454.958.865.270.572.877.982.384.989.193.398.5105.4115.2125.0135.6147.6155.1160.4171.4188.7194.7185.8196.0208.1224.3239.9262.6292.5317.7350.4281.9289.3296.5302.1308.0312.6317.2332.8339.4349.7354.2358.3353.0356.5360.195.1128.1128.0128.0125.7136.3147.8154.1156.7168.5171.8181.2194.1203.6216.8235.2262.4274.8296.4328.1345.7369.3413.7489.9135.0113.9531.6544.1613.7670.8735.7876.11,023.71,165.2199.1213.8223.9239.3245.9247.6251.6278.6286.7292.4294.8291.3274.6279.8281.810.312.110,010.49.612.113.212.411.313.913.513.915.116.418.320.322.622.024.826.625.226.529.637.810.610.551.044.654.357.262.981.888.491.317.721.121.921.223.722.421.321.022.324.923.520.618.118.219.36.15.75.25.55.67.07.87.56.98.38.28.59.210.011.613.014.614.415.516.415.716.518.023.36.77.034.127.733.735.539.353.556.959.611.213.514.414.415,114.213,714.014.216.214.914.312.211.812.543.551.153.955.758.261.366.470.674.679,283.187.792.396.3101.3106.3115.1122.6130.3142.3151.7160.5172.0185.4191.7182.1199.0215.3238.4256.8277.9308.0350.4393.0294.3303.2312.6321.9335.9345.5353.3366.9379.1389,7399,4404.0403.5407.6414.21 In <strong>the</strong> old series, "income taxes" refers to Federal income taxes only, as State and local income taxes had already been deducted.In <strong>the</strong> new series, no income taxes have been deducted.1 Annual data are average equity for <strong>the</strong> year (using four end-<strong>of</strong>-quarter figures).Note.—Data are not necessarily comparable from one period to ano<strong>the</strong>r due to changes in accounting procedures, industryclassifications, sampling procedures, etc. For explanatory notes concerning compilation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> series, see "Quarterly Financial <strong>Report</strong> forManufacturing, Mining, and Trade Corporations, Federal Trade Commission.Source: Federal Trade Commission.260


TABLE B-86.—Relation <strong>of</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>its after taxes to stockholders' equity and to sales, all manufacturingcorporations, 1947-82Year or quarterRatio <strong>of</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>its after income taxes (annualrate) to stockholders' equity—percent *AllmanufacturingcorporationsDurablegoodsindustriesNondurablegoodsindustriesPr<strong>of</strong>its after income taxes per dollar <strong>of</strong>sales—centsAt!manufacturingcorporationsDurableRoodsindustriesNondurable" goodsindustries19471948 ..194919501951 „ .19521953 ..19541955 .19561957 ..19581959 „I960 .. .19611962 ..19631964 ..1965 „19661967 ..19681969 .. .1970 ..19711972 ..19731973- IVNew series:1973: IV1974 ..19751976 ..19771978 ..19791980 .19811979:|11 .HIIV1980:IIIHIIV ..1981:||IllIV ..1982:1 ,||III15.616.011.615.412110.310.59.912 612.310 98.610.4928.99810.311.613 013.411712.111.5939.710612.813.414.314.911613 914.215 016.413 913.615 718116.315.715 413 612.514.013.615.613.412.010110 59.214.415.712.116.913.011.11U10.313.812.811.38.010.48.58.19.610.111.713.814.211.712.211.48.39.010.813.112.913.312.610.313 714.516 015.411211.916.218 414.013.412.610 69.112.612.014.611.69.57.79.25.91 Annual ratios based on average equity for <strong>the</strong> year (using four end-<strong>of</strong>-quarter figures). Quarterly ratios based on equity at end <strong>of</strong>quarter only.Note—Based on data in millions <strong>of</strong> dollars.See Note, Table B-85.Source: Federal Trade Commission.16.616.211.214.111.29.79.99.611.411.810.69.210.49.89.69.910.411.512.212.711.811.911.510.310.310.512.614.015.317.112.914.213.814.217.416.315.215.317.818.417.918.016.415.615.215.016.614.914.212.111.612.16.77.05.87.1494.34.34.5545.3484.24.8444.3454.75.25.65.65.05.14.8404.14.34.74.75.65.54.65.45.35.45.74.84.75.66.15.75.35.34.84.54.74.75.34.74.33.83.93.56.77.16.47.7534.54.24.6575.24.83.94.8403.9444.55.15.75.64.84.94.63,53.84.24.74.55.04.74.15.25.35.55.24.04.35.56.04.84.64.43.83.44.44.34.94.23.53.03.42.46.76.85.46.5454.14.34.45 15.3494.44.9484.7474.95.4555.6535.25.0454.54.44.85.06.16.45.1555.35.36.15.65.15.66.36.46.06.15.75.55.05.05.55.14.94.44.24.4261


TABLE B-87.—Relation <strong>of</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>its after taxes to stockholders' equity and to sales, all manufacturingcorporations, by industry group, 1981-82IndustryRatio <strong>of</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>its after income taxes (annualrate) to stockholders' equity—percent l1981 1982Pr<strong>of</strong>its after income taxes per dollar<strong>of</strong> sales—cents1981 1982All manufacturing corporations....13,412.010.110.59.24.74.33.83,93.5Durable goods industries ,U.69.57.79.25.94.23.53,03.42.4Stone, cfay, and glass productsPrimary metal industries11.913.95,83.0-3.74.6-3.47.3-8.34.64.92.51.21.9»1.32.9-3.7Iron and steelNonferrous metals18.46.3L8-6.21,0-13.2-.95.92.6.03.618-2.3.4-5.5-.5Fabricated metal productsMachinery, except electricalElectrical and electronic equipment,.,,...,....,Transportation equipment 114.114.112.91.99.415.512.33.89.811.812.64.39,910.812.611.65.17,311.44.64.26.34.5.62.96.84.31.13,25.74.71.33.15.24.63.21.73.84.41.4Motor vehicles and equipmentAircraft, guided missiles, andparts-6.913.9-1.611.7.010.811.8U.6-.212.6-2.24.1-.53.1.03.23.23.2-.13.7Instruments and related products...O<strong>the</strong>r durable manufacturingproducts17.79.814.95.913.32,415.38.314.76.99.42.87.91.87,6,88.32.57.92.1Nondurable goods industries14.914.212.1U.612.14.94.44.24.4Food and kindred products. ...Tobacco manufacturesTextile mill productsPaper and allied productsPrinting and publishingChemicals and allied products*...13.819.49.99,715.613.914.618.66.512,515,513.312.618.42.66.29.713.012.321.34.96.513.812.211.920.88.46.113.510.73.2U.32.63.95.26.53.310.91.75.45.16.73.111.4.82.83.46.42.912.51.42.84.76.02.812.22.52.74.55.3Industrial chemicals and syn<strong>the</strong>ticsDrugs11.916.111.418.68.920.87.717.65.618.95,310.25.612.44.313.64.011.82.812.3Petroleum and coal productsRubber and miscellaneous plasticsproductsO<strong>the</strong>r nondurable manufacturingproducts17.411.414,415.49.115.013.98.77.0U.610.49.613.89,012.06.43.33.35.82.83.35.72.71.74.93.12.46.02.92.71 Ratios based on equity at end <strong>of</strong> quarter.* Includes o<strong>the</strong>r industries not shown separately.Source: Federal Trade Commission.262


TABLE B-88.—Determinants <strong>of</strong> business fixed investment 1955-82[Percent, except as noted]YearRealinvestmentaspercent<strong>of</strong> realGNPityutilizationmanufacturing1Cashflow aspercent<strong>of</strong>GNP 2Rate <strong>of</strong> return ondepreciab e assets 3BeforetaxNonfmancial corporationsAftertaxRate <strong>of</strong> return onstockholders'equity*BeforetaxAftertaxRatio <strong>of</strong>marketvalue tomentcost <strong>of</strong>netassets 61955195619571958...19599.39.79.78.78.887.186.483.775.281.99.38.98.98.69.319.816.815.212.816.49.8797.46.58.513.111610.58.410.56.2545.0395.11.11211041.01810411.25219601961. .19621963....19649.18.89.09.09.480.277.481.683.585.68.98.89.49.710.115.015.117.418.820.28.08.210.311.212.59.99.511.212.113.35.04.66.16.77.81.22213501.28214191.52119651966196719681969 .. ..10 511.010 410.310 789 691.186 987.186.210610.310 09.48.622121.819.318.916.514 013.712 411.39.715 515.213413.812.5969.2828.0711621146614801.52313531970 .197119721973197410.510.010.211.010.979.378.483.587.683.87.88.38.68.07.012.813.514.314.311.07.98.59.18.76.18.89.910.512.811.24.75.76.28.37.310911.17612581.157827197519761977197819799.79.710.211.011.572.979.581.984.485.79.09.39.79.58.911.912.913.913.712.17.77.98.78.67.48.58.610.210.710.25.24.86.36.86.6.811.911.797.761.709198019811982*11.311411.279.178.569.88.7959.610.511.09.56.6777.58.47.7< fl )5.551( 6 ).666694.6901 Federal Reserve Board index.2 Cash flow calculated as after-tax pr<strong>of</strong>its plus capitaj consumption allowance plus inventory valuation adjustment.3 Pr<strong>of</strong>its plus capital consumption adjustment and inventory valuation adjustment plus net interest paid divided by <strong>the</strong> stock <strong>of</strong>depreciable assets valued at current replacement cost.4 Pr<strong>of</strong>its corrected for inflation effects divided by net worth (physical capital component valued at current replacement cost).5 Equity plus interest-bearing debt divided by current replacement cost <strong>of</strong> net assets.« Not available.Sources: Department <strong>of</strong> Commerce (Bureau <strong>of</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> Analysis), Board <strong>of</strong> Governors <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Federal Reserve System, and Council <strong>of</strong><strong>Economic</strong> Advisers.263


TABLE B-89.—Sources and uses <strong>of</strong> funds, nonfarm nonfinancial corporate business, 1946-82[Billions <strong>of</strong> dollars; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]SourcesUsesYear orquarterTotalInternal'TotalTotalExternalCredit market fundsSecuritiesandmortgagesLoansandshorttermO<strong>the</strong>r 2TotalCapita)expenditures3IncreaseinfinancialassetsDiscrepancy(sourcesless uses)194619471948..194918.727.028.919.98.112.919.119.510.614.19.7.46.98.46.53.13.65.46.74.93.33.0-.2= 1.83.75.83.3-2.716.825.625.318.318.117.320.314.8-1.48.45.03.51.91.43.61.61950195119521953195442.136.429.927.829.618.020.221.921.723.924.016.28.06.15.78.110.59.55.76.54.26.48.06.06.73.94.11.4-.4-.215.95.7-1.5.5-.840.437.629.228.027.824.030.224.625.722.916.47.44.62.34.91.7^1.2.6=.11.81955..195619571958..195952.744.943.441.956.329.529.531.530.336.023.215.411.911.720.210.212.812.310.512.36.47.510.410.58.13.75.31.9-.04.213.12.5-.41.27.949.140.839.138.551.232.636.834.927.737.016.54.04.210.814.23.54.14.33.45.01960196119621963196448.656.360.168.473.935.436.542.846.551.813.219.817.322.022.112.112.912.812.514.17.510.79.48.47.84.62.23.44.06.21.26.94.69.58.041.451.055.560.464.937.536.743.244.750.13.914.212.315,714.87.25.34.68.09.01965196619671968196991.897.694.7113.5115.558.562.663.665.064.433.335.031.148.551.118.523.827.827.732.37.614.319.115.014.611.09.58.712.617.714.811.23.320.918.882.791.388.5106.0115.361.074.772.275.483.721.816.616.330.631.69.16.46.27.5.21970197119721973,.1974102.3125.3151.6192.4190.161.873.585.091.785.640.551.866.6100.7104.435.337.243.456.769.926.332.82M20.726.39.04.416.936.043.65.314.623.244.034.598.7122.7149.1191.9190.180.086.099.0121.5137.918.736.750.170.552.23.62.62.4.5.01975..1976197719781979156.9210.8252.2315.4346.3119.7134.2157.4175.7188.837.276.694.9139.7157.530J54.570.479.391.238.738.233.931.925.9-8.016.336.547.46!).36.522.124.560.466.3150.9201.8237.6294.2347.1109.7148.3175.1202.2219.841.253.562.592.0127.36.09.014.721.219801981333.7352.2197.5231.1136.2121.195.792.657.523.138.269.640.628.5317.9314.8220.5260.997.453.915.837.41980:\\'ZIllIV1981:IIIIllIV363.2263.4326.4381.9333.6381.2348.9345.0192.6197.4199.3200.8222.4225.4235.2241.4170.666.0127.2181.1111.3155.8113.7103.6114.762.686.6118.768.7119.1100.282.546.158.663.761.741.634.83.212.768.64.022.957.127.184.397.069.955.93.440.562.442.636.713.521.1341.2248.7314.2367.5318.2352.2304.6284.0231.3215.6209.9225.2233.5260.0284.6265.5103.933.1104.3142.384.792.220.018.522.014.712.214.415.429.044.261.01982:H'ZIll*.297.7348.2371.7232.6234.3240.365.0113.9131.3110.293.398.030.633.159.379.760.338.7-45.220.533.3225.3304.9328.5241.9248.5264.2-16.656.464.372.343.343.11 Undistributed pr<strong>of</strong>its (after inventory valuation and capital consumption adjustments), capital consumption allowances, and foreignbranch pr<strong>of</strong>its, dividends, and subsidiaries' earnings retained abroad.1 Consists <strong>of</strong> tax liabilities, trade debt, and direct foreign investment in <strong>the</strong> United States.3 Plant and equipment, residential structures, inventory investment, and mineral rights from U.S. Government.Source: Board <strong>of</strong> Governors <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Federal Reserve System.264


TABLE B-9Q.~Current assets and liabilities <strong>of</strong> U.S. corporations, 1939-82[Billions <strong>of</strong> dollars]Current assetsCurrent liabilitiesEnd <strong>of</strong> yearor quarterTotalCash 1U.S.Governmentsecurities 2NotesandaccountsreceivableInventoriesO<strong>the</strong>rcurrentassetsTotalNotesandaccountspayableO<strong>the</strong>rcurrentliabilitiesNetworkingcapitalCurrentratio 3All corporation s*SEC series: 5193954.510.82.222.118.01.430.021.98.124.51.817194019411942194319441945194619471948194960.372 983.693 897.297 4108.1123 6133.0133.113.113917.621621.621.722.825.025.326.52.04010.116420.921115.314114.816.824.028 027.326.926.525.930.738.342.443.019.825 627.327 626.826 337.644 648.945.31.5141.3131.4241.7161.61.432.840 747.351651.745 851.961.564.460.723.226 426.026 326.825 731.637 639.337.59.614 321.325324.920120.323 925.023.327.532 336.342145.651.656.262.168.672.41.83817911.7671.8181.8802.1272.0832.0102.0652.1931950195119521953195419551956195719581959161.51791186.2190 6194 6224.0237 9244.7255 3277.328.130 030.831.133 434.634.834.937.436.319.720719.921.519 223.519118.618 822.856.861.567.468.573 688.997.7102.2109.7120.655.164 965.867 265 372.880482.281988,41.7212.424314.2596.7759.179.892 696.198.999 7121.0130.5133.1136.6153.148 354 959.359 561776.183 986.690 4101.031.637 836.839 438 045.046 646.546 252.081.686 590.191894 9103.0107 4111.6118.7124.22.02419341.9381.92719521.8511.8231.8381.8691.811I9601961289.0306.837.241.120.120.0129.2139.291.895.210.611.4160.4171.2106.8114.653.656.6128.6135.61.8021.792Nonfinancial corporations 6SEC series: 5196119621963196419651966196719661969254.7269.7288 2305.6336 0364.0386 2426.5473.634.837.139 840.542.841.945.548.247.916.516.816 715.814 413.010311.510.697.9103.2110 5119.91341146.6155.3173.9197.095.0100 5106 8113.1126 6142.81531166.0186.410.512.114 416.318119.722 026.931.6123.7132.4145 5156.6178 8199.4211.3244.1287.884.488.797 0104.91215137.5147.1168.8199.239.343.748 551.757.361.964.275.388.6131.0137.3142 7149.0157.2164.6174.9182.4185.72.0592.0371.9811.9511.8791.8251.8281.7471.64619701971197219731974492 3529.6599.3697.8790.750 253.359.066.371.17711.010.612.812.32061221.1248.2288.5322.11933200.4225.7263.9313.635 043.855.866.471.7304 9326.0375.6450.9530.42113220.5282.9340.3402.393 6105.592.7110.7128.1187.4203.6223.7246.9260.31.6151.6251.5951.5481.491FTC-FRB series: 7197419751976197719781979735.4759.0827 4912 71043 71,218.273.282.188.297 2105 5118.011.119.023 518 217 317.0265.8272.1292 9330 3388 0461.1319.5315.9342 5376 94316505.565.969.980.39011013116.7453.4451.6495.1557.1669 3807.8269.8264.2282.1317 6382 9461.2183.6187.4213.0239 6286 4346.6282.0307.4332.4355.5374.4410.51.6221.6811.6711.6381.5591.508198019811.333.51.427.1127.1131.719.317.9510.6536.7543.7587.1132.7153.6890.9980.0515.2562,9375.7417.1442.6447.11.4971.4561981:1ItIllIV1,374.51,388.31,410.91,427.1126.6126.2125.1131.719.219.918.017.9528.0533.1542.4536.7560.2565.3577.0587.1140.5143.8148.3153.6923.2931.5967.2980.0520.3525.9549.5562.9402.9405.5417.7417.1451.3456.8443.7447.11.4891.4901.4591.4561982:It1,423.61,419.4121.3123.417.117.4537.8534.4593.8589.2153.6155.0985.7982.6555.0554.9430.8427.8437.9436.81.4441.4451 Includes time certificates <strong>of</strong> deposit.2 Includes Federat agency issues.3 Total current assets divided by total current liabilities.4 Excludes banks, savings and loan associations, and insurance companies.5 Based on data from 'Statistics <strong>of</strong> Income," Department <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Treasury.6 Excludes banks, savings and loan associations, insurance companies, investment companies, finance companies (personal andcommercial), real estate companies, and security and commodity brokers, dealers, and exchanges.7 Based on data from "Quarterly financial <strong>Report</strong> for Manufacturing, Mining, and Trade Corporations," Federal Trade Commission. See"Federal Reserve Bulletin," July 1978, for details regarding <strong>the</strong> series.Note.—SEC series not available after 1974.Sources: Board <strong>of</strong> Governors <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> federat Reserve System, Federal Trade Commission, and Securities and Exchange Commission.265


TABLE B-91.—State and municipal and corporate securities <strong>of</strong>fered, 1934-82[Millions <strong>of</strong> dollars]Year or quarterStateandmunicipalsecurities<strong>of</strong>feredfor cash(principalamounts)Totalcorporate<strong>of</strong>feringsType <strong>of</strong> corporate securitystockPreferredstockCorporate securities <strong>of</strong>fered for cashBondsandnotesManufacturinglIndustry <strong>of</strong> corporate issuerElectric,gas, andwater 2Transportation3CommunicationO<strong>the</strong>r1934....1939....1940....1941....1942....1943....1944....1945....1946....1947....1948....1949....9391,1281,2389565244356617951,1572,3242,6902,9073972,1642,6772,6671,0621,1703,2026,0116,9006,5777,0786,0528710811034561633978917796147361831671121243697581,1277624924253721,9792,3862,3899179902,6704,8554,8825,0365,9734,890676049928485395101,0612,0263,7012,7422,2261,4141331,2711,2031,3574724771,4222,3192,1583,2572,1872,320176186324366481616091,45471128675580090257121103159 96211092113292931,0089461950....1951....1952....1953....1954....1955....1956....1957....1958....1959....1960....1961....1962....1963....1964....1965....1966....1967....1968....1969....1970....1971....19721973197419751976197719781979198019811982; First 3quarters1981:II...,III...IV...1982:II...III..3,5323,1894,4015,5586,9695,9775,4466,9587,4497,6817,2308,3608,55810,10710,54411,14811,08914,28816,37411,46017,76224,37022,94122,95322,82429,32633,84545,06046,21542,26147,13346,13449,2319,15913,3619,88213,73212,77017,62718,8346,3627,7419,5348,8989,51610,24010,93912,88411,5589,74810,15413,16510,70512,21113,95714,78217,38524,01421,26125,99737,45143,22939,70531,68037,82053,63253,31454,22948,21253,09378,89672,50354,58716,68123,75811,52920,53515,57215,96023,0558111,2121,3691,3261,2132,1852,3012,5161,3342,0271,6643,2941,3141,0112,6791,4731,9011,9273,8857,6407,0379,48510,7077,6424,0507,4148,3058,0477,9378,70618,99625,10714,9935,0119,6475,0935,3564,6575,8004,5366318385644898166356364115715314094504223434127245808816366911,3903,6833,3713,3412,2733,4592,8033,9162,8323,5303,6351,7883,4974372672805821,1261,7894,9205,6917,6017,0837,4887,4208,0029,9579,6537,1908,0819,4208,96910,85610,86512,58514,90421,20616,74017,66629,02330,06125,62820,70031,49742,75942,20642,26637,44340,85756,26545,60636,09710,86513,6746,16814,89910,3339,03416,7301,2003,1224,0392,2542,2682,9943,6474,2343,5152,0732,1524,0773,2493,5143,0465,4147,05611,0696,9586,34610,64711,6516,3984,83210,51118,65215,49613,75711,06211,56324,39817,3959,8475,5776,0441,8623,9122,3481,7715,7282,6492,4552,6753,0293,7132,4642,5293,9383,8043,2582,8513,0322,8252,6772,7602,9343,6664,9355,2936,71511,00911,72111,31410,26912,83615,89314,41813,70412,25313,73615,94014,49513,1273,2694,5162,9863,7244,2694,3724,4868134949925957788937248248249677186945679579827021,4941,6391,5641,7791,2531,1488608111,0053,6374,6493,2182,6963,2973,7272,7791,3108581,2114103003992806313996127608827201,1321,4191,4621,4247171,0501,8341,3031,1052,1899452,0031,9751,7752.1725,2915,8404,8364,8723,9324,4663,5624,4433,6404,6947,4016,1581,7651,3542,2941,8077035195566901,3001,0581,0682,1382,0372,7572,6192,4261,9912,7333,3833,5272,7613,9574,9804,7873,1674,3965,6718,9859,25212,86716,29810,8979,63210,98315,19419,11318,56519,80327,42931,67628,5355,6239,6934,46411,8968,0378,97811,5201 Prior to 1948, also includes extractive, radio broadcasting, airline companies, commercial, and miscellaneous company issues.2 Prior to 1948, also includes telephone, street railway, and bus company issues.3 Prior to 1948, includes railroad issues only.Note.—Covers substantially all new issues <strong>of</strong> State, municipal, and corporate securities <strong>of</strong>fered for cash sale in <strong>the</strong> United States inamounts ovsr $100,000 and with terms to maturity <strong>of</strong> more than 1 year; excludes notes issued exclusively to commercial banks,intercorporate transactions, and issues to be sold over an extended period, such as employee-purchase plans. Closed-end investmentcompany Issues are included beginning 1973.Sources: Securities and Exchange Commission, "The Commercial and Financial Chronicle," and "The Bond Buyer."266


TABLE B-92.—Common stock prices and yields, 1949-82Common stock prices 1Common stock yields(percent) 5Year or monthNew York Stock Exchange indexes (De ;. 31, 1965 = 50) 8CompositeIndustrialTransportationUtilityFinanceDowJonesindustrialaverage 3Standard& Poor'scompositeindex(1941-43=10) 4Dividendpriceratio 6Earningspriceratio 71949 ..9 02179.4815.236.5915,481950 ..195119521953 ..195419551956 ..195719581959 ..10 8713.0813.8113.6716.1921.5424.4023.6724 5630.73216.31257.64270.76275 97333.94442.72493.01475.71491.66632.1218.4022.3424.5024.7329.6940.4946.6244.3846.2457.386.576.135.805.804.954.084.094.353.973.2313 9911.829.4710.268,577.957.557.896.235,7819601961 ..1962196319641965 ..196619671968 ..1969300135.3733 4937 5143 7647.3946.1550.7755.3754.6746.1851.9758.0057.4450.2653.5150.5846.9645.4145.4344.1942.8044.4549.8265.8570.49618.04691.55639.76714.81834.05910.88873.60879.12906.00876.7255.8566.2762.3869.8781.3788.1785.2691.9398.7097.843.472.983.373.173.013.003.403.203.073.245.904.625.825.505.325.596.635.735.67.6.081970 ..19711972 .19731974197519761977 .. . .19781979 ..45.7254.2260 2957.4243.8445.7354.4653.6953.7058.3248.0357.9265.7363.0848.0850.5260.4457.8658.2364.7632.1444.35501737.7431.8931.1039.57410943.5047.3437.2439.5338.4837.6929.7931.5036,9740 9239.2238.2060.0070.3878.3570.1249.6747.1452.9455.2556.6561.42753.19884.76950 71923.88759.37802.49974.92894.63820.23844.4083.2298.29109.20107.4382.8586.16102.0198.2096.02103.013.833.142.843.064.474.313.774.625.285.476.455.415.507.1211.599.158.9010.7912.0313.461980 ..19811982681074.0268.9378.7085.4478.1860 6172.6160.4137 3538.9139.7564.2573.5271.9989141932.92884.36118.78128.05119.715.265.205.8112.6611.961981:Jan..FebMarApr..MayJune762473.5276.4677.6076.2876.8089.2385.7489.3990.5788.7888.6374 4372.7677.0980.6376.7876.7138 5337.5937.8238.3438.2739.2370.0468.4872.8274.5974.6579.79962.13945.50987.181,004.86979.52996.27132.97128.40133.19134.43131.73132.284.805.004.884.864.985.0310.7211.44JulyAug..Sept.OctNovDec74.98


TABLE B-93.—Business formation and business failures, 1929-82Year or monthIndex<strong>of</strong> netbusinessformation(1967=100)businessincorporations(number)Businessfailurerate 2TotalNumber <strong>of</strong> failuresBusiness failures 1Liability size classUnder$100,000$100,000and overAmount <strong>of</strong> current liabilities(millions <strong>of</strong> dollars)TotalLiability size classUnder$100,000$100,000and over19291933 s1939"194019411942194319441945194619471948194919501951195219531954195519561957195819591960196119621963196419651966196719681969197019711972197319741975...1976197719781979104.886.490.890.194.592.490.898.295.491.491.198.194.591.192.894.798.099.598.9100.0107.6113.5107.1109.5115.5115.5111.2108.8117.2126.5132.9131.7132,916112,89796,34685,64093,09283,77892,946102,706117,411139,915141,163137,112150,781193,067182,713181,535182,057186,404197,724203,897200,010206,569233,635274,267264,209287,577316,601329,358319,149326,345375,766436,170478,019524,565103.9100.369.663.054.444.616.46.54.25.214.320.434.434.330.728.733.242.041.648.051.755.951.857.064.460.856.353.253.351.649.038.637.343.841.738.336.438.442.634.828.423.927.822,90919,85914,76813,61911,8489,4053,2211,2228091,1293,4745,2509,2469,1628,0587,6118,86211,08610,96912,68613,73914,96414,05315,44517,07515,78214,37413,50113,51413,06112,3649,6369,15410,74810,3269,5669,3459,91511,4329,6287,9196,6197,56422,16514,54113,40011,6859,2823,1551,1767591,0033,1034,8538,7088,7467,6267,0818,07510,22610,11311,61512,547L3.49912,70713,650L5.00613,77212,19211,346L1.34010,83310,1447,8297,1928,0197,6117,0406,6276,7337,5046,1764,8613,7123,9307449792272191631236646501263713975384164325307878561,0711,1921,4651,3461,7952,0692,0102,1822,1552,1742,2282,2201,8071,9622,7292,7152,5262,7183,1823,9283,4523,0582,9073,634483.3457.5182.5166.7136.1100.845.331.730.267.3204.6234.6308.1248.3259.5283.3394.2462.6449.4562.7615.3728.3692.8938.61,090.11,213.61,352.61,329.21,321.71,385.71,265.2941.01,142.11,887.81,916.92,000.22,298.63,053.14,380.23,011.33,095.32,656.02,667.4261.5215.5132.9119.910O.780.330.214.511.415.763.793.9161.4151.2131.6131.9167.5211.4206.4239.8267.1297.6278.9327.2370.1346.5321.0313.6321.7321.5297.9241.1231.3269.3271.3258.8235.6256.9298.6257.8208.3164.7179.9221.8242.049.746.835.420.515.117.118.851.6140.9140.7146.797.1128.0151.4226.6251.2243.0322.9348.2430.7413.9611.4720.0867.11,031.61,015.61,000.01,064.1967.3699.9910.81,618.41,645.61,741.52,063.02,796.34,081.62,753.42,887.02,491.32,487.51980...1981...121.1113.5533,520581,24242.161.311,74216,7945,6828,2336,0608,5614,635.16,955.2272.5405.84,362.66,549.3Seasonally adjusted1981:Jan..,Feb..Mar..,&July..,Aug..,Sept,Oct...Nov...Dec,1982:


AGRICULTURETABLE B-94.—Farm income, 1929-82[Billions <strong>of</strong> dollars; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]Income <strong>of</strong> farm operators fromarmingGross farm incomeNet farm incomeYear or quarterTotal 1TotalCash marketing receiptsLivestockandproductsCropsValue <strong>of</strong>inventorychanges"ProductionexpensesCurrentdollars1967dollars 319291933193913.86.910.711.35.37.96.22.84.55.12.53.3-0.1-.2.17.74.46.36.22.64.412.06.610.6194019411942194319441945194619471948194911.314.319 923 324.025.429.632 436 530.88.411.115.619.620.521.724.829.630.227.84.96.59.011.511.412.013.816.517.115.43.54.6658.19.29.711.013113112.4.3.41.1-.1-.4-.4.0-1.81.7-.96.97.810.011.612.313.114.517 018.818.04.56.59911.711.712.315.115 417.712,810.714.720 222 722.222.825.823 024 517.919501951 ....1952195319541955195619571958195933.138.337.834 434.233.534.034 839 037.928.532.932.531.029.829.530.429.733.533.616.119.618.216.916.316.016.417.419.218.912.413.214.314.113.613.514.012 314.214.7.81.2.9-.6.5.2~.s.8.019.522.322.821.521.822.222.723.725.827.213.615.915.013.012.411.311.311.113.210.718.920.518.816.215.414.113.813.115.212.319601961196219631964196519661967..1968196938 940 542.343.442.346.550 550 551.856,434.235.236.537.537.339.443.442.844.248,219.019.520.220.019.921.925.024.425.528.615315716.317.417.417.518 418.418.719.6.4.3.6.6-.81.0-.1.7.1.127.428.630.331.631.833.736.538.239.542.111.512.012.111.810.512.914.012.312.314.313 013 313.312.811.313.714.412.311.813.0197019711972197319741975197619771978197958.762 071.098.898.01010101.9108.6127 3151.350.552.761.186.992.488.995.496.2112.5131.729.530.535.645.841.343.146.347.658.868.621.022 325.541.151.145 849.048.653 763.1.01.4.93.4-1.63.4-2.41.01.15.644,447.252.165.472.075.883.390.2100.6119.014.214.818.933.426.025.218.718.426.732.412.212.215.125.117.615.611.010.213.614.91980 . ...19811982"150 6166.8163.7139.5143.5142.967.868.569.071775.073.9-4.35.5-.2130.5141.6144.220.125.119.58.29.26.71980:1||IllIV148.6145 2153 2155.4135.3134.3143.6144.866.764.469.370.868.669 974 374.0-1.4-4.2-6.0-5.6125.7128.7132.0135.422.916.521.220.09.56.88.57.81981.1IIIllIV161.8164 71715168.8142.5142.3146 7142.567.969.471.065.774.672 975 776.82.55.37.27.0139.0141.0143.2143.222.823.728.325.68.68.810.29.11982:||| ...HIIV162.0163 0161.6168.1143.4144.4143.2140.667.470.170.468.176.074 372.872.5-1.0-.5.0.5143.7144.2144.3144.618.318.817.323.56.56.65.98.0J Cash marketing receipts and inventory changes plus Government payments, o<strong>the</strong>r farm cash income, and nonmoney incomefurnished by farms.2 Physical changes in end-<strong>of</strong>-period inventory <strong>of</strong> crop and livestock commodities valued at average prices during <strong>the</strong> period.3 Income in current dollars divided by <strong>the</strong> consumer price index (Department <strong>of</strong> Labor).Source: Department <strong>of</strong> Agriculture, except as noted.269


TABLE B-95.—Farm output and productivity indexes, 1929-82[1977 = 100]Farm outputProductivity indicatorsYearTotal *Total 8FeedgrainsCrops 2FoodgrainsOilcropsLivestockandproducts*r«.mrarmoutputperunit <strong>of</strong>totalInputCropproductionperacre*Farm output per hour <strong>of</strong>TotalId 111) WVIPCropsLivestockandproducts1929...444838396504548910141933...4243352755445.43910131939...48494036145650511112141940...1941...,1942....1943...,1944...,1945...,1946...,1947....1948....1949....1950....1951....1952....1953....1954....1955....1956....1957....1958....1959....I960....1961..,.1962....1963....1964....505258575958605863626163666666696967737476767780795152585558565956646159606262616363626968727071747241445147494751395750514750495154545864666962626859404548415153556462534949635751485047695566605659651616232320201922272626262626283034333936384344464657606772696866656467707374747779797879838286868991525358565758605863606061636464676868747477787982815354595558576057646059596262616364657372777881838112131414141516161819192022232426282933353739414547131415151616181820202222242526283033383741424547491415161616161717181819202122232425 26283132353740431965....1966....1967....1968....1969....827983858576737779807070797578676776807453555664658991949495858385878885838689915253586263565963666845495355591970....1971....1972....1973....1974....1975...1976....1977....1978....1979....84929193881001041117786879284939210010211371928891749196100108116698177869110810710093108666874877186741001051299910010199100959910010110487949495909997100102106889€99998896941001051136674788179899410010911970798487808991100105118646873768285931001091181980....1981....1982",.1031151171011161209712112412114314099114103106108107100112114991131181121291311041211261291381371 Farm output measures <strong>the</strong> annual volume <strong>of</strong> net farm production available for eventual human use through sales from farms orconsumption in farm households.1 Gross production.3 Includes items not included in groups shown.* Computed from variable weights for individual crops produced each year.Source: Department <strong>of</strong> Agriculture.270


TABLE B-96.—Farm input use, selected inputs, 1929-82YearFarm populationApril 1Number(thousands)Aspercent<strong>of</strong>totalpopulation2Farm employment(thousands) 3TotalFamilyworkersHiredworkersCropsharvested(millions<strong>of</strong>acres)*TotalSelected indexes <strong>of</strong> input use (1977=100)FarmlaborFarmrealestateMechanicalpowerandmachineryculturalchemicals8Feed,seed,andlivestockpurchases81929..1933..1939..1940....1941..,.19421943....194430,58032,39330,84030,54730,11828,91426,18624,81525.125.823.523.122.621.419.217.912,76312,73911,33810,97910,66910,50410,44610,2199,3609,8748,6118,3008,0177,9498,0107,9883,4032,8652,7272,6792,6522,5552,4362,2313653403313413443483573621009496979810110210346945741941741142141641210699104106104102101100910111328263739424448481945....1946....1947....1948....1949....24,42025,40325,82924,38324,19417.518.017.916.616.210,00010,29510,38210,3639,9647,8818,1068,1158,0267,7122,1192,1892,2672,3372,2523543523553563601019999100103386371351342329101105105106107131415161850495152561950..1951..1952..1953..1954..23,04821,89021,74819,87419,01915.214.213.912.511.79,9269,5469,1498,8648,6517,5977,3107,0056,7756,5702,3292,2362,1442,0892,081345344349348346102105105104103310310296285274108108107107107192123242458626363651955....1956....19571958195919,07818,71217,65617,12816,59211.511.110.39.89.38,3817,8527,6007,5037,3426,3455,9005,6605,5215,3902,0361,9521,9401,9821,952340324324324324103101999810026424923122221610710510410310426272728326669687377I960..1961..1962..1963..1964..15,63514,80314,31313,36712,9548.78.17.77.16.77,0576,9196,7006,5186,1105,1725,0294,8734,7384,5061,8851,8901,8271,7801,6043243022952982989898989898207198189183174102102103103103323538434677818383851965..1966..1967..1968..1969..1970..1971..1972..1973..1974..1975..1976..1977..1978..1979..198019811982 "...12,36311,59510,87510,45410,3079,7129,4259,6109,4729,2648,8648,253'6,1946.5016,241'6,051'5,7906.45.95.55.25.14.74.54.64.54.34.13.8'2.8'2.972.8'2.7'2.55,6105,2144,9034,7494,5964f5234,4364,3734,3374,3894,3424,3744,1553,9573,7743,7058 3,8163,7004,1283,8543,6503.5353,4193,3483,2753,2283,1693,0753,0262,9972,8592,6892,5012,4022,4562,4051,4821,3601,2531,2131,1761,1751,1611,1461,1681,3141,3171,3771,2961,2681,2731,3031,3601,2952982943063002902933052943213283363373453383493523663659696989897979898989897991001011041031031561471431381331261231171151121071031009593929010210110310210110410210110098979810010010010110182868786868787909396981001041071051054956666973758186909283961001071181201238689928993961021041079993101100104111108106'Farm population as defined by Department <strong>of</strong> Agriculture and Department <strong>of</strong> Commerce, i.e., civilian population living on farms inrural areas, regardless <strong>of</strong> occupation. See also footnote 7.2 Total population <strong>of</strong> United States including Armed Forces overseas, as <strong>of</strong> July 1.3 Includes persons doing farmwork on all farms. These data, published by <strong>the</strong> Department <strong>of</strong> Agriculture, differ from those onagricultural employment by <strong>the</strong> Department <strong>of</strong> Labor (see Table B-31) because <strong>of</strong> differences in <strong>the</strong> method <strong>of</strong> approach, in concepts <strong>of</strong>employment, and in time <strong>of</strong> month for which <strong>the</strong> data are collected.4 Acreage harvested plus acreages in fruits, tree nuts, and farm gardens.5 Fertilizer, lime, and pesticides.s Nonfarm constant dollar value <strong>of</strong> feed, seed, and livestock purchases.'Based on new definition <strong>of</strong> a farm. Under old definition <strong>of</strong> a farm, farm population (in thousands and as percent <strong>of</strong> totalpopulation) for 1977, 1978, 1979, 1980 and 1981 is 7,806 and 3.5; 8,005 and 3.6; 7,553 and 3.4; 7,241 and 3.2; and 6,942 and 3.0,respectively.8 Previous basis for farm employment series has been discontinued. Employment after 1980 is estimated.Note.—Population includes Alaska and Hawaii beginning 1960.Sources.- Department <strong>of</strong> Agriculture and Department <strong>of</strong> Commerce (Bureau <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Census).271


Year or month19401941194219431944194519461947194819491950195119521953195419551956195719581959I96019611962196319641965 .. ..19661967196819691970197119721973197419751976197719781979198019811982"1981:JanFebMarAprMay......:..:::::::::::::::::JuneJulyAug ,Septoct I.::..:::::::::::::::;.NovDec1982:JanFebMarApr|£yJune:::::::: :JulyAugSeptOctNovDec*TABLE B-97.—Indexes <strong>of</strong> prices received and prices paid by farmers, 1940-82Prices received by farmers22273542434552606355566663565451 505155535253535352545855565960626998105101102100115132134138133145144143143142142142138133130130128132133133135139137136133136128129127Crops21253443464753615952546162555653545252515152545555535552525052566091117105102100105116125134122144144145143142138138130120120121122126123120123125125124119125114118116AllfarmproductsLivestockandproducts2329364141445060655658706456524947515753535253514954605760676767771049498101100124147144143144146145141144143147147146145140138133137142145147151149148147146142140138[1977-100]Allcommodities,services,interest,taxes,andwagerates l 18192225262830353836374142404040404243434444454545474949515355586271818995100108123138150155147148149150150150150151151150150150153153154154155156156156156155156155Total 2212226283030333943414247 47444443434446464646474747485050505254576173839197100108125138148150146146147149149150148148148147147145148148150150150151151151150149149149Prices paid by farmersProduction items3940424447495154586882911001091221361521651421421461461461551551551591591591591591591611611611671671671681681681683737414444454550555654575959595857585857575858575757565552484850525692120102100100108134144144136136145145147147147147147144144143143143147147146146146146146141141139Fuelsandenergy4949505051525354577988931001051371882132112012122162172162152142142142142142142172152072002022122142132132122132091 Includes items used for family living, not shown separately.* Includes o<strong>the</strong>r items not shown separately.3 Average for 48 States. Annual data are for March 1 <strong>of</strong> each year through 1975, for February 1 for 1976 through 1981, and for April 1,for 1982. Monthly data are for first <strong>of</strong> month.Source: Department <strong>of</strong> Agriculture.272Wagerates781014171920222322222526272727 282930323333343536384144485357596369798593100107117127136136140140140135135135135135135135135135136136136136136136136136136136136136TractorsandselfpropelledmachineryFertilizerAddendum:Averagefarmrealestatevalueperacre 3 777891011131414141618181819192122232425262729313335384042434753667586100109125145158157158157


TABLE B-98.—U.S. exports and imports <strong>of</strong> agricultural commodities, 1940-82[Billions <strong>of</strong> dollars]YearTotal»FeedgrainsFoodgrains 2ExportsOilseedsandproductsCottonTobaccoAnimalsandproductsTotal *Crops,fruits,andvegetabfes3mportsAnimalsandproductsC<strong>of</strong>feeCocoabeansandproductsAgriculturatradebalance19401941194219431944194519461947194819491950195119521953 . .195419551956195719581959I960.. ..196119621963196419651966196719681969197019711972.19731974197519761977 _1978197919801981Jan-Nov:19811982.0.5.71.22.12.12.33.14.03.53.6294.0342.83.13.24.24.53.94.04.8505.05.66.36.26.96.46.36.0737.79417.721.921.923 023.629.434.741.243.339.733.7(*4444.1.32.3.3.3.4.3.6.5 5.8.8.91.11.3.9.9111.0153.54.65.2604.95.97.79.89.48.75.9( 'l.4.71.41.51.161.111'.5.61.01.0.8.91.2141.31.51.71.41.81.51.41.2141.31.84.75.46.2473.65.56.37.99.68.97.4t*4( 4n.2.322.2.3.4.5.5.6.6.6'.B1.01.21.21.31.3. 1.3192.22.44.35.74.5516.68.28.99.49.68.78.30.2.1.2.3^4!91.01.1 9[B.5l.Q.7.41.0.9'.B.5.4.5.5.34.6.5.91.31.0101.51.72.22.92.32.01.81 Total includes items not shown separately.2 Rice, wheat, and wheat flour.3 Includes nuts, fruits, and vegetable preparations.Hess than $50 million.Note.—Data derived from <strong>of</strong>ficial estimates released by <strong>the</strong> Bureau <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Census, Department <strong>of</strong> Commerce. Agricultural commoditiesare defined as (1) nonmarine food products and (2) o<strong>the</strong>r products <strong>of</strong> agriculture which have not passed through complex processes <strong>of</strong>manufacture. Export value, at U.S. port <strong>of</strong> exportation, is based on <strong>the</strong> selling price and includes inland freight, insurance, and o<strong>the</strong>rcharges to <strong>the</strong> port. Import value, defined generally as <strong>the</strong> market value in <strong>the</strong> foreign country, excludes import duties, ocean freight,and marine insurance.Source: Department <strong>of</strong> Agriculture..2.2.4.3'.3.32.3.4.3.4.4.3.4.4.4.4.4.4.5.5.5.6.57.7.8.991.11.41.21.31.51.31.40.1.3.81.21.3.9.9.7,5.4.3.3Ạ5.6.7.7.5.6.6.6.6'.B.87.7.891.01.11.61.81.7242.73.03.83.84.23.93.61.31.71.31.51.81.7232.83.12.94.05.24.54.24.04.04.04.03.94.13.83.73.94.04.14.14.54.55.05.05.85.86.58.410.29.311013.414.816.717.416.815.414.0(4 I.1.1'.2.2,2.2.2.2'.21.2.3.3.4.4.5.5.5.6.7.8.8.8.91.21.51.71.72.01.92.20.2.3A.3.4.4.4.6.4.71.1J.6.5.5.47.8.6.9.9.8.91.21.11.31.41.61.51.82.62.21.82.32.33.13.93.83.53.23.30.1.2!3.3'6'.&1.11.41.41.51.51.41.41.41.21.11.01.01.01.01.21.11.11.01.2.91.21.21.31.71.61.72.94.24.04.24.22.92.62.644444Ki.1.2'.3.2.2.2.2.2.2.2.1.1.22.3.2.2.3.5.61.01.41.2.9.9.9-0.8-10-.16.3.5.81.2.37-11-1.1-11-1.3-.9-.8.2.6( 4 )-11.0131.21.62.32.12.41.91.31.1151.9299.311712.612 010.214.618.023.926.624.319.7273


TABLE B-99.—Balance sheet <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> farming sector, 1929-83[Billions <strong>of</strong> dollars]AssetsClaimsO<strong>the</strong>r physical assetsFinancial assetsBeginning <strong>of</strong>yearTotalRealestateLivestock»MachineryandmotorCrops svehiclesU.S.savingsbondsTotalRealestatedebtO<strong>the</strong>rdebtHouseholdequipmentandfurnishingsDepositsandcurrencyInvestmentsincooperativesProprietors'equities1929... 48.0 6.6 3.2 9.81933...1939...1940194119421943194419451946194719481949195019511952195319541955..,.1956195719581959....1960196119621963196419651966196719681969197019711972197319741975 3197619771978 ..19791980..,.1981....1982....1983*.53.054.862.973.684.093.8102.9115.9127.4134.6134.5154.3170.1167.6164.5168.9173.6182.8191.3207.6210.2210.9219.3227.6235.8243.8260.8274.3288.0302.8314.9326.0351.8394.8478.6502.6576.3664.2736.3873.41,004.81,091.01.091.81.070.030.834.133.634.437.541.648.253.961.068.573.776.677.689.598.5100.198.7102.2107.5115.7121.8131.1137.2138.5144.5150.2158.6167.5179.2189.1199.7209.2215.8223.2239.6267.3327.8359.7418.1496.4554.7655.0755.9830.0823,8789.15.15.37.19.69.79.09.711.913.314.412.917.119.514.811.711.210.611.013.917.715.215.616.417.315.914.517.619.018.820.223.523.727.334.142.424.529.429.031.951.361.460.853.658.33.13.34.04.95.46.55.45,37.410.112.214.116.717.418.418.719.320.220.121.822.722.222.523.523.924.826.027.429.831.332.334.436.639.344.254.764.071.077.085.196.7102.8111.4115.32.73.03.85.16.16.76.37.19.08.67.67.98.89.09.19.68.38.37.69.37.78:08.89.39.89.29.710.09.610.610.910.711.814.522.023.321.322.124.828.033.535.936.537.54.24.14.84.84.75.25.67.28.18.98.49.610.19.69.59.710.09.69.69.49.28.78.98.88.88.48.48.38.89.49.610.010.811.912.311.211.712.113.816.017.219.421.722.43.23.54.25.46.67.99.410.29.99.69.19.19.49.49.49.49.59.49.510.09.28.78.89.29.29.610.010.310.911.511.912.413.214.014.914.014.514.815.215.515.916.216.817.30.2.4.51.12.23.44.24.24.44.64.74.74.74.64.75.05.25.15,15.24.74.64.54.44.24.24.13.93.83.83.73.63.74.04.13.83.93.83.94.24.03,83.63.50.8.9.91.01.11.21.41.51.71.92.12.32.52.72.93.03.23.53.73.94.24.54.85.05.45.65.96.26.56.87.28.010.911.413,414.915.218.320.222.224.426.653.054.862.973.684.093.8102.9115.9127.4134.6134.5154.3170.1167.6164.5168.9173.6182.8191.3207.6210.2210.9219.3227.6235.8243.8260.8274.3288.0302.8314.9326.0351.8394.8478.6502.6576.3664.2736.3873.41,004.81,091.01,091.81,070.08.56.86.66.56.46.05.44.94.84.95.15.35.66.16.77.27.78.29.09.810.411.112.012.813.915.216.818.921.223.125.127.429.230.332,235.139.544.649.655.263.371.485.495.5105.6110.03.44.04.13.93.53.43.13.54.16.16.97.07.98.99.29.59.89.510.012.612.713.414.616.217.617.919.520.922.323.123.824.127.429.833.837.041.948.759.469.480.486.496.1105.043.044.352.563.875.185.495.0107.5118.1123.3122.1141.3155.5151.5147.6151.2154.9163.4170.8183.9185.4184.7190.9196.2201.4207.0220.1230.2240.6252.3261.9271.5292.2329.9405.3421.0484.8560.3613.6732.6839.0909.0890.1855.01 Beginning with 1961, horses and mules are excluded.3 Includes all crops held on farms and crops held <strong>of</strong>f farms by farmers as security for Commodity Credit Corporation loans.9 Beginning 1975, data are for farms included in <strong>the</strong> new .farm definition, that is, places with sates <strong>of</strong> $1,000 or more annually.4 Forecast.Note.—Beginning I960, data include Alaska and Hawaii.Source: Department <strong>of</strong> Agriculture.274


INTERNATIONAL STATISTICSTABLE B-100.—Exchange rates, 1967-82[Cents per unit <strong>of</strong> foreign currency, except as noted]Year and monthBelgian francCanadiandollarFrench francGerman markItalian liraJapanese yenMarch 197319671968196919701971197219731974197519761977197819792.53782.01252.00261.99422.01392.05982.27162.57612.57132.72532.59212.79113.18093.4098100.33392.68992.80192.85595.80299.021100.93799.977102.25798.297101.41094.11287.72985.38622.19120.32320.19119.30218.08718.14819.82522.53620.80523.35420.94220.34422.21823.50435.54825.08425.04825.49127.42428.76831.36437.75838.72340.72939.73743.07949.86754.5610.17604.16022.16042.15940.15945.16174.17132.17192.15372.15338.12044.11328.11782.120350.38190.27613.27735.27903.27921.28779.32995,36915.34302.33705.33741.37342.47981.458341980198119821981:III. ..IllIV3.42472.70072.18442.96332.68992.51572.646585.53083.40881.01183.78483.42782.54783.91823.69418.48915.19920.60918.48417.24717.68255.08944.36241.18648.00843.95841.170. 44.508.11694.08842.07386.09995.08827.08232.08352.44311.45432.40151.48644.45491.43172.445721982:1IIIllIV2.41662.22162.10172.052987.72180.36680.02281.19916.68615.94914.39614.14342.63042.04840.26839.998.07932.07575.07169.06968.42821.41003.38614.38697Ne<strong>the</strong>rlandsguilderSwedish kronaSwiss francUnited KingdompoundMultilateral trade-weighted value <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> U.S. dollar (March 1973=100)NominalMarch 19731967...1968196919701971 .1972 .19731974197519761977197819791980198119821981:1IIIffIV1982:flIll(V34.83427.75927.62627.59227.65128.65031.15335.97737.26739.63237.84640.75246.28449.84350.36940.19137.42743.86439.56737.05740.50038.83637.92036.60936.52622.58219.37319.34919.34219.28219.59221.02222.97022.56324.14122.95722.38322.13923.32323.64719.86015.91421.97620.52018.86618.09617.43216.92916.22913.66031.08423.10423.W923.18623.19924.32521.19331.70033.68838.74340.01341.71456.28360.12159.69751.02549.19652.81849.09847.75754.72653.35850.12447.27246.739247.24275.04239.35239.01239.59244.42250.08245.10234.03222.16180.48174.49191.84212.24232.58202.43174.80230.96207.91183.62188.22184.61177.95172.41164.81100.012O.0122.1122.4121.1117.8109.199.1101.498.5105.6103.392.488.187.4102.9116.694.5103.1110.0105.4109.9114.0119.8122.2Real 1 100.098.899.293.997.393.184.283.284.8100.8111.792.3100.3108.0102.7106.0109.2115.3116.2•Adjusted by <strong>the</strong> consumer price index for all urban consumers.Source: Board <strong>of</strong> Governors <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Federal Reserve System.275


TABLE B-101.—£7.5. international transactions, 1946-82[Millions <strong>of</strong> dollars; quarterly data seasonally adjusted, except as noted. Credits ( + )• debits ( }]Year orquarterMerchandise 12Exports Imports NetInvestment income 3Receipts Payments NetNetmilitarytransactionsNettravelandtransportationreceiptsO<strong>the</strong>rservices,net aBalanceon goodsandservices * ARemittances,pensions,and o<strong>the</strong>runilateraltransfers'Balanceoncurrentaccountl *1946..1947..1948..1949..1950..1951..1952..1953..1954..1955..1956..1957..1958..1959..I960..1961..1962..1963..1964..1965..1966..1967..1968..1969..1970..1971..1972..1973..1974..1975,.1976..1977..1978..1979..11,76416,09713,26512,21310,20314,24313,44912,41212,92914,42417,55619,56216,41416,45819,65020,10820,78122,27225,50126,46129,31030,66633,62636,41442,46943,31949,38171,41098,306107,088114,745120,816142,054184,473^5,067^5,973-7,557-6,874-9,081-11,176-10,838-10,975-10,353-11,527= 12,803-13,291= 12,952-15,310= 14,758= 14,537= 16,260-17,048-18,700=21,510=25,493-26,866-32,991-35,807- 39,866=45,579-55,797-70,499-103,649-98,041=-124,051= 151,689475,813-211.8196,69710,1245,7085,3391,1223,0672,61114372,5762,8974,7536,2713,4621,1484,8925,5714,5215,2246,8014,9513,8173,8006356072,603-2,260-6,416911-5,3439,047-9,306-30,873-33,759-27,3467721,1021,9211,8312,0682,6332,7512,7362,9293,4063,8374,1803,7904,1324,6164,9995,6186,1576,8247,4377,5288,0209,36810,91211,74712,70714,76421,80827,58725,35129,28632,17942,24564,129-212-245-437=476-559-583-555-624-582-676-735-796-825-1,061-1,237-1,245-1,324-1,561-1,784-2,088-2,481-2,747-3,378-4,869-5,516-5,436-6,572-9,655-12,084-12,564-13,311-14,217-21,680-32,9145608571,4841,3551,5092,0502,1962,1122,3472,7303,1023,3842,9653,0713,3793,7544,2944,5965,0405,3495,0475,2735,9906,0436,2317,2718,19212,15315,50312,78715,97517,96220,56531,215-493-455^799-621-576-1,270-2,054-2,423-2,460-2,701-2,788-2,841-3,135=-2,805-2,752-2,596-2,449-2,304-2,133-2,122-2,935-3,226-3,143=3,328-3,354-2,893-3,420-2,070-1,653-7465591,528621-2,035733946374230-12029883-238-269-297-361-189-633-821-964-978-1,152-1,309-1,146-1,280-1,331-1,750-1,548-1,763-2,038-2,345-3,063-3,158-3,184-2,792-2,558-3,293-3,125-2,4293101451752082422543093073052994474824865735795948099601,0411,3871,3651,6121,6301,8332,1802,4952,7663,1843,9864,5984,7115,2245,9555,6907,80711,6176,9426,5112,1774,3993,1451,1952,4992,9285,1537,1073,1451,1665,1326,3466,0257,1679,6048,2855,9635,7083,5633,3935,6252,269= 1,94111,0219,30922,8939,382-9,451-9,7435,095=2,922=2,625-4,525= 5,638=4,017= 3,515-2,531-2,481-2,280-2,498-2,423-2,345=2,361=2,448-2,308-2,524-2,638=2,754-2,781-2,854-2,932-3,125-2,952-2,994-3,294-3,701-3,854-3,8818 -7,186=4,613-4,998-4,617-5,030-5,5614,8858,9922,417873-1,840884614= 1,2862194302,7304,762784-1,2822,8243,8223,3874,4146,8235,4323,0312,5836113992,331-1,433-5,7957,1402,12418,2804,384-14,068-14,7734661980....1981....1980:IIV1981:IIV1982:II111*..224,237236,25454,75255,84355,78657,85660,68360,28457,69457,59355,78055,17452,480-249,575264,143-64,431-62,363-59,735=63,046-64,995-66,831-65,539-66,778-61,653- 60,869=64,938-25,338-27,889-9,679-6,520-3,949-5,190-4,312-6,547=7,845-9,185-5,873-5,695-12,45872,68685,94519,94416,01617,84818,87720,52821,64222,04821,72720,89022,56221,880-42,776-52,908= 10,505-10,268-10,485-11,519-12,405-13,441-13,865-13,198-14,029-14,874-14,46229,91033,0379,4395,7487,3637,3588,1238,2018,1838,5296,8617,6887,418-2,471-1,541•=931-514-286-742=-48758761-528167247527-940-231-436= 216-114-174-495-139200203-66-=319-2017,1447,7021,6441,8081,8101,8791.8381,9811,9601,9242,0342,0502.1408,30311,079373064,8243,1314,6672,9092,5599433,1233,9712,574=6,783-6,608= 1,837-1,306-1,444-2,195-1,422-1,510-1,808= 1,870-2,048-1,740-1,6531,5204,471-1,800-1,0003,3809363,2451,399751-9271,0752,231-4,2271 Excludes military.8 Adjusted from Census data for differences in valuation, coverage, and timing.o Fees and royalties from U.S. direct investments abroad or from foreign direct investments in <strong>the</strong> United States are excluded frominvestment income and included in o<strong>the</strong>r services, net.4 In concept balance on goods and services is equal to net exports and imports in <strong>the</strong> national income and product accounts (and<strong>the</strong> sum <strong>of</strong> balance on current account and allocations <strong>of</strong> special drawing rights is equal to net foreign investment in <strong>the</strong> accounts),although <strong>the</strong> series differ because <strong>of</strong> different handling <strong>of</strong> certain items (gold, extraordinary military shipments, etc.), revisions, etc.6 Includes extraordinary U.S. Government transactions with India.See next page for continuation <strong>of</strong> table.276


TABLE B-101.—U.S. international transactions, 1946-82—Continued[Millions <strong>of</strong> dollars; quarterly data seasonally adjusted, except as noted]Year orquarterTotalU.S. assets abroad, net[increase/capital outflow 43-5,126-5,137-1,438-1,143-1,390-1,1545,144-5,2354,623-5,9868,0505,336-6,347-7,386-7,833-8,20610,22912,940-12,92520,388-33,643-35,38044,498-30,717-57,20259,469-72,74698,982-8,21024,32117,136-23,0792,2942,7051,9113,2173,6437423,6617,3799,92812,7026,35922,97021,46118,38834,24115,67036,51851,31964,03638,46054,48477,9217,8658,61612,64725,3561,4737651,2701,9861,660134-6723,451-774-1,3016,90826,87910,4756,02610,5467,02717,69336,81633,678-13,69715,4424,7857,4217,6447,5417,6788211,9396411,2311,9836074,3333,92810,70314,002-550-3,90910,98612,36223,6968,64318,82614,50330,35852,15739,04273,13615,2869725,10617,6778677177101,1*39"1,1521,0931,152-1019-989-1,124-360-907-458629-205438-1,516-219-9,779-1,879-2,654-1,6205,75310,367-2,46511,86625,21228,87025,8095,70017,3463,6082,219-643795-2,7542,6051981:1IIIllIV1982:1II|||p-22,796-21,566-17,257-47,677-31,201-37,790-26,364-4,529-905262-1,089-1,132-794-1,375-1,518-1,257-987-904-1,547-2,41816,892-19,143-15,996-46,952-29,20835,111-23,1528,47013,46416,88039,10725,08029,61916,0545,361-2,861-5,8358,119-3,1221,9982,1023,10916,32422,71530,98828,20227,62113,9521.0939,9886,703-3749,4975,0455,94014,537-=829503-2,1442,474-899574-1,973e Consists <strong>of</strong> gold, special drawing rights, convertible currencies, and <strong>the</strong> U.S. reserve position in <strong>the</strong> International Monetary Fund(ItVlrJ.Note.—Quarterly data for U.S. <strong>of</strong>ficial reserve assets and foreign assets in <strong>the</strong> United States are not seasonally adjusted.Source: Department <strong>of</strong> Commerce, Bureau <strong>of</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> Analysis.277


TABLE B-102,—U.S. merchandise exports and imports by principal end-use category, 1965-82[Millions <strong>of</strong> dollars; quarterly data seasonally adjusted]ExportsImportsNonagriculturalNonpetroleurrYear or quarterTotalAgriculturalTotalO<strong>the</strong>rgoodsTotalCapitalgoodsexceptautomotivePetroleumandproductsTotalIndustrialsuppliesandmaterialsO<strong>the</strong>rgoods1965 .. .196619671968196926,46129,31030,66633,62636,4146.3056,9496,4536,2976,09620,15622,36124,21327,32930,3188,0528,9079,93411,11112,36912,10413,45414,27916,21817,94921,51025,49326,86632,99135,8072.0342,0782,0912,3842,64919,47623,41524,77530,60733,1589,12310,2359,95612,02711,79810,35313,18014,81918,58021,3601970197119721973197442,46943,31949,38171,41098,3067,3747,8319,51317.97822,41235,09535,48839,86853,43275,89414,65915,37216,91421,99930,87820,43620,11622,95431,43345,01639,86645,57955,79770,499103,6492,9273,6504,6508,41526,60936,93941,92951,14762,08477,04012,41613,79416,30819,63627.81924,52328,13534,83942,44849,22119751976197719781979107.088114,745120,816142,054184,47322,24223,38124,33129,90235,59484,84691,36496,485112,152148,87936,63939,11239,76746,47058,84248,20752,25256,71865,68290,03798,041124,051151,689175,813211,81927,01734,57344,98342,31260,48271,02489,478106,706133,501151,33724.01329,75935,67042,54249,88047,01159,71971,03690,959101,45719801981224,237236.25442,15644,264182,081191,99074,17881,666107,903110,324249,575264,14379,41477,579170,161186,56455,63260,281114,529126.2831980:1||IllIV54,75255.84355,78657.85610,15910,15910,70611,13244,59345,68445,08046,72417,07018,45818,96519,68527,52327,22626,11527,03964,43162,36359,73563,04621,04920,83417,73519,79643,38241,52942,00043,25015,33113,62413,16713,51028,05127,90528,83329,7401981:|||IIIIV60,68360,28457,69457,59312,57511,1519,94710,59148,10849,13347,74747,00220,12221,10720,23620,20127,98628,02627,51126,80164,99566,83165,53966.77820,53320,79818,15818,09144,46246,03447,38248,68714,47415,20515,49815,10229,98830,82931,88433,5851982:III|[|P55,78055,17452,48010,51010.6738,49645,27044,50143,98419,35419,31018,57125,91625,19125,41361,65360,86964,93815,65213,41616,45346,00147,45348,48514,23013,42213,48531,77134,03135,000Note,- Data are on an international transactions basis and exclude military shipments.Source: Department <strong>of</strong> Commerce, Bureau <strong>of</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> Analysts.278


TABLE B-103.—U.S. merchandise exports and imports by area, 1973-82[Millions <strong>of</strong> dollars]Item 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 19811982 first3 quartersat annualrate*Exports71,41098,306 107,088114,745120,816142,054184,473224,237236,254217,912Industrial countries48,52964,48766,49672,33576,97087,948115,930137,152141,134130,069CanadaJapanWestern EuropeAustralia, New Zealand,and South Africa16,7108,35621,2162,24721,84210,72428,1643,75723,5379,56729,8843,50826,33610,19631,8833,92028,53310,56634,0943,77731,22912,96039,5464,21338,69017,62954,1775,43441,62620,80667,6037,11745,25021,79665,0908,99840,09920,83960,9528,180O<strong>the</strong>r countries, exceptEastern Europe20,83432,08237,34338,28740,95150,21362,63082,94290,63683,820OPEC 2 ...O<strong>the</strong>r 3 ..3,41417,4206,21925,8639,95627,38711,56126,72612,87728,074Eastern Europe2,047 1,737 3,249 4,1232,895Imports70,499 103,649 98,041 * 124,051451,689Industrial countries... 48,985 61,092 55,973 67,48879,228Canada17,694 22,392 21,710 26,475 29,645Japan9,665 12,414 11,257 15,531 18,565Western Europe 19,774 24,267 20,764 23,003 28,226Australia, New Zealand,and South Africa 1,852 2,019 2,242 2,479 2,79214,84635,3673,893'175,81399,15133,55224,54136,6184,44014,53748,0935,913'211,819112,60039,02026,26141,8265,49317,36465,5784,1431 249,575 •264,143127,70242,69731,21747,2556,53321,09369,5434,461143,39547,31637,59852,8735,60821,10362,7174,023-•249,947145,68148,86338,77552,9555,089O<strong>the</strong>r countries, exceptEastern Europe...20,91341,58041,33455,37970,68074,40296,137119,142119,196103,102OPEC 2...O<strong>the</strong>r'...5,09715,81617,23424,34618,89722,43727,40927,97035,77834,90233,28641,11645,03951,09855,60263,54049,93469,26232,43370,669Eastern Europe... 601 977 734 875 1,127 1,508 1,896 1,444 1,5521,1321 Preliminary; seasonally adjusted.2 Algeria, Ecuador, Gabon, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela.3 Latin American Republics, o<strong>the</strong>r Western Hemisphere, and o<strong>the</strong>r countries in Asia and Africa, less members <strong>of</strong> OPEC.4 Trade with international organizations is included in totals for 1976-82, but not in area detail. This includes imports <strong>of</strong>nonmonetary gold from International Monetary Fund in 1976-80; an export <strong>of</strong> tin to International Tin Council (ITC) in 1981; and animport <strong>of</strong> tin from ITC in 1982.Note.—Data are on an international transactions basis and exclude military.Source: Department <strong>of</strong> Commerce, Bureau <strong>of</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> Analysis.279


TABLE B-104.—U.S. merchandise exports and imports by commodity groups, 1960-82[Millions <strong>of</strong> dollars; monthly data seasonally adjusted]Year ormonthMerchandise exports 1Domestic exportsTotaldomesticandFood,foreign Total 23exports 3andtobaccoF.a.s. value 8Crudematerialsandfuels 4ManufacturedgoodsTotal 3Merchandise importsFood,beverages,andtobaccoGeneral imports"Crudematerialsandfuels*Customs valueManufacturedgoodsTotal,elf.value 7Merchandise trade balanceExportslessimports,customsvalueExportslessimports,f.a.s.Exportslessimports,elf.I960..1961..1962..1963..1964..1965..1966..1967..1968..1969..1970..1971..1972..1973..1974..1974*1975*1976*1977*1978*1979*1980198119821981:JanFebMar....June..July...Aug.,.Sept..oeSNov...Dec...1982:JanFebMar...tpJune..July...Aug...Sept..OclNov...Dec...,19,65920,22620,98622,46725,83226,74229,49031,03034,06337,33242,65943,54949,19970,82397,99898,092 96,679107,652 106,161115,223 113,549121,232 119,024143,681 141,142181,860 178,633220,630 216,515233,677 228,899212,193 207,07618,90219,78821,27819,78618,89919,75019,28919,03119,55119,16319,15318,88518,73718,70418,60217,84318,21818,82218,02717,49817,38716,69815,69316,33519,45919,98220,71722,18225,47926,39929,05430,64633,62636,78842.02542,91148,39969,73096,63418,53619,46520,84319,37718,52819,34018,91918,72019,10818,73318,75118,37718,35018,34118,12717,44117,80718,38617,63817,17716,65116,31015,31715,9023,1673,4663,7434,1884,6374,5195,1864,7104,5924,4465,0585,0766,56912,93815,23315,23316,79317,23415,96320,60424,58730,40733,20626,9772,9342,9433,3042,8912,6672,5732,5492,4702,7722,9202,6752,5152,2792,4822,6732,5062,4782,4211,8962,1621,9092,1322,0861,9433,9423,8643,3563,7754,3374,2734,4044,7264,8655,0066,6926,4417,09110,73515,80215,80215,19716,09518,57920,95728,22233,71933,02233,5182,8152,9583,2192,5302,5262,3422,4302,6622,7952,8632,8722,9343,0763,4343,1512,8982,9122,7972,6172,6422,8322,6652,3612,42012,58312,78413,66814.29716,52917,43319,21820,84423,81826,78529,34430,44333,74044,73163,52363,52370,95177,24180,15194,473116,587143,891154,283139,71612,06512,81313,55813,27612,61913,45613,06012,99112,94712,45812,59012,31812,46311,87611,82211,42811,83712,56312,59011,88211,33410,98710,36910,66015,07314,76116,46417,20718,74921,42725,61826,88933,22636,04339,95145,56355,58369,476101,394102,55998,503123,477150,390174,757209,458244,871260,982243,95222,61621,91621,02922,24921,23222,00520,11423,24221,27423,07722,50819,74622,82919,09020,34917,38720,55821,31019,55923,49420,64421,09618,93718,8653,3923,4553,6743,8634,0224,0134,5904,7015,3655,3086,2306,4047,3799,23510,701F.a.s. value 84,4184,3344,6914,7555,0295,4405,7185,3676,0316,3916,5427,2688,83813,44631,8426,8636,5377,6498,0709,10611,24414,44615,75620,62423,01125,90730,41437,76745,00156,20210,709 32,064 55,2239,923 32,596 51,08011,891 41,474 64,77514,227 53,554 76,55415,743 51,901 100,31717,735 71,390 112,22618,551 93,973 125,122Customs value18,35017,8171,7361,5891,6121,4711,6651,4721,3901,4791,3931,5831,4131,5421,3401,1541,5291,4351,5691,5671,3891,6171,5811,6671,4981,46992,87374,4048,9769,0997,4718,8787,1468,2496,5767,7797,4117,6427,4686,1748,2695,8455,7175,0334,9066,1986,6457,1685,9686,7115,7706,181142,475.144,02211,27810,75011,37911,32511,81611,64511,62213,36111,97113,12712,82611,41412,58411,52712,40210,33713,21912,89910,98214,11112,43412,02811,03810,62128,74535,32038,24142,42948,34258,86273,573108,392110,875105,880132,498160,411186,045222,228256,984273^352254,88523,67922,91721,98323,26622,24823,03321,07424,39822,31724,19423,56820,69923,87019,90021,23718,16521,50922,25920,44924,57821,58022,02419,78319,7014,5865,4654,5225,2607,0835,3113,8724,1418371,2892,708-2,014-6,3841,348-3,39627,30531,759-3,714-2,127249-2,463-2,333-2,255-825-4,212-1,724-3,914-3,356-86141,7474562,3402,4881,5325,9963,2574,3983,2442,529-4,4679,149-8,254-29,158-31,076-27,599=24,2412,283-1,257-909230-4,793-9,6632,752-10,395-12,7831,772-17,274-39,179-42,364-40,368=36,354=39,675=42,691-4,777=3,129-7053,480-3,349-3,283-1,784=5,367= 2,766-5,031=4,415-1,814= 5.134-1,197= 2,635-322=3,291-3,437=2,422-7,080-4,192=5,326-4,090-3,3661 Beginning 1960, data have been adjusted for comparability with <strong>the</strong> revised commodity classifications effective in 1965.2 Department <strong>of</strong> Defense shipments <strong>of</strong> grant-aid military supplies and equipment under <strong>the</strong> Military Assistance Program are excludedfrom total exports.9 Total includes commodities and transactions not classified according to kind.4 Includes fats and oils.5 Includes machinery, transportation equipment, chemicals, metals, and o<strong>the</strong>r manufactures. Export data for <strong>the</strong>se items includemilitary grant-aid shipments through 1977 and exclude <strong>the</strong>m <strong>the</strong>reafter.8 Total arrivals <strong>of</strong> imported goods o<strong>the</strong>r than intransit shipments.7 C.i.f. {cost, insurance, and freight) import value at first port <strong>of</strong> entry into United States. Data for 1967-73 are estimates.6 F.a.s. (free alongside ship) value basis at U.S. port <strong>of</strong> exportation for exports and at foreign port <strong>of</strong> exportation for imports.Trade in gold is included beginning 1974. Export statistics cover all merchandise shipped from <strong>the</strong> U.S. customs area, except suppliesfor <strong>the</strong> US. Armed Forces. Exports include shipments under Agency for International Development and Food for Peace programs as wellas o<strong>the</strong>r private relief shipments.Data for 1980 and 1981 include trade <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> U.S. Virgin Islands, except that for 1980 Virgin Islands exports are reflected only in <strong>the</strong>figures for domestic and foreign exports combined, total domestic exports, and trade balance.*Data for 1974=79 for domestic and foreign exports combined, total domestic exports, total general imports, and trade balanceInclude trade <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Virgin Islands.Source: Department <strong>of</strong> Commerce (Bureau <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Census and International Trade Administration, Office <strong>of</strong> Trade Investment andAnalysis, Trade Performance Division).280


TABLE B-105.—International investment position <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States at year-end, selected years, 1970-81[Billions <strong>of</strong> dollars]Type <strong>of</strong> investment 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1979 1980 1981Net international investment position <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States..U.S. assets abroadU.S. <strong>of</strong>ficial reserve assets..GoldSpecial drawing rights (SDRs)Reserve position in <strong>the</strong> International MonetaryFund (IMF)Foreign currency reservesO<strong>the</strong>r U.S. Government assets..U.S. loans and o<strong>the</strong>r long-term assetsU.S. short-term assets o<strong>the</strong>r than reservesU.S. private assetsDirect investments abroad (book value)Foreign securitiesClaims on foreigners reported by U.S. banks, notincluded elsewhereClaims on unaffiliated foreigners reported byU.S. nonbanksForeign assets in <strong>the</strong> United States-Foreign <strong>of</strong>ficial assetsU.S. Government securities lO<strong>the</strong>r U.S. Government liabilitiesLiabilities reported by U.S. banks, not includedelsewhereO<strong>the</strong>r <strong>of</strong>ficial assetsO<strong>the</strong>r foreign assetsDirect investments in <strong>the</strong> United States (bookvalue)Liabilities reported by U.S. banks, not includedelsewhereU.S. Treasury securitiesO<strong>the</strong>r U.S. securities 2Liabilities to unaffiliated foreigners reported byU.S. nonbanks58.6165.514.511.1.91.9.632.129.72.5118.875.521.013.88.5106.826.117.71.76.7.080.713.322.71.234.78.837.1199.013.210.52.0.5.236.134.12.0149.789.927.620.711.4161.863.252.91.68.5.298.714.921.21.250.710.758.8255.715.911.72.41.9.038.436.32.1201.5110.128.246.217.0196.979.858.12.618.4.6117.125.141.81.734.913.683.8347.218.711.62.44.4.346.044.11.9282.4136.844.281.120.3263.4104.272.68.817.25.6159.130.853.57.054.913.076.2447.918.711.71.61.04.454.252.31.9375.0162.753.4130.828.1371.6173.0128.512.723.38.5198.742.577.78.953.616.094.9510.619.011.22.71.33.858.456.51.9433.2187.956.8157.031.5415.7159.7106.612.630.59.9256.054.5110.314.258.618.4121.6606.926.811.22.62.910.163.561.91.7516.6215.662.5203.934.7485.3175.8118.213.130.414.1309.468.4121.116.174.129.8160.3717.430.111.24.15.19.868.567.21.3618.8227.362.9293.535.0557.1180.1125.113.126.315.6377.189.8164.718.575.328.91 Includes Treasury and agency issues <strong>of</strong> securities.2 Corporate and o<strong>the</strong>r bonds and corporate stocks.Source: Department <strong>of</strong> Commerce, Bureau <strong>of</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> Analysis.281


TABLE B-106.— World trade: Exports and imports, 1965, 1970, 1975, and 1979-82[Billions <strong>of</strong> U.S. dollars]Area and country1965 1970 1975 1979 1980 19811982 lExports, f.o.b. *Developed countries'.130.1226.7585.71,085.71.283.91.258.91,199.7United StatesCanadaJapan27.58.48.543.216.719.3108.134.155.7182.058.3102.3220.867.7130.4233.772.6151.5212.971.1140.3European Community 465.2113.6300.6577.2665.8612.8599.3FranceWest GermanyItalyUnited Kingdom..,10.217.97.213.818.134.213.219.653.190.234.844.5100.7171.872.286.4116.0192.977.7110.1106.4176.175.3102.796.4175.777.395.5O<strong>the</strong>r developed countries..20.533.787.1165.8199.1188.2176.1Developing countries40.261.7226.5452.8608.8606.1525.9Oil exporting countries 8O<strong>the</strong>rCommunist countries 0 ..10.529.623.217.544.234.9113.6113.090.5214.3238.5170.4301.2307.6203.1276.4329.6213.2212.8313.1215.6U.S.S.REastern Europe....China8.211.82.012.818.22.233.445.37.364.977.913.576.487.518.979.491.121.480.990.123.0TOTAL...193.5323.3902.71,708.92,095.82,078.21,941.2Developed countries 3 ..United States..CanadaJapanEuropean Community 4FranceWest GermanyItalyUnited KingdomO<strong>the</strong>r developed countries..Developing countriesOil exporting countries 8O<strong>the</strong>rCommunist countries 0 ..TOTAL..U.S.S.REastern Europe..China137.523.28.78.270.510.417.67.416.127.043.56.437.222.58.011.61.8203.5237.842.714.318.9118.919.129.915.022.043.167.89.957.934.111.718.52.2339.7618.1105.936.257.8306.454.074.938.453.3111.8221.652.8168.9100.837.151.37.4940.5Imports, c.i.f. 71,182.7222.257.0109.8611.1107.0159.677.999.6182.6408.0100.1307.8170.958.083.015.71,761.61,427.1257.062.8141.3729.2134.9188.099.5115.8236.8540.1137.2402.9202.8$8.593.120.92,170.01,358.3273.470.0142.9644.2121.0163.991.1102.0227.9595.2162.0433.2211.273.297.319.62,164.71,290.4261.460.8132.0628.1116.6154.990.5100.1208.1562.4163.9398,5209.380.189.219.12,062.11 Preliminary estimates.2 Free-cn-board ship value.3 Includes <strong>the</strong> OECD countries, South Africa, and non-OECD Europe.4 Includes Belgium-Luxembourg, Denmark, Greece, Ireland, and <strong>the</strong> Ne<strong>the</strong>rlands, not shown separately.6 Includes Algeria, Ecuador, Gabon, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, andVenezuela.•Includes North Korea. Vietnam, Albania, Cuba, Mongolia, and Yugoslavia, not shown separately.'Cost, insurance, and freight value; except Eastern Europe (except Hungary) and U.S.S.R., which are f.o.b (free on board).Sources: International Monetary Fund, Organization for <strong>Economic</strong> Cooperation and Development, and Council <strong>of</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> Advisers.282


TABLE B-107.— World trade balance and current account balances, 1965, 1970, 1975, and 1979-82[Billions <strong>of</strong> U.S. dollars]Area and country 1965 1970 1975 1979 1980 1981 1982»World trade balance 2Developed countries 3-7.4-11.2-32.5-97.1-143.2-99.4-90.7United States....CanadaJapan4.3-.2is2.2-2.1-2.1-40.21.3-7.5-36.24.9-10.9-39.62.68.6-48.510.38.3European Community 4-5.3-5.2-5.7-33.9-63.3-31.4-28.8FranceWest GermanyItalyUnited Kingdom....O<strong>the</strong>r developed countriesDeveloping countriesOil-exporting countries 5O<strong>the</strong>r ..-.2-2-2.3-6.4-3.34.2-7.5-1.04.3-1.8-2.4-9.4-6.17.6-13.6152-3.6-8.8-24.74.960.8-55.9-6.312.2-5.7-13.2-16.844.8114.2-69.4-18.94.9-21.8-5.7-37.768.6164.0-95.4-14.512.2-15.8-39.710.8114.4-103.6-20.220.8-13.2-4.6-32.0-36.548.9-85.4Communist countries 6 ...«-10.3-.5.32.06.3U.S.S.REastern Europe..China.2'21.1~!o-3.7-6.06.9-5.1-2.27.9-5.6-2.06.2-6.11.8.8.83.9TOTAL 7 ...-10.0-16.4-37.8-52.7-74.2-86.5-120.9Developed countries 3 ..United States..CanadaJapanEuropean Community 4FranceWest GermanyItalyUnited Kingdom....O<strong>the</strong>r developed countries ,Developing countriesOil exporting countries 5 ..O<strong>the</strong>r.. *Communist courTOTAL..U.S.S.REastern Europe..China3.25.4-1,1.4-1.62.2-.1-2.94.72.32!o2.8-.1.9.92.0-3.1-1,8-.1Current account balances 8-2.718.3-4.7-.62.51.64.0-.6-3.4-18.2-16.519.4-35.9-11.2-4.7-6.4-30.4-29.8-A2-8.7-8.75.2-6.15.4-1.7-7.7-18.327.9-46.2-4.93.8-7.6-1.1-53.0-70.61.5-.9-10.7-37.3-3.6-16.4-9.86.9-23.2-1.372.1-73.4-3.03.5-5.5-1.0-74.9-40.14.2-4.45.1-14.2-3.0-7.1-8.512.4-30.7-25.056.5-81.52.72.7-3.53.5-62.4-43.8-8.81.06.5-17.0-11.5-"sis4,5-25.5-61.02.0-63.06.71 Preliminary estimates.2 Exports f.o.b. (free-on-board ship value) less imports c.i.f. (cost, insurance, and freight).3 Includes <strong>the</strong> OECD countries. South Africa, and non-OECO Europe.4 Includes Belgium-Luxembourg, Denmark, Greece, Ireland, and <strong>the</strong> Ne<strong>the</strong>rlands, not shown separately.* Includes Afgeria, Ecuador, Gabon, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, andVenezuela.• Includes North Korea, Vietnam, Albania, Cuba, Mongolia, and Yugoslavia, not shown separately.7 Asymmetries arise in global payments aggregations because <strong>of</strong> discrepancies in coverage, classification, timing, and valuation in <strong>the</strong>recording <strong>of</strong> transactions by <strong>the</strong> countries involved.8 OECD basis.Sources: International Monetary Fund, Organization for <strong>Economic</strong> Cooperation and Development, and Council <strong>of</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> Advisers.3.1-2.05.6-98.1283


TABLE B-108.—International reserves, selected years, 1952-82[Millions <strong>of</strong> SDRs; end <strong>of</strong> period]Area and country1952196219721979198019811982NovemberAll countries *.Industrial countries 3United States....CanadaAustraliaJapanNew ZealandAustriaBelgiumDenmark...FinlandFranceGermanyIcelandIrelandItalyNe<strong>the</strong>rlandsNorwaySpainSwedenSwitzerlandUnited Kingdom..Oil-exporting countries..AlgeriaIndonesiaIranIraqKuwaitLibyaNigeriaOmanQatarSaudi Arabia..United Arab Emirates..VenezuelaNon-oil developing countries..AfricaAsiaEuropeMiddle EastWestern Hemisphere..a 49,39138,58224,7141,9449201,1011831161,13315013268696083187229531641345041,6671,9561,699314177131505004438,5761,2023,4079668252,17562,85152,53517,2202,5611,1682,0212511,0811,7532562374,0496,958323594,0681,9433041,0458022,9193,3082,03018610821119397962892685838,1711,6352,5501,3469401,700147,443110,28212,1125,5725,65616,9167672,5053,5647876649,22421,908781,0385,6054,4071,2204,6181,4536,9615,20110,0714545318857203352,694346149562,3031,59526,1323,1686,6406,4282,4027,494306,995180,77515,1702,9511,35915,6673443,8325,3072,5141,20416,21243,2251251,69316,1497,3013,24110,5502,88015,39115,62656,3182,2143,09311,6822,2684,9024,23544522814,7901,1075,95868,7034,28623,2057,4007,44226,370358,706211,49021,4793,1591,60320,1642774,8797,3302,7121,50124,30140,9761382,25520,47710,6694,7839,8132,89315,19016,85173,6013,1534,3113,16910,3728,04969228618,5361,6005,57971,7764,44424,9478,0608,31126,014375,793212,73225,5023,7551,71325,0835805,2795,4512,2461.31921,99140,8921992,29019,6319,5625,4149,7943,30614,92513,75781,4283,3704,4163,5837,8603,37198833927,8552,7757,41575,3034,17527,4418,1599,00126.527364,589207,39630,4153,3965,53922,1505235,1575,0862,0041,25415,23043,5801322,15114,60510,0566,808* 7,6753,49915,44812,77076,9892,5113,0415,2636,2391,128• 1,04926,929* 2,9576,72173,0354,21832,6286,9728,75320,4641 Includes Taiwan, not shown in area detail.8 Includes Cuba.3 Includes Luxembourg.4 Data are for October 1982.Note.—International reserves is comprised <strong>of</strong> monetary authorities' holdings <strong>of</strong> gold, special drawing rights (SDRs), reserve positionsin <strong>the</strong> International Monetary Fund, and foreign exchange. Data exclude U.S.S.R., o<strong>the</strong>r Eastern European countries, and Cuba (after1960).U.S. dollars per SDR (end <strong>of</strong> period) are: 1952 and 1962—1.00000; 1972—1.08571; 1977—1.21471; 1978—1.30279; 1979—1.31733; 1980=1.27541; 1981-1.6396; and November 1982-1.07953.Source: International Monetary Fund, "International financial Statistics,"284


TABLE B-109.—Growth rates in real gross national product, 1960-82[Percent change]Area and country1960-73annualaverage1974-81annualaverage1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 iU.S. dollarvalue in1981(billions) 2Developed countries 3 ..5.12.74.13.51.21.4-.57,020United States..Canada4.15.610.42.72.64.44.83.75.13.23.05.6-.2.04.22.03.02.9-1.8-5.02.52,9262801,150European Community 44.71.93.13.41.3-.4.32,420FranceWest Germany....ItalyUnited Kingdom..O<strong>the</strong>r developed countries..Developing countriesOil exporting countries 8O<strong>the</strong>rCommunist countries 7 ..5.84.75.23.15.15.85.22.52.22.1.91.94.43.74.62.73.73.62.73.32.14.36.73.34.23.54.34.91.4-1.74.13.24.51.61.61.84.0-1.74.04.52.05.61.9.3-.3-.2-.85.22.7-.53.11.21.5-1.3.8.51.21.45776872995022451,9655401,4252,740U.S.S.REastern Europe..China5.24.16.52.31.85.93.43.012.31.36.91.5.46.91.8-1.03.01.61,587671328TOTAL..5.22.93.82.81.81.8211,7251 Preliminary estimates.2 Estimates based on conversion at average rates <strong>of</strong> exchange for 1980, except for those <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Communist countries, which wereconverted at U.S. purchasing power equivalents.3 Includes <strong>the</strong> OECD countries, South Africa, and non-OECD Europe.4 Includes Belgium-Luxembourg, Denmark, Greece, Ireland, and <strong>the</strong> Ne<strong>the</strong>rlands, not shown separately.• Not available .6 Includes Algeria, Ecuador, Gabon, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, andVenezuela.7 Includes North Korea, Vietnam, Albania, Cuba, Mongolia, and Yugoslavia, not shown separately.Sources: Department <strong>of</strong> Commerce, International Monetary Fund, Organization for <strong>Economic</strong> Cooperation and Development (OECD), andCouncil <strong>of</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> Advisers.285


TABLE B-110.—Industrial production and consumer prices, major industrial countries, 1960-82[1967-100]Year or quarterUnitedStatesCanadaJapanEuropeanCommunity1FranceWestGermanyItalyUnitedKingdomI9601961 • ...196219631964196519661967196819691970197119721973197419751976197719781979198019811982 p1981:IIIIllIV1982:|IIHI .IV »i96019611962196319641965....1966....1967....1968196919701971197219731974197519761977197819791980198119821981:IIV1982:ll'ZIIIIIV66.266.772.276.581.789.897.8100.0106.3111.1107.8109.6119 7129.8129.3117.8130.5138.2146.1152.5147.0151.0138.6151.8152.5153.0146.3141.8139 4138.2135.188.789.690.691.792.994.597.2100.0104.2109.8116.3121.3125.3133.1147.7161.2170.5181.5195.4217.4246.8272.4289.1262.9269.0276.7280.7283.0287.3292.8293.463.165.671.275.782.689.796.2100.0106.4113.7115.3121.5130.7144.6149.2140.3148.5152.2157.8167.4164.6167.3167.8172.8168.1160.7156.1151.9147.785.986.787.789.290.993.196.5100.0104.0108.8112.4115.6121.2130.3144.5160.1172.1185.9202.5221.0243.5273.9303.4262.0270.2278.2285.0292.2301.2307.6312.643.051.255.461.771.474.283.8100.0115.2133.4151.8155.7167.0190.5183.1163.9182.0189.7201.1217.7232.5239.5235.4236.1241.1245.9243.6239 7243.568.371.876.782.585.891.696.3100.0105.3110.9119.3126.5132.3147.9184.0205.8224.9243.0252.3261.3282.2296.2291.4296.3296.9300.130O.3303.5304.8Industrial production 274.778.181.384.891.094.798.4100.0107.4117.6123.3126.1131.7141.4142.3132.8142.6145.9149.7156.8155.6152.3151.5152.1152.1151.8151.9151.5148.6Consumer prices77.081.184.587.690.894.297.5100.0103.7108.0113.3120.3127.6138.3156.4176.7195.2214.7229.9250.7281.6314.1300.7310.4317.8326.3333.9344.3348.2707378869093981001041141201281351451481391491521551631601571581601611611581591513 78.03 80.685.489.592.594.897.4100.0104.5111.3117.1123.5131.1140.7160.0178.9196.1214.5233.9259.1294.2332.7315.7326.1338.9349.9359.8371.0376.078.482.886.188.996.6102.1103.0100.0109.2123.2131.1133.6138.7147.7145.1137.1149.1152.0154.1161.8162.3159.916216016116016215915482.984.887.489.992.095.098.4100.0101.6103.5107.1112.7119.0127.2136.1144.2150.4155.9160.2166.8175.9186.3182.2185.5187.8190.0192.7195.4197.659.265.571.978.479.282.893.3100.0106.4110.5117.6117.5122.7134.6140.6127.6143.5145.1147.9157.6166.5162.7157.7160.1152.3159.8161.0158.6146.674.175.779.285.190.194.296.4100.0101.4104.1109.2114.4121.0134.0159.7186.8218.1255.2286.2328.5398.0472.4448.4468.0482.1504.9523.7539.6562.784.484.385,188.195.097.799.2100.0106.7110.3110.9110.6113.2123.0120.0114.3117.4122.9126.9132.2123.6118.8117.8118.5118.6120.0119.2119.8119.879.081.685.186.889.693.997.6100.0104.8110.3117.4128.5137.7150.2174.3216.5252.4292.4316.6359.0423.6473.9514.7450.4472.3480.5492.3500.5516.6518.9522.71 Consists <strong>of</strong> Belgium-Luxembourg, Denmark, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Ne<strong>the</strong>rlands, United Kingdom, and West Germany Industrialproduction prior to July 1981 excludes data for Greece, which joined <strong>the</strong> EC in 1981.8 All data exclude construction. Quarterly data are seasonally adjusted.» Data for 1960 and 1961 are for Paris only.Sources: Department <strong>of</strong> Commerce (International Trade Administration, Office <strong>of</strong> Trade Investment and Analysis, Trade PerformanceDivision) and Department <strong>of</strong> labor (Bureau <strong>of</strong> Labor Statistics).286


TABLE B-lll.—Unemployment rate, and hourly compensation, major industrial countries, 1960-82[Quarterly data seasonally adjusted]Year or quarterUnitedStatesCanada Japan FranceWestGermanyItalyUnitedKingdomUnemployment rate (percent) 1I9601961196219631964196519661967196819695.56.75.55.75.24.53.83.83.63.5707.15.95.54.73.93.43.84.54.4171.51.31.31.21.21.41.31.21.1161.4131.21.3141.81.82.42.211.6.6A.3131.1.6383.2282.42.6353.83.43.43.32 11.9273.32.4212.2323.23.0197019711972 . ..19731974197519761977197819791980198119821981:II „IllIV1982:|||IIIIV4.95.95.64.95.68.57.77.16.15.87.17.69.77.47.47.48.38.89.410.010.75.76.2625.55.36.97.1818.47.57.57.611.07.37.27.68.48610.212.112.71.21.3141.31.4192.0202.32,12.02.22.22.42.22.2232.42.42.42.7282.72.9424.6505.46.16.57.77.07.77.97.9838.68.7'.B.71.63.53.53.53.43.03.04.23.53.94.44.95.35.86.23.13.1363.42.8323.6363.73.93.94.24.63.94.34.14.54.64.64.54.53.139423.23.1466.0646.35.77311.310.311.111.512.512.812.913.0I96019611962196319641965 .. .1966196719681969197019711972197319741975197619771978197919801981198236.737.739.140.342.042 844.847.050.453.957.661.164.469.076.385.492.3100.0108.3118.9132 8146.4158.829.929428.729.430.632134.637.340.043.047.853.158.163 475.082.497.1100.099.4106.6116 4126.1Hourly compensation (1977 = 100) 26.6778.89.811.012 413.615.317.921.325.430.340.155 067.177.182.3100.0136.1138.5142 6157.016.217 819.621.723.325126.728.932.632.333.938.046.260 066.288.590.6100.01231148.2174 2158.310.512.313.914.9 -16.117.619.020.121.323.629.534.742.056.967.179.483.5100.0125.6147.5161.7139.911.913.115.518.320.421822.825.427.130.736.843.152.366.474.095.089.5100.0119.1143.1164.8152.424.926.828.329.531.634 737.638.235.638.844.351.860.065.578.296.591.8100.0128.1168.5228.2230.8'Unemployment rates, approximating U.S. concepts. Data for United Kingdom exclude Nor<strong>the</strong>rn Ireland. Quarterly data for France.West Germany, and United Kingdom should be viewed as less precise indicators <strong>of</strong> unemployment under U.S. concepts than <strong>the</strong> annualdata. Beginning 1977, changes in <strong>the</strong> Italian survey resulted in a large increase in persons enumerated as unemployed. However, manyalso reported that <strong>the</strong>y had not actively sought work in <strong>the</strong> past 30 days. Such persons have been provisionally excluded forcomparability with U.S. concepts; <strong>the</strong>ir inclusion would more than double <strong>the</strong> rates shown for Italy.2 Hourly compensation in manufacturing, U.S. dollar basis. Data relate to all employed persons (wage and salary earners and <strong>the</strong> selfemployed)in <strong>the</strong> United States and Canada, and to all employees (wage and salary earners) in <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r countries. For France andUnited Kingdom compensation adjusted to include changes in employment taxes that are not compensation to employees, but are laborcosts to employers.Source: Department <strong>of</strong> Labor, Bureau <strong>of</strong> Labor Statistics.287

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!