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More Tricks For Defeating SSL InPra
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Certificate ChainingVeriSignInterme
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What they say:●●●●Verify th
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VeriSignWhat if...IntermediateCAInt
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What they say:●●●●Verify th
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But we just created a valid certifi
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...is a somewhat obscure field.Moxi
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And then in 2002...●●●Microso
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sslsniffMoxie MarlinspikeInstitute
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Lately, I've been talking aboutSSL
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Moxie MarlinspikeInstitute For Disr
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In the context of web browsing●
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Moxie MarlinspikeInstitute For Disr
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We Can Attack SSLBefore We Even Get
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sslstripMoxie MarlinspikeInstitute
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sslstrip●Watch HTTP traffic go by
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How Does It Look?
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How Does It Look?
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The sites themselves confuse us.
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Some sites provide no visible diffe
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Other Little Tricks:
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Where do we need to go from here?Mo
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What's with certificates, anyways?X
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What's with certificates, anyways?X
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Moxie MarlinspikeInstitute For Disr
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SSL/TLS Handshake BeginningsClientH
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The Problems For Us BeginAttackerCl
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In 2000, things were different.Moxi
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Identification!Moxie MarlinspikeIns
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Actual people involved...Moxie Marl
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These days it's all about:online do
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Moxie MarlinspikeInstitute For Disr
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PKCS #10CertificateRequestVersionSu
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PKCS #10CertificateRequestVersionSu
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PKCS #10CertificateRequestVersionSu
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PKCS #10CertificateRequestVersionSu
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PKCS #10CertificateRequestVersionSu
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SubjectsDistinguishedNameCountrySta
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SubjectsDistinguishedNameCountrySta
- Page 85 and 86: CNcommonName ::=SEQUENCE { { 2 5 4
- Page 87 and 88: PKCS #10 SubjectDistinguishedNameCo
- Page 89 and 90: PKCS #10 SubjectCommon Nameverisign
- Page 91 and 92: PKCS #10 SubjectCommon Namewww.payp
- Page 93 and 94: PKCS #10 Certificate SigningRequest
- Page 95 and 96: Our Original ScenarioX509Certificat
- Page 97 and 98: In memory, though...char *destinati
- Page 99 and 100: In the eyes of most SSLimplementati
- Page 101 and 102: A First Cut: updated sslsniffsslsni
- Page 103 and 104: How does it look?Moxie MarlinspikeI
- Page 105 and 106: How does it look?Moxie MarlinspikeI
- Page 107 and 108: 1) Targeted attacks are kind of lam
- Page 109 and 110: Moxie MarlinspikeInstitute For Disr
- Page 111 and 112: Moxie MarlinspikeInstitute For Disr
- Page 113 and 114: Moxie MarlinspikeInstitute For Disr
- Page 115 and 116: Universal Wildcard*~.thoughtcrime.o
- Page 117 and 118: And... your remote exploit.● 144
- Page 119 and 120: And... your remote exploit.● 144
- Page 121 and 122: And... your remote exploit.(AAAAAAA
- Page 123 and 124: And... your remote exploit.(AAAAAAA
- Page 125 and 126: A Second Cut: sslsniff withwildcard
- Page 127 and 128: What do we have to worry about?Moxi
- Page 129 and 130: What do we have to worry about?1) C
- Page 131 and 132: Moxie MarlinspikeInstitute For Disr
- Page 133 and 134: Defeating OCSPOCSPResponse ::= SEQU
- Page 135: Defeating OCSPOCSPResponse ::= SEQU
- Page 139 and 140: Defeating OCSPOCSPResponse ::= SEQU
- Page 141 and 142: Defeating OCSPOCSPResponse ::= SEQU
- Page 143 and 144: A Third Cut: ocsp-aware sslsniffssl
- Page 145 and 146: What do we have to worry about?2) U
- Page 147 and 148: Firefox/Thunderbird: A Case StudyUp
- Page 149 and 150: Firefox/Thunderbird: A Case Study
- Page 151 and 152: A Fourth Cut: update-aware sslsniff
- Page 153 and 154: Postscript:Stripping NULL is no sol
- Page 155 and 156: Conclusion●●●●●●We have