More Tricks For Defeating SSL In Practice

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$\H1B%-12345X@PJL JOB “HackingPrinters”$

Something must be wrong, but...●●●●All the signatures are valid.Nothing has expired.The chain is in tact.The root CA is embedded in the browser andtrusted.Moxie MarlinspikeInstitute For Disruptive Studies
But we just created a valid certificatefor PayPal, and we're not PayPal?Moxie MarlinspikeInstitute For Disruptive Studies
Page 1: More Tricks For Defeating SSL InPra
Page 7 and 8: Certificate ChainingVeriSignInterme
Page 9 and 10: What they say:●●●●Verify th
Page 11 and 12: VeriSignWhat if...IntermediateCAInt
Page 13: What they say:●●●●Verify th
Page 17 and 18: ...is a somewhat obscure field.Moxi
Page 19 and 20: And then in 2002...●●●Microso
Page 21 and 22: sslsniffMoxie MarlinspikeInstitute
Page 24 and 25: Lately, I've been talking aboutSSL
Page 26 and 27: Moxie MarlinspikeInstitute For Disr
Page 28 and 29: In the context of web browsing●
Page 32 and 33: We Can Attack SSLBefore We Even Get
Page 34 and 35: sslstripMoxie MarlinspikeInstitute
Page 36 and 37: sslstrip●Watch HTTP traffic go by
Page 38 and 39: How Does It Look?
Page 40 and 41: How Does It Look?
Page 43 and 44: The sites themselves confuse us.
Page 45 and 46: Some sites provide no visible diffe
Page 47 and 48: Other Little Tricks:
Page 49 and 50: Where do we need to go from here?Mo
Page 51 and 52: What's with certificates, anyways?X
Page 53 and 54: What's with certificates, anyways?X
Page 57 and 58: SSL/TLS Handshake BeginningsClientH
Page 59 and 60: The Problems For Us BeginAttackerCl
Page 61 and 62: In 2000, things were different.Moxi
Page 63 and 64: Identification!Moxie MarlinspikeIns
Page 65 and 66:
Actual people involved...Moxie Marl
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These days it's all about:online do
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Moxie MarlinspikeInstitute For Disr
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PKCS #10CertificateRequestVersionSu
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SubjectsDistinguishedNameCountrySta
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SubjectsDistinguishedNameCountrySta
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CNcommonName ::=SEQUENCE { { 2 5 4
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PKCS #10 SubjectDistinguishedNameCo
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PKCS #10 SubjectCommon Nameverisign
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PKCS #10 SubjectCommon Namewww.payp
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PKCS #10 Certificate SigningRequest
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Our Original ScenarioX509Certificat
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In memory, though...char *destinati
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In the eyes of most SSLimplementati
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A First Cut: updated sslsniffsslsni
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How does it look?Moxie MarlinspikeI
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How does it look?Moxie MarlinspikeI
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1) Targeted attacks are kind of lam
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Universal Wildcard*~.thoughtcrime.o
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And... your remote exploit.● 144
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And... your remote exploit.● 144
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And... your remote exploit.(AAAAAAA
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And... your remote exploit.(AAAAAAA
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A Second Cut: sslsniff withwildcard
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What do we have to worry about?Moxi
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What do we have to worry about?1) C
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Defeating OCSPOCSPResponse ::= SEQU
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A Third Cut: ocsp-aware sslsniffssl
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What do we have to worry about?2) U
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Firefox/Thunderbird: A Case StudyUp
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Firefox/Thunderbird: A Case Study
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A Fourth Cut: update-aware sslsniff
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Postscript:Stripping NULL is no sol
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Conclusion●●●●●●We have
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More Tricks For Defeating SSL In Practice

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