More Tricks For Defeating SSL In Practice

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$\H1B%-12345X@PJL JOB “HackingPrinters”$

Defeating OCSPOCSPResponse ::= SEQUENCE {}responseStatusresponseBytesOCSPResponseStatus,[0] EXPLICIT ResponseBytes OPTIONALOCSPResponseStatus ::= ENUMERATED {successful (0), --Response has valid confirmationsmalformedRequest (1), --Illegal confirmation requestinternalError (2), --Internal error in issuertryLater (3), --Try again later--(4) is not used}sigRequiredunauthorized(5), --Must sign the request(6) --Request unauthorizedMoxie MarlinspikeInstitute For Disruptive Studies
Defeating OCSPOCSPResponse ::= SEQUENCE {}responseStatusresponseBytesOCSPResponseStatus,[0] EXPLICIT ResponseBytes OPTIONALOCSPResponseStatus ::= ENUMERATED {successful (0), --Response has valid confirmationsmalformedRequest (1), --Illegal confirmation requestinternalError (2), --Internal error in issuertryLater (3), --Try again later--(4) is not used}sigRequiredunauthorized(5), --Must sign the request(6) --Request unauthorizedMoxie MarlinspikeInstitute For Disruptive Studies
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More Tricks For Defeating SSL InPra
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Certificate ChainingVeriSignInterme
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What they say:●●●●Verify th
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VeriSignWhat if...IntermediateCAInt
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What they say:●●●●Verify th
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But we just created a valid certifi
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...is a somewhat obscure field.Moxi
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And then in 2002...●●●Microso
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sslsniffMoxie MarlinspikeInstitute
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Lately, I've been talking aboutSSL
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Moxie MarlinspikeInstitute For Disr
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In the context of web browsing●
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We Can Attack SSLBefore We Even Get
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sslstripMoxie MarlinspikeInstitute
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sslstrip●Watch HTTP traffic go by
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How Does It Look?
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How Does It Look?
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The sites themselves confuse us.
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Some sites provide no visible diffe
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Other Little Tricks:
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Where do we need to go from here?Mo
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What's with certificates, anyways?X
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What's with certificates, anyways?X
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SSL/TLS Handshake BeginningsClientH
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The Problems For Us BeginAttackerCl
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In 2000, things were different.Moxi
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Identification!Moxie MarlinspikeIns
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Actual people involved...Moxie Marl
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These days it's all about:online do
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PKCS #10CertificateRequestVersionSu
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SubjectsDistinguishedNameCountrySta
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SubjectsDistinguishedNameCountrySta
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CNcommonName ::=SEQUENCE { { 2 5 4
Page 87 and 88: PKCS #10 SubjectDistinguishedNameCo
Page 89 and 90: PKCS #10 SubjectCommon Nameverisign
Page 91 and 92: PKCS #10 SubjectCommon Namewww.payp
Page 93 and 94: PKCS #10 Certificate SigningRequest
Page 95 and 96: Our Original ScenarioX509Certificat
Page 97 and 98: In memory, though...char *destinati
Page 99 and 100: In the eyes of most SSLimplementati
Page 101 and 102: A First Cut: updated sslsniffsslsni
Page 103 and 104: How does it look?Moxie MarlinspikeI
Page 105 and 106: How does it look?Moxie MarlinspikeI
Page 107 and 108: 1) Targeted attacks are kind of lam
Page 109 and 110: Moxie MarlinspikeInstitute For Disr
Page 115 and 116: Universal Wildcard*~.thoughtcrime.o
Page 117 and 118: And... your remote exploit.● 144
Page 119 and 120: And... your remote exploit.● 144
Page 121 and 122: And... your remote exploit.(AAAAAAA
Page 123 and 124: And... your remote exploit.(AAAAAAA
Page 125 and 126: A Second Cut: sslsniff withwildcard
Page 127 and 128: What do we have to worry about?Moxi
Page 129 and 130: What do we have to worry about?1) C
Page 133 and 134: Defeating OCSPOCSPResponse ::= SEQU
Page 137: Defeating OCSPOCSPResponse ::= SEQU
Page 143 and 144: A Third Cut: ocsp-aware sslsniffssl
Page 145 and 146: What do we have to worry about?2) U
Page 147 and 148: Firefox/Thunderbird: A Case StudyUp
Page 149 and 150: Firefox/Thunderbird: A Case Study
Page 151 and 152: A Fourth Cut: update-aware sslsniff
Page 153 and 154: Postscript:Stripping NULL is no sol
Page 155 and 156: Conclusion●●●●●●We have
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