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NEWHORIZON

NEWHORIZON - Institute of Islamic Banking and Insurance

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<strong>NEWHORIZON</strong> April to June 2013<br />

ANALYSIS<br />

The Subprime Crisis and the Lessons<br />

for the Islamic Finance Industry<br />

By: Suleman Muhammad Ali, Manager- Product Structuring & Research;<br />

Product Development and Shar’iah Compliance, Meezan Bank Limited<br />

Background<br />

The subprime mortgage crisis is<br />

ongoing. It started in the United<br />

States and was characterised among<br />

other things by evaporating liquidity<br />

in the world’s credit markets,<br />

declining asset prices especially in<br />

the housing sector, high rates of<br />

foreclosures on mortgage assets<br />

and the failure of mortgage-backed<br />

securities. Although the crisis<br />

started in the United States its<br />

effects have been contagious and<br />

have extended to other financial<br />

markets around the globe.<br />

Factors Leading to the Financial<br />

Crisis<br />

The crisis started when the US<br />

housing asset price bubble started<br />

to burst. US housing asset prices<br />

had risen sharply during the five<br />

years up to 2006. During the<br />

period of the bubble more and<br />

more people were encouraged to<br />

borrow money at low interest rates<br />

by various financial institutions.<br />

Adjustable Rate Mortgages (ARM)<br />

were offered by numerous banks<br />

under which mortgage loans were<br />

available at very low initial interest<br />

rates, with a pre-agreed increase<br />

after a certain period, for instance<br />

after two to three years. Similarly<br />

mortgage loans were offered on<br />

very easy terms or with minimal<br />

credit appraisal requirements often<br />

flouting the process of adequately<br />

checking the assets or the existing/<br />

future income streams of the<br />

borrowers. All of these efforts were<br />

geared towards encouraging more<br />

and more borrowing to acquire<br />

residential property.<br />

The High Consumption<br />

Mindset<br />

Similarly the long-term trend of<br />

rising prices encouraged more<br />

and more home owners to use the<br />

increased value of their homes<br />

as security for getting a second<br />

mortgage or credit for financing<br />

their consumption expenditures<br />

or for financing investments in the<br />

stock market. In 2008 the average<br />

US household debt was around<br />

134% of disposable income and<br />

the total nationwide household<br />

debt was $14.5 trillion according<br />

to US government statistics. All<br />

these figures show that the average<br />

American was consuming more<br />

than he or she was earning. How<br />

is it possible for anyone to spend<br />

more than they are earning? The<br />

answer lies in incurring debt to<br />

finance consumption expenditure.<br />

All this was due to low credit rates,<br />

easy or zero-credit application<br />

terms and the increasing value of<br />

the underlying mortgaged assets.<br />

Bad Credit Practices and<br />

Subprime Lending<br />

In the years leading up to the<br />

crisis the US economy had seen<br />

unprecedented growth, which in<br />

turn resulted in high capital inflows<br />

from the growing economies of<br />

Asia and from elsewhere around<br />

the world as the US was seen<br />

as a safe haven for investment.<br />

The money that was coming<br />

in resulted in a high supply of<br />

liquidity. This coupled with lower<br />

interest rates and the high rate of<br />

origination of mortgage-backed<br />

securities produced a mindset in<br />

which banks were more eager to<br />

service large volumes of credit<br />

applications in shorter time spans<br />

rather than focusing on ensuring<br />

the quality of the credit. The<br />

result was the emergence of<br />

various schemes allowing credit<br />

to individuals with an impaired<br />

or no credit history. Automated<br />

credit application schemes based<br />

on concepts such as NINA (No<br />

Income No Assets) basically<br />

allowed borrowers to apply for<br />

and get credit without showing<br />

any proof of employment or<br />

assets. Credit was, therefore, given<br />

without taking into consideration<br />

the ability of the borrower to<br />

make repayments. This was also<br />

partly prompted by the greed and<br />

short sightedness of those bank<br />

managers, who were keen to inflate<br />

their performance by showing high<br />

credit disbursements in the hope<br />

of getting short-term benefits and<br />

high-performance bonuses.<br />

The Case of Mortgage-Backed<br />

Securities (MBS)<br />

Mortgage-backed securities are<br />

underpinned by the earnings or the<br />

cash flows from various mortgage<br />

loans. The payment, return and<br />

the security are all tied up in these<br />

mortgage loans. It is a product<br />

created through modern financial<br />

engineering, which allows various<br />

banks to pass on their credit<br />

exposures to other banks and<br />

financial institutions or individuals<br />

by repackaging the original<br />

mortgage loans into securities or<br />

bonds representing an ownership<br />

or security interest in these<br />

mortgage loans. The previous<br />

mortgage or lending model<br />

envisaged that the banks originating<br />

the loans would hold on to them<br />

until maturity; however, with the<br />

engineering of securitisation, banks<br />

were able to originate and distribute<br />

the loans to other entities by<br />

repackaging them into securities.<br />

This had two detrimental effects on<br />

the US financial market. Firstly it<br />

resulted in the availability of excess<br />

liquidity to the credit markets.<br />

Banks were able to originate the<br />

loans through their deposits and<br />

then sell these loans throughout<br />

the world by repackaging them<br />

into securities thereby releasing<br />

the liquidity tied up in the original<br />

loans to finance yet further<br />

mortgages and loans.<br />

Secondly the policy of originate<br />

and distribute led to the moral<br />

hazard problem and encouraged<br />

the banks and investment banks<br />

to originate high volumes of<br />

mortgage loans with little emphasis<br />

on the credit quality of such loans<br />

since their focus was short term<br />

in nature, i.e. to earn large profits<br />

through origination fees; fees for<br />

structuring complex mortgagebacked<br />

securities and profits from<br />

the sale of such securities. These<br />

banks and investment banks were<br />

not concerned about the longterm<br />

quality and results of such<br />

securities or the defaults that would<br />

arise if housing prices started to<br />

fall. The structuring managers<br />

were appraised and were paid<br />

substantial bonuses on the basis of<br />

the various complex securitisation<br />

structures of MBS that they were<br />

able to sell successfully and the<br />

www.islamic-banking.com IIBI 15

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