Confronting the Complexity of Loss

Such socialisation gained momentum during the Buddhist revivalist movement, which
began to emerge during the latter part of the Nineteenth Century. Hence Sinhala-Buddhist
nationalism became a dominant ideological force in Sri Lankan social and political life
well before independence in 1948. The new ethno-religious ideology broke away from
traditional Buddhist practices and forged a new ‘protestant’ form of Buddhism, which
was perhaps more amenable to the idea of a ‘Sinhala-Buddhist nation’. 16 In this context,
the use of force for the purpose of protecting the Sinhala-Buddhist nation was not ruled
out—as in the Mahāvamsa’s account of Dutugemunu’s triumph over Elara—despite
doctrinal incompatibility with Buddhism. 17 Carefully chronicling the emergence and
consolidation of this ideology during the post-independence era, authors Richard
Gombrich and Gananath Obeyesekere in Buddhism Transformed: Religious Change in
Sri Lanka (1988), were perhaps some of the first commentators to unapologetically
observe that ‘violence [had] taken root at the heart of the Buddhist establishment.’ 18 This
observation was made in the context of the violent reaction of the Buddhist clergy to the
Indo-Lanka Accord of 1987, which was perceived as a threat to the Sinhala-Buddhist
nation. The observation, once contextualised, is critical to explaining the seemingly
untenable cohabitation between Buddhism and ethno-nationalist violence.
Sinhala-Buddhist nationalists perceived Sri Lankan Tamils as having disproportionate
access to education and public service employment under the colonial administration. 19
Sasanka Perera explains the possible realities that underpinned these perceptions. He
argues that Tamils attended English language schools, which had better facilities as a
consequence of well-funded American missionary activities. As a result, they received a
relatively higher quality of pre-university education. Cultural norms and economic
necessity further prompted Tamils in the North and East to seek employment through
education. 20 Consequently, there was an over-representation of Tamils in higher
education, the public sector, and certain professions. 21
16 Richard Gombrich & Gananath Obeyesekere, Buddhism Transformed: Religious Change in Sri Lanka
(1988), at 202-238.
17 See Mahinda Deegalle, ‘Is Violence Justified in Theravāda Buddhism?’ [2002] 39 Current Dialogue 8-
17. The author argues that the justification of violence in the Mahāvamsa is not doctrinally supported by
earlier canonical literature. He observes: ‘This passage in the Mahāvamsa seems to suggest that certain
forms of violence such as killings during war can be allowed in certain circumstances such as in the case of
threats to the survival of Buddhism in Sri Lanka during the time of Duṭṭhagāmani. However, it is hard to
justify this Mahāvamsa position either through Buddhist practice or doctrinal standpoint as found in the
Pāli canon of the Theravāda Buddhists.’
18 Ibid. at x. It is noted, however, that violence had been associated with Buddhism even earlier. The
Ceylonese riots of 1915 were sparked as a result of Moors disrupting a Buddhist procession in Kandy. Yet
there is little evidence to suggest that the wider economic and political impetus for the riots could be linked
to Buddhist nationalism. See Kumari Jayawardena, ‘Economic and Political Factors in the 1915 Riots’
[1970] 29.2 The Journal of Asian Studies 223-233.
19 Perera, op. cit. at 9.
20 Ibid. at 11.
21 Ibid. The author notes: ‘By independence, Tamils accounted for over 30% of government services
admissions, a share larger than their proportion in the general population—i.e., Sri Lankan and Indian
Tamils have never totalled more than 25%. By 1956, it is estimated that Tamils constituted 50% of the
clerical personnel of the railway, postal and customs services, 60% of all doctors, engineers and lawyers,
and 40% of other labour forces.’
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