sdm pulse

Recommendations

Info

4 sdmpulse fall 2015 sdm.mit.edu initial tasks + + + campaign plan - OPTEMPO contingency missions + + OPTEMPO GAP + + task arrival + contingency OPTEMPO - B Depletion II Tasks in Higher Level Objective + + + successes B Depletion I deployment time operational capacity + - time available to achieve higher level + objective - + + allowable mission attempts operational capacity utilization + + mission complexity gap discovery + + desired intel production + + + minimum required intel production - retask capacity Intel Gaps B Intel Cycle + intel capacity utilization Missions to Rework filled + - intel products + + intel capacity intel readiness factor + - intelcyle time failure time to + + Rework + - planning - mission cycletime requests Missions to Do attempts + desired + + production discard filter B + time B likelihood of attempt - Prioritization Operational filterability Tempo timeto + - risk R Intel Cycle Current Ops intel support to mission + + - uncertainty B Mission Planning Missions in Progress mission executiontime + completed - Figure 1. System dynamics model for tactical mission performance. The decision mechanisms within the model are founded on US operations and intelligence doctrine. continued from page 3 The model enables simulation of the system under a variety of scenarios and highlights the relative impacts of operational or intelligence capacity variables on mission performance. These outcomes include: • Mission fails as a result of operational capacity exceeding the unit’s intelligence capacity; and • Mission succeeds, but the unit must put in extra effort to compensate for limited intelligence. Note that additional unit effort means additional exposure to risk for troops in the operational environment. This demonstrates that intelligence capacity is more than a force multiplier: It is a force preserver.
5 Enduring Challenges in Tactical Intel Tasks in the Military Decision-Making Process Commander XO Exec Officer S3 Operations S2 Intelligence S6 Communications S1 Personnel S4 Logistics Operators 1 Receipt of Mission Alert key staff and participants. Gather tools. Update running estimates. Conduct initial assessment. Issue the initial warning order. Analyze higher HQ plan or order. Perform initial Intelligence Preparation of Battlefield. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 Organizational Design Challenges • Experience Differential • Organizational Culture Determine specified, implied, and essential tasks. 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 Review available assets. 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 Determine constraints. 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 Command, Staff, and Operator Roles in MDMP 2 3 4 5 Mission Analysis COA Development COA Analysis COA Comparison Identify critical facts and develop assumptions. Begin composite risk management. Develop initial commander’s critical information requirements and essential elements of friendly information. Develop initial recon and surveillance (R&S) synchronization tools. Develop initial R&S plan. Update plan for use of available time. Develop initial themes and messages. Develop proposed problem statement. Develop proposed mission statement. Present the mission analysis briefing. Develop and issue initial commander’s intent. Develop and issue initial planning guidance. Develop course of action (COA) evaluation criteria. Issue a warning order. Assess relative combat power. Generate options. Array forces. Develop a broad concept. Assign headquarters. Prepare COA statements and sketches. Conduct COA briefing. Select or modify COAs for continued analysis. Gather the tools. List all friendly forces. List assumptions. List known critical events and decision points. Select the war-gaming method. Select a technique to record and display results. War-game the operation and assess the results. Conduct a war-game briefing (optional). Conduct advantages and disadvantages analysis. Compare COAs. Conduct a COA decision briefing. 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 Commander XO Exec Officer S3 Operations S2 Intelligence S6 Communications S1 Personnel S4 Logistics Operators Commander 18 17 17 16 10 6 6 8 XO Exec Officer 17 29 28 27 16 8 8 10 S3 Operations 17 28 45 39 17 8 8 13 S2 Intelligence 16 27 39 39 17 8 8 10 S6 Communications 10 16 17 17 17 8 8 10 S1 Personnel 6 8 8 8 8 8 8 4 S4 Logistics 6 8 8 8 8 8 8 4 Operators 8 10 13 10 10 4 4 13 6 7 COA Approval Orders Production Commander selects COA. Commander issues the final planning guidance. Issue warning order #3. Deliver/ brief order to subordinate unit. 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 Figure 2. The domain mapping matrix (DMM) on the left matches tasks in the military decision-making process (MDMP) to individual roles. Squaring the DMM creates the design structure matrix on the right, which shows the interdependent roles within MDMP. Design structure matrix (DSM). The formal mapping of a unit’s staff using the design structure matrix made it possible to see that some transfers of information occur as lateral exchanges while others occur hierarchically. Structural and organizational designs inherent to military culture and hierarchy, including potential disparities in rank and experience, can unfortunately create artificial barriers to communication. For example, it is not atypical for an intelligence officer to rank one or two levels below an operations officer. This means the operations officer could have many more years of experience than the intelligence officer. To work well together, the intelligence officer must spend significant effort building knowledge of the unit’s operations, specific standards, and tactics just to be conversant with the person on whom all of his tasks depend. The communication barriers are significantly greater when an analyst perceptibly lacks competency in his field. continued on page 6
Page 1 and 2: vol. 10, no. 2 fall 2015 The newsle
Page 3: 3 About the Author A Systems Approa
Page 7 and 8: 7 as the analyst’s ability to app
Page 9 and 10: 9 • making progress toward overal
Page 11 and 12: 11 Single Entry/Exit Traveling 1 Do
Page 13 and 14: 13 provided access to users and man
Page 15 and 16: 15 6. Improve the process(es) or in
Page 17 and 18: 17 • creating a baseline scope fo
Page 19 and 20: 19 Spring 2015 SDM Tech Trek Report
Page 21 and 22: 21 • Jake Whitcomb SDM ’12 arra
Page 23 and 24: 23 MIT Integrated Design & Manageme
Page 25 and 26: 25 Employment Report: 2014 SDM Grad
Page 27 and 28: 27 Conference sdm SDM Conference Ce

sdm pulse

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?