sdm pulse

Recommendations

Info

39 26 19 30 18 43 40 30 31 38 23 42 30 31 42 35 36 45 30 22 21 15 23 21 18 21 22 17 36 33 31 39 28 30 30 49 38 27 15 29 27 18 18 26 15 33 36 34 44 39 40 22 38 56 32 23 35 34 22 23 33 22 26 35 29 42 48 47 21 27 32 62 31 47 47 35 39 42 33 29 26 24 42 46 47 15 15 23 31 38 31 32 29 30 32 28 17 15 14 18 36 35 23 29 35 47 31 77 74 50 50 60 40 33 24 23 41 56 56 21 27 34 47 32 74 76 51 51 62 42 31 23 22 40 56 56 18 18 22 35 29 50 51 53 42 48 38 22 15 17 27 40 41 21 18 23 39 30 50 51 42 57 53 42 27 19 17 29 48 45 22 26 33 42 32 60 62 48 53 73 44 28 24 24 38 60 58 17 15 22 33 28 40 42 38 42 44 46 20 14 15 23 38 37 36 33 26 29 17 33 31 22 27 28 20 57 38 40 46 35 37 33 36 35 26 15 24 23 15 19 24 14 38 50 40 50 39 40 31 34 29 24 14 23 22 17 17 24 15 40 40 47 45 35 40 39 44 42 42 18 41 40 27 29 38 23 46 50 45 77 50 53 28 39 48 46 36 56 56 40 48 60 38 35 39 35 50 82 76 30 40 47 47 35 56 56 41 45 58 37 37 40 40 53 76 82 41 42 46 39 50 45 44 42 40 42 29 27 23 18 38 50 53 41 100 43 33 23 24 23 29 35 74 47 50 50 40 31 60 56 56 42 43 100 42 39 30 31 26 19 40 30 31 30 23 18 38 35 36 46 33 42 100 36 38 40 33 26 31 29 27 22 20 17 28 35 37 23 39 36 100 33 31 30 22 21 21 21 18 17 15 22 28 30 24 30 38 33 100 40 36 35 23 26 19 15 14 15 24 39 40 23 31 40 31 40 100 34 29 22 24 17 17 15 14 24 35 40 29 26 33 30 36 34 100 38 27 27 18 18 15 15 26 39 40 35 19 26 22 35 29 38 100 34 32 23 22 22 23 33 48 47 74 40 31 21 23 22 27 34 100 47 51 51 42 32 62 56 56 47 30 29 21 26 24 27 32 47 100 39 35 33 31 42 46 47 50 31 27 21 19 17 18 23 51 39 100 42 42 30 53 48 45 50 30 22 18 15 17 18 22 51 35 42 100 38 29 48 40 41 40 23 20 17 14 15 15 22 42 33 42 38 100 28 44 38 37 31 18 17 15 15 14 15 23 32 31 30 29 28 100 32 36 35 60 38 28 22 24 24 26 33 62 42 53 48 44 32 100 60 58 56 35 35 28 39 35 39 48 56 46 48 40 38 36 60 100 76 56 36 37 30 40 40 40 47 56 47 45 41 37 35 58 76 100 6 sdmpulse fall 2015 sdm.mit.edu continued from page 5 Multi-domain mapping matrix (MDD). Using a multi-domain mapping matrix to scrutinize the analyst’s role in unit operations reveals four major components of competency imperative to analysts’ abilities: intelligence methodology, integration with unit operations, communication, and information processing. The MDM illuminates the relationship of these components across 132 competency specifications. It also highlights the significance of each component and exposes design challenges. Since the MDM contains DSMs that map components to specifications and vice versa, it also generates a DSM (Figure 3), which lends insight into the significance of each competency. Most notably, the new DSM reveals that competence in information processing is extremely important in the early phases of intelligence analysis and endures through decision-making. Thus, the capability of the analyst is the lynchpin for the unit’s intelligence capacity. System dynamics shortcut model.* The Army is still largely reactive when it comes to determining which human-to-digital interfaces maximize information transfer for combat operations. However, leaders are discovering that the tools are only as good Update to Core Competencies Enduring + Newly Identified Set = Enabled Intelligence Production Original DSM Original DSM 62 Planning and Direction 39 Collection 26 Processing & Exploitation 19 Analysis and Production 30 Dissemination and Integration 18 Evaluation and Feedback 43 Operations Doctrine 40 Unit-Specific Mission, Tactics, Procedures 30 Unit's Decision Processes 31 Clarity/Articulation (In Analysis) 38 Cohesion (Operational Context, War Gaming) 23 Delivery (Unit’s Communication Network/Protocols) 42 Data Building 30 Data Mining 31 Data Validation 42 Information Network Mapping 35 Interpretation (Logical/Quanititative Reasoning) 36 Critique (Sources of Uncertainty) Sequential Functions 1 Planning and Collection 2 Processing and Analysis 3 Decision-Making Communication Integration Information Processing Intel Doctrine Planning and Direction Collection Processing & Exploitation Analysis and Production Dissemination and Integration Evaluation and Feedback Operations Doctrine Unit-Specific Mission, Tactics, Procedures Unit's Decision Processes Clarity/Articulation (In Analysis) Cohesion (Operational Context, War Gaming) Delivery (Unit’s Communication Network/Protocols) Data Building Data Mining Data Validation Information Network Mapping Interpretation (Logical/Quanititative Reasoning) Critique (Sources of Uncertainty) Enabling Knowledge A Context and Architecture B Information Processing C Unit-Specific Context Modified DSM 100 Information Network Mapping 41 Operations Doctrine 42 Planning and Direction 46 Data Building 39 Collection 50 Data Mining 45 Data Validation 44 Processing & Exploitation 42 Analysis and Production 40 Unit-Specific Mission, Tactics, Procedures 42 Dissemination and Integration 29 Clarity/Articulation (In Analysis) 27 Unit's Decision Processes 23 Delivery (Unit’s Communication Network/Protocols) 18 Evaluation and Feedback 38 Cohesion (Operational Context, War Gaming) 50 Interpretation (Logical/Quantitative Reasoning) 53 Critique (Sources of Uncertainty) Information Network Mapping Operations Doctrine Planning and Direction Data Building Collection Data Mining Data Validation Processing & Exploitation Analysis and Production Unit-Specific Mission, Tactics, Procedures Dissemination and Integration Clarity/Articulation (In Analysis) Unit's Decision Processes Delivery (Unit's Communication Network/ Protocols) Evaluation and Feedback Cohesion (Operational Context, War Gaming) Interpretation (Logical/Quantitative Reasoning) Critique (Sources of Uncertainty) Figure 3. This design structure matrix shows the competency components an analyst needs. A lack of competency in information processing degrades planning and collection, which in turn degrades processing, or at a minimum greatly delays it. When timely and relevant intelligence does not support the unit’s missions, missions are far less likely to succeed. * This model, adapted from J.B. Morrison, reveals why well-intended shortcuts have detrimental effects on the analysts’ skill development and, consequently, the Army at large.
7 as the analyst’s ability to apply them to the operations context. Blind application of tools essentially prejudices the organization against trusting its intelligence officers. Moreover, shortcuts reduce the number of tasks in the intel cycle, leading to a decrease in learning that affects the analyst’s qualification for intelligence positions of greater influence, propagating skill deterioration across the organization. Without Change, Analyst’s Capability Erodes complexity missions uncertainty - + + new requirements intelligence production requirements fulfillment rate Relative Competency Level Without Change, Analyst’s Capability Erodes Military Intelligence Capability Senior Analyst Junior Analyst inial entry training inial assignments Analyst Competency Ideal Ability career course career developing assignments intermediate level educaon Shortcut Ability 0 3 5 10 time (years) + time pressure + B Work Faster well-intentioned shortcuts + short-term productivity + + - R Skill Building learning analysis proficiency + analyst’s capability forgetting Figure 4. The effect of decreased competency across the organization negatively affects the warfighter in two ways: increasingly higher levels of the organization lack the requisite capabilities to perform intelligence functions effectively, and resources are reallocated to intelligence and away the immediate mission, meaning fewer resources for preparing the warfighter for combat. The results: As a team, the Army needs to revise training for tactical intelligence analysts to align their capabilities with the current and future needs of tactical operations. In order to deliver valuable intelligence insights to the unit, analysts must be competent in information processing and in communicating key intelligence insights to decision-makers. There are currently myriad research efforts focused on how to extract value from large sources of data, leverage tools to optimize their utility, and identify and understand sources of uncertainty. As an intelligence community, we need to: • unify these efforts and identify ways to enhance analyst training in both the near and long term; • incorporate aspects of information processing, such as fundamentals of data analysis or statistical methods, into analysts’ initial entry and career development curricula; • assess in depth the skills and teaching methods that provide the most value; and • employ these findings to guide the development of a new curriculum and culture in military intelligence, providing the enduring foundation for intelligence capacity required for the modern operational environment.
Page 1 and 2: vol. 10, no. 2 fall 2015 The newsle
Page 3 and 4: 3 About the Author A Systems Approa
Page 5: 5 Enduring Challenges in Tactical I
Page 9 and 10: 9 • making progress toward overal
Page 11 and 12: 11 Single Entry/Exit Traveling 1 Do
Page 13 and 14: 13 provided access to users and man
Page 15 and 16: 15 6. Improve the process(es) or in
Page 17 and 18: 17 • creating a baseline scope fo
Page 19 and 20: 19 Spring 2015 SDM Tech Trek Report
Page 21 and 22: 21 • Jake Whitcomb SDM ’12 arra
Page 23 and 24: 23 MIT Integrated Design & Manageme
Page 25 and 26: 25 Employment Report: 2014 SDM Grad
Page 27 and 28: 27 Conference sdm SDM Conference Ce

sdm pulse

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?