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DEPARTMENTOFDEFENSE LAW OFWARMANUAL JUNE2015

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1.4.1 Object of War. The object of war has been understood to be the submission of the<br />

enemy as quickly and efficiently as possible. 53 The military defeat of the enemy in war is<br />

intended to advance political objectives. 54 Even where those political objectives are limited, the<br />

object of war is nonetheless to ensure the submission of the enemy as quickly and efficiently as<br />

possible. 55<br />

The object of war informs the principle of military necessity and what uses of force may<br />

be justified in war. 56 Nevertheless, the law of war limits what uses of force the object of war<br />

may justify. 57<br />

1.4.2 Nature of War.<br />

1.4.2.1 Nature of War – Violence and Suffering. War has been described as a<br />

violent clash of interests characterized by the use of force. 58 The fact that violence is an essential<br />

53 See 1940 RULES OF LAND WARFARE 22 (“The object of war is to bring about the complete submission of the<br />

enemy as soon as possible by means of regulated violence.”); 1914 RULES OF LAND WARFARE 10 (same).<br />

54 George H. Aldrich, Deputy Legal Adviser, Department of State, Human Rights in Armed Conflict: Development<br />

of the Law, Apr. 13, 1973, 68 DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN, 876, 880 (Jun. 18, 1973) (“What we have seen is<br />

all too clearly a general acceptance of the view that modern war is aimed not merely at the enemy’s military forces<br />

but at the enemy’s willingness and ability to pursue its war aims. Thus, in the Second World War the enemy’s will<br />

to fight and his capacity to produce weapons were primary targets; and saturation bombing, blockade of food<br />

supplies, and indiscriminate terror weapons such as the German V bombs, were all brought to bear on those targets.<br />

In Viet-Nam political, rather than military, objectives were even more dominant. Both sides had as their goal not<br />

the destruction of the other’s military forces but the destruction of the will to continue the struggle.”); United States<br />

v. von Leeb, et al. (The High Command Case), XI TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NMT 485 (“War is the<br />

exerting of violence by one state or politically organized body against another. In other words, it is the<br />

implementation of a political policy by means of violence.”); CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 87 (1989) (“We see,<br />

therefore, that war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political<br />

intercourse, carried on with other means. What remains peculiar to war is simply the peculiar nature of its means.<br />

War in general, and the commander in any specific instance, is entitled to require that the trend and designs of policy<br />

shall not be inconsistent with these means. That, of course, is no small demand; but however much it may affect<br />

political aims in a given case, it will never do more than modify them. The political object is the goal, war is the<br />

means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose.”).<br />

55 For example, General Colin L. Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead, 71<br />

FOREIGN AFFAIRS 32, 37 (1992) (explaining that despite the limited political objectives of the 1991 Gulf War, the<br />

United States “did use overwhelming force quickly and decisively.”).<br />

56 Refer to § 2.2.1 (Military Necessity as a Justification); § 2.2.3.1 (Consideration of the Broader Imperatives of<br />

Winning the War).<br />

57 Refer to § 2.2.2 (Military Necessity and Law of War Rules).<br />

58 DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FIELD MANUAL 3-24, Counterinsurgency, 1-1 (1-1) (Dec. 2006) (“Insurgency and<br />

counterinsurgency (COIN) are complex subsets of warfare. Globalization, technological advancement, urbanization,<br />

and extremists who conduct suicide attacks for their cause have certainly influenced contemporary conflict;<br />

however, warfare in the 21st century retains many of the characteristics it has exhibited since ancient times.<br />

Warfare remains a violent clash of interests between organized groups characterized by the use of force. Achieving<br />

victory still depends on a group’s ability to mobilize support for its political interests (often religiously or ethnically<br />

based) and to generate enough violence to achieve political consequences. Means to achieve these goals are not<br />

limited to conventional forces employed by nation-states.”); MARINE CORPS DOCTRINAL PUBLICATION 1,<br />

Warfighting, 3 (Jun. 20, 1997) (explaining that war is “a violent clash of interests between or among organized<br />

groups characterized by the use of military force.”).<br />

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