BATTLE OF SKM AND IUM

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ARCHITECTURAL LAYER OVERVIEW Hypervisor SKM NTOS Hypervisor Ring 0 IUM DLL NT DLL Ring 3 IUM Base Base Client (KERNELBASE) BCRYPT RPCRT4 CRYPTSP CRYPTDLL VTL 1 VTL 0
PLATFORM REQUIREMENTS • The Boot Loader needs to trust that the platform it is running on is not running arbitrary firmware • This code could modify the bootstrap of the Hypervisor and affect all of VSM’s guarantees • Secure Boot provides this guarantee • Also used to safely store protected, persistent variables that cannot be modified (to store policy/settings) • The Hypervisor needs to trust that hardware is not performing DMA access to VTL 1 pages • Flashing a vulnerable device’s firmware, or loading a vulnerable/custom driver could allow a VTL 0 administrator access to VTL 1 memory • IOMMU / VT-d provides this guarantee • The Hypervisor needs to have a secure place to store and seal machine secrets and keys • Otherwise, persistent data such as the Machine Key could be stolen/replayed • TPM provides this guarantee • VBS can be configured to require these platform features, or to work around their lack thereof • VSM will work regardless, and can be enabled on its own
Page 1 and 2: BATTLE OF SKM AND IUM HOW WINDOWS 1
Page 3 and 4: PRESENTATION OVERVIEW • Microsoft
Page 5 and 6: VBS FEATURES IN WINDOWS 10 / SERVER
Page 7 and 8: ENABLING VBS
Page 9 and 10: HOW DOES IT ALL WORK? • Hyperviso
Page 11: SEPARATION OF ROLES • Instead of
Page 15 and 16: HARD CODE GUARANTEES • When hard
Page 17 and 18: VIRTUAL SECURE MODE (VSM) BOOTSTRAP
Page 19 and 20: SKM LAUNCH • To initialize VTL 1,
Page 21 and 22: BCD VSM POLICY OPTIONS • The poli
Page 23 and 24: SKM INTERNALS
Page 25 and 26: SKM STRUCTURES • SKM has a PCR at
Page 27 and 28: SKM CAPABILITIES • The SkCapabili
Page 29 and 30: SECURE MODE CALLS • Secure Mode C
Page 31 and 32: SPECIALIZED SECURE MORE SERVICE CAL
Page 33 and 34: NORMAL MODE SERVICE CALLS • SK ne
Page 35 and 36: IUM INTERNALS
Page 37 and 38: SECURE SYSTEM CALLS • SKM exposes
Page 39 and 40: SECURE BASE API • Trustlets shoul
Page 41 and 42: NOTABLY MISSING… • Trustlets ca
Page 43 and 44: NORMAL MODE SYSTEM CALL PROXYING Th
Page 45 and 46: LAUNCHING A TRUSTLET • Process At
Page 47 and 48: EXAMPLE IUM-COMPLIANT SIGNED BINARY
Page 49 and 50: TRUSTLET INSTANCE GUID • Trustlet
Page 51 and 52: LSA TRUSTLET • One of the two inb
Page 53 and 54: LOADING A TRUSTLET • Ldr, or the
Page 55 and 56: TRUSTLET TO NORMAL WORLD COMMUNICAT
Page 57 and 58: CAN WE BUILD OUR OWN TRUSTLETS? •
Page 59 and 60: CONCLUSION RISKS AND THOUGHTS
Page 61 and 62: SECURE KERNEL COMPLEXITY / ATTACK S
Page 63 and 64:
VSM WITHOUT SECUREBOOT • What’s
Page 65:
YOU HAVE QUESTIONS? I HOPEFULLY HAV
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BATTLE OF SKM AND IUM

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