Diplomatic Negotiation

Chapter VIII: The Nineteenth Century: Inclusiveness and Exclusiveness
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people’ in many of the ‘liberated’ countries where these ideas had taken root. As far as
Napoleon is concerned, he had been beaten in the second battle of Leipzig in October 1813
and also at Waterloo in June 1815 (during the last few days of the Congress of Vienna’s
procedures), but he remained the nightmare of the negotiators and their negotiations.
After all, apart from Britain, all of the victorious allies had at one time or another been his
allies. This implanted mistrust among the allies, haunting the negotiations from the very
start until the end. Moreover, in the period between Leipzig and Waterloo, Napoleon had
not been thrown out of Europe completely, but was still sitting on the island of Elba and
was still a potential ally for some of the powers, which mistrusted their newly acquired
coalition partners. Europe was still in flux and every potential player still counted. As for
the British, such flux seemed to be to their advantage, as long as it did not culminate in
one of the parties obtaining too dominant a position and threatening to upset the power
balance, thereby creating a new threat to the British Empire in waiting (Black, 2010: 138–
149).
Napoleon’s retreat from Russia in November and December 1812 marked the
beginning of the end of French dominance over Europe. While Emperor Napoleon
returned to Paris, Prussian General Yorck negotiated a truce with the Russians at
Tauroggen, thereby removing Prussia as a stumbling block for France’s most dangerous
adversary. It is interesting to note that this move by part of the Prussian military was not
legitimized by Prussian King Frederick William III, who still felt loyalty to his ally Napoleon,
notwithstanding the fact that he himself had been Napoleon’s enemy and forced into an
alliance with France. From a political point of view, the Prussian king still feared Napoleon
and was not too sure about the future course of events, but on 28 February 1813, he
signed the Treaty of Kalisz with Russian Tsar Alexander I. At a later stage, this alliance of
Prussia and Russia against Napoleon proved to be the nucleus of a coalition with Austria
and Britain, joined by Sweden. As a consequence of this alliance, the Prussians had to
give up a big part of their Polish possessions, a problem that would bedevil the Vienna
talks, as the Prussians wanted to be compensated with Saxony, an ally of Napoleon. To
the Austrians, such an exchange would be difficult to swallow as it would bring both
Prussia and Russia closer to their country, so that Austria would then have to compete
with Prussia for dominance in Germany, while Russia would become a competitor in East–
Central Europe. Both Saxony and Poland would later prove to be major diplomatic issues
(Zamoyski, 2007: 195–196).
Frederick William III, King of Prussia, proved to be quite right in his doubts concerning
the waning of Napoleon’s strength, for the emperor defeated the Prussians twice, in
Lützen and Bautzen in May 1813. The Austrians, still neutral at the time, mediated the
armistice of Pläswitz, followed by a less neutral stand when Austrian Foreign Minister
Metternich concluded the Treaty of Reichenbach with Russian Tsar Alexander I on 24 June
1813. Austria, which was technically still a French ally, decided to open negotiations with
Napoleon. Metternich wanted to keep his options open, being wary to take sides while
the overall situation remained unclear. He met Napoleon on 26 June 1813 at Dresden and
on 10 July 1813 in Prague, resulting in Napoleon’s acceptance of Austria as a mediator, as
well as of a suspension of hostilities between Prussia and France. Meanwhile, the British
commander Wellington defeated the French in Spain at the Battle of Vitoria in June 1813,
thereby threatening the southern border of France itself. For Napoleon, the odds seemed