SHALLOWS

War in the Shallows
friendly troops. The spotter was unable to observe any fire from the beach or see the bunkers
but confirmed the request anyway. Arnheiter immediately ordered his gunners to lay down
17 rounds on the “emplacements”—a reckless move given the presence of both American and
South Vietnamese troops in the vicinity. Even more irresponsible was a mission he executed on
30 January in the same area. As Vance closed to within 1,000 yards of the beach, Arnheiter told
the bridge that he had observed fire coming from the beach. All witnesses, including Lieutenant
Hardy, denied seeing anything. “They are shooting at us,” Arnheiter yelled. He then ordered
the ship to return fire. Vance fired a total of 65 rounds of 3-inch munitions and 600 rounds of
.50- caliber at a target no one else on the ship could see. The JAG Manual Investigation later
concluded that Arnheiter disregarded the rules of engagement in both this case and the mission
on 29 January, and castigated him for neglecting “his primary mission of patrol for several days
in Market Time Area 3 in order to manufacture gunfire support missions.” 150
Arnheiter’s lack of judgment manifested itself in other ways as well. In one instance, he left
a group of sailors in the whaleboat for two hours without cover in Xuan Dai Bay while Vance
steamed ten miles away to intercept a possible Viet Cong junk. On several other occasions, he
ordered Vance to tow the speedboat and whaleboat, with sailors embarked, under hazardous
conditions and at unsafe speeds. Once while his men were searching a junk, he shot at a sea
snake, spooking the boarding crew and nearly causing them to open fire on innocent civilians.
On 6 February 1966 he gave away candy from the ship’s store to Vietnamese refugees on a junk
and then told the supply officer to process a false survey for candy, which Arnheiter signed.
On 26 February Vance received a message from its squadron commander requesting a list of
certain diesel spare parts on board. The engineering officer prepared the required report, but
Arnheiter refused to release it. Instead, he told the officer to reduce the quantities and thus forced
the submission of a false report on items that were in critical supply. By involving his officers in
deceitful acts, he undermined their integrity and fueled resentment against him. 151
On 28 February Lieutenant George W. Dando, a chaplain, paid Vance a visit while she
was on patrol in Market Time Area 3. While on the ship, he heard numerous complaints from
the men about Arnheiter and the ship’s low morale. When Dando later tried to discuss the
situation with Arnheiter, he reported that the skipper “did not appear stable.” As the evidence
began to mount against Arnheiter’s fitness for command, Commander Milligan decided to
act. Although Milligan was concerned about the compulsory moral guidance sessions and
poor morale on the ship, he was even more worried about complaints he was receiving from
other destroyer commanders about the unauthorized naval gunfire missions. After informing
his chain of command of the situation, Milligan notified Arnheiter by a message that he was
“hereby detached” from Vance and that he was to “proceed immediately and report to the
destroyer tender Dixie (AD-14) for temporary duty.” The next day Rear Admiral Thomas S. King,
Commander Cruiser Destroyer Flotilla 3, ordered Captain Ward W. Witter, the commander
of Destroyer Squadron 11, to conduct an informal JAG Manual Investigation into the affair. In
all, 30 witnesses, including every officer from Vance, testified under oath during the next three
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