SHALLOWS

Coastal Warfare, 1965–1966
his end-of-tour report, “but I am sure that the increased advisory effort plus the commitment
of U.S. manned units within the zone will improve Vietnamese performance.” Mosher believed
that the only way for advisors to be effective was to suffer the same hardships and danger as the
Vietnamese. “Undoubtedly, some will be lost, others will be heroes, a few will have their health
impaired as a result of this duty but it must be accepted if we hope to win the war by influencing
the Vietnamese.” 29
Others were less optimistic. According to junk force advisor Robert K. Reilly, “The junkman,
contrary to popular opinion, is not a good sailor. He does not like to go to sea and in order
to avoid extended periods at sea (over one day) will resort to lies regarding sickness, approaching
storms, the sea state, lack of food, water, fuel, and the material condition of the junk. Junkmen
have been known to purposefully cripple their boats in order to return to the beach.” 30 A February
1965 Naval Advisory Group staff study concluded that the “deficiencies in anti-infiltration
naval patrols by the Vietnamese Navy have been many.” It listed the major shortcomings as
lack of aggressiveness, lack of coordination with other forces, and poor leadership. 31 Even Rear
Admiral Chung Tan Cang, the VNN CNO, admitted that the Coastal Force was in a state of
crisis during this time: “The junk force itself had many problems.” 32 General Westmoreland
concurred: “The Coastal Force is considered the weakest link in the patrol effort.” 33
The general political turmoil in South Vietnam was one of the root causes of the VNN’s
malaise. The position of nearly every senior officer in the VNN was directly tied to the political
fortunes of their patrons. As governments changed so too did the leaders of major VNN
commands. This frequent turnover of top level personnel undermined morale further down
the chain of command and compelled junior officers to pay close attention to shifting political
alliances. The situation was made worse by various other rivalries within VNN, including
those between officers born in North Vietnam and South Vietnam, between Christians and
Buddhists, and the various VNN force components. After the death of Quyen in 1964, northerners
in particular lost much of their status within the VNN. Rear Admiral Cang, a southerner
with strong ties to Prime Minister Nguyen Khanh, tended to favor southerners when it came
to personnel assignments and promotions. According to Do Kiem, southerners were “getting
chief of staff positions, while the Navy’s northern officers found themselves stuck on semi-permanent
sea duty.” 34 Cang also undermined the authority of the various force commanders.
Before the Diem coup, force commanders acted as separate “mandarins” with considerable
control of their ships, personnel, and budgets. Although as the former River Force commander
Cang had benefited from the old system, once in power as CNO, he attempted to concentrate
power within his office and establish a system of personal loyalty among the officer corps to
him alone. The situation came to a head in April 1965, shortly after Cang’s patron, Khanh, was
deposed by General Nguyen Van Thieu, General Nguyen Van Cao, and Air Marshal Nguyen
Cao Ky on 21 February 1965. 35
Led by the operating force commanders and with the support of Air Marshal Ky, a handful
of young officers, mostly from the North, barred the entrance to the Saigon naval headquarters
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