SHALLOWS

War in the Shallows
specified group in order to benefit the sponsor directly or indirectly.” 194 Civic action in Vietnam
mainly consisted of public health, medical, and charitable efforts designed to build support for
the government among the civilian populace—operations that today’s Navy generally defines
as “humanitarian operations.” In Vietnam, PSYOP and civic action were intimately linked and
often performed at the same time by the same personnel.
PSYOP officers conveyed propaganda and other information to civilians by various media,
including television, radio, loudspeaker broadcasts, and face-to-face encounters. In September
alone, crewmembers of PBRs, PCFs, and WPBs distributed 334,000 leaflets, 111,000 newspapers,
33,000 magazines, and 20,000 posters. Navy boats and aircraft broadcast over 400 hours
of propaganda from speakers, and U.S. aircraft dropped 11 million leaflets on Viet Cong areas.
Navy units also distributed additional propaganda materials during the course of boarding and
inspecting 82,462 junks and sampans. 195 In the words of Navy PSYOP advisor Lieutenant Victor
G. Reiling Jr., the “USN/VNN have the best consistent face-to-face communications capabilities
of any force in Vietnam.” 196 By 1967 U.S. Navy and VNN personnel had become instrumental
to the overall allied PSYOP campaign in the country.
But did PSYOP actually have an impact on the local populace? One measure of the effectiveness
of these operations was the Chieu Hoi program. Chieu Hoi, which translates to “open
arms,” sought to persuade Viet Cong to switch to the government side by promising potential
defectors literacy and vocational training and help with resettlement and job placement. The
program attempted not only to peel away soldiers from the other side and bring them into the
government fold, but also to exploit these turncoats for military purposes. In many cases the
government deployed defectors as “Kit Carson Scouts” in military units. Founded in 1966 by
the U.S. marines in I Corps, the Kit Carson Scouts led U.S. forces to enemy units and assisted
in pacification efforts. By 1968 more than 700 former Viet Cong were serving with U.S. forces,
often in long–range reconnaissance patrols or in civic action efforts designed to convince more
enemy villagers to defect. 197 By August 1967 the overall Chieu Hoi program had deprived the
Communist forces of 66,000 members. More than 20,000 Viet Cong rallied to the government
side during the first seven months of 1967 alone—more than the entire total for 1966, and an
82 percent increase over 1965. 198
Some of these defections may have resulted more from the difficult living conditions in Viet
Cong areas than from allied psychological operations. In addition to constant allied bombing,
enemy soldiers suffered from food shortages as the war dragged on. In 1965 the rice ration for a
Viet Cong soldier was 2.5 cans per day; by 1967 it was down to 1.5 cans. There were also reports
that as many as 50 percent of the soldiers in some units suffered from malaria. 199 For many, the
prospect of a good meal and rest in a Chieu Hoi resettlement center was all it took for them to
abandon their posts and defect. For the allies, every rallier represented one less enemy combatant
in the field. Some estimates placed the cost of killing one Viet Cong to be $9,000 alone just in
ammunition expended; the cost of maintaining a Hoi Chanh [returnee] at a center and then
reintegrating him in to South Vietnamese society, by comparison, was only $150. 200
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