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The strategy in place was outlined by Baghdadi in his November 2014<br />
announcement (see appendix). Addressing the Saudi people, he said:<br />
“Unsheathe your swords! First, go after the Rejectionists [al-Rafida, that is,<br />
the Shia] wherever you find them, then the Al Salul [that is, the Al Saud family]<br />
and their soldiers, before the Crusaders and their bases.” In Saudi Arabia,<br />
the Islamic State has acted accordingly, with suicide bombers targeting Shia<br />
mosques yielding the most casualties. While there have been more security<br />
incidents involving Saudi security forces (nine) than Shia (six), the group has<br />
managed to kill more Shia (64) than security forces (25). One attack has been<br />
reported against a Western target, a Danish citizen.<br />
The last time jihadis registered this much activity in Saudi Arabia was in<br />
2003–2006, when al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) waged a lowscale<br />
insurgency that killed some 300 people. Over several years, the Al Saud<br />
family managed to destroy AQAP, which then reconstituted itself in Yemen.<br />
It is interesting to observe that the Islamic State’s strategic priorities in Saudi<br />
Arabia contrast sharply with those of AQAP. AQAP’s priorities in Saudi Arabia<br />
were, first, Westerners and Western interests and, second, the Saudi security<br />
forces and the regime. 41 It did not go after the Shia at all. With its anti-Shia<br />
strategy, the Islamic State is trying something quite different. Playing to the<br />
inherent anti-Shiism of Wahhabi religious doctrine, and to the widespread<br />
fears of creeping Shia domination of the region, it is presenting itself as the<br />
champion of Sunni Islam at a time when the Shia are seen to be taking over<br />
the Middle East.<br />
The leaders of Najd Province, in two audio statements released in May and<br />
October 2015, have described and justified this anti-Shia strategy at length. 42<br />
Both statements are diatribes against Shiism. The first (translated in full in the<br />
appendix) accuses the Saudis of failing to carry out their Islamic duty of expelling<br />
the Shia from the Arabian Peninsula and by contrast cites Baghdadi’s order<br />
to “kill the Rejectionists wherever they are found.” “The Al Salul,” it says, “will<br />
never protect you from the Rejectionists. Indeed, they have been unable to protect<br />
their artificial borders from the Houthi scum, so how will they protect you<br />
from the Rejectionists if they join together against you?”<br />
The second statement presents an overview of the Shia threat, which can<br />
be summarized as follows: The Sunnis are under a regionwide attack by an<br />
Iranian-led Shia conspiracy (witness Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, where the Shia are<br />
taking power with Iranian support). The Shia aspire to a massive state in the<br />
shape of a crescent, stretching from Syria through Iraq, down through eastern<br />
Arabia to Oman and Yemen, ultimately encompassing Islam’s holy places<br />
in the Hijaz. The Shia of the Eastern Province are secretly loyal to Tehran<br />
and are readying to free themselves of the Sunni yoke when the time is right.<br />
Meanwhile, members of the Al Saud family are complicit in this plot to the<br />
extent that they care only about their power, wealth, and survival.<br />
Cole Bunzel | 13