THE KINGDOM AND THE CALIPHATE

18 | The Kingdom and the Caliphate: Duel of the Islamic States
the militants and the Shuaybi school; he was killed by Saudi security forces
during a shoot-out in 2003. The Islamic State has no comparable figure in
what it considers its Arabian provinces, and it is uncertain whether it has many
competent people at all. The first statement from Najd Province has several
errors, suggesting a mediocre standard of learning and poor execution on the
part of its leadership.
Yet another reason for the campaign’s slow pace is the historical tendency
of Saudi jihadis to prefer jihad abroad to jihad at home. Saudi Arabia has been
a major contributor of fighters to foreign jihad theaters, from Afghanistan in
the 1980s to Iraq in the mid-2000s, and to Syria and Iraq today. 65 But stirring
unrest at home has proven difficult, probably for reasons to do with the religious
character of the state and the wealth of average Saudis relative to their
neighbors. Altering this tendency will be a challenge for the Islamic State.
Because the Saudi regime is playing only a minor role in the fight against the
group in Iraq and Syria, it has inspired little resentment. Meanwhile, the Saudi
people, surveying the regional upheaval, are keenly aware of the destructive
consequences of a rebellion at home.
Nonetheless, the Islamic State’s attacks in the kingdom are likely to continue
for some time for two reasons. The first is that with its attacks on the Shia
in outlying areas, the group is not disrupting the lives of most Saudis, some of
whom sympathize with attacks on the Shia as idolaters. This is in contrast to
the reaction to AQAP’s attacks on Western civilians in downtown areas. The
second reason is that the campaign’s external stimulus, namely the Islamic
State’s inspiring presence in Iraq and Syria, is by no means on the verge of
receding. The AQAP campaign failed in part because it got going only with a
massive influx of veteran jihadis, whose depletion spelled its ruin. With a more
enduring external stimulus, the Islamic State’s campaign in Saudi Arabia is
likely to hold up longer than AQAP’s.
But as of January 2016, the Islamic State had gone three months without
pulling off a major attack in the kingdom. Whether the current dry spell marks
the decline of the Islamic State in Saudi Arabia or is merely the eye of the campaign’s
storm is too early to tell. But the group’s leaders in Syria and Iraq seem
to be running out of patience.
In November 2014, Baghdadi had counseled his supporters in Saudi Arabia,
“Be patient, do not rush.” 66 But in mid-December 2015, the group launched a
full-scale propaganda campaign calling for attacks in Arabia. In the space of
just a few days, the Islamic State put out fifteen official videos from its provinces,
from Syria and Iraq to Yemen and the Sinai, all concerning Saudi Arabia,
many of them calling on the group’s supporters there to step up their efforts. At
the same time, the Islamic State’s unofficial media agencies released 26 essays
in the same vein. 67 The Islamic State, as Baghdadi’s earlier statement would
suggest, seems to be playing the long game in Arabia. But it is also clearly disappointed
in its progress there.