ECONOMICS YEARLY REVIEW

art. 46 of Regulation No. 806/2014 reserved for the National Parliaments also
appear relevant. Rather, according to some scholars the National Parliaments’
participation in the Banking Union governance exceeds the oversight function
usually played by these bodies towards the National Central Banks 50 .
First of all, like the European Parliament, the National Parliaments also
receive the annual reports from the ECB and the Single Resolution Board. In
turn, the National Parliaments can “react” to them, addressing their reasoned
observations on the reports to the ECB and Single Resolution Board.
Secondly, through their own procedures the National Parliaments may
request the ECB and Resolution Board to reply in writing to any observations or
questions submitted by them.
Finally, the National Parliaments may invite the Chairman or a member of
the Supervisory Board and the Chairman of Resolution Board to participate in an
exchange of views together with a representative of the competent national authority.
However, the terminology used by the Regulations is ambiguous: the
reference to “exchange of views” rather than “hearings” – a tool which instead
could be activated by the European Parliament and Euro Group – could be interpreted
as the exclusion from the possibility to organize meetings with the
same level of formality and publicity typical of the hearings in the National Parliaments’
Rules of Procedure.
It is important to emphasize that the involvement of the National Parliaments
is also the result of the contribution of these institutions within the political
dialogue procedure. Some National Parliaments – this is the case, for example,
of the Czech Republic and Denmark 51 – asked for an empowerment of
50 See MANZELLA, Parlamento europei e Parlamenti nazionali come sistema, No. 4 supra, at
10.
51 On 13 March 2013, a Resolution of the Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic
observed that the “new tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the
supervision of banks leads to a significant concentration of power in the hands of one institution
(…). It is, therefore, necessary to ensure that the ECB is, in the exercise of this function, subject
to democratic control, not only by the European Parliament, but also, in particular (…) National
Parliaments, because the responsibility for the stability of the financial system (including
financial guarantees to depositors) will continue to lie with the Member States”. Instead, on 10
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