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ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY

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oversight bodies which have been found compliant. In the surveillance context, those would<br />

be in particular the Investigatory Powers Tribunal (IPT) in the UK and the G10 Commission<br />

in Germany.<br />

Whether this is the case, needs to be additionally assessed by analysing the powers granted to<br />

the ‘independent’.<br />

3.5.3.7 Investigatory powers<br />

In the Kadi II case the CJEU ruled in regard to Article 47 Charter that “the person concerned<br />

must be able to ascertain the reasons upon which the decision taken in relation to him is<br />

based, either by regarding the decision itself or by requesting and obtaining disclosure of<br />

those reasons, without prejudice to the power of the court having jurisdiction to require the<br />

authority concerned to disclose that information, so as to make it possible for him to defend<br />

his rights in the best possible conditions”. 77 The Courts of the European Union are to ensure<br />

that that decision is taken on a sufficiently solid factual basis 78 . It states clearly that “the<br />

secrecy or confidentiality of […] information or evidence is no valid objection”, at least not<br />

before the Courts of the European Union 79 . Therefore the Working Party concludes that the<br />

Ombudsperson must be given information and evidence that support the reasons relied on for<br />

conducting a measure, to meet the requirements of the CJEU 80 .<br />

It is as yet unclear what the extent of the investigatory powers of the Ombudsperson would<br />

be. Both the Commission draft decision and the Annex III from the State Department are not<br />

abundantly clear on this issue. As far as the Working Party understands, the Ombudsperson<br />

should get sufficient information in order to be able to state if a data processing operation by<br />

the security services takes place in accordance with the law, and if not, to make sure that the<br />

non-compliant situation is remedied. Neither the letter from the State Department nor the<br />

Commission draft decision however specify if the Ombudsperson would have direct access to<br />

the data held on the individual in question and can thus carry out his/her own investigation, or<br />

if he/she can only rely upon the reports from other U.S. Government officials.<br />

3.5.3.8 Remedial powers<br />

It remains rather unclear from the Memorandum in what way the Ombudsperson can order<br />

non-compliance to be remedied. In combination with the lack of clarity concerning the<br />

investigatory powers, it moreover remains unclear to what extent the Ombudsperson as such<br />

will be effectively capable of ordering non-compliance to be remedied and what the result of<br />

such an exercise would be. Could this mean data that was obtained in a non-compliant way<br />

(i.e. illegally) can no longer be used in any procedure and should be deleted?<br />

77 Kadi II §100.<br />

78 Kadi II §119.<br />

79 Kadi II §125.<br />

80 Kadi II §122; although the authority concerned does not have to produce all information and evidence underlying the<br />

reasons for a measure.<br />

50

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