Lessons Learned from South Sudan Protection of Civilian Sites 2013–2016

32 - Lessons Learned from South Sudan Protection of Civilian Sites - UNMISS and the PoC Sites
Protection of Civilians Mandate
The findings and recommendations of two previous
reports on the challenges faced by former UN Mission in
Sudan (UNMIS) 1 and its successor, UNMISS, in carrying
out the protection of civilian mandate prove to be just
as relevant years later. In the first study of UNMIS 1,
conducted by Ingrid Marie Breidlid and Jon Harald Sande
Lie in 2011, the researchers found
"Civilian protection actors and local government
officials expressed considerable frustration over the
UNMIS military, arguing there was no will or intention
on the part of the military commanders to contribute
to protection. And even if there had been such will
among the commanders on the ground, they would
have been unequipped for the assignment."
"Some even questioned the capacity of the military to
protect its own premises and staff, referring to several
incidents of burglaries in the UNMIS compound. The
commanders were also seen to be bound hand and foot
due to their inability to take decisions without approval
from the higher command. As one UN staff member
lamented: ‘If a convoy is attacked the military troops
would not even be able to shoot back unless they have
a “go ahead” from the contingent commander.’ The
military side was therefore seen as merely symbolic,
not an actual protection force.” 29 (p. 18)
Although there was change in mandate from Chapter VI
to Chapter VII when UNMIS 1 changed to UNMISS in July
2011, the challenges on the ground for the new mission
persisted, even with a more robust mandate. A consequent
assessment of the protection of civilians strategy in 2013
by Jort Hemmer examined how overambitious the new
mandate was. The report stated:
“UNMISS’s broad and ambiguous mandate and overly
ambitious PoC objectives have created and perpetuate
expectations that it will never be able to meet. To break
the cycle of unfulfilled promises and capitalize on its
existing potential the recommendations to UNMISS’s
leadership are to
1. specify the mission’s understanding of an role in PoC;
2. further prioritize its PoC activities on the basis of a realistic
assessment of existing demands on the ground, the
mission’s actual capabilities, its comparative advantages
relative to other actors, and its political room to manoeuvre;
3. review accordingly the resources it requires; and
4. act decisively and- with an eye to its temporary stay in
South Sudan- responsibility.” 30 (p. 1)
It is telling that the findings and recommendations of these
two reports, from five and three years ago, respectively, are
still accurate and very applicable to the mission in 2016. A
central point for UNMISS leadership, DPKO and member
states is to recognize the primary challenges and make the
necessary reforms and improvements. Over the past five
years, self-reflection on shortcomings has not produced
practical policy change.
Years later, the same recommendations from 2011 and
2013 were again reiterated in interviews with key UNMISS
staff. For example, the former military chief of staff, Petter
Lindqvist, lamented that “the eternal predicament I faced
as UNMISS chief of staff was that the mission was trying
to do everything and be everywhere. UNMISS had difficulty
prioritizing” (12 January 2016). In consequence, UNMISS has
contributed to creating unrealistic expectations regarding its
capability to protect civilians. Some factors, such as a lack
of troops, funding and logistical and access constraints will
continue to be restrictive and limit UNMISS’s capability to
project outside their bases.
The mission is challenged by unrealistic expectations,
prioritization of its limited assets and forces, the repeated
violations of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) by the
government and the perception of UNMISS forces as soft
targets. Repeated perimeter breaches of its own bases, and
the attacks on the Bor PoC site in April 2014 and Malakal
PoC site in February 2016, particularly, reinforce the
impression that if forces cannot even protect themselves
or civilians in their bases, then they are unable to protect
civilians outside (see case study on the right).
In certain cases, such as the attack on Akobo in December
2013, the reported large numbers of civilian attackers
prevented an adequate response by UNMISS peacekeeping
forces deployed to the base. 31 However, there have also
been many cases where UNMISS failed to protect civilians
within their base and adjacent to their perimeters. A
recent piece in the New York Times states that, in 2015,
“Government soldiers and affiliated militias in particular
attacked and harassed civilians moving in and out of the
centers, abducting or killing them, raping some women and
looting, the United Nations reported. At least 39 people were
killed in the vicinity of one of the sites at Bentiu between
January and October.” 32
29 I.M. Breidlid and J. Harald Sande Lie, 2011.
30 J. Hemmer, “We are laying the groundwork for our own failure: The UN Mission in South
Sudan and its civilian protection strategy: an early assessment.” CRU Policy Brief No. 2
(January 2013).
31 UNMISS, 20 December 2013.
32 N. Cumming-Bruce, 2016 referencing UNMISS and OHCHR, “The State of Human Rights in
the Protracted Conflict in South Sudan”(4 December 2015).