Institute

EDA, from a tool solely advancing national interests (or framework facilitating defence
cooperation) to a genuine architect 33 when building capabilities for European defence.
2013:
Several ranking goals and guiding lines were prioritized by the Council in December
the development of an EU Cyber Defence Policy Framework;
the creation by the EDA and the High Representative, in line with existing
NATO planning processes, of a policy framework encouraging long-term
cooperation in defence planning;
providing a common European answer to the critical security risks arising on
the global geopolitical agenda;
the launch of an EU Maritime Security Strategy;
the involvement of the EDA in examining pooling and sharing scenarios as
regards common defence industrial standards, procurement projects, and
options for lowering the cost of military certifications, by increasing mutual
recognition between Member States.
In light of the above, a clear and resolute direction can be observed, with conclusive
steps taken in strengthening, deepening, and widening the EU level defence collaboration. In
terms of cooperative defence research programmes, the European Commission in partnership
with the EDA as ‘the hub of defence research at EU-level’ 34 is planning to launch a
Preparatory Action (PA) on CSDP-related research, which will shift financing opportunities
in support of European defence cooperation and of the European defence industries from
Members States to the EU per se.
A political economy viewpoint further sheds light on the challenging process of
creating, renewing and transforming Member States defence capabilities in the context of
political-economic limitations, such as: the scope, power and size of the Member States
defence industries; regional and international defence market structures; political and social
interests related to the occupation of workforce; market shares; as well as other ideological
and cultural aspects.
Overall, if the EDA remains solely an agent of the European principals without
credible biding power, it will surely fail to become a strong galvanizing force and facilitator
with the necessary agency to be able to address the capabilities-expectations gap the EU is
currently facing. The role of the EDA as a key enabler to help Member States meet their
capabilities shortfalls still remains under question, due to its intergovernmental institutional
setup. As long as the EDA is financed by Member States in proportion to their gross national
income and not by the European Union, the common interests and issues in defence reform
will not take precedence.
Several high ranking issues have taken priority on the EU’s security and defence
agenda, from emphasized pragmatism in defence cooperation, boosting the defence
dimension in the CSDP, preserving defence capabilities, favouring RPAS development as
critical technologies, funding for competitive R&D and R&T, increasing the digital security
agenda of the EU, to putting forward a new deal for European Defence:
33 J. Coelmont & S. Biscop, ‘Building European Defence: An Architect and a Bank,’ EGMONT Royal Institute
for International Relations, Security Policy Briefs 56 (May 2014): 1. Accessed September 25, 2015.
http://www.egmontinstitute.be/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/SPB56.pdf
34 The EDA: Preparatory Action for CSDP-related research, June 18, 2015. Accessed September 25, 2015.
http://www.eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/activities/activities-search/preparatory-action-for-csdp-related-research
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