Institute

Drone fighting, like other long-range fighting, needs to take into account several
ethical implications: this practice is conducive to easier kills by creating both physical and
moral distance 136 when engaging opponents in conflict situations. This double-distance is
translated in the so-called ‘screenfighting’ 137 and the bureaucratization of killing, 138 which
implies the lack of human empathy and the removal of moral and psychological barriers to
killing. While drone technology can be employed with little risks and costs, the fighting
process involves worrying de-humanising practices redolent of computer war games.
The use of drones may introduce cost-effective advanced technologies to warfare, but
similar to other types of remote warfare, 139 they offer a military solution to more complex
insecurity problems. As is was argued by American philosopher Herbert Marcuse in his book,
One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society (1964), the
choice between a technical rather than a socio-political solution to social problems is highly
significant from a normative point of view.
Questions arise concerning the accuracy and reliability of such technologies to
identify an appropriate target, further complicated by public trust issues in government and
military officials responsible with drone strikes decisions. To address such concerns, several
principles inherent to jus in bello need to be codified: 140 the principle of military necessity,
the principle of distinction (between soldiers and civilians), the principle of proportionality
(the use of force must be proportional to the military objectives to be achieves), and lastly
and probably the most important one, the principle of humanity (the military force must avoid
civilian suffering and casualties, and the destruction of propriety). The legal issues
associated with drone strikes generally refer to the United Nations Security Council
Resolutions 1373 and 1973, the former centred on post September 11 counter-terrorist
operations, and the latter on military operations and interventions in Libya during the
Gaddafi regime overthrow.
The surveillance capability of unarmed and camera-equipped aerial drones allows for
a wide range of both military and civilian tasks: data gathering, ‘border monitoring, assessing
damage to critical infrastructure (e.g. nuclear power plants), guiding search and rescue
workers at natural disaster sites, monitoring weather patterns, searching for persons missing
in difficult terrain, and tracking the spread of large-scale fires.’ 141
1. The EU’s Drone Policy
Bridging the structural-innovation gap in defence technologies is one way forward to
assure the EU’s future normative autonomy in ‘an increasingly, connected, contested and
complex world.’ The recent increased emphasis on dual-use technologies goes hand in hand
with the above-mentioned blurring of lines between ‘civilian versus military’ or ‘homeland
136 M. Coeckelbergh, ‘Drones, information technology, and distance: mapping the moral epistemology of remote
fighting,’ Ethics and Information Technology 15/ 2 (June 2013): 87-98.
137 Ibidem
138 P. M. Asaro, ‘The labour of surveillance and bureaucratized killing: new subjectivities of military drone
operators,’ Social Semiotics Special Issue: Charting, Tracking, and Mapping 23/2 (2013): 196-224.
139 E. Kersley, ‘Learning the lessons: 11 years of drones in Pakistan,’ openDemocracy (June 19, 2015).
Accessed September 25, 2015. https://www.opendemocracy.net/esther-kersley/learning-lessons-11-years-ofdrones-in-pakistan
140 E. Freiberger, ‘Just War Theory and the Ethics of Drone Warfare,’ E-International Relations (July 18, 2013).
Accessed September 25, 2015.
http://www.e-ir.info/2013/07/18/just-war-theory-and-the-ethics-of-drone-warfare/
141 Ibidem, 2.
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