Institute

into ‘defence-producing countries’, i.e. United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and
Sweden, and ‘defence-consumer countries.’
Nevertheless, the institutional advantage of the EDA and its policy consequences are
not to be ignored, because compared to the OCCAR and LoI institutional settings, the EDA
does not exclude the ‘defence consumer countries.’ The EDA puts forward an inclusive
approach 79 to solving the existing capabilities gap in the EU but also the gap between
defence-producing and defence-consumer countries. The EDA, among other things, serves as
an instrument for the Union’s industrial defence policy and its ‘comparative advantage’ 80 is
in its overarching ability to comprehend all national agendas and relate them so as to realize
their synergies.
The European Commission, especially with its Preparatory Action set for 2017-2019,
could also pose interesting challenges in taking lead as regards the EU defence industry and
market as well. With the liberalization of the defence market, the Commission has gained a
central position, because the defence industry would become subject to the rules of
competition, state aid, public procurement, and customs. The bottom line question would be
whether the Commission and the EDA represent competing solutions in the realms of defence
industry, the answer being simplified to two contrasting aspects: the Commission has an
indisputable supra-national, market framework, 81 while the EDA represents an
intergovernmental take on defence, permitting national governments to withhold an upperhand
in the decision making process.
79 M. Trybus, ‘The New European Defence Agency: A Contribution to a Common European Security and
Defence Policy and a Challenge to the Community Acquis?,’ Common Market Law Review 42 (2006): 676-677.
80 Ibidem, 676-677.
81 U. Morth, ‘Competing frames in the European Commission – the case of the defence industry and equipment
issue,’ Journal of European Public Policy 7/2 (June 2000):182.