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PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE

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Panelists’ Written Statements<br />

227<br />

The Supreme Court also declined to embrace a “church autonomy doctrine.” The corollary to<br />

the jurisdictional argument was a theory that churches have “autonomy” from discrimination<br />

law. This theory has been endorsed by numerous church lawyers in a wide variety of settings,<br />

but as I explained in my amicus brief in this case on behalf of BishopAccountability.org, The<br />

Cardozo Advocates for Kids, Child Protection Project, The Foundation to Abolish Child Sex<br />

Abuse, Jewish Board of Advocates for Children, Inc., KidSafe Foundation, The National Black<br />

Church Initiative, The National Center for Victims of Crime, Survivors for Justice, and the<br />

Survivors Network of those Abused by Priests and below, the Supreme Court has never embraced<br />

or identified a “church autonomy doctrine,” 203 and did not do so in this case. In fact, only two<br />

members of the Court, and two who rarely see eye-to-eye on any subject, Justices Alito and<br />

Kagan, endorsed an “autonomy” approach. 204<br />

The Hard Question Largely Left Unanswered: Who is a “Minister”?<br />

Because the Court did not side with the church’s argument in favor of a jurisdictional rule, but<br />

embraced the concept of a ministerial exception required by the First Amendment, it was forced<br />

to decide which employees of religious organizations qualify for the exception. One bright line<br />

would have been to limit it to ordained clergy, but the Court declined to limit the class of those<br />

employees affected to only those who are obviously ordained clergy. The Court also declined to<br />

hold that each and every employee of a religious institution is included. As usual, the hard part<br />

in a constitutional case is the line-drawing.<br />

The lower courts struggled with this same line-drawing, which is why, in the end, the Supreme<br />

Court took up the issue. Essentially the Court held that if an employee is a “minister,” he or she<br />

is excluded from the protections of federal civil rights law. Accordingly, if Perich were not a<br />

“minister,” she would have received the full protection of the ADA, Title VII, and every other<br />

federal, state, and local anti-discrimination law, despite the fact that her employer was religious.<br />

In a Supreme Court case, the most important argument that any litigant can offer is a workable<br />

test. Here, after the Court rejected the jurisdictional theory and a bright-line ordained clergy<br />

category, the test would need to resolve who is, and is not, a minister. Yet, no compelling test<br />

was put forward by either side in Hosanna-Tabor, or, in fact, the Court. For employees who are<br />

not ordained clergy, each case in the future will be based on the facts of that case.<br />

203<br />

Brief of BishopAccountability.org et al. at 17, as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical<br />

Lutheran Church & Sch. v. E.E.O.C, 132 S.Ct. 694 (2012).<br />

204<br />

Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S.Ct. at 711-716 (Alito, J., concurring).

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