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manipulate the start and conclusion of wars, can use informatized weapons to paralyze enemy
weapons and command systems, and can destroy the enemy’s precision guided weapons.” 157
Information control appears to be a key aspect of a deterrent force according to this explanation.
If one side possesses the capability to destroy or weaken an adversary’s information resources then
the other side dare not act hastily. Herein lies one of the strongest arguments in support of information
deterrence in Cai’s opinion. 158 However, a few pages later it is stated that “information network
warfare under conditions of nuclear deterrence will be the new form of future international
conflict.” 159 This argument causes one to reminisce about Russian V. I. Tsymbal’s 1995 statement
mentioned in the introduction to this chapter. Not much has changed over the years if this proves to be
the case.
Network warfare includes network spy warfare and network attack and defense warfare. It is a
form of fighting similar to IW in the opinion of the work’s authors. 160 Network warfare is low cost,
full of surprises and anonymity, involves low personnel casualty costs, and is asymmetrical The latter
concept indicates that warfare could be conducted between countries, between countries and
organizations, between countries and individuals, between organizations, between organizations and
individuals, and even between individuals. 161
Cai notes that computer network warfare’s basic characteristics are that “computer network space
is the battlefield, computers are the primary weapons, smart programming codes are the ammunition,
and personnel with computer attack and defense skills make up the operational units and
detachments.” 162 Capturing and maintaining network information dominance in the economic,
military, and diplomatic fields are important strategic, campaign, and tactical operational goals for
attack and defense scenarios. 163 Further, the mission has changed:
The goal of computer network warfare is no longer annihilating the enemy and preserving
oneself; rather, it is controlling the enemy and preserving oneself. What we call control is
mainly influencing the thinking and will of the war decision-makers, putting the adversary
into a darkroom, depriving him of the means for ‘knowing himself and knowing the enemy,’
and making it impossible to turn war potential into actual capabilities for engaging in
war. 164
The combat strength of China’s armed forces will be balanced on the basis of its computing power,
communications capacity and reliability, real-time reconnaissance capabilities, computer simulation
capabilities, and other information elements. These elements can deter through misconceptions and
psychological pressure. Without a distinction between front and rear, wars will truly become
“People’s Wars” and their shape could be strongly influenced by invisible information space. 165
In 2007 Major General Li Deyi stated that information deterrence will rise to a strategic level
close behind nuclear deterrence. New and important modes of deterrence will include informationtechnology
deterrence, information-weaponry deterrence, and information-resource deterrence.