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Implications of Basel III for the European banking sector

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<strong>Implications</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Basel</strong> <strong>III</strong> <strong>for</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />

<strong>European</strong> <strong>banking</strong> <strong>sector</strong><br />

Euro Finance Week 2011<br />

Frankfurt<br />

November 14, 2011<br />

CONFIDENTIAL AND PROPRIETARY<br />

Any use <strong>of</strong> this material without specific permission <strong>of</strong> McKinsey & Company is strictly prohibited


Current context <strong>of</strong> financial regulation and risk management in <strong>banking</strong><br />

CDS spreads sovereign bonds, bps<br />

6,000<br />

5,500<br />

5,000<br />

4,500<br />

4,000<br />

3,500<br />

3,000<br />

2,500<br />

2,000<br />

1,500<br />

1,000<br />

500<br />

0<br />

2009 2010 2011<br />

Europ. Banks<br />

- MtB ~0.9 ~0.7 ~0.5<br />

- CDS (bps) ~120 ~320 ~470<br />

1 <strong>European</strong> Banks ex UK<br />

2 5 yr spreads, <strong>European</strong> banks<br />

SOURCE: Datastream<br />

Greece<br />

Portugal<br />

Ireland<br />

Italy<br />

Spain<br />

▪ Significant volatility in<br />

<strong>the</strong> financial markets;<br />

liquidity markets drying up<br />

▪ Short-term capitalization<br />

requirements from<br />

EBA stress testing vs.<br />

depressed bank equity<br />

valuation levels<br />

▪ Significant risks <strong>of</strong> an<br />

economic downturn<br />

▪ Longer-term regulatory<br />

re<strong>for</strong>ms and business<br />

trans<strong>for</strong>mation in banks<br />

and market structure<br />

changes overall in <strong>the</strong><br />

financial services industry<br />

McKinsey & Company | 1


New regulatory regime will <strong>for</strong>ce significant capital and liquidity shortfall<br />

<strong>for</strong> Europe and U.S. financial institutions<br />

EUR billions; 2019<br />

<strong>European</strong> U.S.<br />

~ € 750 billion<br />

<strong>of</strong> common<br />

equity shortfall<br />

1,050<br />

Capital<br />

1,300<br />

Shortterm<br />

liquidity<br />

2,300<br />

Longterm<br />

funding<br />

SOURCE: McKinsey <strong>Basel</strong> <strong>III</strong> Impact Assessments <strong>European</strong> and US Banks, Nov. 2010<br />

600<br />

Capital<br />

600<br />

Shortterm<br />

liquidity<br />

2,200<br />

Longterm<br />

funding<br />

McKinsey & Company | 2


After implementation <strong>of</strong> <strong>Basel</strong> <strong>III</strong> regulatory measures, ROE <strong>of</strong><br />

global banks could decrease by 3-4 pp be<strong>for</strong>e mitigation<br />

Percent; expected pre-tax ROE<br />

Without<br />

regulation 2<br />

Capital<br />

requirements<br />

Liquidity/<br />

funding<br />

With<br />

regulation<br />

Capital quality/<br />

deduction<br />

RWA (market risk<br />

and credit risk)<br />

Capital ratios<br />

Leverage ratio 3<br />

Liquidity (LCR)<br />

<strong>European</strong> banks 1<br />

Funding (NSFR) 0.6<br />

0.7 ▪ Introduction <strong>of</strong> NSFR in 2018<br />

10.7<br />

-4.3<br />

1 Sample includes ~45 banks across Europe<br />

2 EU: based on 2004-07 ROE <strong>for</strong> individual banks scaled down to average 1980-2008 levels across EU<br />

3 Only additional capital need (after increase <strong>of</strong> minimum capital ratio and capital deductions) considered<br />

1.3<br />

1.3<br />

0.1<br />

0.2<br />

0.8<br />

15.0<br />

SOURCE: McKinsey <strong>Basel</strong> <strong>III</strong> Impact Assessments <strong>European</strong> and US Banks, Nov. 2010<br />

U.S. average<br />

0.8<br />

0.7<br />

0.7<br />

0.3<br />

0<br />

8.9<br />

12.1<br />

-3.2<br />

Main drivers<br />

ESTIMATES<br />

BEFORE<br />

MITIGATION<br />

▪ Limited recognition <strong>of</strong> DTAs<br />

and minority interest<br />

▪ Significant increase in market<br />

risk and CCR RWA<br />

▪ Common equity and Tier 1<br />

target ratios set at 9 and 11%<br />

▪ Additional capital need from<br />

leverage ratio constraint<br />

▪ Introduction <strong>of</strong> LCR in 2015<br />

▪ Impact after phase-in <strong>of</strong><br />

full <strong>Basel</strong> <strong>III</strong> requirements –<br />

be<strong>for</strong>e mitigating actions<br />

McKinsey & Company | 3


Resulting impact on <strong>the</strong> financial and <strong>banking</strong> market structure:<br />

what trends we do expect?<br />

1<br />

2<br />

3<br />

4<br />

Significant repricing <strong>of</strong> <strong>banking</strong> products – though<br />

timing given <strong>the</strong> different competitive positions unclear<br />

Disintermediation and more direct capital transfer<br />

between Corporates and Investors (insurances, funds etc.)<br />

New structure <strong>for</strong> banks’ capital and funding markets<br />

(secured funding, collateral management)<br />

Continued deleveraging/derisking <strong>of</strong> banks’ balance<br />

sheets and an increase in non-bank/shadow <strong>banking</strong><br />

activities<br />

McKinsey & Company | 4


1<br />

<strong>Basel</strong> <strong>III</strong> will significantly change product costs<br />

bps<br />

Products<br />

Retail<br />

<strong>banking</strong><br />

Corporate<br />

<strong>banking</strong><br />

Trading<br />

book<br />

securities<br />

Offbalance<br />

sheet<br />

▪ ST Retail loans<br />

▪ Residential mortgages<br />

< 35% risk weight<br />

▪ O<strong>the</strong>r mortgages<br />

▪ ST Corporate loans<br />

▪ LT Corporate loans<br />

▪ Specialized lending<br />

▪ Government bonds<br />

▪ Corporate or covered bonds > AA-<br />

▪ Corporate or covered bonds A-<br />

▪ Bonds < A- (or unrated)<br />

▪ Financial Institution bonds<br />

▪ OTC derivatives (relative to market<br />

value/current exposure)<br />

▪ Corporate credit lines (non-FI)<br />

▪ Corporate liquidity lines (non-FI)<br />

▪ FI credit and liquidity lines<br />

∆ Capital cost 1 ∆ Liquidity cost 2<br />

20<br />

15<br />

15<br />

15<br />

15<br />

15<br />

25<br />

30<br />

30<br />

30<br />

25<br />

25<br />

50<br />

60<br />

55<br />

∆ Funding cost 3 ∆ Total<br />

1 Assuming target Tier 1 ratio <strong>of</strong> 8% under <strong>Basel</strong> II and 11% under <strong>Basel</strong> <strong>III</strong>; in addition, 20% increase to account <strong>for</strong> capital quality and deductions measures<br />

2 Introduction <strong>of</strong> LCR in 2014; assuming current liability structure and 7% liquidity holding per product under <strong>Basel</strong> II and 105% LCR target ratio under <strong>Basel</strong> <strong>III</strong><br />

3 Introduction <strong>of</strong> NSFR in 2019; assuming 105% NSFR target ratio<br />

SOURCE: McKinsey <strong>Basel</strong> <strong>III</strong> Impact Assessments, <strong>European</strong> Banks Nov. 2010<br />

-5<br />

0<br />

10<br />

10<br />

10<br />

15<br />

10<br />

-35<br />

-20<br />

-30<br />

-15<br />

-10<br />

-15<br />

-5<br />

-10<br />

▪ Eligible <strong>for</strong> liquidity<br />

buffer<br />

▪ Potential liquidity cost<br />

benefit dependent on<br />

individual bank<br />

30<br />

35<br />

30<br />

60<br />

60<br />

-5<br />

5<br />

5<br />

5<br />

ESTIMATES BEFORE MITIGATION<br />

10<br />

10<br />

25<br />

25<br />

30<br />

Reduced liquidity cost due to<br />

increased long-term funding<br />

50<br />

60<br />

15<br />

15<br />

10<br />

25<br />

45<br />

45<br />

40<br />

Cost increase<br />

over 50bp<br />

50<br />

60<br />

70<br />

70<br />

80<br />

75<br />

85<br />

85<br />

McKinsey & Company | 5


1<br />

Significant re-pricing would be needed to restore ROEs,<br />

especially in structured products<br />

Percent<br />

Asset class<br />

FX ~19<br />

Rates - Flow 11-12<br />

Rates - Structured 7-8<br />

Credit - Flow<br />

Credit - Structured<br />

7-8<br />

Commodities ~11<br />

Cash Equities ~18<br />

EQD - Flow ~11<br />

EQD - Structured 12-13<br />

Prime Services 11-12<br />

Proprietary Trading<br />

Increase in client margin needed1 RoE post(!) immediate<br />

mitigation2 Target RoE <strong>of</strong> 12% Target RoE <strong>of</strong> 15%<br />

10-11<br />

11-12<br />

1 Increase in client margin in percent <strong>of</strong> current margin (to bridge <strong>the</strong> gap between post mitigation RoE and target RoE)<br />

2 Incl. technical mitigations such as improvements in data systems, collateral management, adjustments to product structure<br />

SOURCE: „Day <strong>of</strong> Reckoning“, McKinsey Whitepaper, Sept 2011<br />

N/A<br />

1-5<br />

N/A<br />

1-5<br />

N/A<br />

1-5<br />

N/A<br />

10-15<br />

5-10<br />

30-50<br />

30-50<br />

N/A<br />

N/A<br />

N/A<br />

20-30<br />

15-20<br />

15-20<br />

Level <strong>of</strong> margin increase<br />

30-35<br />

>50 20-50


2<br />

Disintermediation <strong>of</strong> banks’ B/S will lead to a more<br />

US type/disintermediated debt market structure<br />

Percent<br />

Off<br />

balance<br />

sheet<br />

On<br />

balance<br />

sheet<br />

Off<br />

balance<br />

sheet<br />

On<br />

balance<br />

sheet<br />

Corporate<br />

Bonds<br />

Securitized<br />

loans<br />

Bank<br />

Lending<br />

Corporate<br />

Bonds<br />

Securitized<br />

loans<br />

Bank<br />

Lending<br />

100% 100%<br />

19 20<br />

22<br />

58<br />

1990<br />

SOURCE: McKinsey Global Financial Initiative; McKinsey Global Banking Pools<br />

50<br />

30<br />

100% 100%<br />

0 6 11<br />

11<br />

94<br />

78<br />

2010<br />

ESTIMATES<br />

▪ US debt capital markets driven by<br />

corporate bonds and securitizations<br />

(in particular MBS)<br />

▪ However, current regulation, e.g., on<br />

backup liquidity lines, securitization,<br />

and trading will require adjustments to<br />

current business model, incl. some<br />

reintermediation (see new US proposal<br />

on covered bonds)<br />

▪ <strong>European</strong> debt markets very focused on<br />

bank lending<br />

▪ Disintermediation expected due to<br />

– High capital/funding charges on bank<br />

debt (e.g., infrastructure finance)<br />

– Reduced appetite <strong>for</strong> <strong>banking</strong><br />

exposure by insurance companies<br />

(SolvII) and o<strong>the</strong>r inst. investors<br />

– Countereffects from current regulation<br />

as experienced in <strong>the</strong> US<br />

McKinsey & Company | 7


3 Secured funding and collateral management will play<br />

a significantly increased role<br />

100% = EUR tr<br />

Large<br />

corporates<br />

O<strong>the</strong>r<br />

wholesale<br />

SME<br />

Micro<br />

Consumer<br />

Finance<br />

Mortgages<br />

12.5<br />

15%<br />

16%<br />

18%<br />

6%<br />

7%<br />

38%<br />

70-80%<br />

30-40%<br />

40-50%<br />

20-30%<br />

30-40%<br />

70-80%<br />

SOURCE: McKinsey Global Banking Practice, McKinsey Global Banking Pools<br />

ESTIMATES<br />

▪ Long-term funding: Expansion <strong>of</strong> secured<br />

funding markets (vis-à-vis DCM and o<strong>the</strong>r<br />

disintermediations)<br />

– Covered bonds<br />

– Increased and new <strong>for</strong>ms <strong>of</strong> securitizations/loan<br />

funds<br />

– Government-sponsored programs (SME)<br />

– Funding substitutions: syndicated lending<br />

with direct placements towards institutional<br />

investors<br />

▪ Short-term funding: fur<strong>the</strong>r growth in <strong>the</strong><br />

collateralized short-term/repo funding markets<br />

incl. more active collateral trading with<br />

corporates and institutional investors<br />

▪ Important prerequisite: new regulatory<br />

liquidity and funding requirements<br />

(LCR/NSFR) are appropriately adjusted!<br />

McKinsey & Company | 8


4<br />

Overall, <strong>the</strong> <strong>banking</strong> system will be disintermediated at <strong>the</strong><br />

expense <strong>of</strong> near-/shadow <strong>banking</strong> business models<br />

Assets 1<br />

USD trillion<br />

100<br />

90<br />

80<br />

70<br />

60<br />

50<br />

40<br />

30<br />

20<br />

10<br />

0<br />

2002<br />

03<br />

04<br />

1 Based on flow <strong>of</strong> Funds data <strong>for</strong> <strong>the</strong> Euro area, Australia, Canada, Japan, Korea, UK and US.<br />

SOURCE: Financial Stability Board<br />

05<br />

06<br />

07<br />

48<br />

08<br />

09<br />

44<br />

2010<br />

Banks<br />

Share <strong>of</strong><br />

total (percent)<br />

MM-funds,<br />

Hedge-funds<br />

Insurance and<br />

pension funds<br />

Public<br />

financial<br />

institutions<br />

McKinsey & Company | 9


<strong>Implications</strong> <strong>for</strong> <strong>the</strong> banks’ risk management<br />

▪ Significantly increased complexity <strong>of</strong> risk<br />

management frameworks (regulatory capital/<br />

liquidity/leverage frameworks, revised accounting<br />

standards, rating methodologies, …)<br />

▪ More <strong>for</strong>ward looking discretionary management<br />

interventions to handle increased<br />

complexity and market volatility<br />

▪ Fur<strong>the</strong>r industrialization <strong>of</strong> risk management<br />

processes (given continued cost pressures, but<br />

also regulatory in<strong>for</strong>mation requirements) through<br />

increased level <strong>of</strong> specialization/automation<br />

▪ Higher relevance <strong>for</strong> risk function in managing/<br />

guiding bank trans<strong>for</strong>mation (e.g., to ensure<br />

sustainable business models, manage regulatory<br />

pressures etc.)<br />

McKinsey & Company | 10

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