ENFORCEMENT
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Office of the Intellectual Property Enforcement Coordinator<br />
sale or public distribution, in an amount not more than<br />
the value that the seized merchandise would have had<br />
if it were genuine. 23 Further, for second and subsequent<br />
seizures against the same party, CBP is authorized to<br />
impose penalties in an amount of up to twice the value<br />
that the merchandise would have had if it were genuine. 24<br />
The use of CBP-issued fines and penalties merits<br />
further attention, including an in-depth assessment<br />
of practical impediments to issuing or collecting<br />
fines, as well as opportunities to utilize existing civil<br />
penalty authorities for budgetary and law enforcement<br />
purposes. Although CBP-issued fines and penalties may<br />
prove difficult to collect in many circumstances, the<br />
expanded use of appropriately scaled CBP civil penalties<br />
may significantly increase deterrence of illicit trade<br />
activity and could increase resources available for IPR<br />
enforcement efforts. 25<br />
To further deprive criminals of their illicit profits, and<br />
to protect the Government supply chain, it is important<br />
for all Federal Government partners to be aware of the<br />
illicit trader’s identity. Even in cases where it would be<br />
impractical for CBP to collect fines, CBP should consider<br />
ways to utilize existing fine and penalty authorities to<br />
establish which violators have had shipments seized,<br />
and to raise flags of caution to prevent additional<br />
illicit business from being conducted. To this end, CBP<br />
should continue to assess penalties against violators,<br />
while looking for opportunities to create a transparent<br />
violators list for use by Government agencies. By<br />
compiling and sharing information about known<br />
violators with those outside of the traditional targeting<br />
environment, such as Federal procurement officials,<br />
business with illicit traders may be deterred.<br />
ACTION NO. 3.16: Evaluate use of IPR civil<br />
penalties. Within two years of the issuance of this<br />
Plan, DHS, in consultation with OMB, will conduct<br />
an assessment of civil penalties imposed under 19<br />
U.S.C. 1526(f) to identify: (1) obstacles preventing<br />
the routine imposition of fees on, and collection<br />
of fees from, violators and assisting entities; and<br />
(2) optimal penalty levels necessary to produce a<br />
strong deterrent effect.<br />
ACTION NO. 3.17: Identify opportunities<br />
to notify other interested partners of known<br />
violators. Subject to limitations on the sharing of<br />
sensitive law enforcement data, DHS will explore<br />
options for sharing data on known violators with<br />
other Federal agency personnel regardless of the<br />
imposition of fines and penalties on those entities.<br />
10. Improve Administration of ITC Exlusion Orders.<br />
CBP is responsible for administering exclusion orders<br />
issued by the U.S. International Trade Commission<br />
(ITC). The majority of ITC exclusion orders are presently<br />
patent-based. They direct CBP to exclude from entry<br />
articles that infringe valid patent claims.<br />
Most exclusion order cases administered by CBP<br />
involve articles that were not directly reviewed or found<br />
to infringe by the ITC, namely, so-called “redesigned”<br />
articles. Consequently, CBP’s role requires that it rule on<br />
whether a redesigned article is subject to an ITC order<br />
despite being different in some respect from the article<br />
originally excluded by the ITC.<br />
The CBP rulings process, set forth at 19 C.F.R. part<br />
177, is ex parte. This is appropriate for the typical<br />
customs transaction, but may be unsuited to the<br />
exclusion order context where there are two parties in<br />
interest: the complainant and the importer. Importers<br />
submit most ruling requests, and because CBP’s current<br />
rulings process is ex parte, there is no authority for CBP<br />
officials to include the complainant in the proceeding.<br />
Consequently, the complainant may not become aware<br />
of the matter until CBP publishes its ruling, despite the<br />
complainant’s potentially significant economic interest in<br />
the outcome of the proceeding.<br />
There are opportunities to review CBP’s<br />
administration and enforcement of ITC exclusion<br />
orders for enhancements by way of a possible inter<br />
partes proceeding at CBP that would afford CBP the<br />
opportunity to reasonably hear from both the importer<br />
and the complainant, and allow each to make appropriate<br />
arguments while rebutting those of the other.<br />
ACTION NO. 3.18: Evaluate workability<br />
and options for implementing inter partes<br />
proceedings as part of CBP’s exclusion<br />
order rulings process. Within one year of the<br />
issuance of this Plan, CBP will review and report<br />
on whether changes to the structure of the<br />
exclusion order rulings process are warranted,<br />
and make such recommendations for regulatory<br />
amendments as may be appropriate.<br />
SECTION 3<br />
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