Serdar Mohammed (Respondent) v Ministry of Defence (Appellant)
uksc-2014-0219-judgment
uksc-2014-0219-judgment
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cornerstone <strong>of</strong> the international legal order. Their status as a source <strong>of</strong> international<br />
law powers <strong>of</strong> coercion is as significant as the Geneva Conventions, and is just as<br />
relevant where the Convention falls to be interpreted in the light <strong>of</strong> the rules <strong>of</strong><br />
international law.<br />
61. Secondly, I reject the argument that the decision has no application to noninternational<br />
armed conflicts because, while there are differences between the two<br />
classes <strong>of</strong> armed conflict, those differences do not, as it seems to me, affect the<br />
particular features <strong>of</strong> the reasoning in Hassan which are critical to the resolution <strong>of</strong><br />
these appeals. The fundamental question in Hassan was whether the six permitted<br />
grounds listed in article 5(1) <strong>of</strong> the Convention were to be treated as exhaustive in<br />
the context <strong>of</strong> armed conflict. The Court decided that they were not. This was<br />
because the exhaustive list <strong>of</strong> permitted grounds was designed for peacetime and<br />
could not accommodate military detention in the very different circumstances <strong>of</strong> an<br />
armed conflict: para 97. The Grand Chamber referred at para 102 to the decision <strong>of</strong><br />
the International Court <strong>of</strong> Justice in Armed Activities on the Territory <strong>of</strong> the Congo,<br />
and its advisory opinion concerning The Legal Consequences <strong>of</strong> the Construction <strong>of</strong><br />
a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. At para 104, it drew the same<br />
distinction as the International Court <strong>of</strong> Justice had made between peacetime norms,<br />
such as the prohibition <strong>of</strong> internment by international human rights instruments, and<br />
detention in the course <strong>of</strong> an armed conflict. These points do not depend on the<br />
international character <strong>of</strong> the armed conflict in question. The taking <strong>of</strong> prisoners <strong>of</strong><br />
war and the detention <strong>of</strong> civilians posing a threat to security are inherent in<br />
international and non-international armed conflicts alike. The practice <strong>of</strong> states to<br />
detain is common to both and is universal in both contexts. It is right to add that the<br />
state practice as regards derogations, to which the Grand Chamber attached some<br />
importance, is the same in both international and non-international armed conflicts.<br />
No member <strong>of</strong> the Council <strong>of</strong> Europe has ever derogated from the European<br />
Convention with respect to military action <strong>of</strong> whatever kind taken abroad: see Pejic,<br />
art cit, at p 850.<br />
62. It is fair to point out that some aspects <strong>of</strong> the functions <strong>of</strong> the peacekeeping<br />
forces deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan can more readily be accommodated within<br />
the six specified grounds in article 5(1) than the internment <strong>of</strong> prisoners <strong>of</strong> war in an<br />
international armed conflict. In particular, where armed forces are operating in<br />
support <strong>of</strong> the government <strong>of</strong> the territory, article 5(1)(c) may apply (detention for<br />
the purpose <strong>of</strong> bringing a person before a competent legal authority on suspicion <strong>of</strong><br />
having committed an <strong>of</strong>fence or to prevent him from committing one). But the<br />
enforcement <strong>of</strong> the criminal law against individual suspects is far from exhausting<br />
the functions <strong>of</strong> the forces deployed in either theatre. As I have pointed out (paras<br />
21-22, 28 above), their mandate under the relevant Security Council Resolutions<br />
extended well beyond operating as an auxiliary police force. It required them to<br />
engage as combatants in an armed conflict with the forces <strong>of</strong> a violent, organised<br />
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