Stumpf 's Cognitive-Evaluative Theory of Emotion
Stumpf 's Cognitive-Evaluative Theory of Emotion
Stumpf 's Cognitive-Evaluative Theory of Emotion
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<strong>Stumpf</strong> <strong>'s</strong> <strong>Cognitive</strong>-<strong>Evaluative</strong> <strong>Theory</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Emotion</strong><br />
As a historical contribution to the current cognition-emotion<br />
debate in psychology, this article seeks (a) to bring to<br />
the readers' attention the largely ignored tradition <strong>of</strong> cognitive<br />
emotion theory within introspective psychology by<br />
reviewing what is probably the most clearly formulated<br />
cognitive emotion theory <strong>of</strong> this period, that proposed by<br />
Carl <strong>Stumpf</strong>, and (b) to point out the relevance <strong>of</strong> <strong>Stumpf</strong><strong>'s</strong><br />
contributions to the psychology <strong>of</strong> emotions for the contemporary<br />
cognition-emotion discussion. It is suggested<br />
that <strong>Stumpf</strong><strong>'s</strong> version <strong>of</strong> a cognitive-evaluative theory <strong>of</strong><br />
emotion deserves the serious attention <strong>of</strong> contemporary<br />
investigators and that several <strong>of</strong> his objections to noncognitive<br />
theories <strong>of</strong> emotion retain their force against modern<br />
versions <strong>of</strong> these theories.<br />
The relation between emotions and cognitions has become<br />
a much-debated topic during recent years, and the<br />
American Psychologist has been a major forum for that<br />
discussion (e.g., Birnbaum, 1981; Holyoak & Gordon,<br />
1984; Isen, 1984; Lazarus, 1981, 1982, 1984; Lazarus &<br />
Smith, 1988; LeDoux, 1989; Leventhal & Scherer, 1987;<br />
Oatley& Johnson-Laird, 1987; Russell &Woudzia, 1986;<br />
Zajonc, 1980, 1981, 1984; Zajonc, Murphy, &Inglehart,<br />
1989). The two main opposing positions in this debate<br />
are those <strong>of</strong> cognitively oriented emotion theorists, who<br />
hold that cognitions (cognitive appraisals) are necessary<br />
for emotions (e.g., Lazarus, 1982, 1984), and those <strong>of</strong><br />
noncognitive or "independent systems" theorists, who<br />
deny this claim and hold instead that cognitive appraisals<br />
and emotions are independent in principle (e.g., Zajonc,<br />
1980, 1984; Zajonc et al., 1989).<br />
In the present article we contribute to the current<br />
cognition-emotion debate with a historical study. Such<br />
a study seemed to be indicated because, apparently, it is<br />
not generally recognized that the cognition-emotion issue<br />
has been with psychology since its very beginning as an<br />
institutionalized science in the past century, and that the<br />
contributions <strong>of</strong> cognitively oriented introspectionists to<br />
the psychology <strong>of</strong> emotion remain <strong>of</strong> considerable relevance<br />
today. According to the standard account <strong>of</strong> the<br />
history <strong>of</strong> emotion research, the institutionalized science<br />
<strong>of</strong> psychology began with noncognitive theories <strong>of</strong> emotion<br />
(e.g., James, 1884; Wundt, 1896) and continued with<br />
such theories until the cognitive revolution <strong>of</strong> the 1960s,<br />
when a number <strong>of</strong> theorists—in particular, Magda B. Arnold,<br />
Richard S. Lazarus, and Stanley Schachter—revived<br />
the ancient tradition <strong>of</strong> cognitive emotion theory dating<br />
back to Aristotle (see, e.g., Averill, 1983; Frijda, 1986;<br />
Frijda, Kuipers, & ter Schure, 1989; Lyons, 1980; Mandler,<br />
1984; Solomon, 1988). In this article we show that<br />
34<br />
Rainer Reisenzein and Wolfgang Schonpflug<br />
Free University Berlin, Berlin, Germany<br />
this historical view is biased, by bringing to the readers'<br />
attention the cognitive line <strong>of</strong> emotion theorizing within<br />
introspective psychology, which is largely ignored today<br />
(e.g., Brentano, 1874/1971; Husserl, 1901/1975; <strong>Stumpf</strong>,<br />
1899, 1907a). We concentrate on what we believe to be<br />
the most clearly formulated cognitive theory <strong>of</strong> emotion<br />
<strong>of</strong> this tradition, that proposed by Carl <strong>Stumpf</strong> (see, in<br />
particular, <strong>Stumpf</strong>, 1899, 1907a).<br />
Our main motive for drawing the readers' attention<br />
to <strong>Stumpf</strong><strong>'s</strong> contributions to the psychology <strong>of</strong> emotion<br />
is not, however, to correct a biased historical account <strong>of</strong><br />
the history <strong>of</strong> emotion research. Rather, it is with the<br />
belief that, far from being <strong>of</strong> merely historical interest,<br />
<strong>Stumpf</strong><strong>'s</strong> views still deserve the serious attention <strong>of</strong> contemporary<br />
investigators. For one reason, <strong>Stumpf</strong> proposed<br />
a highly interesting theory concerning the nature <strong>of</strong> emotions<br />
and their relation to cognitive appraisals. For another<br />
reason, the major alternative theories <strong>of</strong> emotion to which<br />
<strong>Stumpf</strong> stood in opposition—namely, those <strong>of</strong> James<br />
(1884, 1890/1950) and Wundt (1896)—are direct precursors<br />
<strong>of</strong> contemporary noncognitive (or independent<br />
systems) theories <strong>of</strong> emotion (e.g., Buck, 1985; Izard,<br />
1977; LeDoux, 1989;Tomkins, 1980; Zajonc, 1980, 1984;<br />
Zajonc et al., 1989), and several <strong>of</strong> the issues raised by<br />
<strong>Stumpf</strong> in the intellectual exchange with these theorists<br />
are <strong>of</strong> continued relevance to the current cognition-emotion<br />
debate.<br />
We present (a) a systematic review <strong>of</strong> <strong>Stumpf</strong><strong>'s</strong> cognitive-evaluative<br />
theory <strong>of</strong> emotions, (b) a review <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>Stumpf</strong><strong>'s</strong> main arguments against the major noncognitive<br />
theories <strong>of</strong> his time, namely, sensualistic (e.g., James,<br />
1890/1950) and mentalistic (e.g., Wundt, 1896) feeling<br />
theories, and (c) a discussion <strong>of</strong> the relevance <strong>of</strong> <strong>Stumpf</strong><strong>'s</strong><br />
views on emotion for the contemporary cognition-emotion<br />
debate.<br />
<strong>Stumpf</strong><strong>'s</strong> <strong>Cognitive</strong>-<strong>Evaluative</strong> <strong>Theory</strong><br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>Emotion</strong><br />
Carl <strong>Stumpf</strong> (1848-1936), a student <strong>of</strong> Franz Brentano<br />
and Rudolf Hermann Lotze, spent the main part <strong>of</strong> his<br />
Ludy T. Benjamin, Jr. served as action editor for this article.<br />
Parts <strong>of</strong> this article are based on a paper presented at the 36th<br />
Congress <strong>of</strong> the Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Psychologie in Berlin, October<br />
1988. An extended discussion <strong>of</strong> <strong>Stumpf</strong><strong>'s</strong> theory is available in German<br />
(Reisenzein, 1992).<br />
We would like to thank Jochen Brandtstadter, Richard Lazarus,<br />
and Bernard Weiner, as well as the participants <strong>of</strong> the symposium History<br />
<strong>of</strong> Psychology in Berlin—in particular, Eckart Scheerer—for their useful<br />
comments on an earlier version <strong>of</strong> the article.<br />
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to<br />
Rainer Reisenzein, Department <strong>of</strong> Psychology (WE 7), Free University<br />
Berlin, 1000 Berlin 33, Habelschwerdter AUee 45, Germany.<br />
January 1992 • American Psychologist<br />
Copyright 1992 by the American Psychological Association, Inc. 0OO3-O66X/92/S2.0O<br />
Vol. 47, No. 1,34-45
academic career (1894-1921) as pr<strong>of</strong>essor <strong>of</strong> philosophy<br />
and director <strong>of</strong> the Institute <strong>of</strong> Experimental Psychology<br />
at the Friedrich-Wilhelm University, Berlin. Reflecting<br />
these positions, his publications cover a diversity <strong>of</strong> themes<br />
in philosophy as well as in theoretical and empirical psychology<br />
(cf. <strong>Stumpf</strong>, 1924, pp. 58-61). Concerning the<br />
latter, he is best known for his fundamental contributions<br />
to the psychology <strong>of</strong> music and tone (e.g., <strong>Stumpf</strong>, 1883,<br />
1890), which continue to be given at least passing reference<br />
in the contemporary literature (e.g., Krumhansl,<br />
1991). In general, however, <strong>Stumpf</strong> has become a "nearly<br />
forgotten psychologist" (Sprung, Sprung, & Kernchen,<br />
1986, p. 509), even in German psychology. He is much<br />
less well-known today than, for example, are his students<br />
Kurt K<strong>of</strong>fka, Wolfgang Kohler, Kurt Lewin, and Max<br />
Wertheimer, the founders <strong>of</strong> the Berlin school <strong>of</strong> Gestalt<br />
psychology, and Edmund Husserl, the founder <strong>of</strong> phenomenology.<br />
The cognitive-evaluative theory <strong>of</strong> emotions was first<br />
presented by <strong>Stumpf</strong> in an article published in 1899. The<br />
complementary theory <strong>of</strong> affective sensations was proposed<br />
eight years later (<strong>Stumpf</strong>, 1907a); this theory was<br />
defended against various criticisms by <strong>Stumpf</strong> (1916).<br />
The three articles just mentioned were reprinted in 1928<br />
as a separate volume, together with an introduction containing<br />
further clarifying remarks (<strong>Stumpf</strong>, 1928). The<br />
present review is mainly based on these writings, but additional<br />
material (<strong>Stumpf</strong>, 1907b, 1907c, 1924) was also<br />
considered when it helped to clarify pertinent issues. To<br />
get a firm grasp <strong>of</strong> <strong>Stumpf</strong><strong>'s</strong> theory <strong>of</strong> emotion, it is essential<br />
to know his general views on the nature and classification<br />
<strong>of</strong> mental states.<br />
The Nature and Classification <strong>of</strong> Mental States<br />
According to <strong>Stumpf</strong> (1907b), the mind can be conceptualized<br />
as "the totality <strong>of</strong> mental states and dispositions<br />
. . . [which] are lawfully connected among one another,<br />
their contents, and their non-conscious or non-psychological<br />
determinants" (pp. 8-9; see also <strong>Stumpf</strong>, 1924, p.<br />
48).' Nondispositional, or as we will say occurrent (e.g.,<br />
Lyons, 1980), mental states were for <strong>Stumpf</strong> first and<br />
foremost conscious mental events accessible to introspection,<br />
but he accepted that it is legitimate to postulate<br />
unconscious mental events as theoretical entities, if doing<br />
so seems to be required for explanatory reasons (<strong>Stumpf</strong>,<br />
1899, 1907b). Furthermore, following Brentano (1874/<br />
1955), <strong>Stumpf</strong> held that a characteristic feature <strong>of</strong> mental<br />
states is their intentionality (Husserl, 1901/1975) or object<br />
directedness. As Brentano illustrated this feature <strong>of</strong> mental<br />
states, if one, for example, perceives, believes, desires,<br />
loves, or hates, one always perceives, believes, desires, loves<br />
or hates something. This something (which may not actually<br />
exist) is the intentional object <strong>of</strong> the respective<br />
mental state. Intentional mental states can therefore be<br />
construed as special types <strong>of</strong> relations between the person<br />
and the object <strong>of</strong> the mental state (Brentano, 1874/1955);<br />
different intentional states can differ with regard either<br />
to their objects or to the kind <strong>of</strong> intentional relation, the<br />
"mode <strong>of</strong> mental apperception," that links person and<br />
object (Brentano, 1874/1971, p. 89; <strong>Stumpf</strong>, 1928; see<br />
also Searle, 1983). For example, believing that it rains<br />
and believing that it snows are intentional states <strong>of</strong> the<br />
same psychological mode (namely, believing), but they<br />
have different objects. In contrast, believing that it rains,<br />
desiring that it rains, and being angry that it rains are<br />
intentional mental states that have the same object, but<br />
each <strong>of</strong> them represents that object in a different psychological<br />
mode.<br />
It may be seen as a late vindication <strong>of</strong> Brentano that<br />
intentionality as a mark <strong>of</strong> (some) mental states has again<br />
become a central issue in the contemporary philosophy<br />
<strong>of</strong> mind (e.g., Chisholm, 1967; Mackie, 1975; Mohanty,<br />
1986; Sayre, 1986; Searle, 1983). Contemporary philosophers<br />
typically see the essential feature <strong>of</strong> intentional<br />
mental states in their being representational states having<br />
semantic properties; that is, they represent something by<br />
virtue <strong>of</strong> their content and may thereby refer to items in<br />
the world (e.g., Bieri, 1986; Fodor, 1981, 1987; Searle,<br />
1983). However, in contrast to <strong>Stumpf</strong>, who followed<br />
Brentano in assuming—albeit with certain reservations<br />
(<strong>Stumpf</strong>, 1916)—that all mental states are intentional,<br />
most contemporary philosophers <strong>of</strong> mind agree with<br />
Husserl (1901/1975) that only a subset <strong>of</strong> mental states<br />
are intentional. In particular, sensations and other "raw<br />
feels" are usually not regarded as intentional mental states<br />
today (Rorty, 1979; Searle, 1983).<br />
Furthermore, <strong>Stumpf</strong> divided the totality <strong>of</strong> mental<br />
states into two broad categories, labeled by the technical<br />
terms intellectual and affective (<strong>Stumpf</strong>, 1928; see also<br />
<strong>Stumpf</strong>, 1907b). Each category was thought to comprise<br />
a number <strong>of</strong> subcategories. Concerning intellectual states,<br />
the subcategory most important to the present review<br />
comprises various types <strong>of</strong> beliefs (called judgments by<br />
<strong>Stumpf</strong>). Concerning the affective category, it was further<br />
subdivided by <strong>Stumpf</strong> into (a) active affective states or<br />
desires, which comprise nonperformative or optative<br />
(Green, 1986) desires (i.e., desires or wishes to the effect<br />
that something should or should not be the case) as well<br />
as motivational desires (desires to do something) and volitional<br />
states (intentions, willings); and (b) passive affective<br />
states, which comprise what could be called occurrent<br />
pro-evaluations and con-evaluations, or approvals and<br />
disapprovals <strong>of</strong> a (past, present, future, or merely possible)<br />
state <strong>of</strong> affairs. <strong>Stumpf</strong> (1907a) characterized these evaluations<br />
as "affective attitudes . . . which we call acceptance<br />
or rejection" (p. 15); Brentano (1874/1971) spoke<br />
<strong>of</strong> the appraisal <strong>of</strong> an object as "good pleasurable" versus<br />
"bad unpleasurable" (pp. 88-89).<br />
It must be emphasized that intellectual and affective<br />
mental states were regarded by <strong>Stumpf</strong>, in accord with<br />
Brentano, as fundamentally different psychological modes,<br />
or kinds <strong>of</strong> intentional relations <strong>of</strong> individual to object,<br />
which cannot be reduced to one another. In particular,<br />
the affective states cannot be reduced to evaluative beliefs,<br />
that is, beliefs having evaluative contents (the latter are<br />
1 All translations from German are ours.<br />
January 1992 • American Psychologist 35
simply a subspecies <strong>of</strong> belief; see also Brentano 1874/<br />
1971). According to <strong>Stumpf</strong>, for example, wishing that<br />
it should rain (a nonperformative desire) is a mental state<br />
quite different from believing that it would be good if it<br />
rained; desiring to take a walk (a performative desire) is<br />
different from believing that it would be desirable to take<br />
a walk; and most important, taking a pro-evaluative or<br />
con-evaluative stance toward a state <strong>of</strong> affairs is to be<br />
distinguished from thinking it good or bad that this state<br />
<strong>of</strong> affairs obtains. Thus, <strong>Stumpf</strong><strong>'s</strong> pro-evaluations and<br />
con-evaluations were conceptualized by him as unique<br />
psychological modes <strong>of</strong> relating to objects that are fundamentally<br />
different from the believing mode, even<br />
though pro-evaluations and con-evaluations may be<br />
caused by, or may cause, evaluative beliefs (and this may,<br />
in fact, be a reason why these two kinds <strong>of</strong> mental states<br />
tend to be confused). This does not mean, however, that<br />
all types <strong>of</strong> intentional states were held to be irreducible<br />
to more basic ones. On the contrary, according to <strong>Stumpf</strong>,<br />
emotions can be reduced to beliefs and evaluations.<br />
<strong>Stumpf</strong><strong>'s</strong> assumption that performative and nonperformative<br />
desires and in particular pro-evaluations and<br />
con-evaluations are fundamentally different from beliefs,<br />
including evaluative beliefs, must be regarded as a fundamental<br />
postulate <strong>of</strong> his theory <strong>of</strong> emotion; therefore,<br />
its tenability can perhaps be judged only by the overall<br />
success <strong>of</strong> the theory in explaining emotions. However,<br />
it should at least be noted that this assumption is fairly<br />
well in accord with current theorizing in the philosophy<br />
<strong>of</strong> mind. Many contemporary philosophers think not only<br />
"that belief and desire are somehow the basic intentional<br />
states" (Searle, 1983, p. 29), but that desires, wishes, and<br />
action tendencies are different from and not reducible to<br />
(evaluative) beliefs (Marks, 1986; at least implicitly, this<br />
assumption seems to be shared by many contemporary<br />
psychologists in the areas <strong>of</strong> emotion and motivation; see,<br />
e.g.,Frijda, 1986; Kuhl, 1983). In fact, this consideration<br />
has recently given rise to a new class <strong>of</strong> cognitively oriented<br />
emotion theories, which seek to analyze emotions<br />
in terms <strong>of</strong> beliefs and (nonperformative) desires (e.g.,<br />
Green, 1986; Marks, 1982; Searle, 1983). In contrast to<br />
these recent belief-desire theories <strong>of</strong> emotion, however,<br />
<strong>Stumpf</strong> (1899, 1928) thought that the central evaluative<br />
elements <strong>of</strong> emotions, namely, occurrent pro-evaluations<br />
and con-evaluations, are not reducible to desires or<br />
wishes (desiring or wishing that something should or<br />
should not be the case; for a recent discussion <strong>of</strong> this<br />
issue that might have found <strong>Stumpf</strong><strong>'s</strong> approval, see<br />
Baier, 1986). For although pro-evaluations and conevaluations<br />
were regarded by <strong>Stumpf</strong> as being more<br />
similar to desires and wishes than to beliefs, he thought<br />
that desires, in contrast to pro-evaluations and con-evaluations,<br />
involve a phenomenologically salient, if difficultto-define,<br />
irreducible element <strong>of</strong> "things should be in a<br />
certain way" (<strong>Stumpf</strong>, 1928, p. XV). Perhaps one could<br />
add that pro-evaluations and con-evaluations are those<br />
kinds <strong>of</strong> unique psychological modes <strong>of</strong> relating to objects<br />
that arise if desires are believed to have been fulfilled<br />
or frustrated.<br />
36<br />
The Nature <strong>of</strong> <strong>Emotion</strong>s<br />
According to <strong>Stumpf</strong> (1899), an emotion is "a passive<br />
affective state which is directed at a judged state <strong>of</strong> affairs"<br />
(p. 56). As mentioned earlier, the term passive affective<br />
state designates an occurrent intentional pro- or conevaluation,<br />
or approval or disapproval, <strong>of</strong> an object or a<br />
state <strong>of</strong> affairs. That this evaluation is "directed at a judged<br />
state <strong>of</strong> affairs" means that the evaluation is "based on a<br />
judgment" (<strong>Stumpf</strong>, 1899, p. 49), that is, an occurrent<br />
belief, opinion, conviction, or supposition. Closer examination<br />
reveals that <strong>Stumpf</strong> regarded the relation between<br />
beliefs and evaluations, more precisely, as being<br />
tw<strong>of</strong>old: First, there is a causal connection between these<br />
mental states; that is, the beliefs (or, more precisely, a<br />
person<strong>'s</strong> coming to hold the beliefs) cause the evaluations;<br />
they "belong to the conditions which produce [evaluations]"<br />
(<strong>Stumpf</strong>, 1899, p. 58). Second, there is a semantic<br />
relation between the contents <strong>of</strong> the beliefs and evaluations:<br />
Evaluations are directed at the same state <strong>of</strong> affairs<br />
that is also the object <strong>of</strong> the beliefs. Hence, whereas causal<br />
connections link beliefs and evaluations at the physical<br />
level (i.e., at the level <strong>of</strong> their biological realization or<br />
instantiation), identical—or at least partly overlapping—<br />
contents are the glue whereby these mental states are held<br />
together at the semantic level (see also Rey, 1983).<br />
As described so far, <strong>Stumpf</strong><strong>'s</strong> theory <strong>of</strong> emotion<br />
permits the interpretation that emotions are just evaluations<br />
and, hence, that emotions could occur or could be<br />
produced, at least in principle (e.g., in experiments using<br />
direct brain stimulation), in noncognitive ways (cf. Zajonc,<br />
1980, 1984). <strong>Stumpf</strong> (1899), however, did not think<br />
so. Rather, he noted,<br />
I would not admit, however, that the intellectual states are only<br />
[emphasis added] causes <strong>of</strong> emotions. . . . Envy comprises the<br />
presentation (Vorstellung) and judgment <strong>of</strong> the good concerned<br />
as one belonging to the fellow human, and it exists only as long<br />
as these intellectual elements do exist; they belong to its substance.<br />
If the presentation disappears or the judgment changes,<br />
the affect disappears or changes as well, even though in many<br />
cases aftereffects and sensory repercussions may remain, (p. 58)<br />
It is evident from this quotation that beliefs were<br />
regarded by <strong>Stumpf</strong> not just as the typical causes <strong>of</strong> emotions<br />
(i.e., evaluations), but as derinitionally necessary<br />
causal conditions: "The presence <strong>of</strong> an emotion-relevant<br />
judgment is essential to the definition [<strong>of</strong> emotions]"<br />
(<strong>Stumpf</strong>, 1907b, p. 27). That is, even though there may<br />
be evaluations that are produced in other ways than<br />
through beliefs (as <strong>Stumpf</strong>, in fact, assumed in 1899),<br />
<strong>Stumpf</strong> thought that such noncognitively caused evaluations<br />
are not proper emotions: An evaluation is a proper<br />
emotion only if the appropriate beliefs are also present<br />
and causally effective in the right way. One reason <strong>Stumpf</strong><br />
adopted this view was that he believed that the discriminating<br />
features <strong>of</strong> affects consist primarily <strong>of</strong> "differences<br />
<strong>of</strong> the presentations and judgments underlying the [evaluations]"<br />
(<strong>Stumpf</strong>, 1899, p. 95). This assumption entails<br />
that cognitions (beliefs) are necessary for the definition<br />
<strong>of</strong> different types <strong>of</strong> emotion.<br />
January 1992 • American Psychologist
Note that <strong>Stumpf</strong> did not propose, as do some contemporary<br />
theorists (e.g., Frijda et al., 1989; Johnson-<br />
Laird & Oatley, 1989; Lazarus, Kanner, & Folkman,<br />
1980; Ortony & Clore, 1989), that emotions are complexes<br />
<strong>of</strong> mental states consisting <strong>of</strong> several elements (in<br />
<strong>Stumpf</strong><strong>'s</strong> case, beliefs and evaluations) and, hence, that<br />
beliefs are related to emotions as part to whole. Not only<br />
does <strong>Stumpf</strong> (1899, 1907b) caution against this possible<br />
misunderstanding <strong>of</strong> his position, but his assumption that<br />
beliefs are causes <strong>of</strong> emotions implies that he could not<br />
have accepted this view without rejecting what is generally<br />
regarded—at least since Hume (cf. Mackie, 1974)—as<br />
an indispensable ingredient <strong>of</strong> an acceptable scientific<br />
concept <strong>of</strong> causality (and is, in fact, also well in accord<br />
with our everyday concept <strong>of</strong> causality), namely, that<br />
cause and effect must be distinct singular events. According<br />
to this principle—which one must accept, among<br />
other reasons, if one wants to rule out self-causation—<br />
an event cannot be a cause <strong>of</strong> another event <strong>of</strong> which it<br />
is a part; in this case the effect would subsume the cause,<br />
implying that the cause partly causes itself. Rather, emotions<br />
are belief-caused evaluations, that is, that subclass<br />
<strong>of</strong> evaluations that have the appropriate causal history,<br />
that is, they have been caused by appropriate beliefs regarding<br />
the object <strong>of</strong> the emotion. In modern terminology,<br />
emotions are in part functionally specified evaluations,<br />
that is, evaluations that are partly defined by reference<br />
to their causes, analogous to, for example, the definition<br />
<strong>of</strong> "sunburn" as an "inflammation <strong>of</strong> the skin caused by<br />
over-exposure to sunlight" (Gordon, 1978, p. 125). Note<br />
that such a functional definition <strong>of</strong> emotions is in accord<br />
both with the functionalist view <strong>of</strong> mental states (see<br />
Block, 1980; Fodor, 1975)—which is regarded by many<br />
as the metaphysical backbone <strong>of</strong> contemporary cognitivism—and<br />
with the views <strong>of</strong> several earlier and later emotion<br />
theorists. Already Aristotle (1980) defined fear as a<br />
kind <strong>of</strong> displeasure or perturbation arising from the idea<br />
<strong>of</strong> impending evil; Descartes (1649/1984) defined several<br />
<strong>of</strong> his nonbasic emotions as subtypes <strong>of</strong> basic feelings<br />
whose discriminating features consist in their being<br />
caused by particular types <strong>of</strong> appraisals; and Arnold<br />
(1970) defined emotion in general as "a felt tendency<br />
toward anything appraised as good, and away from anything<br />
appraised as bad" (p. 176; for further examples, see<br />
Davidson, 1976; Gordon, 1974; Lyons, 1980; Searle,<br />
1983; Wilson, 1972).<br />
We can therefore render <strong>Stumpf</strong><strong>'s</strong> proposal concerning<br />
the nature <strong>of</strong> emotions in the following final form:<br />
An emotion is an occurrent pro- or con-evaluation <strong>of</strong> a<br />
state <strong>of</strong> affairs, which is (a) caused by beliefs and (b) semantically<br />
linked to their contents. To use <strong>Stumpf</strong><strong>'s</strong> example,<br />
envy may be (roughly) defined as an occurrent<br />
con-evaluation (a disapproval) <strong>of</strong> another person<strong>'s</strong> possessing<br />
a desired good that one lacks, which is caused, in<br />
part at least, by the belief that the other person possesses<br />
that good, whereas one lacks it oneself. Similarly, pride<br />
may be (roughly) defined as an occurrent pro-evaluation<br />
(an approval) <strong>of</strong> a state <strong>of</strong> affairs or an object, caused in<br />
part by the beliefs that this state <strong>of</strong> affairs or object exists<br />
and that it is relevantly "connected" to oneself (Searle,<br />
1983). In many cases, this latter belief takes the more<br />
specific form <strong>of</strong> believing that one has been causally responsible<br />
for bringing about this state <strong>of</strong> affairs (Weiner,<br />
1986). The writings <strong>of</strong> Descartes and Spinoza, to which<br />
<strong>Stumpf</strong> referred, as well as recent research on cognitive<br />
appraisals in emotion, suggests to us that this kind <strong>of</strong><br />
belief-evaluation analysis <strong>of</strong> emotions may in principle<br />
be possible for a wide range <strong>of</strong> affects (see, e.g., Frijda et<br />
al., 1989; Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988; Reisenzein &<br />
H<strong>of</strong>mann, 1990; Roseman, 1984; Scherer, 1984; Searle,<br />
1983; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Solomon, 1976; Weiner,<br />
1986; Wierzbicka, 1972).<br />
Additional Clarifications and Elaborations<br />
<strong>Stumpf</strong> further clarified the core tenet <strong>of</strong> his theory the<br />
following significant respects:<br />
1. Concerning the belief component <strong>of</strong> emotional<br />
appraisals (judgments), <strong>Stumpf</strong> emphasized—much in<br />
line with Lazarus (1982)—that the term judgment must<br />
be understood in a broad sense. <strong>Emotion</strong>-relevant judgments<br />
must not be restricted to consciously made evaluative<br />
judgments or to hypothetical or categorical judgments<br />
in the logical sense. Rather, "already the very first<br />
beginnings <strong>of</strong> nondeliberate apperception and interpretation<br />
<strong>of</strong> sense-impressions" (<strong>Stumpf</strong>, 1899, p. 51) are to<br />
be regarded as judgments. Elementary judgments are already<br />
involved in spatial orientation, in the distinction<br />
<strong>of</strong> one<strong>'s</strong> own body from other objects, in the recognition<br />
<strong>of</strong> objects, the apperception <strong>of</strong> similarities and differences,<br />
and the expectation <strong>of</strong> similar future cases on the basis<br />
<strong>of</strong> earlier ones. "Psychology," <strong>Stumpf</strong> (1899) wrote, "will<br />
hardly be able to make do without this generalization [<strong>of</strong><br />
the concept <strong>of</strong> judgment], even though one may disagree<br />
about the best label" (p. 51). Furthermore, judgments<br />
can appear in consciousness in very indeterminate and<br />
weak forms, and an occurrent evaluative reaction can<br />
continue even after the judgment is no longer at the focus<br />
<strong>of</strong> consciousness, as presumably is <strong>of</strong>ten the case with<br />
moods. However, the affective state in the latter case is<br />
then no longer <strong>of</strong> exactly the same kind as proper emotions.<br />
Finally, to account for some apparently problematic<br />
cases, one may potentially make use <strong>of</strong> the "auxiliary<br />
concept <strong>of</strong> unconscious presentations and judgments"<br />
(<strong>Stumpf</strong>, 1899, p. 50).<br />
2. The assumption that both emotions themselves<br />
and their building blocks (beliefs and evaluations) are<br />
representational mental states presupposes that there exists<br />
an internal system <strong>of</strong> representation (Fodor, 1975).<br />
Apparently, for <strong>Stumpf</strong> the most important emotion-relevant<br />
representational system was language: Usually the<br />
state <strong>of</strong> affairs at which emotions are directed are mentally<br />
represented as affirmative sentences. However,<br />
Neither linguistic formulations, nor universal concepts are absolutely<br />
necessary for [emotion-relevant] judgments. Thus, a<br />
cognized or believed state <strong>of</strong> affairs, which we would linguistically<br />
express by means <strong>of</strong> an affirmative sentence, and which we would<br />
think with the help <strong>of</strong> concepts, can also be represented in consciousness<br />
unformulated. (<strong>Stumpf</strong>, 1928, p. XIII)<br />
January 1992 • American Psychologist 37
That is at least without being formulated in a natural<br />
language. Whereas <strong>Stumpf</strong> (1928) was referring to a sensory<br />
or imaginal system <strong>of</strong> representation, contemporary<br />
emotion theorists generally prefer to assume a languageindependent,<br />
but nevertheless importantly languagelike,<br />
propositional medium <strong>of</strong> representation (e.g., Mandler,<br />
1984; Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1987; see also Fodor,<br />
1975, 1981). Because emotionally relevant cognitions are,<br />
in principle, language independent, it is possible that prelinguistic<br />
infants as well as animals have emotions. That<br />
they do in fact have at least simple emotions is, according<br />
to <strong>Stumpf</strong> (1928), evident to everybody who is not prejudiced<br />
in favor <strong>of</strong> behavioristic notions.<br />
3. As has already been mentioned, it is primarily<br />
the judgments (beliefs) on which the differentiation between<br />
affects is based. Although evaluations make up the<br />
core <strong>of</strong> emotion, the differentiation that they provide is<br />
relatively crude (essentially, positive vs. negative); hence,<br />
the remaining differentiations between emotions must be<br />
due to beliefs:<br />
A present, past, or future state <strong>of</strong> affairs [must] be cognized or<br />
represented as such if an emotion is to arise, and... the quality<br />
<strong>of</strong> the emotion depends primarily on how this state <strong>of</strong> affairs is<br />
represented in our thinking. (<strong>Stumpf</strong>, 1899, p. 54)<br />
Because cognitions are the primary discriminating features<br />
<strong>of</strong> the emotions, they are also (together with evaluations)<br />
the natural principle <strong>of</strong> classification <strong>of</strong> emotions<br />
into larger groups. In fact, we already distinguish in common<br />
sense, for example, between affects that are directed<br />
at present, past, and future states <strong>of</strong> affairs; affects that<br />
concern beneficial and those that concern harmful events;<br />
and affects that are about our own versus others' welfare<br />
(<strong>Stumpf</strong>, 1899).<br />
4. Finally, <strong>Stumpf</strong> (1899) noted that his theory has<br />
an obvious ontogenetic implication: Any particular emotion<br />
can only arise once its cognitive basis is present. For<br />
example, a child can only experience envy once he or she<br />
is capable <strong>of</strong> forming a belief to the effect that a desired<br />
good belongs to a fellow human. Because <strong>Stumpf</strong> (1899)<br />
believed that newborns lack the cognitive prerequisites<br />
<strong>of</strong> emotions ("the occurrence <strong>of</strong> a proper emotion presupposes<br />
a certain amount <strong>of</strong> cognitive development," p.<br />
51), he held against Wundt that genuine emotions cannot<br />
be attributed to them. This proposal seems to be supported<br />
by more recent developmental evidence (e.g.,<br />
Averill, 1982; Frijda, 1986; Rozin & Fallon, 1987).<br />
<strong>Stumpf</strong> s Arguments Against Noncognitive<br />
Theories <strong>of</strong> <strong>Emotion</strong> and His <strong>Theory</strong><br />
<strong>of</strong> Affective Sensations<br />
<strong>Stumpf</strong> (1899) attempted to support his cognitive-evaluative<br />
theory <strong>of</strong> emotions both directly, by trying to show<br />
that it was consistent with the available evidence and that<br />
it explained the most important facts about emotions,<br />
and indirectly, by trying to demonstrate that the major<br />
existing alternative theories <strong>of</strong> emotion were inadequate.<br />
Concerning the evidence for his theory, <strong>Stumpf</strong> emphasized<br />
that it explained a variety <strong>of</strong> salient aspects <strong>of</strong> emo-<br />
38<br />
tions. In particular, it explained the intentionality <strong>of</strong><br />
emotions, and it gave a plausible account <strong>of</strong> their differentiation<br />
and discrimination; it explained the dependence<br />
<strong>of</strong> emotions on desires and beliefs and their modifiability<br />
by a change <strong>of</strong> these mental states; and it explained the<br />
links <strong>of</strong> emotion to motivation. In addition, <strong>Stumpf</strong><br />
(1899) took it to be a strength <strong>of</strong> his theory that—in<br />
contrast to the theories <strong>of</strong> Wundt and James—it was in<br />
fundamental agreement with both common sense and<br />
with what he and Brentano (1874/1971) regarded as the<br />
dominant traditional line <strong>of</strong> emotion theorizing: the cognitive<br />
tradition exemplified by Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas,<br />
Descartes, and Spinoza. Although the "surprisal<br />
value" <strong>of</strong> the theory is therefore moderate, <strong>Stumpf</strong> (1899)<br />
held that "absolute originality ... in matters which were<br />
open to introspection at all times would be a recommendation<br />
<strong>of</strong> the inventiveness <strong>of</strong> the author, but not <strong>of</strong> his<br />
case" (p. 67).<br />
<strong>Stumpf</strong><strong>'s</strong> main concern, however, was with refuting<br />
the major competing emotion theories <strong>of</strong> his time. Similar<br />
to those <strong>of</strong> today, these theories were variants <strong>of</strong> a special<br />
class <strong>of</strong> noncognitive theories <strong>of</strong> emotion that can collectively<br />
be called emotional feeling theories (Alston, 1972).<br />
The basic tenet <strong>of</strong> these theories is that emotions are certain<br />
kinds <strong>of</strong> conscious qualities that are, in many respects,<br />
similar to sensory qualities such as sensations <strong>of</strong><br />
color, odor, and taste. How close this similarity to sensations<br />
is perceived to be depends on the specific version<br />
<strong>of</strong> feeling theory. According to the first, sensualistic<br />
(Titchener, 1908) variant, the emotional qualities at stake<br />
are in fact nothing but a special class <strong>of</strong> sensations or<br />
perceptions (or patterns, complexes, etc., <strong>of</strong> these),<br />
namely, sensations or perceptions that originate from peripheral<br />
bodily events (e.g., James, 1884, 1890/1950).<br />
According to the second version <strong>of</strong> feeling theory, which<br />
may be termed centralist or mentalist and which found<br />
its most prominent proponent in <strong>Stumpf</strong><strong>'s</strong> contemporary,<br />
Wundt (1896), the emotional qualities are not reducible<br />
to peripherally caused sensations. Their physiological<br />
source was later located, for example, in the thalamus<br />
(Cannon, 1927) or the limbic system (Papez, 1937).<br />
<strong>Stumpf</strong> s Objections to Sensualistic Feeling Theories<br />
<strong>Stumpf</strong><strong>'s</strong> (1899) main objections to sensualistic feeling<br />
theories <strong>of</strong> emotion were as follows: (a) There is no correspondence<br />
between the multitude <strong>of</strong> emotions, on the<br />
one hand, and patterns <strong>of</strong> peripheral bodily changes, on<br />
the other hand, with regard to quality, intensity, and temporal<br />
course (cf. Cannon, 1927; see also Averill, 1982,<br />
concerning temporal course); (b) even if differentiated<br />
patterns <strong>of</strong> bodily changes corresponding to the different<br />
emotions existed, they are probably not represented in<br />
consciousness (cf. Zillmann, 1978); (c) it is unclear what<br />
adaptational value would accrue from a brain that is "like<br />
a tube through which every [emotional] stimulus drop<br />
immediately drains to the periphery" (p. 82). On the<br />
contrary, we must count ourselves "lucky that we do not<br />
react so sensitively" (p. 83); and (d) "a definition must<br />
be convertible" (p. 84); thus, if emotions are identified<br />
January 1992 • American Psychologist
with organic sensations without any qualification, then<br />
all organic sensations are, conversely, emotions, and one<br />
would have to "subsume under the concept <strong>of</strong> emotion<br />
. . . heart-burn, feelings <strong>of</strong> hunger and <strong>of</strong> satiation, <strong>of</strong><br />
heat and chill" (p. 84; see also, Pitcher 1965). Unless the<br />
sensualistic theorists are prepared to accept this consequence<br />
(and few are), they can identify emotions with<br />
only a subclass <strong>of</strong> (complexes <strong>of</strong>) organic sensations. But<br />
this suggestion founders on the fact that the clear phenomenal<br />
difference between the mental states ordinarily<br />
regarded as emotions (e.g., anger) and nonemotional organic<br />
sensations (e.g., heartbeat) is not paralleled by a<br />
similarly compelling difference in felt quality between two<br />
classes <strong>of</strong> organic sensations (emotional and nonemotional<br />
ones). For the sensualistic feeling theory <strong>of</strong> emotions<br />
requires that such a difference exists.<br />
It seems to us that none <strong>of</strong> the proponents <strong>of</strong> contemporary<br />
variants <strong>of</strong> sensualistic emotion theories (e.g.,<br />
Izard, 1977; Leventhal, 1984; Tomkins, 1962, 1980) has<br />
provided a fully convincing answer to these objections.<br />
Consider, for example, how contemporary sensualistic<br />
theories (that focus mostly on facial feedback) try to distinguish<br />
emotional from nonemotional bodily sensations.<br />
Typically, relational criteria are being used. It is suggested,<br />
for instance, that only facial feedback (or its activated<br />
mental representation) that is self-produced, spontaneous,<br />
or congruent with feed-forward feedback (e.g., Laird,<br />
1974; Leventhal, 1984) leads to an emotional feeling. It<br />
remains quite unclear, however, what makes a spontaneous<br />
or self-produced organic sensation emotional, and<br />
clearly there are facial expressions that meet these criteria<br />
but are not emotional at all.<br />
<strong>Stumpf</strong>s Critique <strong>of</strong> Mentalistic Feeling Theories<br />
and His <strong>Theory</strong> <strong>of</strong> Affective Sensations<br />
The problem <strong>of</strong> sense-feelings. The affective phenomena<br />
that <strong>Stumpf</strong> (1899) primarily had in mind when he developed<br />
his theory <strong>of</strong> emotion, which that theory was first<br />
and foremost intended to explain, were paradigmatic<br />
emotions, that is, they were the referents <strong>of</strong> ordinary language<br />
emotion terms—such as joy, sorrow, anger, hope,<br />
and fear—"concerning which there can be no dispute<br />
that they belong to the concept <strong>of</strong> emotion" (p. 50). He<br />
also thought that the theory was applicable, with some<br />
reservations, to mood states. There remained, however,<br />
at least one class <strong>of</strong> prima facie affective phenomena that<br />
could not be well accounted for by the theory, the socalled<br />
Sinnesgefuhle (sense-feelings; Titchener, 1908). The<br />
term was used by <strong>Stumpf</strong> (1907a) as a "theory-neutral"<br />
expression to denote the various sensory pleasures and<br />
displeasures, including purely bodily pains and the pleasurable<br />
sensations <strong>of</strong> bodily well-being in its more general<br />
and more special forms (the latter include the pleasure<br />
component in tickling, the feeling associated with itching,<br />
and sexual pleasure feelings), as well as the pleasure and<br />
displeasure that may be connected with elementary sensations<br />
<strong>of</strong> the "special senses," such as temperature, odors,<br />
tastes, tones, and colors (<strong>Stumpf</strong>, 1907a) as well as with<br />
organic sensations (<strong>Stumpf</strong>, 1899).<br />
The problem <strong>of</strong> the nature <strong>of</strong> sensory pleasures and<br />
displeasures and their relation to paradigmatic emotions<br />
acquired its particular significance from the fact that it<br />
was precisely these affective phenomena with which<br />
Wundt and his followers were primarily concerned; on<br />
the analysis <strong>of</strong> these affective phenomena they founded<br />
their alternative view <strong>of</strong> emotions (see also Lehmann,<br />
1914; Titchener, 1908). Despite the fact that comparatively<br />
little systematic effort was devoted by these researchers<br />
to the study <strong>of</strong> paradigmatic emotions such as<br />
anger, fear, and joy, Wundt (1896) held that not only are<br />
feelings <strong>of</strong> pleasure and displeasure—together with the<br />
feelings <strong>of</strong> arousal, depression, tension, and relaxation—<br />
the simplest affective elements <strong>of</strong> consciousness, but that<br />
paradigmatic emotions are complex combinations or fusions<br />
<strong>of</strong> these elementary feelings (Wundt, 1896; see also<br />
Titchener, 1908).<br />
<strong>Stumpf</strong><strong>'s</strong> original view <strong>of</strong> sense-feelings. In 1899,<br />
<strong>Stumpf</strong> had not only distinguished organic sensations<br />
from emotions, but had resisted the "general scientific<br />
desire for utmost reduction" (p. 58) and had also kept<br />
emotions distinct from sensory pleasures and displeasures.<br />
Although at that time he still classified these latter<br />
feelings among the class <strong>of</strong> intentional evaluative states—<br />
following Brentano (1874/1971)—<strong>Stumpf</strong> believed that<br />
sensory feelings <strong>of</strong> pleasure and displeasure are, in contrast<br />
to paradigmatic emotions, directly caused by sensations,<br />
that is, without mediating cognitions (beliefs).<br />
Therefore, he held that they do not count as proper emotions<br />
(for more on this issue, see the next section).<br />
<strong>Stumpf</strong><strong>'s</strong> revised view <strong>of</strong> sense-feelings: The theory<br />
<strong>of</strong> affective sensations. Yet, according to the position<br />
held by <strong>Stumpf</strong> in 1899, sense-feelings still belonged to<br />
the class <strong>of</strong> intentional evaluative phenomena (i.e., the<br />
passive affective states) and, hence, were similar to proand<br />
con-evaluations, desires, and wishes. They were not<br />
"true" emotions only because, other than the latter kinds<br />
<strong>of</strong> mental states, they were not caused by beliefs. This<br />
view must have appeared increasingly problematic to<br />
<strong>Stumpf</strong> during the following years, and in 1907a, he proposed<br />
a more radical difference between emotions and<br />
sense-feelings (see also Titchener, 1908, for an English<br />
review). Now he posited that sense-feelings are not evaluative<br />
states at all, but rather sensations <strong>of</strong> a special kind,<br />
like sensations <strong>of</strong> color, odor, and tones (although, in contrast<br />
to the latter, they may well be centrally generated;<br />
see also <strong>Stumpf</strong>, 1916). To support his view, <strong>Stumpf</strong><br />
(1907a) carefully compared the various sense-feelings on<br />
several phenomenological dimensions and concluded that<br />
there are, at best, gradual differences between sensory<br />
pleasures and displeasures and ordinary sensations on<br />
these dimensions, whereas there are fundamental differences<br />
between sense-feelings and emotions, even though<br />
feelings <strong>of</strong> pleasure and displeasure may occasionally<br />
cause, be caused by, or accompany emotions, and although<br />
they may be related to emotions both phylogenetically<br />
and ontogenetically (for more detail, see Titchener,<br />
1908). Therefore, <strong>Stumpf</strong> (1907a) concluded, the<br />
view that sense-feelings are but a special class <strong>of</strong> sensations<br />
January 1992 • American Psychologist 39
is the most tenable or, at any rate, the most parsimonious<br />
one to take.<br />
Although <strong>Stumpf</strong>' s thesis was accepted by some <strong>of</strong><br />
his contemporaries, it was rejected by others (cf. <strong>Stumpf</strong>,<br />
1916), including his teacher Brentano (1907/1979).<br />
(Brentano proposed that sensory pleasures and displeasures<br />
should be regarded as intentional evaluations that,<br />
however, have as their objects mental states, namely, the<br />
experiencing <strong>of</strong> certain sensations [see also Chisholm,<br />
1979, and for a related contemporary view, Hall, 1989].)<br />
When considered from the perspective <strong>of</strong> <strong>Stumpf</strong><strong>'s</strong> cognitive-evaluative<br />
theory <strong>of</strong> emotion, however, <strong>Stumpf</strong><strong>'s</strong><br />
position is not an unreasonable one to take. For whatever<br />
else <strong>Stumpf</strong><strong>'s</strong> (1907a) analyses do or do not show, they<br />
certainly do support his conclusion that, phenomenologically,<br />
sense-feelings resemble ordinary sensations much<br />
more than they resemble intentional evaluations and<br />
wishes—the kinds <strong>of</strong> mental states with which emotions<br />
were associated (<strong>Stumpf</strong>, 1899). And, <strong>Stumpf</strong> (1907a)<br />
argued, the idea that emotions (i.e., belief-caused evaluations)<br />
are somehow built up from primitive, sensationlike<br />
feelings is just as implausible as the theory that complex<br />
perceptions, judgments, and thoughts are somehow built<br />
up from elementary sensations. "Time will come,"<br />
<strong>Stumpf</strong> (1907a) wrote, "when the difference in principle<br />
between emotions and sensations, including affective<br />
sensations, will be regarded as being just as evident as is,<br />
already today, the difference between sensations and<br />
thoughts" (pp. 7-8).<br />
Sensory pleasures and displeasures as nonrepresentational<br />
mental states. The quotation at the end <strong>of</strong> the<br />
last paragraph points to a different and perhaps more<br />
compelling argument to defend <strong>Stumpf</strong><strong>'s</strong> thesis that<br />
emotions are fundamentally different from sensations,<br />
including sensory pleasures and displeasures. This argument<br />
had already been presented by Husserl (1901/<br />
1975), a student <strong>of</strong> both Brentano and <strong>Stumpf</strong>, several<br />
years before <strong>Stumpf</strong><strong>'s</strong> (1907a) article and has been reiterated<br />
by several more recent philosophers <strong>of</strong> mind (e.g.,<br />
Kenny, 1963; Pitcher, 1965; Solomon, 1976). As has been<br />
mentioned, in contrast to <strong>Stumpf</strong> and Brentano, contemporary<br />
philosophers <strong>of</strong> mind widely agree with Husserl<br />
that sensations <strong>of</strong> tastes, tones, and so forth, including<br />
pain, are not at all intentionally directed at an object (see,<br />
e.g., Rorty, 1979; Searle, 1983). For it does not seem possible<br />
for these states to be intentionally directed at objects<br />
beyond themselves, as are beliefs and evaluations, and<br />
according to <strong>Stumpf</strong>, emotions. To illustrate, if one experiences<br />
bodily pain, one does not feel pain <strong>of</strong> or about<br />
something in the same sense as when one is afraid <strong>of</strong> or<br />
angry about something (see also Searle, 1983). (One must<br />
not confuse the phenomenal localization <strong>of</strong> pain—e.g.,<br />
"my foot hurts"—with intentionality.) If this holds true<br />
<strong>of</strong> feelings <strong>of</strong> sensory pleasure and displeasure in general,<br />
as Husserl (1901/1975) proposed, then the difference between<br />
these feelings and paradigmatic emotions is just as<br />
fundamental as that between nonrepresentational and<br />
representational states <strong>of</strong> mind.<br />
Inasmuch as these considerations reinforce <strong>Stumpf</strong><strong>'s</strong><br />
40<br />
(1907a) conclusion that sense-feelings cannot be assimilated<br />
to evaluations, his suggestion to classify them as a<br />
special class <strong>of</strong> sensations seems certainly worth considering.<br />
It has in fact been revived by contemporary emotion<br />
theorists (e.g., Lazarus & Smith, 1988). Taking into<br />
account the distinction between representational and<br />
nonrepresentational mental states (Husserl, 1901/1975),<br />
we would then arrive at a modified, fourfold classification<br />
<strong>of</strong> mental states into cognitive versus affective intentional<br />
states (<strong>Stumpf</strong>, 1928) and nonintentional, nonaffective<br />
and affective raw feels (<strong>Stumpf</strong>, 1907a).<br />
Significance <strong>of</strong> <strong>Stumpf</strong> s Views on <strong>Emotion</strong>s<br />
for the Contemporary Cognition-<br />
<strong>Emotion</strong> Discussion<br />
Today, more than 90 years after <strong>Stumpf</strong><strong>'s</strong> (1899) article<br />
was published, cognitive theories <strong>of</strong> emotion have become<br />
a central paradigm <strong>of</strong> emotion research, and in their wake<br />
the issue <strong>of</strong> the relation between cognitions and emotions<br />
has become a central topic <strong>of</strong> research and theoretical<br />
discussion. Yet, <strong>Stumpf</strong><strong>'s</strong> contributions to the psychology<br />
<strong>of</strong> emotion have not been outdated by these recent developments.<br />
Rather than merely anticipating the major<br />
tenets <strong>of</strong> contemporary cognitive emotion theories,<br />
<strong>Stumpf</strong> goes beyond these theories in several respects.<br />
Not only is his cognitive-evaluative theory <strong>of</strong> emotions<br />
more lucidly formulated than many a contemporary theory<br />
(with regard, in particular, to the central issues <strong>of</strong> the<br />
nature <strong>of</strong> cognitive appraisals and <strong>of</strong> emotions and the<br />
relation between these mental states), it constitutes a<br />
thoroughly interesting alternative to existing cognitive<br />
theories. At any rate, however, <strong>Stumpf</strong><strong>'s</strong> views on emotion<br />
raise a number <strong>of</strong> issues that, although <strong>of</strong> central significance<br />
to the cognition-emotion problem, have only been<br />
given marginal attention in the recent discussions. To<br />
document this claim, we will examine three such issues<br />
in more detail: the intentionality <strong>of</strong> emotions, the nature<br />
<strong>of</strong> evaluations in cognitive appraisals, and the nature <strong>of</strong><br />
the relation between cognitions and emotions, with special<br />
consideration <strong>of</strong> the precise sense in which cognitions<br />
may be necessary for emotions.<br />
The Intentionality <strong>of</strong> <strong>Emotion</strong>s<br />
<strong>Stumpf</strong> assumed—in line with his teacher Brentano, with<br />
Husserl, and with a number <strong>of</strong> contemporary philosophers<br />
(e.g., Green, 1986; Searle, 1983; Solomon, 1976)—that<br />
emotions are intrinsically intentional or representational<br />
mental states just as are beliefs and desires. If this assumption<br />
is correct, it would have far-reaching consequences<br />
for the question <strong>of</strong> the nature <strong>of</strong> emotional states.<br />
Not only would it be—as discussed earlier in this article—<br />
a very serious, if not fatal, objection against all those noncognitive<br />
theories <strong>of</strong> emotion that identify emotions with<br />
bodily sensations (e.g., James, 1890/1950), facial feedback<br />
(e.g., Tomkins, 1962; Izard, 1977), centrally generated<br />
"feelings" (e.g., Buck, 1985; Zajonc, 1980; Zajonc et al.,<br />
1989; see also Leventhal, 1984), or other nonrepresentational<br />
raw feels, it would also pose a serious challenge<br />
January 1992 • American Psychologist
to several popular cognitive theories <strong>of</strong> emotion. These<br />
include all those that, although taking cognitive appraisals<br />
to be causally or even definitionally necessary for emotions<br />
(see below), regard the emotions themselves as either<br />
nonrepresentational mental states (e.g., as feelings <strong>of</strong><br />
arousal [e.g., Lyons, 1980; see also Schachter, 1964] or<br />
mental qualities [e.g., Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1987;<br />
Pekrun, 1988]), or as action tendencies (e.g., Arnold,<br />
1970; Frijda, 1986). As concerns the latter theories, although<br />
action tendencies certainly do qualify as intentional<br />
mental states, they do not have the "right" objects,<br />
that is, their objects are different from those <strong>of</strong> the emotions<br />
with which they are identified in these theories. For<br />
example, the intentional objects <strong>of</strong> the desire to flee in<br />
the case <strong>of</strong> fear or to attack in the case <strong>of</strong> anger (namely,<br />
the actions <strong>of</strong> fleeing or attacking, respectively) are different<br />
from what are most naturally construed as the intentional<br />
objects <strong>of</strong> the corresponding emotions (e.g., that<br />
one may be harmed in the case <strong>of</strong> fear or that one has<br />
been <strong>of</strong>fended in the case <strong>of</strong> anger). Therefore, although<br />
fear and anger may give rise to such action tendencies, it<br />
is hard to see how the action tendencies could be identified<br />
with the emotions.<br />
Given the significance <strong>of</strong> the issue <strong>of</strong> the intentionality<br />
<strong>of</strong> emotions, it is surprising that it has received only<br />
the most cursory attention by contemporary emotion<br />
psychologists and has played practically no role in the<br />
recent cognition-emotion debate. The reason may be that<br />
most contemporary psychologists, even cognitively oriented<br />
ones, assume at least implicitly that intentionality<br />
is not an intrinsic but only a derived feature <strong>of</strong> emotions,<br />
that is, a feature that accrues to many or most emotion<br />
instances only because they are associated with cognitive<br />
appraisals (e.g., Frijda, 1986; Johnson-Laird & Oatley,<br />
1989). Principled expositions and defenses <strong>of</strong> this nonrepresentational<br />
view <strong>of</strong> emotions are hard to come by,<br />
however, and the standard argument advanced in its support—that<br />
emotions cannot be intrinsically intentional<br />
because there are cases <strong>of</strong> objectless emotions, such as<br />
objectless anxiety and some mood states (e.g., Johnson-<br />
Laird & Oatley, 1989; Storring, 1922)—is by no means<br />
convincing. So-called objectless fears may not completely<br />
lack objects; rather, their objects may only be ill defined,<br />
vague, or difficult to verbalize (e.g., a "feeling <strong>of</strong> dread<br />
that something awful is going to happen" [italics added;<br />
Oatley, 1988, p. 357]). As to moods, it can be plausibly<br />
argued that they constitute cases in which the person appraises,<br />
simultaneously or in rapid sequence, many different<br />
states <strong>of</strong> affairs, making it difficult or impossible<br />
to single out any particular one as the object <strong>of</strong> the mood<br />
state (e.g., Isen, 1984; see also Ortony & Clore, 1989, for<br />
further considerations). Finally, even if some emotion<br />
types truly had objectless instances, it would hardly prove<br />
that all or even the majority <strong>of</strong> emotion types are intrinsically<br />
nonintentional. In short, the issue <strong>of</strong> the intentionality<br />
<strong>of</strong> emotions raised by <strong>Stumpf</strong> is far from settled,<br />
and given its significance to the cognition-emotion problem,<br />
certainly deserves more attention than it has received.<br />
The Nature <strong>of</strong> Evaluations in <strong>Cognitive</strong> Appraisals<br />
Although contemporary cognitive emotion theorists<br />
would agree with <strong>Stumpf</strong> that cognitive appraisals, whatever<br />
they are more precisely, are intentional mental states<br />
that comprise both nonevaluative or "descriptive" components<br />
(e.g., the belief that an event is more or less likely,<br />
that it is caused by certain factors, that it is controllable),<br />
and evaluative components (e.g., the evaluation <strong>of</strong> an<br />
event as good or bad), one must agree with Lazarus and<br />
Smith (1988) that beyond these assumptions there is today<br />
a good deal <strong>of</strong> "confusion about what is meant by appraisal"<br />
(p. 282). One particularly important aspect <strong>of</strong><br />
this confusion or disagreement that becomes salient when<br />
contemporary cognitive formulations are compared with<br />
<strong>Stumpf</strong><strong>'s</strong> theory concerns the nature <strong>of</strong> the evaluative<br />
appraisal components. Are all <strong>of</strong> these components just<br />
special types <strong>of</strong> belief (i.e., beliefs having evaluative contents),<br />
or is there at least one evaluative appraisal component<br />
essential to an emotion that is a mental state entirely<br />
different from belief, as <strong>Stumpf</strong> assumed? Explicit<br />
proponents <strong>of</strong> both views exist: See, for example, Arnold<br />
(1960a, 1960b, 1970), Green (1986), Marks (1982), or<br />
Searle (1983) for the second position and Solomon (1976,<br />
1988) for the first one. (It should be recalled, however,<br />
that for Green, Marks, and Searle—in contrast to<br />
<strong>Stumpf</strong>—this evaluative component <strong>of</strong> emotions is a<br />
nonperformative desire.) But more frequently—particularly<br />
in the psychological literature—the issue remains<br />
unclear. Possibly, many psychologists have simply not<br />
recognized that a significant question might be at stake<br />
here.<br />
In truth, however, this issue is <strong>of</strong> central importance<br />
to the cognition-emotion problem. First, the lack <strong>of</strong> clarity<br />
about the nature <strong>of</strong> cognitive appraisals in emotion<br />
has undoubtedly fostered the recent criticisms <strong>of</strong> cognitive<br />
theories (e.g., Zajonc, 1980, 1984), for this criticism is<br />
implicitly based on the assumption that cognitive appraisals<br />
are exclusively beliefs. In fact, Zajonc (1984) apparently<br />
even assumes that cognitive appraisals comprise<br />
only nonevaluative beliefs and, as a consequence, sees his<br />
original (Zajonc, 1980) contention that evaluations do<br />
not presuppose certain kinds <strong>of</strong> belief (specifically, recognitions<br />
<strong>of</strong> objects as old vs. new) as synonymous with<br />
the claim that emotions do not presuppose appraisals<br />
(Zajonc, 1984). This is clearly a misinterpretation <strong>of</strong> cognitive<br />
emotion theories! In fact, it is precisely the affective<br />
judgments that Zajonc (1980) takes to be in part independent<br />
<strong>of</strong> cognitions—for example, "safe-dangerous,<br />
good-bad, or nice-nasty" (p. 171)—that are mentioned<br />
by cognitive emotion theorists as typical examples <strong>of</strong> (the<br />
evaluative components <strong>of</strong>) cognitive appraisals (e.g., Arnold,<br />
1960a, 1960b; Lazarus et al., 1980; Schachter,<br />
1964). Second, the failure to consider seriously the necessity<br />
<strong>of</strong> distinguishing clearly between evaluations (in<br />
<strong>Stumpf</strong><strong>'s</strong> sense) and (evaluative) beliefs may also have<br />
been a major reason why many cognitively oriented emotion<br />
theorists found it necessary to postulate a nonappraisal<br />
component, such as perceived physiological<br />
January 1992 • American Psychologist 41
arousal (e.g., Mandler, 1984; Schachter, 1964), a felt action<br />
tendency (e.g., Arnold, 1970; Frijda, 1986), or centrally<br />
generated feelings <strong>of</strong> a Wundtian (1896) or Cannonian<br />
(1927) variety (e.g., Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1987; Pekrun,<br />
1988) as at least an additional, indispensable component<br />
<strong>of</strong> emotion, resulting in "hybrid" theories <strong>of</strong><br />
questionable validity.<br />
The reasoning <strong>of</strong> these emotion theorists has apparently<br />
been that there must be something else to emotion<br />
other than just cognitive appraisals, something that<br />
imbues "cold cognition" with "emotional warmth." This<br />
reasoning is in fact plausible if cognitive appraisals are<br />
restricted to beliefs (including evaluative beliefs) because,<br />
as <strong>Stumpf</strong> (1899, 1907b) observed, it seems indeed counterintuitive<br />
to think that emotions are just special types<br />
<strong>of</strong> beliefs (see also Frijda, 1986;Leighton, 1985). However,<br />
if it is assumed with <strong>Stumpf</strong> that, although evaluative<br />
beliefs may be important to emotions, the central evaluative<br />
component <strong>of</strong> emotions is a mental state that is<br />
fundamentally different from beliefs, then the need to<br />
postulate an additional, nonappraisal component <strong>of</strong><br />
emotions evaporates, for then the evaluative component<br />
can provide the necessary emotional warmth. As noted<br />
earlier in this article, according to <strong>Stumpf</strong> it is in fact<br />
quite unclear how, for example, perceptions <strong>of</strong> physiological<br />
arousal could be capable <strong>of</strong> imbuing cognitions<br />
with emotional warmth. On the contrary, <strong>Stumpf</strong> thought<br />
that we must resort to evaluations to explain how emotional<br />
and nonemotional arousal differ.<br />
The Relation Between <strong>Cognitive</strong> Appraisals<br />
and <strong>Emotion</strong>s<br />
The central issue in the recent cognition-emotion debate<br />
has been phrased as the question <strong>of</strong> whether or not cognitions<br />
(cognitive appraisals) are necessary for emotions.<br />
Viewed from the perspective <strong>of</strong> <strong>Stumpf</strong><strong>'s</strong> theory, it becomes<br />
immediately apparent that this question is doubly<br />
ambiguous, first, because <strong>of</strong> the lack <strong>of</strong> consensus concerning<br />
the nature <strong>of</strong> cognitive appraisals, and second,<br />
because the type <strong>of</strong> necessity under discussion could either<br />
be that <strong>of</strong> (purely) causal (or nomological) necessity, or<br />
that <strong>of</strong> definitional necessity.<br />
The recent cognition-emotion discussion has focused<br />
on the question <strong>of</strong> whether cognitions are causally<br />
necessary for emotions. That is, the central question has<br />
been whether the only causal pathway to the elicitation<br />
<strong>of</strong> emotions in the intact organism is through cognitive<br />
appraisals, or whether there are additional natural noncognitive<br />
pathways <strong>of</strong> emotion elicitation (Lazarus, 1982;<br />
Zajonc, 1980; Zajonc et al., 1989). <strong>Stumpf</strong> (1899), however,<br />
did not just claim that emotions are typically caused<br />
by cognitions (beliefs) or even that they are always caused<br />
by cognitions in the intact organism, but that cognitions<br />
belong to the defining features <strong>of</strong> emotions (i.e., emotions<br />
are functionally defined with regard to their cognitive<br />
causes). As a consequence, he held that, even if evaluations<br />
could be noncognitively caused, such evaluations would<br />
not count as proper emotions. As was mentioned earlier,<br />
a similar functional-definition view <strong>of</strong> emotions is held<br />
42<br />
by several contemporary cognitive emotion theorists (e.g.,<br />
Arnold, 1970; Davidson, 1976; Gordon, 1974; Lyons,<br />
1980; Searle, 1983; Wilson, 1972). Other contemporary<br />
cognitivists contend even that appraisals are component<br />
parts <strong>of</strong> (e.g., Lazarus et al., 1980; Oatley & Johnson-<br />
Laird, 1987; Schachter, 1964) or are identical with (e.g.,<br />
Solomon, 1976) emotions. If these latter views are correct,<br />
cognitions are not just definitionally necessary for emotions;<br />
one cannot even meaningfully say that cognitions<br />
cause emotions at all.<br />
It is clear that if a convincing case for the definitional<br />
necessity <strong>of</strong> cognitions for emotions could be made, then<br />
a very strong case would exist for the indispensability <strong>of</strong><br />
cognitions for emotions. Probably the most important<br />
consideration regarding this issue concerns the question<br />
<strong>of</strong> how the many (prima facie) emotional states <strong>of</strong> humans<br />
are distinguished from one another. For if different emotion<br />
types cannot be reliably distinguished from one another<br />
other than by reference to appraisals—if, for example,<br />
envy simply cannot be discriminated reliably from<br />
other emotions unless one takes into account the belief<br />
that a desired good that one lacks belongs to another person<br />
(<strong>Stumpf</strong>, 1899)—then cognitions are necessary for<br />
the definition <strong>of</strong> different emotion types. In evaluating<br />
this issue, it should be recalled that the attempt to provide<br />
a plausible solution to the discrimination <strong>of</strong> emotion<br />
problem was one <strong>of</strong> the major reasons for the turn toward<br />
cognitive theories in the 1960s (e.g., Arnold, 1960a,<br />
1960b; Hunt, Cole, & Reis, 1958; Schachter, 1964). To<br />
these theorists, cognitive appraisals seemed to be the only<br />
features <strong>of</strong> emotion that are differentiated enough to account<br />
for the multitude <strong>of</strong> emotional states. Today, firm<br />
evidence for the existence <strong>of</strong> a multitude <strong>of</strong> nonappraisal<br />
mental states that correspond in a one-to-one fashion with<br />
the multitude <strong>of</strong> emotions is scarcely more abundant than<br />
it was 25 years ago (see also, Zajonc et al., 1989), whereas<br />
there is now good evidence for the appraisal discrimination<br />
<strong>of</strong> emotions (e.g., Frijda, 1987; Frijda et al., 1989;<br />
Reisenzein & H<strong>of</strong>mann, 1990; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985,<br />
1987; Weiner, 1986).<br />
Finally, it must be reemphasized that the assumption<br />
that cognitions are definitionally necessary for emotions<br />
does not necessarily imply the denial <strong>of</strong> the existence <strong>of</strong><br />
affective phenomena—in a wide sense <strong>of</strong> this term—for<br />
which cognitions are not necessary even in the purely<br />
causal sense. As we have seen in the previous section, in<br />
contrast to Lazarus (1982; but see Lazarus & Smith, 1988,<br />
for a different opinion), <strong>Stumpf</strong> (1899) did not feel obliged<br />
by his advocacy <strong>of</strong> a cognitive theory <strong>of</strong> emotions to<br />
maintain that all affective states necessarily presuppose<br />
cognitions. He would have readily agreed with Zajonc<br />
(1980) that there are at least some simple affective reactions<br />
(e.g., sensory pleasure and displeasure feelings) that<br />
are directly caused by sensations, that is, are unmediated<br />
by cognitive appraisals (or, more precisely, beliefs). However,<br />
in contrast to Zajonc (1984), who argued that paradigmatic<br />
emotions therefore most likely do not presuppose<br />
cognitive appraisals as well (but see Zajonc et al.,<br />
1989, for a more moderate opinion), <strong>Stumpf</strong> (1899) con-<br />
January 1992 • American Psychologist
eluded that such cognitively unmediated pleasure-displeasure<br />
feelings are not emotions proper. This move is<br />
emphatically not an immunization strategy that seeks to<br />
settle the cognition-emotion issue by definitional fiat<br />
(Zajonc, 1984). Rather, it is an application <strong>of</strong> the scientific<br />
strategy to let a theory (in this case, a theory <strong>of</strong> the structure<br />
<strong>of</strong> emotions) that seems to work well with paradigmatic<br />
cases, autodetermine its own range <strong>of</strong> application<br />
in problematic cases (Stegmiiller, 1986). This strategy is<br />
both legitimate and reasonable. For what kind <strong>of</strong> mental<br />
state an emotion is, is ultimately determined by a theory<br />
that successfully accounts for paradigmatic emotional<br />
states. If it turns out that other prima facie affective phenomena<br />
do not conform to this theory, then this is the<br />
best possible reason one can have for believing that these<br />
latter phenomena and the paradigm cases constitute different<br />
natural kinds.<br />
Conclusion<br />
Rather than being <strong>of</strong> recent origin, the cognition-emotion<br />
problem has been with psychology since its very beginnings<br />
as an institutionalized science, and the central issues<br />
seem to have remained much the same. Had <strong>Stumpf</strong> had<br />
the opportunity to comment on the recent debate, he<br />
would have agreed with the criticisms <strong>of</strong> contemporary<br />
cognitive emotion theories to the extent that these theories<br />
constitute attempts to either reduce emotions to beliefs<br />
(e.g., Solomon, 1976) or to subsume all affective phenomena<br />
under emotions (e.g., Lazarus, 1982). But he<br />
would certainly have opposed the return to noncognitive,<br />
"feeling" theories <strong>of</strong> emotion (e.g., Buck, 1985; Izard,<br />
1984; Zajonc, 1984; Zajonc et al., 1989), as well as to<br />
"hybrid" cognition-feeling theories such as those proposed<br />
by Lyons (1980), Mandler (1984), Oatley and<br />
Johnson-Laird (1987), or Schachter (1964). To some degree,<br />
this return to feeling theories may simply have happened<br />
because more plausible noncognitive theories <strong>of</strong><br />
emotions were not in sight. But it may also have been<br />
fostered by the fact that there seems to be, at least since<br />
James and Wundt, but probably since the introduction<br />
<strong>of</strong> the threefold division <strong>of</strong> mental states into cognitive,<br />
affective, and motivational ones around 1750 (see, e.g.,<br />
Brentano, 1874/1971; Hilgard, 1980; Scheerer, 1992), a<br />
deeply entrenched a priori belief among many psychologists<br />
that emotions are intrinsically nonrepresentational<br />
states similar to sensations. These psychologists may wish<br />
to seriously reconsider <strong>Stumpf</strong><strong>'s</strong> suggestions that (a) the<br />
mind does not just consist <strong>of</strong> intellectual representations<br />
(beliefs) and action tendencies, on the one hand, and raw<br />
feels, on the other hand, but that there are further types<br />
<strong>of</strong> intentional states such as desires and wishes <strong>of</strong> various<br />
kinds, as well as approvals and disapprovals (see also Baier,<br />
1986; Kuhl, 1983), and (b) that not all affective phenomena<br />
may turn out to be emotions on closer examination.<br />
Although read and quoted by his contemporaries,<br />
<strong>Stumpf</strong><strong>'s</strong> writings on emotion did not exert much influence<br />
on the psychological literature later in this century.<br />
A probable major reason was that neither <strong>Stumpf</strong> nor his<br />
students actively propagated his ideas and developed them<br />
further. As for <strong>Stumpf</strong> himself, emotion was not his central<br />
area <strong>of</strong> interest and he did not regard his pertinent<br />
work as particularly novel or surprising. Also, he took on<br />
administrative duties (e.g., he became rector <strong>of</strong> his university)<br />
that demanded much <strong>of</strong> his time. As for his students,<br />
they were engaged in articulating and propagating<br />
their own school <strong>of</strong> Gestalt psychology, which gave little<br />
attention to emotion. We hope that this article will help<br />
to give <strong>Stumpf</strong> the place in the history <strong>of</strong> emotion research<br />
that, in our view, he deserves.<br />
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