German Clandestine Activities in South America in World War II

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satisfactory location near the AVIANCA Air Field and the RAS receiver was installed in
the house occupied by Cullen and Fowlkes. Roldan had again promised to provide five
operators for training, but had actually assigned only one man, the operator trained by
Atkins and Warren. Cullen and Fowlkes informed the Communications Security Section
of CNO on 27 October that the naval attache had been ordered by the ambassador to
actively engage in tracking down clandestine stations and that that was what they had
been doing. The two chiefs noted that ifresults from that part of their assignment were
desired, then additional qualified men should be assigned, since the operators Captain
Roldan would provide would not be qualified for such a task. The CNO noted, once again,
on 23 December that the naval radiomen were sent to Colombia as a political gesture for
duty as instructors, and that the DF in Colombia was intended to operate independently
under the control of the local government and not as a part of any DF net under U.S.
control. 128
After his inspection trip to Colombia in October 1940, McElroy had gone on to
Ecuador. At that time he had predicted to Lieutenent Commander Greenleaf that the
Ecuadoran government wanted to pay for nothing in connection with the DF operation
and it would be necessary to provide U.S. funds for expenses connected with the truck.
McElroy had also advised that cash should be advanced to Atkins and Warren in
Colombia to minimize overt Navy involvement, but Bureau of Ships stated that such
expenses were chargeable to radio station maintenance funds in 15th Naval District.
Such funds could not be advanced on the basis of an estimate, but only issued after a
determination had been made ofthe amount required for the remainder ofthe fiscal year.
Such a request had to originate with the Commandant, 15th Naval District, and be
forwarded to BureauofNavigation for CNO approval. l29
McElroy thought that handling the project through the Supply Department of the
Bureau ofNavigation had already made it "known to the whole world." Furthermore, the
poor mail service made the forwarding of the required vouchers quite difficult.
Apparently the problem was never resolved. ISO
In August 1941, DNC had requested that orders be issued transferring Chief
Radiomen Harry I. Maltz and Raymond H. Bradford to Ecuador. During the interval
between Smith's departure and the arrival of the new team, there had been an extensive
shakeup in the Ecuadoran military high command, with the consequence that none ofthe
new incumbents knew about the DF operation. Since the new command was pro­
American, Greenacre did not consider this to be any great problem. He was worried,
however, about the wording of the team's transfer orders, which said that Maltz and
Bradford were to "report to the Chief of the Naval Mission for duty under the naval
attache." Greenacre noted that this was akin to "reporting to the USS Missouri for duty
on the USS Idaho" and requested clarification.131
For some not readily understandable reason, there was strong opposition in
Washington to any change in the wording of the orders or clarification thereof. A
memorandum from Bradford to the Communications Security Branch of CNO on 31
October recommended that the unit be assigned to the mission and that the Chief of the
Mission be authorized to issue travel orders. On the copy ofthis memorandum received by
OP-20-G there is an underlined "NO!" written in next to this recommendation. Bradford's
request had been occasioned by the fact that the team, which had been in Ecuador for
nearly a month, had not yet been able to commence operations, as its status had not been
cleared by CNO. 132
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