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Gender and Constitution Building - Women for Women International

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grams frequently resulted in gender discrimination. For<br />

example, female combatants initially did not receive<br />

equal treatment in the allocation of crucial resources<br />

such as l<strong>and</strong>. The reasons were many, ranging from<br />

machismo at the grassroots level to lack of support from<br />

the male-dominated leadership of the guerrilla movement.<br />

Nidia Díaz, the FMLN official originally in charge<br />

of the l<strong>and</strong> program, affirmed that although the discrimination<br />

of female combatants was not officially<br />

sanctioned or designed, the socio-cultural context often<br />

made it a reality. 13 Lorena Peña concurred: “I believe<br />

that the principal problem that we have experienced<br />

is that the reintegration of the female combatant<br />

into civilian life has taken place under the classical<br />

sexist concepts that have predominated in all political<br />

<strong>for</strong>ces of the country, including the FMLN.” 14 Peña<br />

claimed that an estimated 70 to 80 percent of female<br />

combatants initially did not receive the benefits allocated<br />

to them.<br />

Significantly, in-depth studies of the reintegration<br />

programs demonstrated that these early instances of<br />

discrimination were subsequently rectified. 15 The reason<br />

<strong>for</strong> this reversal could be found in the mobilization<br />

of the women’s movement. Together with female<br />

FMLN activists, it succeeded in exerting sufficient pressure<br />

on the government <strong>and</strong> the FMLN to reverse discriminatory<br />

practices.<br />

Guatemala<br />

In Guatemala, the challenge of reintegrating the<br />

URNG combatants into civilian life was enormous. Of<br />

particular concern were the poverty <strong>and</strong> ethnic backgrounds<br />

of the ex-combatants. The majority of the<br />

URNG’s personnel came from Guatemala’s 21 groups<br />

of indigenous peoples <strong>and</strong> belonged to the most<br />

marginalized sectors of society. Not surprisingly, evaluations<br />

of the peace accords’ impact sounded a pessimistic<br />

note. Leaders of the women’s movement argued<br />

that the dem<strong>and</strong>s of women in respect to the implementation<br />

of the accords lacked tangible results <strong>and</strong><br />

that commitments had not been converted into actions.<br />

The government was criticized <strong>for</strong> “failing to have an<br />

idea of how to attend to women’s historic problems”<br />

<strong>and</strong> <strong>for</strong> lacking a strategy of action designed to ensure<br />

that the provisions of the accords would not remain<br />

empty words. 16 With a government unwilling to follow<br />

through on commitments made in the accords, <strong>and</strong> a<br />

demobilized guerrilla movement lacking the political<br />

clout necessary to hold the government accountable,<br />

women were left out in the cold.<br />

Analysis<br />

The current emphasis on the inclusion of gender<br />

equality provisions in peace accords <strong>and</strong> subsequent<br />

constitutions is only a necessary first step. While it is<br />

important to fight <strong>for</strong> <strong>for</strong>mal gender equality, it is the<br />

implementation of these <strong>for</strong>mal agreements that really<br />

matters. Peace accords <strong>and</strong> constitutions that institutionalize<br />

gender equality can easily remain utopian visions<br />

unless a concerted ef<strong>for</strong>t by societal <strong>for</strong>ces trans<strong>for</strong>ms<br />

these visions into reality.<br />

El Salvador<br />

In El Salvador, the women’s movement evolved into<br />

an effective advocate <strong>for</strong> gender equality <strong>and</strong> thus was<br />

able to correct the imbalance created by peace accords<br />

that failed to address women’s issues. The movement’s<br />

ef<strong>for</strong>ts were greatly helped by the strong political party<br />

that emerged out of the <strong>for</strong>mer guerrilla movement. The<br />

FMLN’s political strength permitted the new party to<br />

pressure the government to adhere to the provisions of<br />

the peace accords, which established benefits <strong>for</strong> the excombatants.<br />

Female FMLN militants were successful in<br />

gaining substantial representation in the FMLN’s leadership<br />

structures <strong>and</strong> in the party’s parliamentary representation.<br />

While <strong>for</strong>mal gender equality was achieved in<br />

most instances during the implementation of the benefits<br />

programs, the prevailing cultural norms impeded<br />

progress toward substantive equality. Nevertheless, the<br />

Salvadoran experience teaches us that it is essential that<br />

ex-combatants <strong>for</strong>m strong political parties to ensure<br />

the implementation of any accord.<br />

Guatemala<br />

The Guatemalan peace accords can best be compared<br />

to the constitutions of many countries that guarantee<br />

extensive rights to the citizens that in the end are<br />

rarely en<strong>for</strong>ced. The accords establish normative goals<br />

<strong>for</strong> the future of Guatemalan citizens but not an en<strong>for</strong>ceable<br />

code of law. Some commentators have noted<br />

that “the Guatemalan agreement contains more wide<br />

ranging language on social <strong>and</strong> economic areas, by far,<br />

than the Salvadoran accord, but a great many of the<br />

provisions are stated in sufficiently general terms as to<br />

make them virtually unen<strong>for</strong>ceable,” a fact described as<br />

the Achilles’ heel of the accords. 17 There is strong consensus<br />

that the URNG’s weakness at the bargaining table<br />

made it impossible <strong>for</strong> the guerrilla leadership to negotiate<br />

more specific, en<strong>for</strong>ceable agreements–a reality that<br />

impedes the full realization of the provisions in the accords.<br />

The URNG continued to exhibit political weakness<br />

during the implementation phase, at a time when a<br />

CRITICAL HALF 17

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