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One state or two? • Iran and North Korea • Interview with Ya’alon
The Jerusalem
ReportR
FEBRUARY 5, 2018
COVERING ISRAEL, THE MIDDLE EAST & THE JEWISH WORLD
ISRAEL’S SECURITY
ENVIRONMENT
The INSS’s top minds assess the Jewish state’s
situation ahead of its 70th anniversary
7415
המחיר בישראל:‏ ₪21.00 באילת:‏ ₪17.90
NY & North NJ $4.00 Elsewhere in US $5.50

ISRAEL'S
Heichal Hatarbut (Zucker Hall), th Tel Aviv
YEAR
MONDAY, JANUARY 29, 2018
Lt. Gen. Gadi Eisenkot will speak at the conference’s opening event
- By invitation only -
09:15 Opening Remarks
TUESDAY, JANUARY 30, 2018
09:20 New Exhibit: "The Path to Negotiations"
A “Jewish and Democratic State” and Issues of National Security
Adv. Col. (res.) Pnina Sharvit Baruch, Dr. Zipi Israeli,
Maj. Gen. (ret.) Hagi Topolansky, Prof. Asher Cohen,
09:30
Prof. Sammy Smooha, Prof. Daniel Friedmann, Ms. Polly
Bronstein, Dr. Carmit Padan, Ms. Kim Lavi, Mr. Khader Sawaed,
Adv. Col. (res.) Gilead Sher
11:00 Coffee Break
Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs and Security
11:20
Policy, NATO, Mr. Alejandro Alvargonzález
UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process,
11:40
H.E. Nikolay Mladenov
11:55 Blame Game
INSS National Security and Public Opinion Polls: Latest Findings
12:55
Dr. Zipi Israeli
13:10 Lunch
Friend or Foe? Regional Perspectives on Israel
14:10 The Hon. Dr. Philip H. Gordon, Amb. Zalmay Khalilzad,
Mr. Khaldoon Bakhail, Prof. Gilles Kepel, Dr. Abdullah Swalha
What Lies Ahead for the Middle East? Strategic Implications
for Israel
Brig. Gen. (res.) Udi Dekel, Dr. Carmit Valensi,
15:10
Ms. Suzanne Maloney, Mr. Chagai Tzuriel, Dr. Michal Yaari,
The Hon. Michèle Flournoy, Amb. Zvi Magen, Ms. Orit Perlov,
Brig. Gen. (ret.) Shlomo Brom, Prof. François Heisbourg
16:40 Coffee Break
The IDF: Preparing for the Challenges of the Future
Dr. Liran Antebi, Gen. (ret.) David H. Petraeus,
17:10 Brig. Gen. (res.) Udi Dekel, Col. (ret.) Dror Ben David,
MK Omer Barlev, Brig. Gen. Eran Shani, Brig. Gen. (ret.) Meir Elran,
Maj. Gen. (res.) Nimrod Sheffer, Mr. Or Heller, Dr. Zipi Israeli
18:40 Break
19:00 Challenges of the Future Leadership
INSS Director, Maj. Gen. (ret.) Amos Yadlin
Former Minister of Defense, Lt. Gen. (ret.) Moshe (Bogie) Ya’alon
Head of the Zionist Union, Mr. Avi Gabbay
Former Minister of Education, Mr. Gideon Sa’ar
19:45 Closed reception - by invitation only
08:30
09:30
09:50
WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 31, 2018
Violence in the Arab Sector: Trends and Responses
Brig. Gen. (ret.) Meir Elran, Justice Salim Joubran,
Brig. Gen. Jamal Hakrush, Adv. Morsi Abu Moch, Ms. Shuruk Ismail
Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs,
Dept. of State, Amb. David Satterfield
Minister of Public Security, Minister of Information, and Minister
of Strategic Affairs, MK Gilad Erdan
10:10 Head of Yesh Atid, MK Yair Lapid
10:30
Minister of Construction and Housing, Maj. Gen. (ret.) Yoav
Galant
10:50 Coffee Break
11:10 Minister of Education, MK Naftali Bennett, Habayit Hayehudi
11:30 Head of Meretz, Ms. Zehava Galon
11:50 Break
12:00
13:00
The Regional Powers: Between Partnership and Rivalry
Ms. Sima Shine, Ms. Clarisse Pasztory, Prof. Sema Kalaycioglu,
Maj. Gen. (res.) Amos Gilad, Sir John Jenkins, Prof. Meir Litvak
Minister of Defense Mr. Avigdor Liberman speaking with
Maj. Gen. (ret.) Amos Yadlin
13:30 Lunch
14:30
American Jewry and Israel’s National Security
Dr. Michal Hatuel-Radoshitzky, Minister Tzachi Hanegbi,
Mr. Jonathan Greenblatt, Amb. Daniel Shapiro, Ms. Na'ama Ore
15:30 Mr. Sigmar Gabriel, German Foreign Minister
16:00
Conversation among Commanders
Brig. Gen. (res.) Udi Dekel, Maj. Gen. (ret.) Giora Eiland,
Maj. Gen. (ret.) Moshe Kaplinsky, Maj. Gen. (ret.) Yair Naveh,
Maj. Gen. (ret.) Uzi Dayan
17:00 Coffee Break
17:20
17:40
Amb. Nathan Sales, State Department Coordinator for
Counterterrorism
Minister of Transportation and Minister of Intelligence,
MK Yisrael Katz, Likud
18:00 Head of Hatnuah, MK Tzipi Livni, Zionist Union
18:20
19:20
Trump – Entering the Second Year
Mr. David Ignatius, Maj. Gen. (ret.) Amos Yadlin,
The Hon. Michèle Flournoy, Prof. François Heisbourg, Dr. Avner Golov
The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Political Options
Adv. Col. (res.) Gilead Sher, MK Moti Yogev, MK Stav Shaffir,
MK Yoav Kish, MK Tamar Zandberg
20:20 Closing Remarks

The Jerusalem
SARAH LEVI
REUTERS
ReportR
6 Israel’s strategic environment: Elements, challenges and
policy recommendations by Amos Yadlin
16 Comparing the nuclear challenges posed by North Korea
and Iran by Emily B. Landau
TABLE OF CONTENT
2 Letter from the editor
3 14 Days
4 Opening shot
12 Israel and the Palestinians
by Udi Dekel
18 Interview with Moshe Ya'alon
by Noa Amouyal
20 Israel and American Jewry’s two-way street
by Noa Amouyal
24 Shaping the future
by David Brummer
26 INSS women who make Israel more secure
by Maayan Hoffman
28 The National Security Index
by Zipi Israeli
31 Yoram Peri's new book
by Matan Danskeri
32 East side story
by Amotz Asa-El
35 Looking back at our first year
by Benita Levin
36 Inside a Gaza tunnel
by Yossi Melman
38 Auschwitz hero
by Martin Sieff
40 Ultra-Orthodox: 50 shades of black
by Shlomo Maital
44 Learning to talk the talk
by Greer Fay Cashman
46 A Jewish approach to war and peace
by Rabbi Ron Kronish
48 From the Sketchbook
Avi Katz
Cover photo by Hen Galilii of Amos Yadlin presenting the INSS
2017-2018 Strategic Survey for Israel to President Reuven Rivlin
on January 1
ISRAEL’S NATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES
IN THE CHANGING MIDDLE EAST
3 WEEKS OF INTENSE INTELLECTUAL ADVENTURE
REGISTRATION IS OPEN FOR SUMMER 2018
For more information and to apply: www.international.tau.ac.il/inss • www.inss.org.il
FEBRUARY 5, 2018 SHVAT 20, 5778 VOLUME XXVIII NO. 22

Published By:
THE JERUSALEM REPORT
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Elliot Jager (Jewish World), Ralph Amelan (Books)
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CORRESPONDENTS: Atlanta: Jan Jaben-Eilon
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Washington: Martin Sieff Moscow: Julie Masis
CONTRIBUTORS: Paul Alster, Bernard Dichek,
Mark Weiss, Patricia Golan, Robert Horenstein,
Shula Kopf, Yossi Melman, Bruce Maddy-Weitzman,
Shlomo Maital, Benita Levin, Matt Nesvisky,
Judith Sudilovsky, Amiel Ungar, Haim Watzman
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FROM THE EDITOR
Partnering with the INSS
AHEAD OF the Institute for National Security
Studies’ 11th Annual International Conference
on January 30-31, I visited the prestigious Israeli
think tank’s impressive premises in Tel Aviv
to discuss the content of this special edition of
The Jerusalem Report.
As I sat in the conference room named in
memory of journalist, Ze’ev Schiff, with INSS
managing director, Udi Dekel, and his team, it
struck me that this was a calm academic paradise
in an otherwise noisy neighborhood – just
as Israel is an island of stability in an extremely
volatile region.
In the cover story of this issue, Amos Yadlin,
INSS’s executive director and a former head of
the IDF Military Intelligence Directorate, writes
that seven years after the current upheaval in the
Middle East began, two years after the nuclear
deal between the world powers and Iran and a
year after the Trump administration took office,
the main contours of the region’s emerging reality
are becoming clear. “These factors shape
Israel’s current strategic environment and its
different policy alternatives,” Yadlin says. “As
Israel approaches the 70th anniversary of its
independence, it can be confident in its strong
national security balance, facing new challenges
and significant opportunities.”
Tel Aviv University’s INSS, which incorporates
the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies,
was founded in 2006 by its chairman, Frank
Lowy, “to conduct basic research that meets the
highest academic standards on matters related
to Israel’s national security as well as Middle
East regional and international security affairs.”
It also aims “to contribute to the public debate
and government deliberation of issues that are
– or should be – at the top of Israel’s national
security agenda.”
In the preface to the new INSS annual Strategic
Survey, editors Shlomo Brom and Anat
Kurz say “the Middle East is witnessing the
convergence of several important developments
that will potentially have a broad impact
on Israeli national security.” The Syrian civil
war may be subsiding, they say, but the process
dominated by Russia, Iran and Turkey poses
the danger that Israel’s interests will not be taken
into account in the deliberations toward an
agreement. While Islamic State may have been
SARAH LEVI
Presenting this year’s Strategic Survey for
Israel are Orly Hayardeny, deputy director
of INSS, Anat Kurz, director of Research,
Amos Yadlin, director of INSS, Frank
Lowy, chairman of the Lowy Institute for
International Policy (Australia), and Pnina
Sharvit Baruch, head of the Program on
Law and National Security
obliterated in Syria and Iraq, the underlying
idea driving the group remains a security challenge
in the region and beyond.
The balance of power and dynamics between
the major powers are changing, they say, but
the regional struggle between Iran and Saudi
Arabia (and their allies) has heated up significantly.
Finally, they note, after the first year of
the Trump administration, “the impact of the
transition between two markedly different US
administrations, particularly in their respective
approaches to the Middle East and Israel’s relations
with its principal ally, the United States,
has emerged clearly.”
We hope you enjoy this issue, which includes
a must-read cover story by Yadlin on Israel’s
strategic environment, an article by Dekel on
the Israeli-Palestinian track, another by Emily
Landau comparing the nuclear challenges
of Iran and North Korea, and an exclusive interview
with former defense minister Moshe
Ya’alon. There are also interesting features on
young researchers and women researchers, and
a fascinating panel discussion on an INSS research
program (together with the Ruderman
Family Foundation) titled “The American Jewish
Community and Israel’s National Security.”
I’d like to thank Noa Amouyal, Reut Levy
and Ruth Pines for their assistance in putting
together this special edition of The Report, produced
in conjunction with the INSS.
Steve Linde
Send letters by email to: jerusalemreport@gmail.com. Please include your full postal address. The editor reserves
the right to edit letters as appropriate. Priority will be given to brief letters that relate to articles in the magazine.
2
THE JERUSALEM REPORT FEBRUARY 5, 2018

14
Compiled by
Steve Linde
MARC ISRAEL SELLEM
ABBAS ANGER Palestinian Authority
President Mahmoud Abbas slammed
the Trump administration in a speech
to the Palestinian Central Council in
Ramallah on January 14, and rejected
the idea of Abu Dis, a town adjacent to
Jerusalem, becoming the future capital
of a Palestinian state. He also dismissed
the role of the US as an honest broker,
and cursed President Trump, saying
several times in Arabic, “May your house
be destroyed.”
UNRWA CUT The US announced on
January 16 that it is cutting more than
half of its funding to the United Nations
Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) for
Palestinian refugees. Two weeks after
US President Donald Trump threatened
to cut aid to the Palestinians unless
they returned to peace negotiations
with Israel, the State Department said
it was holding $65 million of a $125m.
aid package, adding that the funds are
“frozen for future consideration.”
PENCE VISIT US Vice President Mike
Pence arrived in Israel on January 22
for a two-day visit as part of a regional
BELOVED RABBI Hundreds attended the funeral at Havat Gilad
on January 10 of Rabbi Raziel Shevach, who was murdered the
previous night in a drive-by terrorist shooting nearby. Shevach,
32, was a much-loved religious educator who volunteered with
Magen David Adom, and is survived by his wife, Yael, and six
young children. The IDF said security forces killed one terrorist
and captured two others during an operation in Jenin a week later,
in which an Israeli soldier was seriously wounded.
tour that included Egypt and Jordan.
“The United States of America is deeply
committed to restarting the peace
process in the Middle East,” Pence
said, adding that Washington would
back a two-state solution if Israel and
the Palestinians agreed to it. He also
stressed that the US would not let the
dictatorship in Iran, “the leading state
sponsor of terrorism” dominate the
Middle East.
MINIMARKET LAW The Knesset passed
the Haredi-backed “Minimarket Law” in a
58-57 vote on January 9. Under the law,
any municipality wanting to allow new
stores to open on Shabbat must receive
permission from the interior minister. The
current minister, Shas leader Arye Deri,
is unlikely to give permission, but future
ministers might. In the coalition, five
Members of Knesset from Yisrael Beytenu
voted against the bill, while MKs Sharren
Haskel (Likud) and Tali Ploskov (Kulanu)
absented themselves.
2019 BUDGET The cabinet unanimously
approved the 2019 state budget, totaling
397.3 billion shekels, on January 12.
THE JERUSALEM REPORT FEBRUARY 5, 2018
The defense budget totals a record 63 b.
shekels, surpassing the education budget
of 60 b. shekels. The budget, which was
presented almost a year in advance to
stabilize the coalition, now goes before
the Knesset for approval.
INDIA TRIP Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu and his Indian host, Narendra
Modi, hailed “the dawn of a new era”
in bilateral ties after signing key deals
in defense, agriculture and aviation in
New Delhi on January 8. The premier
persuaded India to go ahead with a
multimillion dollar deal to buy anti-tank
missiles from Israel’s Rafael Advanced
Defense Systems. During the six-day
visit, Netanyahu was accompanied by his
wife, Sara, and a 130-member business
delegation.
TOP JURIST Former Supreme Court
justice Eliyahu Winograd died
January 12 at the age of 91. After
serving for 24 years as a judge, seven
years as president of the Tel Aviv
District Court and seven years as an
acting justice in the Supreme Court
(1989-96), he headed what was
called the Winograd Committee that
investigated the shortcomings of the
government and the military in the
2006 Second Lebanon War. Born in
Tel Aviv, Winograd was buried at the
Ramat Hasharon Cemetery.
3
REUTERS

Opening shot
Moshe Holtzberg ,11, who survived the 2008 Mumbai terror attack but whose
parents were killed, presents a damaged Torah remnant to Prime Minister
Benjamin Netanyahu at Chabad House in Mumbai, India, on January 18, 2018
DANISH SIDDIQUI / REUTERS

Cover Story
ISRAEL’S STRATEGIC
ENVIRONMENT:
Elements, challenges and
policy recommendations
By Amos Yadlin
SEVEN YEARS after the onset of the upheaval
in the Middle East and two years of
the nuclear deal between the world powers
and Iran, the main contours of the region’s
emerging reality – the actors, rivalries,
partnerships, front lines, power relations,
and behavior of the major powers – are becoming
clear. Now, after one full year, the
nature of the Trump administration and its
impact are also coming into sharper view.
These factors shape Israel’s current strategic
environment and its different policy
alternatives. As Israel approaches the 70th
anniversary of its independence, it can be
confident in its strong national security balance,
facing new challenges and significant
opportunities.
Elements of Israel’s strategic
environment: A strong and stable Israel
with quiet borders.
Israel maintains its military superiority
in the region and its ability to deter
state, hybrid and non-state adversaries.
Israel’s proven willingness and capability
to take action when necessary to exact
a maximum price, even at the risk of
escalation, explains the relative calm
along Israel’s borders in spite of resolute
activity against shipment of weapons to
Hezbollah and against the tunnels in the
south. Israel’s non-military balance is also
positive: in contrast to the destruction and
decay in the surrounding Middle East,
the Israeli economy is strong and stable.
Despite the negative impact of Israeli
policy towards the Palestinians, Israel has
managed to preserve its foreign relations,
particularly with the major powers.
The US under the Trump
administration
The Trump administration is friendly to
Israel, and the two States see eye-to-eye the
Middle East strategic picture. However, the
United States’ regional influence is waning.
On the positive side are: US strengthening
its relations with major allies in the region;
the US view of Iran as a major rival and
threat to regional stability that must be
contained; US response to use of chemical
weapons in Syria; support of Israel in the
UN; and recently, the recognition of Jerusalem
as Israel’s capital.
On the other hand, it is still unclear
where the administration stands, between
isolationism and a focus on American
domestic problems, and its rhetoric on
the need to strengthen US military power
and use of massive force against foreign
enemies. Its ability to engage systematically
in management of a variety of complex
issues is also limited. In the Middle East,
after victory over the Islamic State in
Syria and Iraq Washington appears to be
tempted to proclaim “victory” and detach
itself from the region. The polarization in
US politics and Israeli closeness to Trump
makes it difficult to position Israel as a
bipartisan issue resulting in a growing rift
between Israel and American Jewry on top
of Israel’s controversial policies on issues
of religion and civil society.
Russia emerging as a major victor in the
Middle East
In spite of economic weakness and
isolation because of Ukraine, Russia
managed to solidify its status in the Middle
East through its military intervention
in Syria. Russia used a limited but high
intensity power, and changed the direction
of the civil war. It proved the efficacy of
military solutions employed correctly and
with determination. Russia’s protégé, the
Assad regime, recovered most Syrian
territory, and Russia achieved preeminence
as the political actor shaping and stabilizing
Syria, marginalizing the United States. It
established a long term military, naval, and
6
THE JERUSALEM REPORT FEBRUARY 5, 2018

WIKIMEDIA COMMONS
A map of the Middle East
air strategic presence in Syria. It avoided
entrapment in a “quagmire,” (President
Obama’s warning) and maintained good
relations with all the actors in the Middle
East: Iran and Saudi Arabia; Israel and the
Palestinians; Turkey and the Kurds; and
Egypt and Qatar.
Israel’s relationship with Russia is complicated:
in the short term and tactical level,
through strategic dialogue and operational
de-confliction channels, Israel maintains
a certain freedom of operation in Syria
without friction with Russian forces. On
a strategic level, a fundamental conflict of
interest exists between Israel and Russia,
which has allowed Iran and its proxies to
establish themselves in Syria, undermining
American influence. Russia also continues
to support Palestinian positions voting for
anti-Israel resolutions in UN forums.
China: An economic powerhouse with a
low strategic profile
China has positioned itself in the global
economic system as a leading responsible
actor and in international institutions. China’s
primary interest lies in Asia and the
Pacific, where there is growing competition
between the superpowers. In the Middle
East, China has left the political-security
domain − and its military and international
political costs − to Russia and the United
States. In the meantime, it continues to focus
primarily on the economic realm and engage
in symbolic diplomacy, while having a minor
military presence in areas such as peacekeeping
and anti-pirating. Chinese strive to
have parallel relations with all relevant rivaling
parties in the region, including Saudi
Arabia and Iran. It has relations with Israel,
perceived an important source of innovation
and technology. Politically China’s supports
the Arab-Muslim block, as do its voting patterns
in international forums. There are early
signs of a change in policy. China’s interests
in the region in terms of investments, projects,
and Chinese workers are intensifying,
as well as m its energy needs and its interest
in the security of shipping routes. The strategic
One Belt, One Road initiative (“The
New Silk Road”) adds potential for Chinese
involvement in the economies and infrastructure
of the region. This may lead to a
moderate increase in the profile of its political
activity in the region.
Iran and the nuclear program
Although the Trump administration opposes
the nuclear agreement with Iran referring
to it as “the worst agreement ever seen,” the
JCPOA has been honored over the past year.
Although Trump decertified it recently, the
President did not yet decide on withdrawal
from the agreement. Parties within the
United States and US allies assuming that
the agreement’s annulment would do more
damage than good persuaded the administration
that it would be preferable instead
to seek its rectification. President Trump
emphasized the need to rectify the sunset
clauses lifting most of the restrictions on
Iran; the quality of supervision of its undeclared
sites and weapons-related activity;
and lack of ballistic missile limitations. Yet
it is unclear how the agreement could be
improved unilaterally when the other world
powers are unlikely to cooperate. That implies
pressure will eventually be exerted on
President Trump to fulfill his promises and
withdraw from the agreement, but any US
unilateral action should be evaluated as to
whether it does more harm than good on
this complicated issue, In the meantime,
no preparations take place for the period
after the end of the agreement’s limitations,
when Iran will be free to resume massive
operation of its nuclear infrastructure significantly
reducing its breakout time to a
nuclear weapon.
Iran posing a challenge to Israel in
Syria
The war in Syria has been decided
in favor of the pro-Assad coalition,
strengthening Iran and its supporters. The
regime is regaining control over most of
its lost territory and the opposition has
been significantly weakened. However, the
civil war has not ended, and the politics of
shaping Syria’s future will be complicated.
Israel’s main challenge is the solidification
of Iranian presence in Syria, which might
allow it to pose threats on a new scale.
The growing cooperation of the Iranian-
Shiite camp and the Sunni political Islam
camp –Turkey, Qatar, and the Muslim
Brotherhood movement - demands
ongoing scrutiny. Still, “the Iranians are
THE JERUSALEM REPORT FEBRUARY 5, 2018 7

Cover Story
not at Israel’s fences” and the threat is
still in initial stages of evolution. Iranian
military deployment in Syria also presents
major limitations for Iran (high costs and
long supply lines) and provides Israel with
relatively easy intelligence gathering and
attractive targets.
Defeat of Islamic State and its
evolvement
The past year has witnessed significant
weakening of the Salafi jihadist forces following
decisive action taken by the global
and regional coalition to destroy them. The
Islamic State lost its entire territorial stronghold
in Iraq and Syria. It still possesses
limited strongholds in other places (e.g. the
Sinai Peninsula and North Africa). “Islamic
State 2.0” – the return to a non-territorial
terror group or a shift to new locations – is
likely to evolve. The ideology is still attractive
among Muslim populations. Islamic
State cells, and individuals inspired by the
group, continued to engage in terrorist activity
and undermine stability in Arab countries
and around the world.
A weakened pragmatic Sunni camp, with a
significant change in Saudi assertiveness. It
has failed to stop the tide of Iranian successes
– in Syria; in Yemen, where the Houthis
launch missiles into the heart of Saudi Arabia;
and in Lebanon. It has also failed in its
campaign to cut Qatar off from Iran and the
Muslim Brotherhood. The defeat of the Islamic
State in Iraq has likewise increased
the influence of Iran and the Shiite militias.
The perception of the Iranian-led axis as victorious
has motivated Sunni states to invest
greater resources in their struggle against
Iran. They are led by Saudi Arabia, which
is currently undergoing a leadership change.
Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who
in practice runs the kingdom, is establishing
control over the centers of power, working
to moderate the religious establishment,
and implementing a more aggressive policy
against Iran. Success of his policies, and a
peaceful succession of King Salman, could
advance a model of a non-violent top-down
“Arab Spring.” However, a failure would
have a major impact on the Middle East.
MARC ISRAEL SELLEM
Amos Yadlin: Signs of doubts are
emerging in Trump’s midst
In the Palestinian arena: Deadlock,
reconciliation, and opportunities
2017 saw continued deadlock in the Israeli-Palestinian
process. Security wise Israel
has continued to maintain deterrence and
relative calm vis-à-vis the Gaza Strip, and
suffered a low number of attacks and casualties
from Judea and Samaria. Nonetheless,
uncontrolled escalation in Gaza as a result
of incidents on the ground is still possible.
Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud
Abbas’s strategy of internationalizing
the conflict was also blocked this year
by the new US administration. The failure
of the three strategies pursued by the Palestinians
– violence, negotiations and internationalization
– might push them to a “strategy
of one state.”
Some internal developments embed the
potential of change. First is the desire of
Abbas – being aware of the imminent end
of his tenure – to leave a legacy and shape
the future of the Palestinians before leaving.
Quite uncharacteristically, he has displayed
much greater assertiveness and a willingness
to take risks. Second is the rise of a
new leadership in Hamas that understands
the price of its political isolation and its
failure to extricate the Gaza Strip from its
current economic and social misery. Consequently,
Hamas is attempting to draw closer
to Egypt while maintaining military ties to
Iran. Hamas largely kept the ceasefire in
the Gaza Strip and concluded a reconciliation
agreement with Fatah. The two sides
probably will not succeed in achieving full
reconciliation, requiring an agreement on
the fate of Hamas’s military wing, Hamas’s
joining the PLO, and elections. It is also still
unclear whether the two sides are capable
of honoring a more modest implementable
agreement. Still, there is a better chance of
preserving the stability in Gaza, and resuming
a dialogue between Israel and the government
in Ramallah with Hamas unable to
disrupt it.
Underlying this effort is President Donald
Trump’s desire to broker the “ultimate deal”
for Israel and the Palestinians. However
the team led by his son-in-law Jared Kushner
and chief negotiator Jason Greenblatt
has still no achievement to show. Signs of
doubts are emerging in Trump’s midst regarding
the feasibility of negotiations for a
final status agreement to achieve this “deal,”
perhaps reflecting a preference to adopt
more modest goals and a process-based approach
of incremental progress. Moreover,
the recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s
capital prompted a Palestinian announcement
on “a halt to the political process and
the refusal to accept the Americans as an
honest broker.” It is still unclear whether
the administration will issue a document of
principles for an agreement in early 2018.
If he does, Israel and the Palestinians, who
are concerned about the reactions of an unpredictable
president, will likely focus on
blaming the failure of the initiative on the
other side.
In Israeli society: Risks to cohesion and
resilience
8
THE JERUSALEM REPORT FEBRUARY 5, 2018

The trend of waning solidarity and diminishing
sense of a unified goal in Israel
continues to unfold. The tension between
right and left is on the rise, fed by irresponsible
fanning of the flames by politicians
and opposite views on the way to keep Israel
a Jewish, democratic, secure, and just
state. Exposure of corruption in government
has become increasingly common damaging
public trust in the state institutions.
Aggressive legislation against democratic
attributes of the state, damage to the delicate
balance among the different branches
of government, and a systematic campaign
aimed at weakening the media, the law enforcement
authorities, and other gatekeepers
of democracy have exacerbated the polarization
in Israeli society. Attacks by extremist
elements and reckless campaigns on
social media against the President, the judiciary,
the IDF and other security organs, and
the repercussions of the dispute surrounding
the shooting of the immobilized terrorist in
Hebron have not abated. The tension between
the country’s Jewish population and
the Arab minority has also continued to
fester, and attempted legislation seeking to
hurt the Arab minority and present it as an
enemy in spite of only very limited involvement
in terror attacks has added fuel to the
fire. On the eve of 2018 severe political
crises and fundamental tensions among the
country’s different tribal identities continue
to challenge Israeli society’s cohesion and
resilience.
Challenges, dilemmas, and
recommendations
Over the past decade, Israel has adapted
successfully to the changing reality of
the Middle East, gaining more military
and political power, and avoiding serious
confrontations and wars. However, the
window of political and military opportunity
provided by the regional crisis and the nuclear
deal with Iran appears to be narrowing.
Consequently, Israel must address ten key
medium term and long term threats and
opportunities.
The "short-of-war" campaign against Iran
and in the northern front. Israel’s major
challenge will be to contend with the infrastructure
established by Iran and its proxies
in Syria and Lebanon. Activity against Hezbollah
buildup over the last decade evoked
no significant retaliation so far. From now
on, a wider and more challenging campaign
against the three enemies in the north: Iran,
Hezbollah, and Syria is essential to address
both Tehran’s buildup there, and possible
retaliation by the Assad regime, Iran,
and Hezbollah, avoiding escalation under
tougher conditions. The main dilemma will
be the tension between impairing enemy
buildup and future threat, and risking imminent
escalation. It is needed to draw rules of
the game for the new environment, through
military action and strategic communication
with the adversaries and Russia, a significant
actor. Israel possesses significant leverage
against Iran and Russia: its ability to
undermine their achievement in preserving
the Assad regime and progressing stability
in Syria.
The ‘first northern war’ (the Third
Lebanon War)
Israel and Hezbollah are not interested in
another war. Nonetheless, the Israeli action
against Iran and Hezbollah, coupled with
lesser urgent need to rescue Assad in Syria,
could lead to escalation to “the first northern
war”. This war could expand into Syria,
and perhaps also involve the Syrian army.
That might be the largest military confrontation
since 1973. Israel must address the
strategic and operative priorities involved
in conducting a campaign against three enemies:
Syria, Hezbollah, and Iran, under
Russian presence.
Specifically, Israel must prepare for three
scenarios: war in Lebanon alone; war in
Lebanon and Syria including Iranians and
Shiites operating in Syria; and war with Iran
itself. Israel has announced that the rules of
the game in Lebanon changed since 2006
because Hezbollah and Lebanon are a single
political/military unit, and the rules for conducting
the campaign will change accordingly.
It will be necessary to engage with
new military threats: accurate ballistic missiles,
air defense systems, UAVs, anti-ship
missiles, and possible attempts to invade
populated locations in the Galilee.
Amending the nuclear deal and containing
Iranian expansion. The joint view of
The US and Israel must be translated into
a “parallel agreement” engaging the Iranian
threat as a whole and focusing on the
nuclear agreement at its core. It should determine
a joint strategy against the range of
Iranian threats with three aims: preventing
Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons or
approaching “zero distance” from a nuclear
weapon; curbing the subversive Iranian
activity and its support of terrorism; and
preventing military capabilities serving solidification
of its influence in the region.
The understandings must be on three layers:
A joint response to the weaknesses of
the nuclear agreement in the short and long
terms. In the short run keeping the agreement
is better than its collapse. It will enable
Israel and the United States to prepare
for the more significant threats in the future.
If Iran is not caught violating the agreement,
it would be ill advised to withdraw
from it. The “parallel agreement” should
define possible Iranian violations, including
a breakout to a bomb, and the responses to
them. It should ensure that Israel can stop
Iran if it decides to break out, and that it
is not dependent on a delayed international
response. Other necessary items of the
agreement include coordination of the intelligence
efforts on top of the international
monitoring, and preventing further nuclear
proliferation in the region.
Parameters for amending the nuclear
agreement
Extending the sunset (on major nuclear
restrictions) clauses, or making them
conditional on a change in Iranian behavior
in the non-nuclear realm; improving
monitoring of the Iranian sites suspected
of military nuclear activities; passing a new
UN Security Council resolution clearly
prohibiting testing of missiles and cruise
missiles capable of carrying a nuclear
warhead; and conditioning end of the
military embargo on weapons supply to Iran
on change in Iranian behavior.
THE JERUSALEM REPORT FEBRUARY 5, 2018 9

Cover Story
The struggle against non-nuclear
Iranian threats
Israeli-American strategy must hold Iran
accountable for the actions of its proxies
paying a high price for their subversive activities.
Consequently, the strategy against
Iranian assets must be designed in response
to its expansion strategy, as well as its tactical
provocations, denying Iran economic
and military means, including by expanded
secondary sanctions against foreign banks.
Finally, a joint strategy striving to drive a
wedge between Russia and Iran, using issues
on which they might disagree – Assad’s
future and Iranian military presence in
Syria – and on curbing the Iranian missile
threat.
Renewing the Israeli-Palestinian
political process
The Trump administration might present
a plan for the “ultimate deal” between Israel
and the Palestinians. Its content – principles,
parameters, and way of reaching the agreement)
– is still shrouded in secrecy, and recognizing
Jerusalem as Israel’s capital added
complications. The Israeli government may
try and use the excellent relations with the
Trump administration to ensure the parameters
are unacceptable to the Palestinians
winning the “blame game”. However, more
important is the need to take advantage of
the current favorable conditions – a supportive
US president, changing Arab attitudes
toward Israel, and Israel’s strategic posture.
It is a historic opportunity Israel cannot
afford to miss. Even when chances of a final
status agreement now are slim to non-existent,
the plan might set parameters (better
than the Clinton parameters) that could
determine a future agreement; and help in
stopping the slide toward a one-state reality.
The Israeli government should also adopt a
proactive plan to ensure the feasibility of a
future agreement that preserves the four pillars
of the Jewish people’s national home:
a Jewish, democratic, secure, and just state.
Israel should engage with the challenge
of internal Palestinian reconciliation and
the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip. The
reconciliation is supposed to return the
Palestinian Authority to the Gaza Strip, but
did not address the major problem from
Israel’s perspective of Hamas’s military
wing. The reconciliation agreement will
likely fail due to Palestinian disagreements.
Still, humanitarian and moral reasons
dictate the need to promote reconstruction of
devastated Gaza. The crisis in Gaza can also
overflow to Israel. Specific reconstruction
efforts must be guided by two criteria:
avoiding Hamas misuse for military
buildup, and denying the terrorist group
political gains. A correct reconstruction
effort, with strong political backing of the
Arab states, could also constitute a platform
for gradual change in Gaza’s government.
Israel’s alliance with the Sunni Arab world
Israel is enjoying unprecedented cooperation
with neighboring pragmatic
Sunni Arab states. Common interests and
common threats of Iran and radical Islam
led to deeper cooperation with Egypt and
Jordan, as well as with Gulf States, with
which Israel does not have diplomatic relations.
With Egypt operational cooperation
against the Islamic State in Sinai, and Israel’s
support of the el-Sisi regime in Egypt
as well as 40 years of a peace treaty are the
basis for cooperation. With Gulf States, led
by Saudi Arabia, it is the common Iranian
threat and the value of Israel’s intelligence,
technological, and economic assistance.
The rise to power of Saudi Crown Prince
Mohammed bin Salman, who is pursuing
proactive and risky policies presents Israel
with space for strategic actions, alliances,
improving its geostrategic situation. The
key for moving from limited covert cooperation
to overt cooperation is progress
on the Palestinian issue. Rectifying the
crisis with Jordan over Jerusalem and the
incident with the Israeli embassy guard in
Amman is essential for advancing the cooperation
with Jordan.
The challenge of Islamic State
The territorial Islamic State in Syria
and Iraq has been defeated. However, its
remaining footholds in Libya, the Sinai
Peninsula, Afghanistan, and the Golan
Heights, may attract fighters escaping areas
they lost. Terror cells around the world are
still active, and new ones are evolving.
Most important, the idea of the Islamic
State is alive and well in social networks
and mosques with radical imams. Following
the loss of its territorial basis the Islamic
State may attempt to demonstrate its vitality
through showcase attacks throughout
the Middle East – including Israel – and
elsewhere. Bringing an end to the Islamic
State presence in the southern Golan Heights
should be part of the stabilization of Syria,
and support for Egypt in the Sinai Peninsula
should continue. No one should assume for
intelligence and operational purposes that
this group no longer poses a threat.
The security budget and the security
doctrine
Chances of a large military confrontation
in the northern front in 2018 are greater than
at any time in the past decade. This requires
accelerated preparations, including allocation
of the necessary budget. The new type
of confrontation requires preparations at all
levels, from the political level to the military
level. Understandings on the fundamental
concepts of deterrence, decision, maneuver,
and firepower ought to be developed
requiring the senior political and military
echelons to begin discussing the goals and
targets of the possible campaign; its start,
management, and exit stages; its boundaries;
and its operational efforts. The cabinet
should engage in discussions and planning
long before the confrontation.
Maintaining Israel’s legitimacy
Israel faces a significant problem of legitimacy
among large populations in the Middle
East, Europe, and the United States. The
campaign against Israel consists of a unique
combination of three different groups – radical
Islamists, the hyper-liberal left, and the
hyper-nationalist right –sharing the goal of
undermining Israel’s right to exist. These
groups employ soft but effective kinds of
10
THE JERUSALEM REPORT FEBRUARY 5, 2018

SARAH LEVI
warfare. The ongoing Israeli-Palestinian
conflict is the main joint platform for the
campaign against Israel and the Jews. They
argue the conflict is solely because of Israel’s
intransigence. The protracted conflict
feeds accusations of a perpetuated occupation,
racism, a policy of apartheid against
the Palestinians, colonialism and oppression
of the indigenous population, the violation
of human and civil rights, war crimes, and
genocide. These claims enable the campaign
against Israel to appeal to a variety of audiences
and mobilize them against Israel
using a variety of agendas.. Israel’s support
among members of the political establishment
reflects only a temporary advantage
among an older and relatively established
segment of the population. The anti-Israel
campaign affects also younger Jews. Improving
significantly in recent years, Israeli
response still suffers from dispersed tactical
management and a lack of major systemic
undertakings. Responding to this challenge
requires integrated government and civil
society organizations action in Israel and
abroad.
Reaching understandings with US Jewry
Because of the growing estrangement between
Israel and many in US Jewry a troubling
reality is developing in which Jews are
finding it increasingly difficult to defend Israel
against its critics, when they are unable
to resolve the tension between their sense
of ethical identity as Jews and the State of
Israel. Israel that remains faithful to its role
as the national home of the Jewish people
and committed to its future and security
both within its borders and in the Diaspora,
it is obligated to take resolute action to heal
these divisions, bringing the world’s two
largest Jewish communities closer together,
and infusing the relationship with new
content. That could also include an updating
of the 1950 agreement between Ben-Gurion
and Yaakov Blaustein (of the American
Jewish Committee) that defined the close
relations between the State of Israel and
American Jewry institutionalizing them on
a strong partnership.
Revitalizing solidarity and reconciliation,
reducing the tensions within Israel. Israeli
leadership ought to display determined
statesmanship by resolute defense of the
judicial system and law enforcement, the
IDF and other security organs, as well as
other gate keepers of democracy. Silence in
face of attacks on these institutions, along
with support of those who undermine them,
leads toward a non-democratic future. There
should be a public discourse on the balance
between Jewish values and democratic values,
removed from extremist rhetoric. It is
also important to continue implementing
programs aimed at advancing and integrating
the Arab minority, refrain from legislation
against this population, and promote
broad dialogue between streams in Jewish
and Arab society in order to set rules for the
cultural-political discourse.
Defining a grand strategy
Addressing these issues has several important
assets:
• Military power, security stability, effective
state performance, and notable economic
strength, as opposed to the crises plaguing
the Middle East.
•An improved relationship with the US
administration and a supportive president.
• Good relations with Russia and an effective
dialogue with the Russian leadership.
• Rapidly rising economic relations with
Asia’s two major powers, China and India.
• A Sunni Arab Middle East with increasing
Amos Yadlin discusses the latest INSS
Strategy Assessment with President
Reuven Rivlin on January 1
openness to the possibility of dialogue,
improved relations, and cooperation, albeit
on a low profile.
• Reaching a “parallel agreement” between
Israel and the United States on the Iranian
nuclear program and a campaign against the
malignant activity of Iran with its proxies in
the Middle East, and Syria in particular, is
part of a necessary overall strategy for 2018.
The United States and the pragmatic Sunni
world expect Israeli flexibility and progress
in the process with the Palestinians. Beyond
the expectations of others, it is an Israeli
interest of the highest magnitude to shape
its borders and its character. Israel now has
a rare strategic window of opportunity. It
would be wise to maximize this opportunity.
A necessary condition for utilizing these
external conditions is internal cohesion –
centered around a properly functioning government,
public trust in the system, social
unity, solidarity, and a shared vision of the
future involving not only Israelis, Jews and
non-Jews alike, but also the world Jewry.
This article appears in its entirety in the
INSS Strategic Survey for Israel 2017-18.
Amos Yadlin is Executive Director of the Institute
for National Security Studies
THE JERUSALEM REPORT FEBRUARY 5, 2018 11

THE REGION UDI DEKEL
Israel and the Palestinians,
between one state and two
states: Time to decide
BACKGROUND
The political debate around the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict since the second intifada
has largely been characterized by a
dichotomous conceptual framework: negotiations
for a permanent status agreement of
“two states for two peoples” versus “continued
conflict management,” without seeking
a solution in the absence of a proper partner
for consent and implementation. It now appears
that over the past year, the public debate
has reached a turning point whereby the
government of Israel has in effect taken the
two-state solution off the table, after years
of keeping it there as its declared policy. At
the same time, new-old ideas have arisen,
deriving from the recognition that there is
no chance now for a political arrangement
to end the conflict. The most striking are
versions of the one-state solution, the application
of Israeli law to the settlements in Judea
and Samaria or the annexation of Area
C. Israel has chosen a policy of preferring to
manage the conflict and maintaining the socalled
“status quo,” based on an assumption
that it is sustainable. This choice is grounded
in the assessment that in view of the regional
volatility, this is the least dangerous
alternative for Israel. Another reason is the
inability to crystallize a national consensus
around the configuration of dividing the
country and defining the final borders of the
State of Israel.
Since the Document of Principles on
interim self-government was signed in
Oslo, there have been material changes to
the conflict. At the Israeli-Palestinian level
there were repeated rounds of violence,
alongside failed attempts at negotiations;
Gaza saw the Israeli withdrawal and the
rise of Hamas and its brutal takeover of
the Strip; and there was a gradual but
considerable expansion of settlements and
growth in the Israeli population in Judea
and Samaria. At the regional level, there
were upheavals that weakened the central
state actors and undermined the political
order; Salafi-jihadist Islam has broadened
its influence, mainly in the form of the
Islamic State; the ongoing wars have caused
widespread destruction, generating huge
waves of displaced persons and refugees
and creating opportunities for exploitation
by Iran looking to extend its sphere of
influence. At the level of the great powers,
the United States aims to reduce its presence
and involvement in the Middle East, while
Russia is becoming more involved and
influential. All these factors have weakened
the elements that were pushing for a
two-state solution to remove the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict from the center of the
regional and international focus.
Lessons from rounds of negotiations
and the gaping divide
The rounds of negotiations between Israel
and the Palestinians have highlighted one
pattern. Throughout the talks, the Palestinians
have clung to their basic positions,
while Israel has tried to be flexible and has
gone a long way toward the Palestinians. In
practice, no situation has arisen that would
satisfy the needs of both sides to sign an
agreement. The most prominent issues to
be resolved were (and remain): the Israeli
demand for recognition of Israel as a Jewish
state, and the Palestinian refusal to do so;
failure to accept Israeli’s security demands,
which are perceived as interfering with the
sovereignty of the Palestinian state; responsibility
for the Palestinian refugee problem,
which has been ascribed to Israel, and the
demand for “the right of return” and its implementation
(though only partial) within
the boundaries of the State of Israel; and
the refusal to recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s
capital (an issue highlighted following
President Trump’s recognition of Jerusalem
as the capital).
In the current circumstances, it is hard
to foresee a breakthrough toward a stable
political agreement with a sovereign, responsible,
and stable Palestinian state in
control of its people and with a monopoly
over power in its territory. The Palestinian
entity is divided between two leaderships,
in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip –
with both lacking legitimacy in their areas
of control. Looking ahead of the Palestinian
Authority the threat of a leadership
vacuum expected the day after Mahmoud
Abbas. PA rule in the West Bank survives
to a large extent thanks to broad international
financial support and because Israel
frustrates all attempts by Hamas to become
a principal presence. As for the Gaza Strip,
the damage caused to Hamas and the general
population after Operation Protective
Edge is joined by the intensifying multi-dimensional
infrastructure crisis (electricity,
water, sewage, and housing) and the employment,
economic, and social crisis in
the region. While it is true that all these
12
THE JERUSALEM REPORT FEBRUARY 5, 2018

WIKIMEDIA COMMONS
have made Hamas willing to return the
reins of civilian control in the Strip to the
PA, nevertheless it is hard to see if and how
the latter will indeed regain full control.
The PA leadership – backed by pragmatic
Sunni Arab states and the international community
– worked to emphasize the necessity
of the two-state solution, especially when the
State of Israel stopped presenting it as an imperative.
However, against the ongoing political
freeze, the Palestinian public is showing
signs of a greater desire for “one state” with
equal rights for all its citizens on the one
hand, while supporting terror and violence
on the other. (Some 35% of Palestinians
currently support the “one-state” solution
according to a referendum survey in August
2016 conducted by the Israeli Democracy Institute
and the Palestinian Center for Policy
and Research (PSR). A PSR survey in March
2016 found that 67% of respondents thought
that a new wave of terror developing into a
full intifada would serve Palestinian national
interests.) Trump’s declaration regarding Jerusalem
also aroused voices in the PA leadership
in support of the one-state idea.
As for Israel, over the years the waves
of terror and the political impasse have led
to decreasing public support for a peace
agreement (from 70 percent in 2005 to 55
percent in 2017), according to a broad, methodical
sampling of surveys on this subject.
Moreover, an understanding has taken
shape that Israel has no partner for such an
agreement, and even if a political agreement
could be achieved, the Palestinians
would have difficulty implementing it and
would be unable to satisfy Israel’s security
demands, which were presented by Prime
Minister Netanyahu as freedom for operational
activity from the Jordan River to the
Mediterranean Sea. At the same time, Israel’s
settlement enterprise has continued to
expand, which is perceived by the Palestinians
and by the international community in
general as Israeli policy designed to block
the two-state solution.
The latest alternatives for an Israeli-Palestinian
arrangement
The goal of US President Donald Trump
to seek the “ultimate deal” marked the first
crack in the widespread perception among
elements in the international community
and Arab states that there was only one
agreed solution: a permanent status agreement
of two states, based on the 1967 borders
and two capitals in the Jerusalem area.
The last three decades have shown that there
is no purpose in striving for a better result in
the framework of the same perceptions and
paradigms of negotiations that have failed
again and again in previous rounds.
The Institute for National Security Studies
(INSS), after a long and comprehensive
research process, has compiled a list of currently
dominant alternative approaches, that
is, maintaining the current situation or options
toward an arrangement. The basis is a
distinction between the two overarching approaches
and the respective future options:
the concluding end state approach, indicating
the final geopolitical situation, and the
process approach, which can create a whole
range of future options, with or without a
favored option.
In most scenarios, the concluding end
state approach guides the parties at the end
of the process to a reality of two states or
one state. The concluding situation of two
states has several possible formats: (1) two
separate, independent states; (2) an Israeli-Palestinian
confederation (after setting up
a Palestinian state); (2) a Jordanian-Palestinian
confederation (after setting up a Palestinian
state); (4) two states in one space, a
kind of limited Israeli-Palestinian confederation.
The concluding situation of one state
also has several formats: (1) a state for all its
citizens, full equality of rights for both peoples;
(2) a Jewish state with limited rights
for the Arab-Palestinian public, who will
have the status of residents but not citizens;
(3) an Israeli-Palestinian federation, which
has a range of options for the ties between
different publics and districts. The question
of the Gaza Strip is a separate issue, but it
could be incorporated into the various options,
or subject to a different solution, such
as an independent entity or an entity ruled
by a regional or international trust.
In the process approach, on the other
hand, there are a number of options that
serve opposing views, of which the main
ones are: (1) continuation of the existing
conflict management situation; (2)
A map of Areas A, B and C under the Oslo
Accords
transitional arrangements toward a reality
of two separate states/entities; (3) a regional
settlement to provide a supportive regional
environment, with collateral and guarantees
for progress toward a bilateral Israel-
Palestinian arrangement; (4) the application
of Israeli law to settlement blocs; (5)
processes of annexing some or all of the
settlements plus Area C (60 percent of the
West Bank).
For purposes of comparing the options,
the main objectives were marked, and each
option was examined with reference to the
manner and degree promoted. The ultimate
objectives – retaining and strengthening
Israel as a Jewish, democratic, secure, and
moral state; establishing Israel’s regional
and international status; and the existence
of a functioning, stable Palestinian political
entity that can serve as the “responsible address”
(for both the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip). A number of criteria were outlined,
such as: (1) the degree to which the option
depends on Palestinian ability to deliver;
(2) the ability to stabilize the Gaza Strip and
prevent it from becoming a “spoiler” for
any positive process; (3) the feasibility of
implementing the option within the Israeli
THE JERUSALEM REPORT FEBRUARY 5, 2018 13

THE REGION
public and political system; (4) the feasibility
within the Palestinian political system;
(5) the option’s dependence on external
factors.
After that, simulations were performed to
examine the survivability and stability of the
options given a range of future scenarios,
and with reference to possible future challenges.
The following scenarios were run:
security deterioration in the Palestinian arena;
a failed Palestinian entity, leading to the
breakup and collapse of the PA; creation of
a hostile Palestinian entity in the West Bank;
economic collapse and loss of governance
in Gaza; internal Palestinian reconciliation
with one responsible address in government,
or Hamas retaining its military power
while the PA governs (the Hezbollah model);
weakening that undermines stability in
neighboring countries in tandem with intensifying
trends towards regional chaos; polarization
and internal rifts in Israeli society.
Both research methods – criteria and simulations
- found that the most stable option
in support of the main national objective
of a democratic, secure, and moral Jewish
state was that of political and geographical
separation from the Palestinians and the establishment
of a separate, functioning Palestinian
entity alongside the State of Israel. In
view of the understanding that in the current
conditions it is not possible to “leap” from
the existing situation to a permanent two
states for two people situation, there are two
relevant options for emerging from the current
political freeze.
The first one is transitional arrangements,
which refers mainly to a sequence of arrangements
between Israel and the PLO/PA
with the purpose of creating the conditions
on the ground to facilitate territorial and
political separation. These arrangements include
a series of understandings and agreements
between Israel and the PA, to be implemented
on the ground before any final
agreement is reached. Gradually a de facto
situation of two states will take shape. The
advantages of this option lie in its practical
and flexible nature, as it can be integrated
into the President Trump initiative. The
option provides a security response to Israel’s
demands, based on IDF control of the
security perimeter around the shared Israeli
and Palestinian space, with Israeli freedom
to take action against terror infrastructures
in the Palestinian territories. In return for
cooperating with this move, the PA would
receive benefits such as the transfer of land
and authorities (such as unification of Areas
A and B under PA control, and even transfer
of control of parts of Area C settled by Palestinians,
or designated for economic and
infrastructure development), plus creation
of the conditions for building a Palestinian
state and establishing governance capacity.
The opportunity to advance in the chain of
arrangements will significantly increase if
the pragmatic Arab states decide to be involved
in the process and provide guarantees
and financial support to the PA. The
central weakness of this option is that for its
success is required Palestinian goodwill and
the ability of the PA to function effectively
and maintain stability and the tendency
toward progress. At present the Palestinian
leadership is suspicious of transitional
arrangements, which it sees as an ongoing
interim situation that will interfere with the
ability of the Palestinians to implement their
objectives and vision in the long term.
The second option, that parties with specific
interests are placed on the table without
clarifying the consequences, is one state,
which means annexing all the territories
(with or without the Gaza Strip) and applying
Israeli law. In addition, the PA will be
dismantled (or will remain as an autonomous
entity in the framework of one state),
and 2.7 million Palestinians will be added
to the State from the West Bank and East
Jerusalem (and another 2 million Palestinians
from the Gaza Strip, if it is included
in this step). This means that the State of
Israel will lose its Jewish majority. As noted,
there are two broad outlines for implementing
the one-state option: (a) one state
with full equality for all its citizens, Jewish
and Palestinian, including the right to vote
and be elected, freedom of movement, and
choice of where to live; (b) one state with
restrictions on equal civil rights for the Palestinians.
The one-state option could come
about through an agreement between Israel
and the Palestinians – it can be assumed that
Palestinian agreement would be conditional
on the Palestinians receiving full and equal
rights, including equalizing its immigration
policy with that of Israel (i.e., abolishing
the Law of Return or adding a similar right
of return law for the Palestinians), or as a
one-sided move of annexation of land by Israel,
without Palestinian consent. There is a
possibility that in this case the Palestinians
would also not receive full rights. Such a
step would arouse strong opposition from
the Palestinians, regional actors, and the international
community. The advantages of
the one-state option focus on the full Israeli
security control that would be retained in the
entire territory. Also, there would be no need
to evacuate settlements and resettle their
inhabitants. The state would have clear borders
that could be defended against external
threats, even if internal security might be undermined;
and Jerusalem would remain united
with freedom of access to the holy places.
WHEN THE anticipated consequences are
weighed, the disadvantages of the one-state
option are greater than its advantages. One
state inhabited by two very hostile populations,
where the asymmetry of their situation
shapes their agenda, would increase the
existing friction between them. Establishing
an arrangement with unequal rights between
citizens of the state, involving discrimination
against the Palestinian (Arab) population,
would lead to clashes, violence, economic
damage, and a drop in the standard
and quality of life in Israel. The move could
lead to a civil war – between Jews and Arabs
– and to the breakup of the one state. Not
only that, there would be no Jewish majority,
and the stability and integrity of the state
would be seriously damaged. Relinquishing
the Jewish majority of the state would require
material changes in the basic definition
of the state, and it cannot be assumed
that this would gain public support in Israel.
To the extent that annexation excludes the
14
THE JERUSALEM REPORT FEBRUARY 5, 2018

MOHAMAD TOROKMAN / REUTERS
Gaza Strip, this area remains
without a solution and as a
source of instability and ongoing
security threats. And finally,
dismantling the Palestinian
Authority and taking control of
the whole territory and the Palestinian
people incurs an enormous
budgetary expenditure to
manage the lives and welfare
of the Palestinian population, in
infrastructures and services.
Therefore, the likelihood of
implementing the one-state
option with positive results is
very slim. There is no historical
precedent for successfully uniting
two entities with different
ethnic and religious characteristics
into one state – particularly
when a bloody conflict has already
existed between them for many years.
On the contrary, the historical examples
show an ethnic-based disintegration.
Now is the time to ensure the future of a
Jewish and democratic state
The option of managing the conflict,
which Israel has clung to because it is seen
as the “least worst” option, cannot provide
a sufficient response to the negative trends
and the risks to Israel and its future. Moreover,
it encourages slipping into a situation
of inability to separate from the Palestinians,
and in fact to a “one state” reality. Therefore,
in order to protect a Jewish, democratic,
and secure State of Israel, there must be
progress in stages, while building conditions
to enable a range of options in the future.
Above all, measures must lead to political,
demographic, and territorial separation from
the Palestinians.
This gradual building of conditions could
be done with a series of transitional arrangements
towards the reality of two states, or
two separate entities. To enable Palestinian
voices that are ready to cooperate with Israel
on steps to promote separation to overcome
other voices calling for realization of their
rights in one state, there must be extensive,
sincere, and deep efforts to improve the
Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas gestures
during a meeting of the Palestinian Central Council in Ramallah
on January 14
Palestinians’ difficult daily life conditions
and foster an independent government, and
thereby persuade them to agree, or at least
accept and cooperate with Israeli moves.
Transitional arrangements also create
the conditions and atmosphere to support
a political initiative, including that of
President Trump, and include negotiating
an agreed and realistic arrangement for
peaceful, secure, and dignified coexistence
between Israel and its neighbors. At
the same time, this is also a Plan B if
negotiations over an “ultimate deal” should
fail and Israel is forced to take coordinated
or independent measures to improve its
strategic situation. These would create the
conditions for moves toward separation
from the Palestinians (governmental and
geographical, but not security-related).
In any event, it is essential to maintain a
constant and varied dialogue with the PLO/
PA and with various groups in Palestinian
society – not only in the narrow framework
of negotiations for a permanent status
agreement, but also to promote safe and fair
coexistence for both sides, reducing control
over the Palestinians, and if possible,
creating the reality of two states for two
peoples.
The option proposed here, of
a regional settlement combined
with transitional arrangements
between Israel and the PLO/
PA, is highly auspicious at this
time, particularly due to its
dynamism and flexibility regarding
future developments.
The approach emerging from
the Trump administration promotes
the concept of expanding
the deal into a supportive
regional format, with the broad
cooperation of the Arab Quartet
(Saudi Arabia, Egypt, UAE,
and Jordan), and creating the
conditions for an Israeli-Palestinian
settlement by moving
from the outside in – from a regional
settlement granting benefits
to Israel by establishing
formal relations with leading Sunni nations,
while providing guarantees to the PA and
PLO to advance the objective of two states,
including establishing a Palestinian state,
even if all the disputes between the parties
are not yet settled. Transitional arrangements
can support that approach based on
the principle that anything that is agreed on
will be gradually implemented.
The regional-Arab component of the plan
can help to promote mutual recognition,
multi-dimensional cooperation, and civic
co-existence. The energy of the international
community can be harnessed to create the
conditions and infrastructures to build the
institutions and economy of the emerging
Palestinian state, so that it will be stable, accountable,
and functioning, and not another
failing regional entity. A strong and stable
Palestinian state/entity would enable Israel
to advance with greater security to definition
of its final borders and reach an overall
agreement.
Brig.-Gen. (res) Udi Dekel is managing
director and a senior research fellow at
INSS. Dekel was head of the negotiating
team with the Palestinians in the Annapolis
process under Ehud Olmert's government.
THE JERUSALEM REPORT FEBRUARY 5, 2018 15

IRAN EMILY B. LANDAU
Comparing the nuclear
challenges posed
by North Korea and Iran
DRAWING A comparison between Iran
and North Korea in the nuclear realm is
both conceptually sound and empirically instructive.
Both states are strongly motivated
nuclear proliferators that violated their NPT
commitment to remain non-nuclear, and in
both cases the effort to bring them back to
the fold of the treaty has proven to be an
extremely difficult arms control challenge
for the international community. Moreover,
Iran and North Korea are both dangerous
nuclear proliferators – despite rhetorical
protestations to the contrary, the aggressive
behavior they display toward states in their
regions and beyond undercuts their narrative
of being solely defensively oriented in
the missile and nuclear realms. The nuclear
capabilities they seek – while useful for regime
survival – are also a means for advancing
offensive strategic goals. This finds expression
in North Korea’s repeated threats
of actual (first) use, but also in both states’
recognition of the value of a nuclear shield:
the fact that nuclear capabilities render
states invulnerable to coercive responses to
their actions. This message was underscored
by reactions to NATO’s attack of Libya in
2011, namely, that if Libya had not given up
its Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), it
would not have been attacked.
North Korea today is a nuclear state –
and according to latest US estimates, it
has enough fissile material (plutonium and
highly enriched uranium) for about 60 nuclear
weapons, as well as ballistic missiles
that can be used to attack its close neighbors.
Regarding an attack on the US mainland,
despite North Korea’s demonstration
of ICBM capability through missile tests
carried out in 2017, it will most likely take
more time and testing before North Korea
can strike the US with a nuclear tipped missile.
But it is inching toward this goal.
As far as is known, Iran is still well behind
North Korea, and has not yet crossed
the nuclear threshold. The Joint Comprehensive
Plan of Action (JCPOA) negotiated
between the P5+1 and Iran was meant to
prevent Iran from ever reaching that stage
by dismantling Iran’s dangerous nuclear infrastructure,
but the deal does not achieve
this goal. Moreover, Iran remains as motivated
as ever to maintain and enhance its
nuclear breakout capability. As such, once
the main provisions of the deal expire, Iran
can be expected to return to its previous
nuclear activities. In fact, Iran will be even
better positioned to do so, having in the
ensuing period become stronger economically
(sanctions lifted), regionally (having
significantly enhanced its regional reach
since the deal was presented), and in terms
of its nuclear infrastructure (having worked
on advanced centrifuges under the terms of
the deal).
Some contest the comparison between
these two states in the nuclear realm, noting
that Iran and North Korea are actually very
different – that unlike North Korea, Iran is
not a nuclear state and that it has agreed to
the JCPOA which curbs its program; moreover,
they point out that Iran is an important
regional actor with a rich cultural history,
whereas North Korea is isolationist and
aggressive. In short, the argument goes, in
light of these differences analysts should not
draw negative conclusions about Iran on the
basis of the experience with North Korea.
It is no doubt true that these two states
are very different in many respects, and that
differences among states are sometimes pertinent
to comparisons in the nuclear realm
as well. But not always. In fact, the features
that are normally mentioned in the North
Korea-Iran context do not undercut the
much more significant similarities between
these two states. So the fact that North Korea
is a nuclear state and Iran is not says nothing
about the much more important question
of their nuclear motivation, which is very
strong in both cases. And if Iran remains
behind North Korea, this is not a reason to
dismiss the comparison, but should rather
encourage us to take heed of what could ultimately
evolve in Iran’s case as well.
WHEN THINKING about these two cases,
beyond the common challenge that they
pose to the international community that
seeks their nuclear rollback, an important
question is what we might expect from Iran
if it too were to cross the nuclear threshold.
And in this regard, some of the features
mentioned by detractors of the comparison,
in order to base their claim that Iran should
not be unfavorably compared to North Korea,
actually indicate that it is Iran that will
be the more dangerous nuclear state.
Iran’s regional strength and the JCPOA it
agreed to are actually not features that work
in favor of making light of any pending
threat. As in the case of deals that were
struck with North Korea, the JCPOA is at
best a partial deal that does not signal a
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THE JERUSALEM REPORT FEBRUARY 5, 2018

Officials attend the opening of the North
Korean Embassy in Tehran, in August, 2017
KCNA / REUTERS
strategic reversal on the part of Iran. Indeed,
Iran often clarifies how easy it will be for
it to revert back to its previous program if
the P5+1 do not adhere to its demands. It
did so when it threatened to return to 20
percent enrichment within five days, and
with regard to the facility at Arak which Iran
recently claimed it poured cement only into
its external pipes, not the heart. Whether
these statements are true or not, they are
reminders that Iran has hardly made a
decision to reverse course, and continues to
threaten a quick return to previous activities.
In the missile realm, Iran recently signaled
its willingness to limit the range of its longrange
ballistic missiles to 2000 km, but then
almost immediately threatened European
states that if they seek to target Iran’s missile
program, Iran can easily extend the range to
cover Europe. In short, Iran continues on
an aggressive path, threatening whichever
P5+1 state it wants to keep in line, while
constantly reminding international actors of
its nuclear and missile advances that can be
revived and enhanced at any time.
The fact that Iran is a strong regional
power is reason for great concern in the nuclear
realm, and certainly not reassurance.
This is because Iran demonstrates through
its policies and behavior that it is not satisfied
with being strong and secure within
its own borders – it supports terror organizations
and proxies across the Middle East
in order to expand its power and influence.
Iran has regional hegemonic ambitions that
it hopes to advance with the help of these
proxies, and by creating a corridor of influence
across the region.
Iran’s regional agenda would be significantly
advanced if it were to achieve nuclear
status. States tend to be very wary of challenging
nuclear states, especially when they
have just been established and it is not clear
what their intentions are, or how they might
react – in short, when rules of the game in the
nuclear realm have not yet been established.
This wariness and reluctance to confront the
new nuclear state could initiate a process that
works in favor of the proliferator – establishing
rules of the game according to which it
is Iran that deters strong international powers
from even thinking of intervening in its
affairs in light of implicit threats of nuclear
use. The pattern of deterrence that Iran was
able to establish vis-à-vis the Obama administration
merely with its threats of leaving
the nuclear deal show how vulnerable strong
powers can be to such threats. While the
Trump administration is working to empty
these Iranian threats of their potency – on
the basis of its assessment that it is clearly
Iran’s interest to remain in the deal, at least
for now – it will be a very different situation
when Iran is a nuclear state and the stakes
rise considerably.
It should be noted that there is one area
where North Korea currently poses a more
severe challenge than Iran, and that is with
regard to further proliferation efforts and
activities. North Korea has already proven
its willingness to share nuclear knowhow,
technology, and components to whoever
is willing to pay hard cash. The fact that
there is no ideology or religious affinity
that North Korea adheres to in this regard
makes it especially dangerous. Iran is less
likely to follow this path of directly sharing
its nuclear wares, although its cooperation
with North Korea in the non-conventional
realm could end up doing so via a
more circular route.
North Korea and Iran are both dangerous
nuclear proliferators, and the comparison
between them underscores the significant
similarities. They are both aggressively
challenging nuclear norms that were established
during the Cold War years, and have
been upheld for the past 72 years. With due
respect to some current international efforts
to advance a “ban the bomb” agenda, the
more realistic target of nuclear arms control
and disarmament efforts should no doubt be
these two most dangerous nuclear, and almost
nuclear states.
Dr. Emily B. Landau is a senior research fellow
at the INSS and head of the Arms Control
and Regional Security Program.
THE JERUSALEM REPORT FEBRUARY 5, 2018 17

Interview
Stabilizing an unstable region
Moshe Ya’alon may be out of politics – for now – but with the INSS, the veteran
security expert is flexing his know-how in new and exciting ways
By Noa Amouyal
DURING THE Cold War, the United States
and Russia fiercely competed for spaceflight
capability dominance. Today, a more
sinister race for hegemony is brewing and
its ultimate conclusion will not only have
ripple effects for the Middle East, but
the world. So says former defense minister
Moshe Ya’alon, who now serves as a
senior research fellow at the Institute for
National Security Studies. Ya’alon outlines
three specific threats to the Middle East
that all comprise of an overarching desire
to control the region and impose its own
absolutist worldview.
The current situation in the Middle East
generated by three Islamic movements
vying for hegemony and influence in the
region and beyond,” Ya’alon tells The
Jerusalem Report. “The most dangerous
element is Iran,” he begins, echoing a
sentiment that is felt throughout much of
Israel’s security community. Iran’s use of
proxy forces like Hezbollah in Lebanon
and the Houthis in Yemen should not be
taken lightly, he warns. “This is a very significant
challenge, not just for Israel, but
the entire region,” he says.
The second threat, according to Ya’alon,
is ISIS and its desired mission to create
an Islamic caliphate. While ISIS has lost
major territory in the Levant, Ya’alon cautions
against ruling out their potential for
executing terror attacks throughout the
Middle East, North America and other
parts of the world.
The third, and perhaps most complicated,
is the threat of the Muslim Brotherhood,
which today is primarily associated with
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
Ya’alon’s carefully outlined view of how
he sees the Middle East today was crafted
during his time at the INSS, which he
joined a year ago. He believes this is a
critical time for the region, where leaders
are faced with nearly unprecedented challenges.
“The only stabilized element in the
Middle East is instability. I believe that the
Middle East is going through the most significant
crisis since the time of Mohammad
in the 7th century,” he says bluntly. “It’s not
the Arab Spring or the Islamic Winter, we
need to look at it from a wider perspective.”
And looking at the situation from a wider
perspective is exactly what he’s doing at
the INSS. “Watching the developing situation
from the INSS and analyzing it, is a
very good opportunity to discuss issues and
look at them from different angles – ‘out
of the box.’ At INSS we meet people from
abroad, experts as well as practitioners,
share our ideas and worries and try to find
out how to meet the challenges ahead,” he
says. “I don’t have to spend energy trying
to create coalitions, compromising my ideals,
or maneuver politically. I have time
available for professional work.”
Content with the pace of his work at the
institute, Ya’alon says that joining it was
a natural fit for both him and the think
tank, “The INSS as a unique platform. It’s
a meeting point of experts from academia,
young people and practitioners like myself,”
he adds.
His perspective on the Middle East is
delineated in his research paper called
“United States Policy in the Middle East:
The Need for a Grand Strategy” and is an
example of the symbiotic relationship he
enjoys with the think tank. In the paper, he
not only offers his unique assessment of
the situation, but also provides a platform
where his ideas are read by the best of the
best in the security field both in Israel and
abroad. The paper, and his conversation
with us, offers recommendations for
President Trump as he concludes the first
year of a topsy-turvy presidency. “There
is a change in the US rhetoric,” Ya’alon
says of the new administration, which has
distanced itself as much as possible from
President Barack Obama’s belief that
working with and containing Iran was a
path to peace in the region.
Ya’alon doesn’t seem entirely convinced
that the Trump Administration has formulated
a clear policy in the Middle East,
which is why he believes papers like his
can help guide an administration that
seems to be feeling its way. “I hear there
are certain reactions to the article, but this
is a way that we [at the INSS] deal with
the situation. We have ideas, we publish
articles, we talk about it in the media in
Hebrew and English and try to propose
ideas of our own. Of course, we don’t have
the responsibility, but we have the knowledge
about the Middle East and I’m not
sure that this kind of knowledge is everywhere,”
he says.
Regarding US President Donald Trump’s
policy on Israeli-Palestinian conflict,
Ya’alon is satisified that he is making the
right calls thus far - including his decision
to recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital.
“Regarding what he calls the ‘ultimate
deal,’ so far, so good,” Ya’alon, said.
However, in terms of a future path to
peace, Ya’alon remains skeptical and encourages
Trump to be as well. “If I have
to give him a recommendation, I’d say:
Don’t have high expectations. You can’t
deliver any final settlement between Israel
and the Palestinians in the coming future,
because the Palestinians are not ready to
divide the country with us,” he says, citing
the many offers rejected by the Arabs/
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MARC ISRAEL SELLEM
Palestinians since the beginning of the 20th
century. That said, Ya’alon acknowledges
that the status quo may ultimately lead to
a bi-national state, a conclusion he rejects
out of hand. Instead, Ya’alon vouches for
incremental progress that begins from the
bottom up. In other words, improving Palestinian
infrastructure and their quality of
life must be a priority.
He also advocates for the Taylor Force
Act, a US Senate bill threatening to halt all
aid to the Palestinian Authority until it stops
funding terror. But while, so far, Israel has
succeed in thwarting Palestinian attacks,
its ability to extinguish a more existential
threat such as the Boycott, Divestment and
Sanctions movement, remains to be seen.
“The good news about BDS and the
delegitimization campaign against Israel is
that our enemies have lost hope to eliminate
the State of Israel by military force.
So they moved to the international arena,
to use propaganda to manipulate naive
liberals and antisemites,” he says. It is the
combination of those two groups of people
that can’t be ignored. As such, Ya’alon
advocates for educating young generations
around the world about Israel so they are
not susceptible to manipulation. Ya’alon
practices what he preaches at INSS, especially
when he speaks to young security
experts about the region.
For example, he lectures at the think
tank’s annual international summer program,
which brings students from all over
the world earning their master's degree to
spend an intense three weeks in Israel. “I
tell them to be open-minded, to be curious,”
he says. “Don’t be stuck with old concepts.
And even as youngsters, they have their
own concepts - it’s not a tabula rasa.”
While Ya’alon has yet to reveal his future
Ya’alon: The current instability in the
Middle is generated by three Islamic
movements claiming for hegemony and
influence in the region and beyond
plans regarding a grand return to the political
arena, for now he is pleased with the work
he’s doing at the INSS. “The Institute is in
a unique position to offer expertise from a
wide variety of fields, and when we discuss
issues we have all the experts in the room.
I believe this is the best think tank in Israel.
Our papers are well accepted. In many
discussions we bring in officials from the
military and political arena to contribute and
I know our papers are read by high-ranking
officials – I know because I read them myself
when I was defense minister. I believe
it’s valuable to the Israeli strategic decision
making process,” he says.
THE JERUSALEM REPORT FEBRUARY 5, 2018 19

Round Table
Israel and American
Jewry’s two-way street
INSS experts discuss the ‘vital bond’ between US Jewry and Israel and how that
relationship is key to the security of both nation and people By Noa Amouyal
THE UNITED States and Israel are currently
home to the two largest Jewish communities,
but it appears that in recent years these
communities have increasingly drifted apart
in values and world views, narratives and
identities, interests and agendas. This trend
reflects natural generational evolution, but
this past year’s events – including the Israeli
government’s warm embrace of Donald
Trump, a controversial President who
was opposed by most US Jews, the rise in
anti-Semitism in the United States, Israel’s
government reneging on the Western Wall
agreement and the religious conversion bill
– have heightened the challenges to the relationship
between Israel and the US Jewish
community. This said, the defense relations
and cooperation between Israel and the US
remains intense, to the benefit of both.
The Jerusalem Report sat down with experts
at the Institute for National Security
Studies to talk about what defines and fuels
this symbiotic relationship in a stimulating
round table discussion. Members of the panel
included Distinguished Visiting Fellow
and former US Ambassador to Israel Daniel
Shapiro; Senior Research Fellow Brig. (res)
Assaf Orion; Research Fellow Dr. Michal
Hatuel-Radoshitzky; and Research Fellow
Lt.-Col. (res.) Shahar Eilam.
Below are highlights from that conversation
which comes as a backdrop to a joint
initiative INSS is conducting with the Ruderman
Family Foundation. The research program,
called “the American Jewish Community
and Israel’s National Security,” explores
the dynamic between the two communities
and attempts to foster understanding as to
the different aspects of this relationship , as
well as to their unfolding trends, not only
in terms of security, but in terms of Israel’s
foundational values and identity and of
America’s long-term commitment to Israel.
How do each of you characterize the relationship
between the US Jewish community
and Israel; and what are the factors that influence
this relationship?
SHAPIRO: I define it as a relationship between
the two largest and two of the most
significant and influential parts of the Jewish
people as a whole. It’s been a very powerful,
mutually reinforcing relationship for much
of the last century – certainly all of Israel’s
existence – bound by some very powerful
common memories, including tragedies, like
the Shoah. A very powerful sense of the importance
of the establishment and strengthening
of the State of Israel; both for its own
sake and what it contributes to the Jewish
people outside of Israel.
For most of that period – and we hope it’s
still the case – there is a mutually supportive
relationship where American Jews have
felt invested in being allies and partners and
contributors to Israel’s security and its prosperity
and the strong relationship between
Israel and the United States. And Israelis
have seen value in engaging with that community
in making them feel connected and
honored and welcomed as part of the broader
Jewish people that Israel feels connected
to worldwide. I think historically that has
very much defined it.
ORION: We are essentially two parts of one
people bound by a story, a book, an identity,
shared values and perhaps destiny in
certain ways. Israel is a common heart and
a binding cord between us both; an origin
and an identity organ; as a symbol, a spiritual
and physical home, a source of yearning,
a destiny and a national homeland. Certainly,
our bond includes interesting encounters
between nationhood and peoplehood, as
different layers of our respective identities.
As with any relationship, ours can’t adapt
to challenges without some serious work
on those relationships, because as times are
changing we need to strongly engage with
each other, and get to really know each other.
As both Israel and US Jews go through
changes, as our grandparents and parents
pass the baton to us and to our kids, we all
need to adjust to the new realities, to our
current roles, discussing our differences,
our hopes and concerns, our expectations
from each other and our disappointments as
well. From the strategic perspective, each
community’s perceived power and influence
spill over and reflects on the other.
EILAM: We should remember that each
community is a huge success story in its
own way. The major successes, as well as
joint legacy, memories and challenges, were
the anchors and inspiration for developing
the relations between the two communities:
the establishment of Israel, the strengthening
of Israel and its special relations with the
US, the joint campaign for enabling Soviet
Jewry emigration from the USSR, etc. For
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RUTH PINES / INSS
many years, the internal successes of each
community were actually contributing to
the mutual relations between them. Each
success story has its own internal challenges,
which as Assaf mentioned, center on
internal identity issues – which in the long
run also shape challenges between the two
communities. We shouldn’t only look at superficial
developments in the relations, but
we should aim to understand that first and
foremost some of the problems are basically
internal factors that challenge each community
separately.
How do the different Jewish denominations
and streams in the US relate to Israel?
HATUEL-RADOSHITZKY: We’re seeing
a gradual process in which the Jewish
communities in America and in Israel seem
to be drifting apart. The main schism centers
on two issues: one is the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict and the other is issues of pluralism
and faith. In relating to differences pertaining
to the conflict – worth noting is that most
Jewish Americans are traditionally liberal
and known to vote for Democratic presidential
candidates. This trend is opposed to what
we’re seeing in Israel where the population
appears to be shifting in more conservative
directions and voting for leaders with more
hardline stances on conflict-related issues.
In looking at issues of faith and pluralism
– most Jewish Americans are Conservative,
Reform or define themselves in other ways
with only a minority of Jewish Americans
defining themselves as Orthodox. In Israel,
religious affairs are controlled by the Orthodox
Rabbinate and thus recent developments
regarding the Kotel and issues of conversion
were perceived by most Jewish Americans
as particularly dismissive of their identity,
values and strong bond to Israel.
What are the stories of how American
Jewry has contributed to Israel’s success
from a security perspective?
SHAPIRO: It’s hard to separate the
strength and depth and durability of the
US-Israel bilateral relationship – in all of
its manifestations: The strong political and
diplomatic support; especially the incredible
Sitting around the INSS table with moderator Noa Amouyal (behind the laptop) are
(from left to right) Research Fellow Michal Hatuel-Radoshitzky, former US Ambassador
to Israel Daniel Shapiro, Senior Research Fellow Brig. (res) Assaf Orion and Research
Fellow Lt.-Col. (res.) Shahar Eilam
security partnership; and the protection of
Israel against campaigns of delegitimization
and BDS from the very wide and deep
support for Israel from the American Jewish
community. Fortunately, it’s not only the
American Jewish community; there are
many other parts of American society who
also identify with Israel and want Israel to
be supported and considered a close ally of
the United States.
I think it would be hard to imagine that
the relationship have would reached the
strength and depth it has without that strong
base of support from that pillar of the American
Jewish community.
So talking about the American military
assistance that Israel receives – including
recently about the missile defense programs
and the F-35. When we’re talking about the
US having Israel’s back in international forums
where it is singled out for criticism and
I would even extend it to US support for trying
to achieve Israeli-Palestinian peace. It’s
not always without controversy, but something
that clearly Israeli governments have
wanted the United States to be a partner in
trying to achieve. I think these are all examples
of ways that the American Jewish communities
effort to keep these issues on the
agenda and hold their own elected officials
accountable to them have helped to sustain
and strengthen the relationship.
HATUEL-RADOSHITZKY: The ties
between the two states are obviously
very deep and go way back and it may be
problematic to separate, quantify, categorize
and label the Jewish component of it. Worth
noting, however, is that the relationship
is mutual and that it serves the strategic
interests of both parties.
If we look at the military cooperation for
example, the United States perceives Israel
as a stabilizing factor in the Middle East and
it is thus an American interest that Israel retains
its qualitative military edge. We’re seeing
a lot of cooperation between the defense
and intelligence communities of both states,
and these close working relations undoubtedly
emanate from shared goals and strategic
interests.
Another aspect of it, is the homeland security
front where we see ample cooperation
between Israel’s Homefront Command and
America’s National Guard in joint exercises,
exchanging best practices and research and
development (R&D) in the technological
realm. Here too, Israel has much knowledge
and experience to share - particularly
in developing and cultivating national resilience
and in integrating citizens to actively
contribute and mobilize in emergency situations.
EILAM: I think we should keep in mind
that at least part of the contribution is not
necessarily one-sided from them to us and
not just an instrumental factor but rather a
THE JERUSALEM REPORT FEBRUARY 5, 2018 21

Round Table
much deeper issue with long-term implications
on the future of both communities.
Usually we talk or hear a lot about philanthropy
projects – the huge amount of money
that comes from there in support of many
projects here. We should keep in mind that
this also contributes to American Jewry’s
relations and linkage to Israel, which is an
important identity component for them; so
in some sense it may be as important for
them and their own needs there, as it is to
us here. This is one example. Another is to
look at Birthright (Taglit) – which is also
an example that looks like something that
should help mainly American Jewry, but
there are around 100,000 Israelis that have
already participated in Taglit – most of them
are IDF soldiers and officers. For many of
them it is their first and only opportunity
to meet American Jews and in many cases
to establish their connections with Jews
abroad. So, we should look at some of the
contribution issues, which go both ways and
shape the future of relations between the two
communities.
When you talk to Israeli experts, colleagues
and peers, are they aware of the
dynamic?
HATUEL-RADOSHITZKY: The Israeli
defense leadership is undoubtedly aware
of the multifaceted aspects of the close Israel-US
relations, and the pertinence of this
relationship to Israel. Our research finds that
Israeli defense leaders are far less aware of
the American Jewish community’s characteristics,
connection to Israel and role in
contributing to the Jewish state which for
some American Jews is a defining value.
We also found that Israel’s political echelon
and establishment fundamentally perceives
Israel as the center of the Jewish world - diverging,
in this parameter, from the Jewish
community in America which tends to perceive
the Jewish people as comprised of two
centers: one in Israel and one in the US. In
line with the Israeli-centric perception we
saw that in more cases than one, despite
familiarity with the issues at hand, policy
decisions in Israel are made according to internal
political considerations. Thus, a lack
of “awareness of the dynamic” (as phrased
in the question) cannot explain Israeli policy
decisions which run counter to the needs
and values of Jewish Americans.
Why do we start to notice patterns of misunderstanding
or hurt feelings; from where
does this stem?
SHAPIRO: You can see that these specific
issues are somewhat symptomatic of the
trends and evolutions of the communities.
So, Israel, by most measures is becoming
more religious and a right-of-center country,
the American Jewish community, there
are trends of intermarriage and assimilation,
which are making it a challenge to keep the
next generation of Jews connected both to
the Jewish community generally and Jewish
institutions that have been the traditional
base of the community and to Israel as well.
And so, against that background when you
have issues of specific disagreement it’s even
harder to necessarily bridge that gap. Many
Israelis were troubled that many American
Jews who were supportive of President
Obama were also supportive of the Iran deal
that the majority of Israelis viewed as a bad
deal and something that would be harmful
to Israel’s security. Many American Jews,
as was mentioned, are concerned about the
seeming stalemate on the Israeli-Palestinian
peace effort and the role that settlements play
– although not only settlements obviously
there’s blame to go on both sides – and the
risk that poses to Israel’s future as a Jewish
and democratic state, which touches some of
the core values that American Jews associate
with Israel and associate with some of their
own identity as Americans and as Jews.
And against the same backdrop when the
Israeli govt. takes decisions that American
Jews feel are disrespecting their own
Jewish identity and practice of Judaism and
their own ability to even connect to Israel,
such as the cancellation of the Kotel agreement
or the proposed conversion laws. It’s
certainly accentuates some trends that might
have already existed, which posed challenges
to keeping communities as close as
they’ve been, and it’s something that leaders
on both sides need to be attentive to.
What do we do from here to mend ties?
HATUEL-RADOSHITZKY: I would say
education. It is very important to educate
Israelis here about the United States in general;
the bilateral relations, the importance
of the strategic ties between the two states
and then the contribution of American Jewry
therein to these ties.
ORION: Some of it is indeed state and
government leadership issues of how to
integrate the Diaspora’s positions in dayto-day
policy making in Israel – that is an
issue of debate: in what measure we should
take into account the views and positions of
people who do not live here, especially in
matters of life and death, and in many domestic
issues. But this also sheds a special
light on the responsibility of non-governmental
leadership, community to community,
and people-to-people.
Let our next generations familiarize with
each other; connect with each other, interact
with each other, meet in summer camps,
do an “inverse Taglit” – student exchanges.
But we also need common missions and
common causes. If we used to have a “Let
My People Go” campaign from the Soviet
Union, we now have a golden opportunity
to pull our efforts together against common
threats like delegitimization, BDS, antisemitism
and Jewish safety.
Israeli stories need American story-tellers.
Doing it together shoulder-to-shoulder
means that we should bring our youths together
and unite around a common mission.
And that is a splendid opportunity to jointly
write a new chapter in the great book of our
common history.
SHAPIRO: I think that the lion’s share of
the responsibility for keeping American
Jews connected to Israel falls on the American
Jewish community itself. To do the
education; to create the opportunities for
engagement; to expand programs like Taglit
into new areas, whether it’s doing joint
projects about the Jewish people or about
broader Tikkun-Olam focus, helping American
Jews engage with the Israeli hi-tech
economy or focus on ways that can contribute
to improving Israeli society and helping
Israelis improve Israeli society. Those are
things that American Jews primarily have
to take responsibility for doing in our own
community. But to help that succeed and
to help to ensure that those American Jews
will feel motivated and feel that there is a
mutuality of that effort – education on the
Israeli side, certainly the demonstration
of respect and honoring American Jewish
identity in its different manifestations is
critically important – even if it’s short of
giving American Jews the same say about
22
THE JERUSALEM REPORT FEBRUARY 5, 2018

Israeli govt. decisions as Israeli citizens
have, is going to be critically important.
Certainly avoiding a replay of issues like
the Kotel decision and solving that kind of
crisis is something that Israel can do to help
American Jewish leadership to strengthen
the bonds that next generation will feel toward
Israel.
In the security realm should we expect another
very large defense deal, with whichever
administration is in charge then?
SHAPIRO: My judgment is that security
partnership has its own logic and its own
basic support in both countries – it serves
the interests of both countries. There is every
reason to expect that that kind of partnership
will continue. It’s hard to project
decades into the future.
Certainly Israel has become a developed
economy that doesn’t need the same kinds
of assistance that it once did, but I think
the security partnership in some very
developed and profound form, including
assistances is very likely to continue.
How do we feel the BDS issues will prevent
us from doing this kind of education
work from mending ties and waging forward?
Is BDS on college campus a reality
we are facing?
HATUEL-RADOSHITZKY: I wouldn’t
give so much credit to the BDS campaign.
BDS is certainly a problem, but it is not
responsible for driving a wedge between
Israeli and American Jews and certainly
not for affecting bilateral Israel-US ties. I
would argue that the BDS campaign skillfully
preys on existing gaps and works to
strategically amplify them.
ORION: When we follow our rivals and
enemies’ efforts, we see that they are trying
to attack our allliance and to drive a wedge
between Israel and the diaspora Jews, usually
widening gaps and cracks which are
already there and are of our own making.
It means that they perceive it as a Jewish
and Israeli center of gravity, and they’re
aiming at it; part of our counter BDS campaign
needs to address this effort and thwart
it.
Looking at one of the things we’ve discovered
during the last year is that when
you look only on the instrumental aspect
of the relations it’s missing the long-term
implications which are huge. We talked before
– looking to the next generation – the
future of the Jewish people is mostly going
to be shaped by the relations between these
two communities.
We can’t look at the issue through
one-sided transactional contribution lenses.
We should look for the next joint missions.
In order to do that, we need to work together;
we need to understand and know each
other, to think anew and to act anew.
David Brummer contributed to this report.
Fostering understanding behind the ‘unbreakable bond’
The INSS partners with the Ruderman Family Foundation
in one-year-program By Rachel Cohen
The Ruderman Family Foundation
and INSS have joined forces to
explore ways to strengthen the ties
that form this “unbreakable bond.”
The one-year program called “The
American Jewish Community and Israel’s
National Security,” aims to establish
a foundation of knowledge to facilitate
increased awareness – throughout the
foreign affairs and security community
and among decision makers and
the shapers of public opinion in Israel.
“We recognize that the relationship between
Israel and the American Jewish
community is a matter of national security
for Israel, which led us to work with
the leading national security organization
in Israel,” Ruderman Family Foundation
President, Jay Ruderman says, explaining
why he chose to team up with INSS.
“Educating policymakers and the defense
establishment on the American Jewish
community will create conversations and
policy change for the people and the
State of Israel.”
“Despite their differences, the two
largest Jewish communities in the world
depend on each other for their combined
future viability,” Ruderman adds.
As for major rifts like the one that appeared
in the wake of the now reneged
Western Wall deal and conversion law
controversy, communication is key.
“The solution to a better relationship
between Israeli and American Jews lies in
better communication, dialogue and mutual
respect regarding what both bring
to the overall worldwide community. Instead
of talking at each other, we need to
talk with each other on overcoming the
differences that lie between us,” he says.
“The reality facing the Israeli and American
Jewish communities is very different.
Nevertheless, the two largest Jewish communities
in the world depend on each
other for their combined future viability.
Jay Ruderman
Although the connection between American
Jews and Israel is changing, we believe
the vast majority of American Jews
support and remain connected to the
State of Israel.
“However, when American Jews receive
messages from ministers and the Israeli
government, that they are not fully accepted
as a part of the worldwide Jewish
community, it leads to rifts.”
NOAM GALAI
THE JERUSALEM REPORT FEBRUARY 5, 2018 23

Young Researchers
Dr. Avner Golov
Shaping
the future
Young researchers shape Israel’s
contemporary and future policies
By David Brummer
CHEN GALILI
Vera Michlin-Shapir
Dr. Liran Antebi
AT THE Institute for National Security Studies, heavy intellectual
lifting is not just for its veteran researchers; the think tank’s newest
members are doing in-depth work that is likely to have an increasingly
important strategic role in Israel’s future.
They may be relatively young, but their work stands to shape the
course of Israeli life in the years to come. These young researchers
at the Institute for National Security Studies are grappling with complex
situations and challenges, whose solutions and applications
promise to impact regular citizens’ lives in the future.
Dr. Avner Golov, one such researcher, wears two hats at the INSS.
Not only is he a research fellow with a particular focus on North
Korea and Iran and their nuclear ambitions, he is also interested in
US-Israel relations. In addition, he is the director of research programs
– responsible for organizing content at an institutional level.
Golov approaches the US-Israel relationship from a zoomed-out
point of view and is of the opinion that the link between Israel and
the United States is still a special one, but that it is maturing and
changing over time. “In the past, the relationship has been described
as ‘a big brother [somewhat dictating] to a little brother,’” he says.
“Even though we still need their help, particularly in the international
arena, it is gradually becoming more mutual.”
Golov sees that there is scope for a widening and deepening of
US-Israel ties, which relies on the curiosity of our respective peoples
wanting to meet and understand the other, but there is a potentially
devastating parallel challenge. Although he acknowledges that
the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement has created
a lot of publicity, he is not overly concerned by this particular
campaign in and of itself. Of much more immediate concern is what
the BDS movement embodies; namely delegitimization, with Golov
labeling it “a potentially huge problem.”
To understand the phenomenon more clearly, however, we need
to pull back the lens a little. Since 2001, the picture has radically
altered. It is thought that in today’s Republican Party there is
around 75% support for the state of Israel, as opposed to approximately
50% in the 1980’s. “Republicans have put Israel at the core
of the dispute because it differentiates them from liberals – but it
has become a political issue that could be potentially very damaging,”
says Golov.
24
THE JERUSALEM REPORT FEBRUARY 5, 2018

It should come as no surprise that Israel’s
relationship with Russia is crucial, albeit
complicated – and it seems that Israeli
policy makers have much to learn from
their Russian counterparts
The liberal camp in the Democratic Party
has seen a shift in the opposite direction.
There is already a generation of young,
well-educated students who are the potential
future leaders of the Democratic Party.
They have already cut their teeth in the
highly charged adversarial atmosphere of
delegitimization and will take those lessons
forward, which according to Golov, “will
significantly erode the United States’ and
Israel’s sense of joint moral interest and
make the relationship harder to maintain.”
Vera Michlin-Shapir is a Neubauer Research
Associate, whose field of expertise is
contemporary Russian politics, with a focus
on Russian defense policy, Israeli foreign
policy and Russian-Israel relations. Michlin-Shapir
will soon complete her PhD in
History at Tel Aviv University, and being
a Neubauer Research Associate allows her
and fellow recipients to be engaged at the
Institute, while completing their degrees.
She says she is grateful to Joseph and Jeanette
Neubauer for their vision in setting up
this fellowship.
Michlin-Shapir says that one of the most
challenging parts of her work (or indeed
any researcher’s work) is that it is sometimes
necessary, vis-à-vis policy analysis
or research, to provide the counter position
to the Israeli public. “I have to present a
point of view, whether it’s Russian or European,
that is authentic although it may
not be pleasant,” she says. “Sometimes it is
not only a question of that; not only does a
foreign player not have your perception of
threat, they have their own goals and interests
in mind.”
IT SHOULD come as no surprise that Israel’s
relationship with Russia is crucial,
albeit complicated – and it seems that Israeli
policy makers have much to learn from
their Russian counterparts. “The Russians
have much experience in developing strategy,”
she says. “They are adept and developed
in making links to defense policy and
the armed forces, i.e. analyzing the bigger
picture. We see it every time we speak to
Russian government officials or analysts.”
With Israel’s 70th birthday rapidly approaching,
she says that over the next 30
years, we would see a necessary maturation
of policy and the decision-makers
who implement it – including politicians
and strategic thinkers. “We are witnessing
systemic changes with regard to technology
and modes of operation and we need
to stay ahead of the curve. Policy analysis
will become increasingly important as we
improve our understanding of how different
countries operate,” she says.
Liran Antebi has a doctorate from Tel
Aviv University and her specialty at the
INSS is in advanced technology and national
security. The bulk of her writing
concerns unmanned systems – robotics and
advanced technologies – which influence
national security in a broad sense, and not
only on the battlefield.
Antebi says that the rhythm of technological
development is so rapid that the cumbersome
bureaucratic process of implementing
policy has no hope of keeping up. “Unmanned
technology – military robotics and
drones – allows decision makers to consider
different calculations before they commit to
a decision,” she says. “For example, when
the US president approves or rejects targeted
killing with unmanned systems being operated
from abroad, it is quite different than
when a crew might be involved in a particular
situation. Not having to worry about
their safety changes the way operations are
executed, influences how decision-makers
think and ultimately change policy.”
In her assessment, future battlefields will
not simply be about remote systems but
rather autonomous ones – almost without
human intervention. Autonomous weapons
systems have caused concern particularly
among human rights groups and have been
the subject of serious debate in the US since
2014,.“The battlefield of the future will be
much more autonomous, although that does
not mean that there will not be armies,”
Antebi says. “Many of the missions that
demand human intervention today will become
autonomous or automatic – and there
is a difference – with human involvement
being in terms of observation.”
Each of the researchers notes that working
at the institute is an exciting and personally
enriching experience, particularly
as their work and ideas have the potential to
affect policy. With regular and open access
to senior staff, including a former defense
minister, former Foreign Ministry officials
and academics, there is a dialectical atmosphere
in which a person’s relative youth is
not an impediment to their progress. Antebi
says she feels “lucky to be surrounded by
people who have greater expertise – and to
sometimes have the opportunity to influence
and change the world around me.”
THE JERUSALEM REPORT FEBRUARY 5, 2018 25

Women Researchers
INSS women who
make Israel more secure
By Maayan Hoffman
ORIT PERLOV and Donald Trump have
something in common. They both spend a
significant amount of time on social media.
While Trump’s total time on Twitter and
Facebook has never been published, for
Perlov it can be as much as 14 hours per
day. She is a social media analyst for the Institute
for National Security Studies (INSS),
where she follows and participates in discourses
on social networks in Arab states.
According to Perlov, about one third of
the Arab population in the Middle East is
actively using social media platforms such
as Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, WhatsApp,
Instagram – in the Middle East, and she
communicates and engages daily with many
leaders of public opinion in the region. They
are from countries such as Jordan, Lebanon,
Syria, Egypt and Tunisia, Saudis as well as
Palestinians.
“I am having conversations with them
and listening to the conversations they have
with others,” said Perlov. “My job is to feel
the pulse, bring Initial information, and understand
the nuances of these conversations,
to recognize trends, and write about them.”
These reports are being read by a variety
of government institutions, the IDF, as well
as the Israeli public. Perlov said she can
help put security threats, social unrest and
other events into perspective and sometimes
see security challenges and trends in their
early stages. Perlov, for example, was one
of the first to write about events in Egypt
and Syria in 2011 that eventually led to the
revolutions and the Arab Spring.
“Not every social unrest is an ‘intifada’
or ‘spring,’ though the media wants to
see these concepts, with attractive, simple
titles,” said Perlov. “I bring the complex
26
story and the nuances. My stories are a little
less sexy but a lot more reliable.”
Perlov’s research will be featured at IN-
SS’s 11th annual international conference
on January 29. Discussion at the conference
will center on the need to address the stark
difference that frequently exists between
illusion and reality. The social networks,
she said, make it possible for people everywhere
to express an opinion at any time and
freely influence the creation of news – not
infrequently through the manipulation of
facts. If public moods are what determine
policy, decisions that are taken are valid for
a short time only.
“You cannot rely on information only on
social media,” said Perlov. “You need to
combine it with other information from traditional
media, academia, and other security
sources. This combination maximizes the
ability to understand reality on the ground
better.”
Perlov has been at INSS since 2012. Before
that, she served as a political adviser
to the Israeli ambassador-at-large based in
the Gulf.
Perlov’s current employment with INSS
cannot be taken for granted. The organization
took a chance on a relatively young
woman whose specialty was – and in some
ways still is – a subject “that no one touches,
no one knows what you are talking about, or
how to digest it,” she said.
“They believed in me,” she said of her
employers, “and took a unique unicorn into
INSS.”
INSS continues to be a pioneer when it
comes to employment of women researchers
on issues related to security. According
to Pnina Sharvit Baruch, a senior research
THE JERUSALEM REPORT FEBRUARY 5, 2018
associate at INSS, between 40 and 50 percent
of INSS researchers are female.
Sharvit-Baruch heads INSS’s program on
law and national security and focuses on issues
related to international law, as well as
to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, which she
said has a strong influence on the identity
of the State of Israel and its international
standing. Her team has been evaluating the
various peace proposals – one-state, twostate
and everything in between – to propose
directions for progress toward better
containment of the conflict, as well as its
future solution.
“DURING MY military service I was also
involved in the attempts to reach a peaceful
resolution of the conflict with the Palestinians
and with Syria, as a legal advisor
to negotiations teams in the different rounds
of negotiation. My experience in this field
is very relevant to the different research
projects at the INSS on Israeli – Palestinian
relations. I have analyzed different aspects
of this issue, focusing lately on exploring
alternative ideas to the two-state solution.
I organized a round table on the one-state
option and another on the idea of a confederation.
I am currently working on a project
of mapping and analyzing all the relevant
options”.
“Coming from within the security system
I appreciate the contribution of the INSS
by providing research and in depth analysis
that are very important to decision makers
and to which there is often not enough time
to invest while in active service”.
Before coming to INSS, Sharvit-Baruch
served in the IDF’s international law department
for 20 years, including as its head

INSS
INSS
INSS
Orit Perlov Pnina Sharvit Baruch Sima Shine
from 2003 to 2009, retiring with the rank
of colonel. “The fact that I was involved in
providing legal advice to commanders on
operational issues enables me to analyze the
activities of the IDF and of other militaries
and offer insights based on an understanding
of the challenges facing the fighting forces.
For example, I carried out an in depth analysis
of the Report published by the Human
Rights Council Commission of Inquiry following
operation “Protective Edge”. This
examination revealed significant problems
in the report: a flawed legal analysis, an inaccurate
legal analysis, absence of relevant
expertise and a clear lack of objectivity. I also
share my experiences and legal expertise regarding
the laws of armed conflict in frequent
lectures and presentations given to different
delegations and groups, including diplomats,
researchers, journalists and students”.
She said that during her tenure, there were
only about 30 women colonels out of hundreds
and that there has only been one woman
in the rank of Major general in the IDF
up to today.
“There are always all kinds of excuses for
this,” said Sharvit-Baruch, who in addition to
her work at INSS, focuses her time on efforts
to promote women in the IDF through Forum
Dvorah: Women in Foreign Policy and National
Security.
Sharvit-Baruch has pushed for the IDF
to open positions for women that enable
them to progress in their military careers.
Then, after the army, these same women can
participate in hard-core security and counter-terrorism
research at the same level as
their male counterparts.
“Men don’t understand more than women,”
said Sharvit-Baruch. “You are either an
expert or you are not.”
Sima Shine said she agreed.
Shine, a senior researcher at INSS, served
as head of the Mossad’s Research Division,
a position never held before by a woman.
Shine has also served in various posts on the
National Security Council and served as the
Deputy General Director in the Ministry for
Strategic Affairs, responsible, inter alia, of
the Iranian file.
Women bring a
different view point
and sometimes
different solutions
and we don’t have
enough women in the
high echelons of the
security establishment
At the INSS, Shine focuses on what she
calls “second tier” countries, those that don’t
border directly on Israel’s borders. Days
before the Iranian protests broke out, Shine
and her team held a simulation exercise
with top US researchers to determine possible
outcomes, and to see what may occur
if Trump decides not to sign the waiver that
will allow for the continuation of sanctions
relief following the nuclear deal with Iran.
Shine said the simulation strengthened
the understanding that for Israel the immediate
concerns are Iran’s ballistic missile
program, its wider presence in Syria, and
support for Hezbollah, leaving the nuclear
issue for a later stage.
“THE SIMULATION found that the US
would not be persuasive at leaving the
nuclear issue on the side, and that all attempts
at negotiations with the Europeans
and the Russians would fail,” said Shine.
“So, while Israel would prefer to deal with
immediate threats, it did not work in the
simulation, and it is therefore likely that
Israel will find itself obligated to support
the American position.”
While reflecting back on her time in the
Mossad, Shine said that she was happy to
promote very knowledgeable and talented
women but, in some cases women chose
not to promote themselves because of their
responsibilities at home.
“When looking back, I often found myself
the lone woman around the table,” she said.
But Shine has a message to women interested
in getting involved in the security
arena: “We need you.”
She said that in the research field the
fact that women must balance, simultaneously,
so many diverse duties between
work, home, and children, gives them the
ability to see the bigger picture and connect
variant components in ways that improves
their evaluations.
Shine said, “Women bring a different
view point and sometimes different solutions
and we don’t have enough women
in the high echelons of the security establishment.”
For more information on all research papers,
please visit www.innss.org.il
THE JERUSALEM REPORT FEBRUARY 5, 2018 27

INSS Survey By Zipi Israeli
The National Security Index: An INSS public opinion survey
The Israeli public - Worried about
threats internally and from the north
THE NATIONAL Security Index is an indepth
public opinion study conducted annually
by the Institute for National Security
Studies (INSS). Since 1984, INSS has
tracked trends in Israeli public opinion on
topics associated with Israel’s national security,
including perceptions of the threats
and challenges facing Israel; the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict; the Iranian threat; Israel’s
northern arena; attitudes toward the IDF;
fundamental national values; the preparedness
of the civilian front; Israel-US relations;
the contribution of American Jewry to
national security; the role of the media from
the perspective of security; and Jewish-Arab
relations in Israel. Examining issues and
processes in depth and over time on the basis
of a broad and updating knowledge base,
the National Security Index constitutes a
singular resource on trends in Israeli public
opinion. It describes the attitudes, perceptions,
and opinions of the Israeli public on
selected issues and analyzes their significance
for national security, thereby attempting
to assist decision makers and inform the
public and media debate.
This year’s study is based on a representative
sampling of adult Israelis of some
800 respondents – men and women, Jews
and Arabs. The interviews were conducted
face to face in the respondents’ homes; responsiveness
in such a setting is high. The
survey was conducted in November-December
2017. What follows are some of the
most salient findings based on the answers
among respondents in the Jewish public.
The public is concerned over internal social
threats Graph 1
In recent years, internal social issues have
been at the heart of the Israeli public agenda.
Even with security-related topics, the public
has focused on internal aspects relating to
IDF activities and less on external security
threats. The study examined if, in light of
this, the public is more troubled by external
security threats or internal social ones.
The study found that internal conflicts are
of great concern to the public: 39 percent
are concerned by external security threats.
A large part is more troubled by internal
social issues (24 percent) or is equally troubled
by both types of threat (37 percent).
The greatest external threat – the northern
arena Graph 2
The study shows that 31 percent of the
public feel that the most significant external
threat to Israel today is the northern arena.
This finding departs from results of previous
years, when the public did not view it as
a significant danger. For example, last year
only 12 percent felt it was the major threat,
in contrast to the security establishment’s
assessment, which then attributed the major
threat to Hezbollah. The gaps may be understood
by the fact that last year, the topic
was barely mentioned in the Israeli public
and media discourse, and therefore the public
did not sense the threat in an immediate
way, particularly after a decade of peace
and quiet on the northern border. By contrast,
during the last year, the threat on the
northern border was much more prominent
on the Israeli agenda.
Regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,
21 percent of the population feel that this
is the major external threat to Israel. Compared
to the last two years, this is a decline
in the number of people with this perception
and a return to the percentage regarding this
threat before the “wave of terrorism” that
began in October 2015. In 2014, only 19
percent felt it was the major threat. With
the onset of the “wave of terrorism,” the
conflict was perceived as a central threat
that must be addressed. In other words, the
perception of the issue as a more pressing
threat was a function of the sense of immediate
crisis, compared to the prior relative
security calm.
Significantly, a combination of three related
threats – the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
(21 percent), Hamas in the Gaza Strip
(13 percent), and Israel’s isolation and
delegitimization (5 percent) – indicate that
a large part of the public (39 percent) still
think that the Palestinian arena represents a
significant threat. At the same time, by and
large the public is not troubled by Israel’s
isolation and delegitimization. This year,
only 5 percent felt this issue represented a
threat (compared to last year’s 13 percent).
The Iranian threat troubled the public in
2017 less than in the past (21 percent). This
is a consistent finding over the last three
years and seems to be an outcome of the
nuclear agreement signed between Iran and
the world powers in 2015. It seems that the
public internalized the experts’ assessment
that at least for the short term, the nuclear
agreement will not harm Israel and that Israel
can expect a decade of relative peace
and quiet on the nuclear issue. In previous
INSS studies (for example in 2012, when
the issue was front and center on the political
agenda), the public viewed Iran as the
most severe threat facing the nation.
Concerning terrorism against Israelis in
Israel and abroad, like last year, the Israeli
public does perceive the Islamic State
(ISIS) and other terrorist organizations as
significant threats (9 percent). The many
terrorist attacks in Europe around the time
the survey was conducted this year did not
affect the findings. In other words, it seems
that even with the passage of time, the Islamic
State and other terrorist groups have
not been assessed by the Israeli public as a
key threat.
28
THE JERUSALEM REPORT FEBRUARY 5, 2018

Are you more worried about the
external/security threats to Israel or
about the internal/social threats?
In your opinion, what is the gravest
external threat to the State of
Israel today?
INFOGRAPHICS BY IFAT ROSEMAN
39% 24% 37%
External/
security
threats
Internal/
social
threats
1
Worried about
both threats
equally
Jewish Public Only
31% 21% 9% 21% 13% 5%
The northern
arena (Iran,
Syria, and
Hezbollah)
Iran’s
nuclear
capability
Terrorist
activities
against
Israeli
citizens in
Israel and
abroad
2
The Israeli-
Palestinian
conflict
Hamas
in the
Gaza
Strip
Political
isolation
and the
־delegitimiz
ation of
Israel
Jewish Public Only
Will the State of Israel be capable of
successfully contending with the
following challenges?
Do you support or oppose the solution
of two states for two peoples?
55%
Support
85% 83% 71% 66% 58%
War on two
fronts
simultaneously
in the northern
arena and in
the Gaza Strip
Consecutive
major
terrorist
attacks
Social
polarization
Corruption
in the
government
system
The United
State reducing
its support of
Israel
45%
Oppose
Jewish Public Only
3 4
Jewish Public Only
In your opinion, what is Israel’s
best option in the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict?
39%
Striving toward a
permanent
arrangement
17%
Transitional
arrangements for
separation from
the Palestinians
Annexation of all
territories in Judea and
Samaria to Israel
Annexation of the
settlement blocs in Judea
and Samaria to Israel
15%
Maintaining the
status quo
18%
11%
In your opinion, what will be the
implications of another failure in the
political process between Israel and
the Palestinians?
25%
An intifada will
break out
19%
The
international
community
will force
Israel to end
its control over
the territories
Jewish Public Only
5 6
10%
Israel will be forced
to take unilateral
measures in the
territory, such as
annexing Maaleh
Adumim
46%
The status quo
will continue
Jewish Public Only
THE JERUSALEM REPORT FEBRUARY 5, 2018 29

The study also examined in detail the
ability to cope with threats of various kinds:
The public is concerned about Israel’s
ability to cope successfully with decreased
US support for Israel and with
corruption in Israel’s government and
establishment systems Graph 3
As in the previous year, in 2017, most of
the public feels that Israel will be able to
cope very well with external threats. Thus,
for example, 85 percent feel that Israel can
successfully handle a simultaneous war on
the northern arena and Gaza, and 83 percent
think that it can successfully cope with frequent
severe terrorist attacks. The public’s
high assessment of Israel’s ability to cope
with external threats is also manifested in
the fact that most of the public feels that the
IDF is prepared for military confrontations
(85 percent).
By contrast, the public thinks Israel can
deal less well with several other challenges.
The first challenge lies in the internal arena.
In the last two years, 60-70 percent of
the public felt that Israel can successfully
manage the polarization among the different
population segments. The public is now
less convinced of this than in the past, as
this figure represents a drop from 80-85
percent. Corruption in the government and
governing bodies also worries the public:
66 percent feel that Israel can successfully
handle this challenge.
The second challenge is Iran’s ability to
attack Israel with nuclear weapons: 63 percent
feel that Israel can successfully cope
with that challenge. This figure has been
consistent in INSS studies since 2004.
The third challenge is reduced United
States support for Israel. As in the last two
years, 58 percent think Israel can successfully
cope with reduced US support, but
a broader perspective reveals a change in
public opinion on this topic over the last
decade. For example, in 2009, 78 percent
felt that Israel could successfully cope with
reduced US support. It therefore seems that
the Israeli public is aware of the vital importance
of the special bond between Israel and
the United States.
In light of the importance of this challenge,
the study used specific questions to
examine stances on US-Israel relations.
The study shows that most of the public
(71 percent) think that the relationship between
Israel and the Unites States improved
over the last year. For comparison’s sake,
last year, at the end of Barack Obama’s tenure,
only 7 percent thought that relations
had improved. By contrast, the rest of the
public this year was divided among those
who felt that relations between the United
States and Israel had worsened (43 percent)
and those who felt that relations remained
the same (48 percent). Last year, most of
the public felt that the main reason for the
disagreements between Israel and the United
States was the interpersonal relationship
between the leaders of the two countries
and their different worldviews (60 percent).
Other findings reflect the public’s views
on the status of the United States as a world
power. More than one-third say that there
has been no change in its status as a world
power (38 percent), one-third feel its status
has risen (31 percent), and one-third think it
has fallen (31 percent). Most of those who
feel that the status of the United States as a
world power has dropped are worried about
this development, and think this represents
a problem for Israel (81 percent). On a related
note, a large portion of the public (47
percent) feel that given the changes in the
status of the United States and its waning
influence in the Middle East, Israel should
consider the possibility of forming a strategic
alliance with Russia at the expense
of the relationship with the United States.
Indeed, there has been an increase in the
number of respondents holding this view;
last year, the percentage stood at 38 percent.
Finally, many feel that US President Donald
Trump will be able to promote a significant
political move (55 percent). There
are no significant differences between right
wing, left wing, and centrist supporters on
this point.
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict: The public
wants an agreement and opposes the
status quo
Graph 4
Support for the two-state solution remains
relatively high: 55 percent of the public support
it. This is a slight decrease compared to
the findings of the last two years: in 2015-
2016, 59 percent of the public favored the
two-state solution. Support for the two-state
solution was consistently high and stable
from 2003 until 2013, both during crises
and at times of security calm, regardless of
the leanings of the government (above 70
percent). Even if there has been a decrease
in recent years, support for the solution remains
high − despite the political deadlock,
tensions related to various aspects in the internal
Israeli arena, the fact that the state is
ruled by a distinctly right wing government,
and the deterioration of the security situation
since 2015.
Graph 5
A clearer picture emerged from a related
question. Respondents were asked what, in
their opinion, is the best option for Israel in
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the immediate
future. It seems that most of the public
(56 percent) desire a settlement, whether
a “permanent settlement” (39 percent) or
“interim agreements leading to separation
from the Palestinians” (17 percent). Only
11 percent express the desire to annex all of
Judea and Samaria or the settlement blocs
(18 percent), and only 15 percent support
maintaining the status quo. A further specific
question discovered that a large part of
the public think that the status quo is bad for
the country: 56 percent feel this way, compared
to 43 percent who think that the status
quo is in Israel’s interest.
Graph 6
Although the majority of the public want
a solution based on an arrangement, a large
part think that, in practice, the status quo
will persist. Responses to the question
“What will be the ramifications of another
failure in the political process between Israel
and the Palestinians?” reveal that 46
percent of the public think that the status
quo will continue, 35 percent think an intifada
will break out, 19 percent think that the
international community will force Israel to
end the occupation, and 10 percent think Israel
will be forced to take unilateral steps,
such as the annexation of Ma’aleh Adumim.
It appears that the public understands that
a policy of passiveness is detrimental to
Israel in the long term. It would therefore
seem that when it comes to the perception
whether or not time is on Israel’s side, most
of the public feel that time is not on Israel’s
side and believe that the passive policy Israel
pursues and the political deadlock are
harmful in the long run. In other words, the
public senses the problematic nature of a
bi-national state and expresses worry about
this becoming a reality. It would therefore
seem that the Israeli public still wants separation
from the Palestinians one way or
another. If the Israeli government reaches
some agreement with the Palestinians, the
agreement would presumably win an even
higher percentage of support.
Dr. Zipi Israeli is the head of the National
Security Index project at INSS. The National
Security Index’s findings will be presented
in detail at the INSS annual conference
“Strategic Assessment for Israel,” to be
held on January 29-31, 2018.
30
THE JERUSALEM REPORT FEBRUARY 5, 2018

Books
Weapons of mass media
Yoram Peri's new book is a wake-up call to Israel
and other liberal democracies fighting wars By Matan Dansker
TOWARDS THE end of Operation
Protective Edge, I and 12 of my soldiers were
stuck for nine days in a small house in Gaza.
We had heard media reports of an imminent
ceasefire and yearned for home. A new soldier
brought us supplies and, thinking it would
boost our morale, shared a recent poll from
a news website that 80% of Israelis favored
continuing the war against Hamas. But there
was a disconnect between the mood of the
public and us soldiers on the ground. The
spirit of soldiers can have a direct influence
on the capability of an army to fight.
This is just one personal example of how
21st century media have the capacity to impact
the way we perceive and conduct wars.
Yoram Peri’s new book, “Mediatizing Wars:
Power, Paradox and Israel's Strategic Dilemma,”
which is currently available only in Hebrew,
examines the strategic challenges that
Israel and other liberal democracies face as a
result of what he calls the “mediatization” of
war zones. “Mediatization” is a term used in
communication theory to describe the process
in which society is shaped by the media.
Peri, a senior researcher at INSS, presents
a fascinating historical analysis of a subject
he has thoroughly researched and analyzed.
He differentiates between two kinds of media.
One is classic journalism that reports
facts and offers analysis. The other is "mediatizing,"
which perceives the press as an
active player in the political and strategic decision-making
process.
In the past, media played the role of updating
the public about what was happening
on the battlefield. They were there to report,
interpret and analyze a government's goals.
Now the equation has changed. Today, according
to Peri, government actions are directly
influenced by the messages, state of
mind, and perspective conveyed by the media.
The 24/7 news broadcasts and the competition
between television, radio and Internet
news sites, are not in sync with the slower
pace of war.
It is a well-known phenomenon that
pictures and videos of the battlefield can
INSS
The cover of Yoram Peri’s new
book in Hebrew
shape the way wars are remembered. They
are the tools that governments use to define
and sharpen their message to the public. The
raising of the flag at Iojima or the Ink Flag in
Eilat during Israel’s War of Independence are
just two examples of a government declaring
victory and the media reporting it. Today,
however, the photograph often stands on its
own, becoming the goal itself. The creates
a situation in which the media’s point of
view or portrayal of the battle can have a
significant influence how the war is actually
conducted. The “picture” that captures the
situation becomes the mission, which can
determine the outcome of the war itself.
The 2006 war between Israel and
Hezbollah, known as the Second Lebanon
War, is where the author pinpoints the
change between "media" and "mediazation"
in this region. Israel was unprepared for its
soldiers being equipped with cellphones and
cameras. These soldiers sent uncensored, and
often gruesome, pictures from the battlefield,
harming public morale, while Hezbollah
carefully controlled its messages to its own
audience as well as to the international
community, presenting pictures of Lebanese
citizens being bombed by Israel’s mighty
military on social media. This had a direct
negative effect on the war itself.
One of the most disturbing examples Peri
cites is an incident that occurred in the deadliest
confrontation of the Second Lebanon
War, now known as the Battle of Bint Jbeil.
A direct order was given by the IDF for its
troops to capture a house, raise an Israeli flag
on top of it and photograph it for PR purposes.
Rather than the picture becoming the
outcome of the conquest, it became the goal
of the mission itself. This set a precedent in
which soldiers' lives were risked in an operation
whose purpose is to advance a media
need as opposed to a strategic need.
The book serves as a wake-up call to readers,
especially in Israel. It shows how our mediatized
world (including both conventional
and social media) can give an unprecedented
advantage to those perceived to be the
underdog or the occupied. Israel's enemies
then have a head start in selling their narrative
to the world, and thereby influence the
war’s status by the smart use of media. They
understand that Israel’s Achilles’ Heel is the
complexity of the situation, which cannot always
be presented in a 20-second video clip
or soundbite.
We do not have to go as far back as 2006 to
realize that Israel’s great military power has
also become one of its biggest weaknesses.
This is what Peri calls Israel's “power paradox”
– the relationship between a powerful
country and its adversary presenting itself as
the underdog. This book, together with the recent
video of the Tamimi girls taunting IDF
soldiers in the West Bank and the constant
anti-Israel media blitzes by the Jewish state’s
enemies, such as Iran, Hezbollah and Hamas,
should trigger a rethinking process about
what must be done to counter “mediatized
wars” that pose a strategic dilemma not just
to the IDF and Israel, but to all liberal democracies
under attack.
Matan Dansker, a former IDF officer, is a
student at Jerusalem’s Shalem College
THE JERUSALEM REPORT FEBRUARY 5, 2018 31

Israel
LINTAO ZHANG / REUTERS
East side story
Fueled by unpredicted, massive, and rapidly growing Asian trade, Israel’s foreign
relations are steadily gravitating from West to East By Amotz Asa-El
DAVID BEN-GURION foresaw the future
in 1959, when he told the Knesset plenary
that the Soviet-American domination of the
world was “transient” because China and India
would replace the geopolitical duo.
Noting that ancient Israel’s foreign relations
were first confined to the Fertile
Crescent and then extended only as far as
Persia and Rome, Ben-Gurion realized that
the modern world was built entirely differently;
that Asia’s place within it would be
dominant; and that this prominence would
materialize sooner rather than later. “Two decades,”
he predicted in 1966, while fielding
questions from youths in Tel Aviv.
Indeed, it took not much longer than that
for both Asian giants to morph into economic
powers, and for Israel’s originally Western-oriented
foreign relations to start pivoting
East.
Ben-Gurion’s Asian vision was, to be sure,
ahead of its time.
Recognizing Communist China as early
as 1950 in disregard of Washington’s
misgivings, Ben-Gurion persuaded
China to announce in 1954 the imminent
establishment of diplomatic ties with Israel,
only to then see Mao Zedong change course
and fully back Israel’s enemies.
What began with utilitarianism – Mao’s
concern for ties with the Arab world and the
Nonaligned Bloc, co-founded by Egyptian
president Gamal Abdel Nasser – morphed by
the next decade into ideological zeal, as Israel
was part of the Western civilization that
was the Cultural Revolution’s antichrist.
32
THE JERUSALEM REPORT FEBRUARY 5, 2018

Chinese Premier Li Keqiang and Prime
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu oversee a
signing ceremony at the Great Hall of the
People in Beijing on March 20, 2017
A similar pattern evolved with India, under
the anti-Zionist Jawaharlal Nehru.
After first refusing to recognize Israel,
New Delhi finally did so in 1950, but it took
another three years for it to let Israel open a
consulate in Mumbai (then called Bombay),
while refusing to exchange ambassadors
with the Jewish state.
The situation was better with Japan, which
did exchange ambassadors with Israel in
1952, less than a month after the end of its
occupation by the US. Unlike China and
India, Japan was now an American satellite,
and as such lacked its fellow Asian powers’
urge to impress the Nonaligned Bloc.
However, Tokyo had economic reasons
to keep Israel at arm’s length because its
heavily industrialized economy depended
for its existence on Middle Eastern oil. Japan’s
leading firms, including its major automakers,
from Mitsubishi and Toyota to
Mazda and Honda, surrendered to the Arab
League boycott.
Israel’s ties with Asia were therefore initially
subdued. While altogether ostracized
by the Muslim belt that stretches from Afghanistan
through Bangladesh to Indonesia,
not to mention the Arab lands on Asia’s opposite
end, Jerusalem cozied with relatively
peripheral Thailand, Burma and the Philippines
while patiently awaiting a breakthrough
with the Asian powers.
Ironically, the only strategic partner the
Israeli economy initially found in Asia was
Iran, where Israel sold arms and food and
built farms and neighborhoods, while helping
Iranian oil’s transshipment to Europe
through the Eilat-Ashkelon pipeline.
Israel would lose Iran in the wake of its
Islamic Revolution, which coincided with
China’s abandonment of its own anti-Western
fanaticism, but well before all of this, Israel-Asia
relations would begin transforming
improbably, and unnoticeably, in unassuming
Singapore.
SURROUNDED BY hostile Muslims while
at odds with the Communist powers but also
unable to enlist Western governments to defend
it, Singapore’s urgent need for an army
was happily supplied by Israel.
IDF generals arrived in the city-state
soon after its independence in 1965 and
secretly built from scratch a powerful military
that to this day is considered the bestequipped
and trained army in its region.
Israel, for its part, emerged with a strategic
foothold in the Far East, forging a close alliance
that flourishes to this day with what
has since become one of the world’s richest
and most stable countries.
The Singaporean saga was followed closely
in Beijing, where Mao and his legacy were
giving way to Deng Xiaoping’s economic
U-turn and to alarm in the face of the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.
Moscow’s new unpredictability spurred
Deng to inspect the Chinese military’s hardware,
after which he concluded that an upgrade
was urgently needed. Realizing what
Israel did in Singapore, he began secretly
buying Israeli arms.
Initially administered through the Israeli
consulate in British-ruled Hong Kong, the
Israeli-Chinese relationship would quietly
mature while communism itself withered.
The consequent disappearance of the Soviet
Union and the Eastern Bloc, and America’s
emergence as the sole superpower, paved the
way to the great diplomatic breakthrough Israel
had awaited since its inception.
Israel and China exchanged ambassadors
in January 1992. The following week, India
said it would open an embassy in Tel Aviv.
The following year, Israel and Vietnam established
full diplomatic relations and Israel
also reopened its embassy in Seoul, which it
had closed in 1978 due to cutbacks.
The diplomatic path to Asia that Ben-
Gurion had mapped had thus been paved.
Now, with military traffic already bustling
along this route, the stage was set for the
commercial relationship that would soon
grow at breakneck speed.
THE ISRAELI economy’s Asian era was
launched by Japan, whose cautious investors
concluded by the early 1990s that
their fear of the Arab League boycott had
become anachronistic.
The turning points in this regard were the
First Gulf War, which, as seen by Tokyo, pitted
Arabs against Arabs regardless of Israel,
and the Madrid Peace Conference in 1991,
which gave reason to believe that the Arab-Israeli
conflict’s intensity was waning.
Japan, therefore, changed course.
Tokyo’s big investment houses began
sending delegations to Tel Aviv, signaling
that they now saw Israel as a diplomatically
safe and financially lucrative destination for
their clients.
Asian capital thus began arriving in Israel’s
fast maturing hi-tech sector while the
Japanese car models that Israelis had previously
seen only in Europe and America now
sparkled in Tel Aviv car dealerships and soon
crowded Israeli highways.
Asia’s newly rising powers arrived on the
heels of their Japanese role model.
With all diplomatic barriers collapsed,
Asian-made clothes, toys, electronics and
THE JERUSALEM REPORT FEBRUARY 5, 2018 33

Israel
white goods swamped Israel’s newly proliferating
shopping malls, while Israeli goods
– from foodstuffs and computer software to
military radars and avionics – flocked East.
By 2015, Israel saw, to its astonishment,
that its exports to Asia – which less than a
quarter-century earlier were negligible – had
eclipsed exports to America, comprising a
quarter of overall Israeli exports, and nearly
equaling exports to Europe, which in 2015
stood at 28%.
Though Asia’s share has narrowed a bit
last year, thanks to renewed growth in Europe
and the US, the general trend is clear:
Israeli exports are tilting East. This is already
obvious in Israel’s arms industry, whose $5.7
billion in sales in 2016 was dominated by
Asia’s 40.1% share, well ahead of Europe’s
27.5% and North America’s 19.3%.
Considering demographic and economic
trends, there is reason to believe that within
some two generations, most Israeli exports
will head to Asian destinations.
In terms of imports, China already sells to
Israel more than any other country, totaling
13.5% of Israeli imports at $7.9b. in 2016,
ahead of the US (12.3% at $7.2b.).
Hardly a decade after China supplied a
mere 0.6% of Israeli imports, it suddenly
seemed only natural that Shanghai-based
Bright Food bought in 2015 a controlling
share in Israel’s largest dairy food company,
Tnuva, for an estimated $1.4b. (the deal’s details
were not publicized), while investment
group Fosun bought cosmetics giant Ahava
for $27m.
Trade with India, while quantitatively
smaller than with China – $1.15b. in exports
and $800m. in imports as of 2016 – is even
more dramatic in its quality, as the same Israel
where India once would not even station
an ambassador is now its second-largest
arms supplier after Russia, having sold the
subcontinent missiles, radars, artillery batteries,
surveillance aircraft and whatnot.
A quarter-century’s worth of commercial
commotion was underscored by a slew of
high-profile diplomatic visits that in Israel’s
first decades were unthinkable.
Chinese president Jiang Zemin’s five-day
state visit to Israel in 2000 was followed
by five visits to China by Israeli presidents
and prime ministers, the last of whom were
Benjamin Netanyahu in 2017 and the late
Shimon Peres in 2014.
Netanyahu visited Japan in 2014 and Japanese
Prime Minister Shinzo Abbe visited
Israel in 2015; president Ezer Weizman
and prime minister Ariel Sharon visited India,
respectively, in 1993 and 2003, Indian
president Pranab Mukherjee visited Israel in
2015, Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited
Israel last July, and Netanyahu visited the
subcontinent in January accompanied by 130
businessmen.
The gradual pivot to Asia that all this traffic
reflects is also expressed in the Foreign
Ministry’s recasting of its outposts worldwide,
having decided to close its consulates
in Minsk, Marseilles, Philadelphia and San
Salvador, and open new ones in Shanghai,
Guangzhou and Bangalore.
That also explains Israel’s decision to join,
as a cofounder, the Asia Infrastructure Investment
Bank, a Chinese-led version of the
World Bank, despite American misgivings.
The relentless effort to create strategic
partnerships with Asian powers registered
one great failure, in 1999, when the Clinton
administration torpedoed a signed deal to sell
China Israeli-upgraded, but American-made,
Phalcon spy planes.
The cancelation cost Israel a $350m. compensation
fee to Beijing, and a broad retreat
from defense deals with Jerusalem, though
the two armies’ chiefs of general staff exchanged
visits in 2011 and 2012.
Israel thus received a humbling reminder
that with all due respect to its burgeoning
Asian ties, they must be cultivated without
compromising its most important ally, Uncle
Sam. Israel, therefore, sought a different kind
of strategic relationship with China. Having
found that formula within a few years, its implementation
is now well underway.
ISRAEL WAS not unique in buying toys,
sweatshirts or dishwashers made in China.
Similarly, what China bought in Israel,
scores of other countries bought here as well.
All this changed, however, when the two
countries set out to help each other advance
to the next phases in their very different economic
histories, with Israel selling China
educational goods and China selling Israel
infrastructure projects.
Chinese public works giants have teamed
up with Israeli companies in building the
Carmel Tunnels under Haifa and the Acre-
Karmiel railroad, and are now involved in
upgrading the Ashdod seaport and constructing
Tel Aviv’s subway.
Most crucially for Israel, China wants, and
is indeed poised, to build the planned Tel
Aviv-Eilat railway, which will be the greatest
infrastructure project in the history of the
Jewish state.
Israel, at the same time, set out to help
China realize its next national aim: to shift
part of its workforce from manufacturing to
invention, and thus transition its economy of
mass production to a post-industrial future.
Realizing Israel’s technological accomplishments,
China’s Tsinghua University
signed a deal in 2014 with Tel Aviv University
to create a joint center for research of
solar, hydrological and other environmental
technologies.
The following year, Haifa’s Technion-Israel
Institute of Technology was hired to build
a $130m. technological institute in Guangdong.
And in April 2016, Jilin University
signed an agreement with Ben-Gurion University
to establish a center of entrepreneurship
and innovation.
Several days later, East China Normal University
said it would open together with the
Technion a Chinese-funded program on its
campus that would specialize in neurobiology,
biomedicine and other fields.
Israel and China are thus forging a type of
strategic partnership the like of which Israel
never had because no superpower had ever
used Israel to cultivate its own industrial
development.
It is only a matter of time before this economic
and educational hyperactivity impacts
the Middle Eastern conflict.
China, India and Japan can do wonders in
this regard by imposing on Israel’s enemies
a peace deal while the US imposes one on
Israel.
This will be particularly true for Iran,
which vitally needs China to buy its oil and
gas, but it will also be true for Saudi Arabia
and the rest of the Gulf States. China’s leverage
in Tehran as a major petroleum buyer
also applies to Japan and India.
The day when Asia plays such a role in the
Mideast conflict may seem a distant reality
right now, but then again, it has only been
one generation since Chinese and Indian
ambassadors arrived in the Jewish state, and
but 40 years since Jerusalem’s lone strategic
partner in Asia was Tehran.
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THE JERUSALEM REPORT FEBRUARY 5, 2018

ALIYA BENITA LEVIN
Looking back at our first year
as ‘olim hadashim’
BENITA LEVIN
A man running with a wine bottle on his
head during the Tiberias Marathon on
January 5
AS I write this article, my family of four
is getting set to celebrate exactly one year
as olim hadashim (new immigrants) in
Israel. Clichéd as it sounds, the past 12
months have flown and the experiences
have far exceeded any of our expectations.
The words “If I’d known then what
I know now” come up often when people
ask about our first year as immigrants in
a new country. Here are some of my top
observations, after what many said would
be a difficult and tumultuous year.
If you give a child the freedom to be –
they’ll grab it with both hands
Up until the time we made aliya, my then
10-year-old son and 9-year-old daughter had
never walked or cycled alone anywhere. On
the second day of school in a new country,
they walked home together. No hesitation.
I have learned that if you give a child the
freedom to move around – without adults
in tow – they’ll take it on, without looking
back. They cycle to friends, walk in the
park and make their own arrangements, day
and night. It seems completely natural to
them. As a South African mom, I celebrate
it and often have to pinch myself when I
think about the incredible independence
they have at such a young age. The fact that
they’ve learned to speak a new language so
quickly is also a huge factor for young children,
as they immerse themselves in a new
social environment.
Our culture should be celebrated – and
so should our differences
We were warned about the culture shock,
when we arrived here. I now believe that
South Africans are among the most polite
people in the world. As a generalization, it
seems we have no problem waiting in lines
and we tend to voice our opinions diplomatically.
That isn’t always the case here! People
seem to be far more assertive and opinionated.
During the past year, we’ve met
people from around the globe – religious,
secular and atheist. How exciting to smile
at our differences and keep learning about a
range beliefs, customs and traditions.
South Africans support each other – no
matter where they find each other in the
world
There is no doubt, one of the hardest
things about immigration, is leaving your
family and your inner circle. So, the move
to Ra’anana was made that much easier,
by the close-knit South African and Anglo
community here. The welcome is overwhelming
at first – reconnecting with people
you haven’t seen in years, invitations to
people you’ve never met and regular messages
and visits from fellow olim. These
friends soon started to feel like family…
Must have – a healthy sense of humor
I truly believe that we all get to decide
how we respond to certain situations – we
can choose to get upset, let go of a situation
or … simply laugh. There have been
countless situations in the past year, in
which I just shrugged, smiled or both. The
time a woman ahead of me in the supermarket
line had a melt-down over a grocery
“issue,” the moment a shop assistant
whispered that we should try a competitor
because they had a “better deal” and the
time a coffee shop owner told me he didn’t
have any change in his cash register, so I
should just come back and pay the next
time I’m in the area.
An attitude of gratitude – le’at le’at
(slowly, slowly)
I have no doubt, no matter when one is in
the world, an “attitude of gratitude” helps
one each and every day. Every country
has its pluses and minuses. There is not a
day that goes by that I am not consciously
grateful for the way things have turned out
in a short space of time. My favourite saying
continues to be “le’at le’at” – slowly,
slowly. Aliya has taught me that you really
don’t know what is going to happen tomorrow.
I do know, we will mark our oneyear
anniversary here eating a shawarma
in a beautiful place with some very special
people.
Word of the week
- Magniv – cool, as in very nice!
Smile of the week – Watching thousands
of runners at the Tiberias
Marathon along the shore of the
magnificent Lake Kinneret – and
spotting one running with a bottle
balancing on his head. (I have
photographic evidence!)
THE JERUSALEM REPORT FEBRUARY 5, 2018 35

INTELLIGENCE REPORT YOSSI MELMAN
Inside a Gaza tunnel
Israel may be solving the problem, but is there light at the end?
JACK GUEZ / REUTERS
A general view of the interior of a cross-border attack tunnel dug from Gaza to Israel, near Kissufim, seen on January 18
THEY WORK around the clock, day and
night, in three shifts, except Friday, the
Muslim holy day. The diggers move 10
to 20 meters a day. They dig with small
drills, shovels and their bare hands. They
work underground at 30 or even 40 meters
below the surface and are supplied
with electricity, water, air and oxygen
tanks to avoid suffocation. Visiting one
of the tunnels reveals a planned structure,
supported by cement panels and cement
bows. No doubt, the diggers are brave
and risk their lives.
The tunnel I visited is nearly 2 kilometers
long and was built by the Palestinian Islamic
Jihad (PIJ), a smaller group than Hamas,
which has been ruling Gaza with an iron fist
since it came to power in a military coup,
toppling the Palestinian Authority in 2007.
Navigating underground in the right direction
is not an easy task. And the right
direction is Israel.
Digging tunnels has been one of the specialties
of Hamas in Gaza. The tunnels have
served two purposes. One is to smuggle
goods and weapons from Sinai, with the
help of the local branch of ISIS, to Gaza.
The second aim is to use the tunnels to infiltrate
into Israel.
Together with rockets, the tunnels have
served as the most important strategic measures
against Israel. During the last war
(“Operation Protective Edge”) in the summer
of 2014, Hamas managed to surprise
the IDF by penetrating Israel via the tunnels
twice and causing both casualties and
damage. By the end of the war, which lasted
nearly two months, the IDF had exposed
and destroyed 31 tunnels.
36
THE JERUSALEM REPORT FEBRUARY 5, 2018

In some Israeli quarters, mainly among
politicians, the tunnels were presented
as the biggest military and psychological
threat in the event of another round of hostilities
with Gaza. The IDF was less concerned,
but had to cave in to the public fears
and the politicians’ pressure.
All in all, after more than a decade of
ignorance and negligence, the IDF and the
Ministry of Defense have taken it upon
themselves to tackle the challenge of the
tunnels.
The IDF countermeasures are in three
areas. Together with the Shin Bet (the Israel
Security Agency, which is in charge
of counterterrorism that also covers Gaza),
intelligence gathering about the tunnels has
improved significantly. Investigations and
detentions of Hamas operatives have enabled
Israel to have a better understanding
and knowledge of how the tunnels are dug
and to where.
The second measure is technological. The
Defense Ministry subcontracted to Elbit,
one of Israel’s major arms manufacturers,
to develop advanced sensors to detect holes.
The third measure – the most ambitious
and expensive one (nearly $1 billion) – is
the construction of an underground barrier
or wall. It is made of a combination of
cement and bentonite boards strengthened
with iron rods and protected by water-resistant
bars. Each board has pipes with sensors
and monitoring devices to detect if tunnels
are being dug.
The boards are inserted (or slid) deep (the
exact depth is an IDF secret) – dozens of
meters – under the ground. When the work
on the barrier is completed by mid-2019,
the entire border with the Gaza enclave
(65 km) will be enveloped by the barrier.
Above ground, the barrier is supplemented
by a 6-meter-high fence with cameras, sensors
and observation towers. Although it is
at an early stage (so far 4 km of the barrier
have been built), the combined efforts have
proved to be very effective.
Since the last war, Israel has already exposed
seven new tunnels – five inside Israel
including the one I visited – and two others,
according to Palestinian sources in Gaza.
Senior IDF officers and Defense Ministry
engineers estimate that once the work is
complete, it will be almost impossible to
cross the barrier through tunnels without
being detected.
Indeed, Israel has now found a solution
to deprive Hamas of one its most important
strategic-military tools.
It is estimated that Hamas has spent over
the past years hundreds of millions of US
dollars on the attack tunnels project. Most of
the money came from Iran, which still continues
to invest nearly $100 million annually
in militarizing Gaza. The two beneficiaries
of Iranian generosity are PIJ, which despite
being a Sunni group is a puppet of Shi’ite
Iran and gets $30-40 million, while the rest
goes to Hamas.
“Hamas realizes that spending more money
on the attack tunnels project is going to
be a waste of money,” I was told by a senior
IDF officer. “Sooner or later Hamas and PIJ
will stop digging tunnels in the direction of
Israel.” He added that they will advance “a
new war doctrine by diverting their military
efforts – thinking, money, energy, and
equipment – to develop alternative tools.”
It is estimated that among these tools will
be efforts to develop a new air unit with
homemade small drones and quadcopters,
which are purchased in civilian markets,
disassembled, smuggled into Gaza and reassembled
there. Already in the last war,
Hamas flew two quadcopters, which were
downed by the Israel Air Force (IAF). Since
then Hamas has increased its efforts in this
area.
Other areas of interest for Hamas will be
to upgrade its sea capabilities, especially underwater
divers – which were also used for
the first time to surprise Israel in the war of
2014 – and forming commando units, which
will be tasked with assaulting Israeli military
positions and rural communities along
the border to compensate itself for the loss
of the tunnels.
Both sides continue to arm themselves and
prepare for a next round but, according to
Israeli intelligence estimates, Hamas has no
intentions of, or interest in, initiating a new
war. Nevertheless, there are two scenarios
which can lead to the outbreak of a war.
One is a miscalculation, as happened
in summer 2014. The other one is the
socioeconomic collapse of Gaza, which out
of despair and frustration, could push Hamas
to trigger a war in a Samson-like depression
– “Let me die with the Philistines!”
Gaza, with its area of 365 sq km and population
of 2 million – 60% under the age of
30 – is one of the most highly populated and
poorest areas in the world. According to a
UN study, 63.1% of Gaza residents live below
the UN poverty line, which comprises
an income of less than $3 per day per capita.
2017 was the worst economic year in Gaza
in the last decade.
The unemployment rate is nearly 50%.
Some 95% of its water is not drinkable.
Electricity is available only 4 or 5 hours per
24 hours. Sewage runs free in the streets.
The danger of spreading epidemics is high
and it is clear that neither sewer water nor
epidemics will stop at the border.
The Israeli military establishment is fully
aware that Gaza is on the verge of a humanitarian
disaster. But the top military echelon
is divided about the right solution to Gaza.
Some argue that Israel must allow a rapid
economic recovery of Gaza by initiating
some major projects, such as building a port
on an artificial island one kilometer from the
coast, and constructing a power station and
water desalination station.
But others, including the head of the
Southern Command Maj.-Gen. Eyal Zamir,
think that with a bit more pressure Hamas
will succumb to Israeli preconditions for
any economic assistance. Israel is demanding
that Hamas dismantle its weapons, accept
demilitarization and release two Israeli
civilian prisoners and two IDF bodies it is
holding. This shortsighted military school of
thought is backed by the cabinet and, above
all, by Defense Minister Avigdor Liberman.
When Israel withdrew from the Gaza Strip
in 2005 and dismantled its settlements, relocating
7,000 citizens, some fantasized that
Gaza had the potential of becoming a second
Singapore. Now it seems that it is closer
to becoming a failed region like Somalia.
And once that happens, it will, more than
anything else, be an Israeli problem. “Gaza
will never be Singapore, but it doesn’t have
to be Somalia,” the officer said.
THE JERUSALEM REPORT FEBRUARY 5, 2018 37

Jewish World
Auschwitz hero
A tribute to the Jewish combat commander who liberated the Nazi death camp
By Martin Sieff
WHEN RETIRED Red Army Lt.-Col. Anatoly
Shapiro died in 2006 at the age of 92,
he was rich in honors as well as years. The
governments of the Soviet Union, Russia,
Poland and Ukraine had all awarded him
some of their highest decorations for valor;
and he was well-known and respected by
international gatherings of Shoah survivors.
Yet in the 11 years since his death, Shapiro’s
name has been scandalously forgotten
by the public at large in Israel, the United
States and throughout the Western world.
Nor during his lifetime did he ever gain
in Israel and the West the renown of thousands
of far lesser figures. Shapiro was
the Red Army officer who commanded
the liberation of Auschwitz – and he was
a Ukrainian Jew.
As the world marks International Holocaust
Remembrance Day on January 27,
let’s pause to reflect on the life of this special
man who liberated Auschwitz.
Shapiro had not planned to become a soldier.
The son of a Jewish family in Konstantinograd
in the Poltava region of Russia, he
graduated from high school with a diploma
in engineering. He joined the Red Army in
1935 but also worked as a civilian engineer
in Zaporozhye and Dnipropetrovsk. He
saw action throughout the full four years of
World War II in the east, and was repeatedly
promoted and decorated for gallantry.
In the great 1943 showdown battle between
the Red Army and the Wehrmacht around
Kursk, he was seriously injured and had to
spend time in the hospital.
When Shapiro received his orders from
Maj.-Gen. Petr Zubov’s 322nd Division of
the First Ukrainian Front, commanded by
the legendary Soviet Marshal Ivan Konev,
to ready his elite 1085th ‘Tarnopol’ Rifle
Regiment for immediate action on January
25, 1945, he knew his force was being
tapped to liberate a Nazi death camp, but
neither he nor any of his men dreamed what
an infernal hell they were about to enter.
The liberation of Auschwitz was a far
cry from that of the infinitely smaller
death camps by the British and US armies
in western Germany from Dachau to Bergen-Belsen
a few months later. The Third
Reich had virtually been destroyed and the
SS and other Nazi guards at the western
camps fled for their lives at the advance of
the Allied liberating forces. But the war was
still raging in full fury in January 1945 and
the Nazis fought with demented fanaticism
to try and prevent Red Army troops from
exposing their most hellish secrets.
On the way to the camp, Shapiro’s 1085th
regiment ran into a minefield. A doctor and
five nurses were killed. As British historian
Michael Jones wrote in his acclaimed 2011
study “Total War: From Stalingrad to Berlin”:
“The following morning the regiment
encountered strong enemy opposition and
even had to fend off a counter-attack.”
Lt. Ivan Martynushkin, a junior officer,
told Jones in an interview more than 60
years later: “As we approached Auschwitz,
we had to fight for every settlement, every
house.” Yet as the 1085th’s combat journal
laconically recorded, “No one wanted to
turn back.”
It was in the early morning of January
27, after much heavy fighting, that the
1085th advanced into Auschwitz itself in
the face of ferocious Nazi artillery fire. By
11 a.m., Shapiro’s men had crossed the Sola
River and he gave the order “Break into
Auschwitz.”
The fighting continued to be fierce. Dozens
of Red Army troops died. Shapiro and
his men entered the camp.
The Nazis had evacuated most of the surviving
prisoners and sent them on a death
march toward the German border. However,
the camp still held at least 1,200 people as
well as another 5,800 at Birkenau, including
611 children
“The gates were padlocked. Snow was
falling and there was a smell of burning in
the air. Inside were rows of barracks but not
a person could be seen,” Jones wrote.
The Red Army men shot the locks off
the doors with their submachine guns. For
the next 60 years, Shapiro vividly recalled
what they found inside. Decades later, he
told the United Jerusalem Foundation in an
interview:
“I had seen many innocent people killed.
I had seen hanged people. But I was still unprepared
for Auschwitz… The stench was
overpowering. It was a women’s barracks,
and there were frozen pools of blood, and
dead bodies lay on the floor.”
Before the 60th anniversary of the liberation
of Auschwitz in 2005, Shapiro shared
more of his memories in an interview with
the Jewish Telegraphic Agency.
Outside one barracks, a sign said “Kinder.”
However, Shapiro recalled, “There
were only two children alive; all the others
had been killed in gas chambers, or were in
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THE JERUSALEM REPORT FEBRUARY 5, 2018

WIKIMEDIA COMMONS
the ‘hospital’ where the Nazis performed
medical experiments on them. When we
went in, the children were screaming, ‘We
are not Jews!’ They were in fact Jewish
children, and mistaking us for German soldiers,
evidently thought we were going to
take them to the gas chambers. We stared
at them aghast… This was the hardest
sight of all.”
Shapiro recalled that the Russian Red
Cross rapidly entered the camp and started
cooking chicken soup and vegetable soup
for the starving survivors. However, he
told JTA, “The people couldn’t eat because
their stomachs were like” – and Shapiro displayed
his clenched fist.
Hundreds of thousands of Muslim soldiers
from Central Asia participated in the
war against the Nazis and many of them
took part in the liberation of the death
camps. The full story of their service and
sacrifices in the defeat of the Nazis has never
been told either in Russia or the West.
One of them, Artillery Sergeant Enver
Alimbekov, quoted by Jones from a 1995
article in the French left-wing newspaper
“Liberation,” recalled entering a dark
wooden hut: “And then in the gloom, I
saw bodies, bodies of little children, everywhere.
Some were dead, others half alive…
I stood there, some of the little bundles
began to move – waddling, crawling, and
making strange babbling sounds… I froze.
Small hands, filthy, dirty – with no flesh on
them at all, just bone – clung to my boots.”
The mute testimony of the belongings
inventoried was as horrifying as the living
and the dead. Jones wrote: “When the
Red Army Lt.-Col. Anatoly Shapiro
clothes store in the warehouse was fully
inventoried, 348,820 men’s suits were recorded
and 836,525 women’s outfits. It was
impossible to count the shoes. There were
millions of them.”
Shapiro had commanded the liberation
of the camp. Another senior Jewish officer,
Colonel Georgi Elisavetsky, became its
very first commandant after its liberation.
His testimony is preserved in the excellent
Russian Holocaust Center in Moscow and
was also cited by Jones.
Red Army forces had only a fraction of
the medical and relief resources available
to the US 12th and the British 21st Army
Groups in the West, but the response of
Marshal Konev’s forces to the humanitarian
catastrophe they had uncovered was
exemplary.
Elisavetsky testified: “We knew immediate
action had to be taken… It is impossible
to describe how our doctors, nurses, officers
and soldiers worked – without sleep or food
– to try and help those unfortunates, how
they fought for every life.”
Jones noted that Red Army Military
Hospital Number 2962, run by Dr. Maria
Zhilinskaya, “nevertheless managed to save
2,819 inmates.”
After the war, Shapiro never lost his
faith in and love for the Soviet Union. But
following its disintegration, he immigrated
with his family to the United States in
1992 and settled in Suffolk County on Long
Island. It was only then that he discovered
the full extent of the Holocaust.
Already almost 80, the move opened a
new chapter in Shapiro’s life. He wrote several
books on the subject and on his own
experiences in his native Ukrainian before
his death on October 8, 2005.
This brave and outstanding man is buried
at Beth Moses Cemetery in Suffolk County,
Long Island.
THE JERUSALEM REPORT FEBRUARY 5, 2018 39

MARKETPLACE SHLOMO MAITAL
MARC ISRAEL SELLEM
Haredi men hold on to their hats on a windy day in Jerusalem
Ultra-Orthodox:
50 shades of black
COWBOYS! IN the small Western Canadian
community where I was born and raised,
this was the denigrating name given to the
ultra-Orthodox shlichim (emissaries) who
often came to ask for money. The image was
based on the wide-brimmed black hats they
often wore and still wear today and has morphed
into today’s “black hats.”
Not much has changed in more than 50
years. The Haredim (ultra-Orthodox) are
still widely scorned and shunned by secular
Jews in Israel and abroad, and their closed
lifestyles and rigid values are also widely
misunderstood.
It is time to take a closer look at the ultra-Orthodox,
in part because they are a
large and growing part of Israel, and also
because they are undergoing major changes
that are positive for us all. Beneath the
surface of the ongoing religious-secular conflict
lays a major new trend, one worthy of
careful analysis.
According to Dr. Gilad Malach, director of
the Israel Democracy Institute’s ultra-Orthodox
in Israel program, “The Haredi community
is adapting itself to the modern world,
but not assimilating into it.”
Within the Haredi community, there are
vast differences. The largest and perhaps
most extreme anti-Zionist Haredi community,
the Satmar Hasidim, is concentrated
in Brooklyn, where they compete with (and
battle against) the Lubavitcher Hasidim. A
large group of ultra-Orthodox are Litvaks
(Lithuanians), who reject the Hasidic world
view.
The entire ultra-Orthodox community has
50 shades of black. To better understand
how the ultra-Orthodox are changing and
progressing, I spoke with Dr. Reuven Gal,
former IDF chief psychologist and former
deputy director of the Council for National
Security.
Gal is my colleague at the S. Neaman
Institute at the Technion-Israel Institute in
Haifa. He is a rare sixth generation Sabra
(Israeli born). His great, great-grandfather
was Rabbi Yisrael of Shklov, the favorite
student of the Vilna Gaon. Rabbi Yisrael arrived
in the Holy Land in 1808 because the
Vilna Gaon said it was a great mitzva to do
so. Gal describes himself as secular, but says
his ancestry created “a soft spot in my heart”
for the ultra-Orthodox.
In 2007, Gal initiated the National Civic
Service – a framework in which Arabs, ultra-Orthodox
and the handicapped could
volunteer to serve their country. Gal worked
with then-prime minister Ehud Olmert who
called on him to build the National Civic
Service framework. Gal called it “service
without guns.”
Until then National Service had been
largely limited to Orthodox women, who
were exempt from regular IDF service. Gal
had to convince the ultra-Orthodox rabbis
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THE JERUSALEM REPORT JANUARY 22, 2018

(the gedolim or Great Ones) that serving
in hospitals, schools, clinics and welfare
institutions was consistent with the ultra-
Orthodox lifestyle. “To convince them,” he
recounted, “I had to get to know them and
gain their trust. I had a series of meetings
with ultra-Orthodox leaders and managed
to win their initial consent. How? I visited
them in their tiny offices. After a half an
hour or so, generally they excused themselves
because they had to lecture and teach.
I would ask, ‘May I join you?’ I joined them
in the beit midrash (house of study) and
studied a blat gemara (page of the Talmud)
with them. I could do this because in my
youth I went to a religious school, Yavne, up
to the fifth grade.
“In general,” Gal explained, “there was
suspicion of national service. Anything but
Torah study was bitul Torah, a denigration
of Torah. Unmarried yeshiva boys (bachurim)
studied Torah. Married yeshiva students
(avrechim) studied in the kollel (yeshiva
for married men). Sometimes avrechim
would ask their rabbi, ‘Is it OK to do National
Civic Service?’ In sharp contrast with
earlier times, the rabbis would not say ‘Yes!’
outright, but they would nod. Their gesture
meant, zol es zein, Yiddish for ‘OK, so be it.’
Within five years, by 2012, 10,000 Haredim
had done either civic service or IDF military
service.
“In 2012, we regressed,” Gal lamented.
“The Tal Law was enacted in 2002 and enabled
yeshiva students to defer IDF service
under certain conditions. It was named after
the retired justice Zvi Tal, who headed the
public committee that wrote the law, and
the law was renewed for five years in 2007.
The Tal Law was annulled by the Supreme
Court in 2012 as unconstitutional, in a 6-3
decision.”
Gal says this was a terrible mistake that
led to a decline in the number of ultra-Orthodox
doing civic service and IDF service.
NONETHELESS, THERE have been sweeping
changes in the ultra-Orthodox community.
Many have entered the labor market
and some 12,000 have enrolled in university.
This has led to a fierce controversy over
segregated classes (men only, women only)
in university.
Gal has a common sense response. “Primarily
Haredi men, who lack any knowledge
of English and math, need to do a mechina,
a preparatory year or two, to catch them up
and enable them to enroll in college. The
mechina should definitely be segregated.
It gets them used to the higher education
framework. But in college or university?
Those who choose to study in a regular university
understand that there is no possibility
of segregating classes and excluding women.
It just cannot be done! And eventually
they accept it.”
The Technion, he noted, has some 100
Haredi graduates. Though this number is
small, it is a proof of concept: Haredim can
become engineers.
Gal’s recipe for success? “If we do things
gradually, introduce change gradually, the
Haredim will adapt to it.”
Gal explained that the ultra-Orthodox
community is a unique “learning society.”
“There is no parallel anywhere of such a
society. Lifelong learning is their goal. The
reason? The Shoah (Holocaust).
“The Shoah left the ultra-Orthodox community
literally in ashes,” Gal said. “After
World War II, the rabbis, who led the remnants
who survived, pondered how to bring
those ashes back to life and light the flame
anew. The answer was given, prominently,
by a famous rabbi known as the Hazon
Ish (Rabbi Avraham Yeshayahu Karelitz),
named after a series of his books by that
name. He was a great leader of the Lithuanian
school and an outstanding posek (one
who decided issues of Halacha, Jewish law).
“The Hazon Ish felt that the only way to
bring Jewish life back to life was total utter
devotion to study, every minute of every
day, for every male, regardless. ‘Everybody
studies’ became the mantra. This led to the
phrase “toratam omanutam,” Hebrew for
‘their [only] occupation is Torah.’
“Generations later, two things are clear,”
Gal observed. “First, it worked! Out of
the ashes, the ultra-Orthodox are back, in
numbers and in spirit. Second, there is an
internal conflict. Based on the normal distribution
curve of abilities, not everybody
is capable of high-level Torah study. This
is increasingly recognized among Haredim.
This has created a serious problem of
dropouts. Some of the dropouts became
delinquents. There are creative solutions
like the yeshiva acheret (alternative yeshiva),
especially for these dropouts. But this
has not solved the problem.
“Half of the Haredi families live in poverty,”
Gal added. The average monthly income
in Haredi households is 12,816 shekels, or
$3,636, 35% less than non-Haredi Jewish
households.
“But increasingly, Haredim are saying,
hey, I’m smart enough to work in hi-tech, I
can be an entrepreneur!”
And indeed they are. After plunging into
the depths of Talmud, secular studies are
for many ultra-Orthodox men not difficult,
despite the enormous gap they have in their
basic math, science and English studies.
I once interviewed an ultra-Orthodox man
who was completing his Technion degree
in civil engineering. He told me that in the
mechina, he once asked the math instructor,
what is that cross (“x”) on the blackboard?
He knew no algebra, not even the use of
the symbol “x.” Today he is doing graduate
studies.
A look at the numbers reveals the sweeping
change the ultra-Orthodox community is
undergoing.
Israel is home to the largest Haredi population.
While Haredim made up just 9.9% of
the Israeli population in 2009, with 750,000
out of 7,552,100, by 2014 that figure had risen
to 11.1% out of 8,183,400.
According to a December 2017 report
published by the Jerusalem Institute for Policy
Research and the Israel Democracy Institute,
the number of Haredi Jews in Israel
now exceeds 1 million, comprising 12% of
the population. By 2030, that number is projected
to grow to 16%, and by 2065, to 33%.
The United States is home to the second-largest
Haredi population, which has
a growth rate on pace to double every 20
years, which is an unprecedented 4% annual
growth rate.
In 2000, there were 360,000 Haredi Jews
in the US (7.2% of the approximately 5
million Jews in the US). By 2006, demographers
estimate the number had grown to
468,000 or 9.4%. There are some 790,000
Haredim in the US and their growth rate is
among the highest of any population in the
world today.
In Israel, since 2002, the proportion of
adult ultra-Orthodox males who are employed
rose from 35% to 52%. Among
women, the rate has increased from 50% to
73%. But among men, between 2015 and
THE JERUSALEM REPORT JANUARY 22, 2018 41

MARKETPLACE SHLOMO MAITAL
2016, the increase in workforce participation
stalled.
In 2003, the average ultra-Orthodox woman
had 7.5 children. That number has fallen
to 6.9, but is still higher than that among
non-Haredi Jewish women today (2.4).
Some 82% of ultra-Orthodox over age 20
are married (63% among non-Haredi Jews).
Some 58% of Haredim are aged 19 or
younger (30% in the overall Jewish population).
In terms of high school matriculation
among girls in Haredi schools, the overall
percentage matriculating rose from 31% in
2005 to 51% in 2015. But among boys, it
dropped from 16% in 2009 to 13% in 2015.
Today’s ultra-Orthodox model clearly has
the women as the breadwinners, so the men
can study, and they largely appear happy to
do so. So the women are leading the charge.
According to the Central Bureau of
Statistics, between 2014-2016, 32.4% of
ultra-Orthodox women aged 20-30 were
single, compared to 18.9% a decade earlier.
For ultra-Orthodox men, the percentages
were 30.4% and 27.8%, respectively. The
women are marrying later so they can get an
education and earn a livelihood.
Between 2003-2004, about 61% of Haredim
aged 20-25 were married. From 2015-
2016, that number fell to 44%.
Ultra-Orthodox men may soon follow the
women’s lead in gaining secular education.
Writing in Ha’aretz, Tzvia Greenfield describes
a “miracle in Betar Illit,” a predominantly
ultra-Orthodox city of 51,000 in Gush
Etzion, near Jerusalem. There, a Hasidic
boys’ high school includes secular studies
and has its graduates take the matriculation
exams in English, math and science. The
school’s founder is Menachem Bombach.
“Only Haredim will be able to really appreciate
the daring and spiritual greatness
being demonstrated by the students of the
high school and mainly the principal,”
Greenfield concluded.
The ultra-Orthodox communities in Israel
and in the US are at once similar and
different. Writing in the monthly magazine
“Commentary,” Jack Wertheimer observed
that “rather than constitute a single monolithic
body, these [ultra-Orthodox] Jews
demonstrate that there are at least 50 shades
of black.
“In Lakewood, NJ,” he wrote, “4,000 children
were born last year into a Haredi population
of 10,000-12,000 families.”
The fertility rate of the Jewish population
of Lakewood is nearly four times that of the
residents of Jersey City and Newark.
“Within the Haredi world, the Satmar and
Lubavitchers retain men for a year or two
of post-high school Torah study and then
encourage them to begin earning a livelihood.
In other Hasidic groups, Bobover and
Skvarer, men linger for more years… sometimes
their entire lives. None of this would
be economically feasible were it not for
the remarkable social safety net constructed
by Haredi communities to support their
own. There are hundreds of aid programs,
gemachs, an acronym for gemilut hasadim,
the giving of loving-kindness,” wrote Wertheimer.
SECULAR JEWS have much to learn from
the phenomenal Haredi economic ecosystem.
Transportation, education, medical
care, cabs, ambulances, the disabled, fertility
treatments, support groups, help for the
bereaved, and an endless list of services all
exist within the community itself. While
conventional measures of poverty are based
on income, these gemach services make the
poverty far more bearable. Haredi incomes
are low, but many of the goods and services
they consume are cheap or free.
But the Haredi ecosystem has a price: The
community demands a high degree of social
conformity in return for its hesed.
The ultra-Orthodox work the system, legally,
in the US. They enjoy food stamps,
Medicaid, Section 8 rent assistance and other
subsidies. In return, they claim, their private
schools educate 150,000 students, and
so save the public coffers a small fortune
had their children gone to public schools.
The ultra-Orthodox work the system in Israel,
too. This is enabled by the fact that politically,
the ultra-Orthodox political parties
form the balance of power.
A new poll by the Geo Cartographic Institute
shows that if elections were to be held
tomorrow, Shas (the Sephardi Haredi party)
would elect four Knesset Members and United
Torah Judaism (UTJ), seven, for a total of
11 Haredi MKs out of 120. They form the
perpetual balance of power between the secular
Right and Left. And they leverage that
power with stubborn persistence and skill to
gain huge chunks of the government budget.
In January, the Knesset Finance Committee,
chaired by Moshe Gafni (UTJ), approved
an additional 278 million shekels for
Haredim in addition to 1.368 billion shekels
this year allocated to the independent Haredi
educational system and 800m. shekels for
Ma’ayan Hahinuch, the independent Shas
school system.
As this story was being written, a fierce
all-night battle raged in the Knesset over
the proposed “Minimarket Law” that would
give Interior Minister Arye Deri authority
to order certain stores to close on the Sabbath.
The law is regarded as primarily ultra-
Orthodox and brought bitter opposition. It
barely passed, 58 for, 57 against.
The Haredi MKs promise they are not
done. Their next battle will be to annul the
Conscription Law, which calls for drafting
all Haredim for military service.
So once again, war has broken out between
the secular and religious. The head
of the Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency),
Nadav Argaman, told the Knesset Foreign
Affairs and Defense Committee in late December,
in a rare appearance, that along with
Palestinian terrorism, he believes internal
dissension of ranks are among the greatest
threats to Israel’s well-being, ahead of Iran.
Among the ultra-Orthodox, change does
occur, but it is gradual, like the slow movement
of the tectonic plates beneath our feet.
From time to time, there are earthquakes, as
an impatient secular society tries to rush or
force change.
It is incumbent on the non-ultra-Orthodox
to reach out to the Haredim with wisdom,
understanding and patience to gently encourage
integrating their young people into
modern life, without threatening their core
values. And this is entirely possible.
If the ultra-Orthodox are on their way to
becoming a third of Israel’s population, neither
they nor the rest of the population have
any other choice.
The writer is a senior research fellow at the
S. Neaman Institute, Technion and blogs at
www.timnovate.wordpress.com
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THE JERUSALEM REPORT JANUARY 22, 2018

Israel
Learning to talk the talk
The Siah Vasig debating society celebrates its 30th anniversary
at a Jerusalem competition By Greer Fay Cashman
GOOGLE A speakers’ bureau list almost
anywhere in the world, and in the overwhelming
majority of cases, male speakers
on almost any number of subjects far
outnumber females. Is this because female
speakers are less inspiring, less convincing,
intellectually inferior or that fewer women
simply don’t apply to speakers’ bureaus to
represent them?
These questions derive from the fact that
there were as many, if not more, female
speakers as males at the annual Harry Hurwitz
Public Speaking Competition that was
held at the Menachem Begin Heritage Center
in Jerusalem in early January, and females
were well represented among the winners.
The competition, run by Siah Vasig – the
Israel Debating Society – and the Cohen-
Idov Center for Debate and Rhetoric is a
form of tribute to the late Harry Hurwitz,
an impressive public speaker himself,
who worked closely with prime minister
Menachem Begin and who, after Begin’s
death, conceived the Menachem Begin
Heritage Center and insisted that there was
no other place for it than Jerusalem, Israel’s
capital.
The South African-born Hurwitz was in
the United States with Begin soon after the
latter’s election in 1977, which spelled a political
turnaround for Israel, and was present
when Begin later addressed a mammoth
audience in Washington, DC. Begin had
said at the time that everyone knows that
the DC in Washington stands for District of
Columbia, but he had come from Jerusalem
DC, where the DC stood for David’s City.
Hurwitz, for the rest of his life, said that he
could hear the roaring ovation in his head.
Begin was also known as a master orator,
so this was yet another reason for the competition
to be held at the Menachem Begin
Heritage Center.
The Israel Debating Society, now in its
30th year, was conceived by South African-born
historian and political scientist
Ann Kirson Swersky, in an attempt to
change the culture of conversation in Israel
and to enable junior and senior high school
students to develop self-esteem, confidence
and the power of persuasion, and to enhance
their research skills and their abilities for
logical analysis, and critical and creative
thinking in the course of preparing their
presentations to be delivered in front of an
audience. Swersky, the chairperson of Siah
Vasig, moderated the event and introduced
a film on Hurwitz’s life and contribution
to Israel. Hurwitz’s son, Hillel, was in the
audience. Students were asked to choose
a topic under the headline, “Israel at 70 –
Groundbreaking events and people.”
Schools from across Israel participated,
and the competition was conducted in
Hebrew, Arabic and English. Director and
coordinator Bronislawa Kabakovitch, who
received loud cheers from the students
when she was given a certificate of appreciation
by Swersky, was happy to report an
increased participation by Arab students this
year.
Many of the competing students were accompanied
by parents, teachers and coaches,
as well as classmates, and it was encouraging
to see the number of hijabs scattered
throughout the auditorium at the opening
and closing ceremonies.
Due to constrictions of time, each individual
language competition was conducted
in a different part of the building, so it was
impossible to get a sense of the overall standard
of presentation, but the adjudicators
ISAAC HARARI
Ann Kirson Swersky (right), the founder
and chairperson of Siah Vasig, presents a
special award to director and coordinator
Bronislawa Kabakovitch
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THE JERUSALEM REPORT FEBRUARY 5, 2018

Tomer Dovzhenko accepts the first place
award in the high school seniors category
from adjudicator Yehuda Weinraub
ISAAC HARARI
said afterwards that everyone had been so
good that it was extremely difficult to determine
in each category who were the three
best speakers.
Although contestants were asked to observe
formal dress code, few heeded this
instruction. It was more common among
Arab girls and in the English-language senior
high school competition, in which there
were 10 finalists, the first and the last competitors
were boys – and each wore a suit
and tie.
This was a particularly interesting competition
because English was not the mother
tongue of any of the contestants, though
one or two of them may have had an English-speaking
parent – or both parents may
have come to Israel from English-speaking
countries.
All contestants in this sector of the contest
spoke without the benefit of a microphone,
and although voice projection was
listed among the tips that they were given
in advance, only the final contestant Tomer
Dovzhenko, who spoke of the influence
of the Israeli metal band, Orphaned Land,
enunciated very clearly and properly projected
his voice.
Dressed in a suit and wearing large hornrimmed
eyeglasses, he looked and sounded
more like a young businessman giving a Ted
talk than like a schoolboy. He was self-confident
and articulate, and had carefully
mapped the details of his three-minute talk,
which included background information
about the band, its innovation musically,
politically and culturally, and its influence
in these spheres in Israel and in the international
community.
He mentioned that Yossi Sassi, a founding
member and former guitarist with the band,
had invented a new two-bodied instrument
called the Bazoukitara, because it enables a
quick switch from an electric guitar to an
acoustic Greek bazouki. Dovzhenko also
spoke of the meaningful lyrics in the band’s
songs, which send a message of unity and
peace, mainly between the three Abrahamic
faiths of Judaism, Christianity and Islam.
He noted that “the members of Orphaned
Land are by far the most popular Israelis in
the Arab countries as of right now,” and its
fans had even nominated it for this year’s
Nobel Peace Prize.
“There is a beautiful analogy between Orphaned
Land’s music and the message they
spread,” he said. “They bring together and
unify contrasting communities, religions,
ethnicities, and beliefs.”
The 10 finalists included a student of
mixed Israeli-Japanese parentage, Dovzhenko,
with a slight Russian lilt in his English,
three Arab contestants along with Jewish
contestants of varied backgrounds, of which
two had traces of American accents, probably
because one or both parents were from
the US.
Before Dovzhenko made his presentation
towards the end, it seemed as if one of the
Arab students would be named the winner.
One thing that was common to two of the
three Arab contestants was that they did not
place themselves behind the lectern and read
their speeches. They had learned their texts
by heart, stood in front of the lectern, moved
around as they talked, had convincing body
language, and made good arguments. All
they really lacked was voice projection.
LEMAR ZIAN was the first of the Arab
contestants. She spoke passionately about
Shimon Peres and the Peres Center for
Peace and Innovation. It was not particularly
surprising to hear an Arab student speak
in such positive terms about Israel’s ninth
president because Peres had championed
coexistence, and through the Peres Center
had organized many events to bring Jewish
and Arab youth together, including Palestinian
Arabs.
The real surprise of the evening was Selina
Abid, who gave a brilliant presentation
on Israel’s national poet, Chaim Nachman
Bialik. She did this so dramatically that it
seemed she might want a future career as an
actress, but when asked about this, she said
that she wanted to be a psychiatrist. Pressed
further as to how come an Arab girl was so
well acquainted with Bialik, her reply was,
“I just love literature.” She placed second.
Third place in this section of the competition
went to Noam Lev, an eloquent young
woman who presented some hard facts about
the low salaries being paid to teachers, especially
new teachers, which – she argued – is
why so few potentially great teachers don’t
enter the profession, and why too many of
the people who do become teachers are insufficiently
qualified.
The auditorium at the Begin Center was
crowded for the closing ceremony at which
all the adjudicators sat on stage. Each of
the winners in the various sections was
announced and came up to receive their
prizes. Several of the youngsters were so
popular with their classmates that loud
roars were heard when their names were
announced. Girls won every competition
(from junior high to high school, in Arabic,
Hebrew and English) except for the
English high school seniors.
One group of adjudicators took longer to
reach a decision than the rest, and during the
lull, one of the adjudicators already on stage
commented that too many people speak in
clichés and slogans without putting sufficient
thought into what they say. But the
most telling thing that she said, about Israelis
and possibly about people in most countries
today, was: “We live in a society that loves
to talk, but not to listen.”
THE JERUSALEM REPORT FEBRUARY 5, 2018 45

THE PEOPLE & THE BOOK RABBI RON KRONISH
Parashat Beshalach: A Jewish
approach to war and peace
IN THE Jewish tradition, the Torah, the
Five Books of Moses, is read every week
in the synagogue and the portion for each
week carries with it a Hebrew name. On the
Shabbat of January 27, we read Parashat
Beshalach (Exodus 13:17-17:16).
This famous Torah portion describes the
Exodus of the people of Israel from Egypt,
with the “miracle” of the parting of the Red
Sea or Sea of Reeds, and the famous song
or poem known as “Shirat Hayam,” “the
Song of the Sea,” which became part of the
daily liturgy in the morning prayers over the
centuries. In fact, this Shabbat has become
known as “Shabbat Shira,” “The Sabbath of
the Song,” because of the centrality of this
poem in the biblical story of the Exodus.
Yet, this famous text in Exodus 15 has
some very problematic verses. For example,
the first verse: “Then Moses and the Israelites
sang this song to the Lord. They said, I
will sing to the Lord, for He has triumphed
gloriously; Horse and driver He has hurled
into the sea.”
How can God do this? What kind of God
is this that delights when some people are
thrown into the sea and destroyed? Can God
really be pleased with this action? Is God
one-sided? Does he want certain human beings
or certain peoples to triumph in war and
others to be the clear losers? In short, is our
God a God of war or of peace?
The interpretative Jewish tradition known
as the Midrash provides at least one remarkably
humanistic answer to this problem.
When the angels sang a song of rejoicing
after the Israelites passed through the Sea
of Reeds, God chastised them: “At that moment,
the ministering angles wished to utter
song before the Holy One, but He rebuked
them, saying, ‘The works of My hands are
drowning in the sea, and you would utter
song in my presence.’” (“The Books of Legends,”
edited by Bialik and Ravnitsky).
According to this idea, our rejoicing is
never complete if someone else needs to
suffer for our liberation from Egypt, both
physically and metaphorically. All human
beings are created in the image of God, and
we should not rejoice when any human being
is killed. This Midrash is so central in
Jewish tradition that it has been incorporated
into many contemporary Haggadahs, the
story that Jews read at the Passover Seders
in order to recall the Exodus from Egypt –
both the one in biblical times and the one
in the 20th century that led to the establishment
of the State of Israel.
Yet, the Torah text continues and becomes
even more perplexing. In Exodus 15:3 we read
the very troublesome verse: “The Lord, the
Warrior – Lord is His Name.” Other translations
render this: “God is a man of war.”
According to Rabbi Gunther Plaut, the editor
of the Reform Jewish commentary on
the Torah, this concept is natural to biblical
thought, in which God is Israel’s protector
and, if need be, will fight for His people.
But the Midrash had mixed views about
this. On the one hand, there was a notion in
Jewish tradition that God fights the war for
the Jewish people. So, for example, according
to the Midrash known as the Mechilta
– a line by line series of interpretations of
the Book of Exodus – we can see that God
fights Israel’s battles for them and that the
other nations of the world need to be aware
of this.
ACCORDING TO this view, which we
might call a “nationalist” viewpoint, God is
on our side, the side of the Jews, and He
will fight our battles for us. Despite universalistic
tendencies in the Bible and in many
places in the Midrash, this idea of God is
a more tribal than universalistic one. He
fights the good fight for his people. This is a
troubling concept and has undoubtedly been
one of the causes for many religious wars
throughout history, up to the present day.
This is, therefore, a highly problematic text.
Yet, the Jewish tradition tries to ameliorate,
to soften the concept, to add some
nuance, which is very helpful. Accordingly,
the most famous of all Jewish commentators
on the Bible, known as Rashi,
offered his own unique interpretation to
this verse by suggesting that even in war,
God is merciful.
This is a reminder to the Jewish people
and to human beings in general: Even if
war becomes “just,” i.e. a necessity sometimes,
one must be careful and humane in
waging war. Massacres or genocide or ethnic
cleansing are clearly not acceptable.
There are rules even for warfare, which are
spelled out later in the Bible (for example in
Deuteronomy 20:10: “When you approach
a town to attack it, you shall offer it terms of
peace”) as well as in later Jewish tradition.
The various interpretations above reflect
interpretations within Judaism with regard
to war and peace. Nevertheless, I would
argue that Jewish sayings and dictates
about peace far outweigh those in favor
of war. There are many classic Jewish
pronouncements about peace, which can be
found, such as, “If there is no peace, there is
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THE JERUSALEM REPORT FEBRUARY 5, 2018

PEPE FAINBERG
nothing at all, for Scripture goes on to say,
‘And I will give Peace in the Land’ (Psalm
26:6), which indicates that peace equals
all else. Indeed, we say in the morning
prayers, ‘When He made peace, He created
everything.’” (“The Book of Legends”)
In addition, our synagogue services are
replete with prayers for peace that ought
to influence the consciousness of contemporary
Jews. And many synagogues have
added special prayers for peace to keep us
mindful of our responsibility of seeking
peace all the time, for the Jewish people,
and for all who dwell on Earth.
So, I return to the question of whether in
the Jewish tradition, God is perceived as a
God of war or not?
“Nowhere [in the Jewish tradition] does
one find militant, angry, warlike or violent
images of God held up as worthy of emulation.
The sages carefully filtered divine
actions on their way to a more compassionate
understanding of God, and that evolving
belief shaped what they asked of the
Jewish people. The softer, gracious image
of God became the model to which to aspire.”
(Rabbi Sheldon Lewis in “The Torah
of Reconciliation”)
Furthermore, I would add that the idea
that traditional Jewish sources actually call
for peace and reconciliation – and not just
for conquest, occupation and settlement – is
unfortunately virtually unknown, or simply
completely sublimated in Israeli society, especially
in establishment circles here.
I wish that every rabbi in Israel – including
those in the Orthodox establishment
– would come to understand how central
these values are in Judaism. They might
even begin to preach and teach peace to
their congregants and to the Israeli public at
large! Wouldn’t that be a refreshing change!
And maybe even some of our politicians –
especially some of those on the so-called
“religious Right”– might learn some new
ideas, which would influence Israel’s search
for peace with our neighbors!
IN PSALM 43:15, we find the famous
verse, “bakesh shalom v’rodfeihu,” “Seek
peace and pursue it.” According to the
Midrash, “Seek peace, and pursue it means
that you should seek it in your own place,
and pursue it even to another place as
well.” (Leviticus Rabbah 9:9) Seeking
peace is not enough; one must be an activist
in pursuing it at all times.
Too many people in our part of the world
– especially in Israel and the Palestinian Authority
in recent years – have given up on
the idea of seeking peace. They live with a
mixture of denial and apathy; they live with
perpetual despair and they have lost hope
in their politicians, as is happening in other
countries, when it comes to seeking peace
(and with regard to other issues, such as
consistent and contemptable corruption).
But denial and apathy are not useful in
the long run. More people will have to realize
the benefits of peace, for both Israeli
and Palestinian societies, as opposed to the
dangers and delusions of ongoing war and
violence.
I, for one, have not given up on the idea of
peace. According to the Jewish tradition, it
is one of our most precious values. We are a
people who have kept the dream of shalom
alive for so many centuries. It is not the time
to ignore it or bury it now.
In Pirkei Avot (Ethics of the Fathers) 1:12,
we read, “Rabbi Hillel said: Be of the disciples
of Aaron, loving peace and pursuing it,
bringing them to Torah.”
We Jews are meant to be the disciples of
Aaron. Let us not forget it. On the contrary,
we ought to be leading the way toward
peace since it is one of our central values
and it is in our enlightened self-interest to
do so.
The writer is a rabbi/educator, blogger, lecturer
and interreligious activist who has lived
in Jerusalem for the past 38 years. His latest
book is‘The Other Peace Process: Interreligious
Dialogue, A View from Jerusalem’
THE JERUSALEM REPORT FEBRUARY 5, 2018 47

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