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Issuer PIN Security Guidelines - Visa

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• Transported clear text key components should be in pre-serialised, separate,<br />

tamper-evident, packaging or in a SCD .<br />

• If a key loading device is used to transport key components:<br />

– The device (or the part of it which contains the key component) should<br />

be a SCD<br />

– The device should only be operated by issuer authorised personnel .<br />

• Key loading procedures should ensure that:<br />

– All participating devices and connections are inspected for monitoring<br />

or tampering<br />

– key loading is performed using dual control<br />

– key components are only combined within a secure cryptographic<br />

device, e .g, a HSM<br />

• Keys should be replaced in accordance with the existing issuer key<br />

management policy3 .<br />

• Keys used in a production environment should not be the same as keys used<br />

in a non-production environment (for example testing or development) .<br />

• Keys should exist in the minimum number of locations needed for correct<br />

operation of the system in accordance with issuer security policy .<br />

• <strong>Issuer</strong> security policy should identify suspicious circumstances that indicate<br />

a key compromise (consistent with their own fraud detection systems and<br />

threat analysis) .<br />

• In the event of a suspected key compromise:<br />

– The key and its derivatives should be replaced immediately<br />

– Replacement keys should not be derived from the compromised key<br />

– The compromised key, and its components should be destroyed<br />

– All keys protected by or derived from the compromised key should be<br />

destroyed<br />

– Users of compromised keys should be informed of the compromise and<br />

change in key, even if the key is no longer in use<br />

– The decommissioning of compromised keys should be logged<br />

– The amount of time in which a compromised key remains active should<br />

be consistent with the risk to affected parties<br />

• <strong>PIN</strong> encryption keys should be used only for <strong>PIN</strong> encryption and not for any<br />

other purpose .<br />

• Reference <strong>PIN</strong>s should be protected using a different key to that used to<br />

protect transaction <strong>PIN</strong>s, both for storage and transmission .<br />

• Encryption keys should be unique to each pair of communicating nodes . .<br />

• The strength of encryption mechanisms should be sufficient to minimise<br />

the risk of security breaches through exhaustive key search or through<br />

cryptanalysis .<br />

3 Key change intervals should be consistent with the corresponding PCI DSS requirements for key change intervals .<br />

<strong>Issuer</strong> <strong>PIN</strong> <strong>Security</strong> <strong>Guidelines</strong> 3 3<br />

<strong>Visa</strong> Public © 2010 <strong>Visa</strong>. All Rights Reserved.

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