Issuer PIN Security Guidelines - Visa

– The keyboard is controlled by secure logic .
• The terminal should be designed to ensure that PIN management
data, cannot be accessed by an application that has been loaded in an
unauthorised way .
• The terminal should provide a “clear” key to correct single digit errors during
PIN entry .
• The terminal should be equipped with a privacy shield .
• If CCTV is used within the issuer location it should not be able to observe
PIN entry .
• The terminal and the operational environment should provide protection
against exhaustive PIN searches, e .g . by the terminal blocking itself or being
blocked after a suspiciously high proportion of incorrect PINs attempts .
PIN change by mail
• Cardholder PIN change by mail should use the same process as cardholder
selected PIN by mail .
IVR PIN change
• See section on IVR PIN advice .
PIN change using the internet
• See section on PIN advice using the internet
Offline PIN change
• The PIN change protocol should support synchronisation of the off-line and
on-line PIN (when an on-line PIN exists) by recognizing exception conditions
such as time-outs .
• Unless the protocol demonstrates that both the on-line and the off-line
PINs have been changed successfully, the offline PIN value should roll back
(where possible) to the original PIN value .
• Transaction protocols at ATMs should ensure that the on-line and off-line
PINs are always aligned . Thus, any failures, such as “time-outs” will result in
a “roll-back” to the original PIN .
• If an on-line PIN update has been completed, but the off-line PIN update has
not been completed for any reason there is the risk that the on-line and offline
PIN values are not synchronised . Issuers should implement procedures
to identify such a condition when it occurs and to display appropriate
instructions to the cardholder .
Issuer PIN Security Guidelines 4 7
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