My Reading on ASQ CQA HB Part V Part 2
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<strong>Part</strong> VH<br />
Indicati<strong>on</strong><br />
If the undetected failure allows the system to remain in a safe / working state, a sec<strong>on</strong>d failure situati<strong>on</strong> should<br />
be explored to determine whether or not an indicati<strong>on</strong> will be evident to all operators and what corrective acti<strong>on</strong><br />
they may or should take.<br />
Indicati<strong>on</strong>s to the operator should be described as follows:<br />
• Normal. An indicati<strong>on</strong> that is evident to an operator when the system or equipment is operating normally.<br />
• Abnormal. An indicati<strong>on</strong> that is evident to an operator when the system has malfuncti<strong>on</strong>ed or failed.<br />
• Incorrect. An err<strong>on</strong>eous indicati<strong>on</strong> to an operator due to the malfuncti<strong>on</strong> or failure of an indicator (i.e.,<br />
instruments, sensing devices, visual or audible warning devices, etc.).<br />
PERFORM DETECTION COVERAGE ANALYSIS FOR TEST PROCESSES AND MONITORING (From<br />
ARP4761 Standard):<br />
This type of analysis is useful to determine how effective various test processes are at the detecti<strong>on</strong> of latent<br />
and dormant faults. The method used to accomplish this involves an examinati<strong>on</strong> of the applicable failure<br />
modes to determine whether or not their effects are detected, and to determine the percentage of failure rate<br />
applicable to the failure modes which are detected. The possibility that the detecti<strong>on</strong> means may itself fail<br />
latently should be accounted for in the coverage analysis as a limiting factor (i.e., coverage cannot be more<br />
reliable than the detecti<strong>on</strong> means availability). Inclusi<strong>on</strong> of the detecti<strong>on</strong> coverage in the FMEA can lead to each<br />
individual failure that would have been <strong>on</strong>e effect category now being a separate effect category due to the<br />
detecti<strong>on</strong> coverage possibilities. Another way to include detecti<strong>on</strong> coverage is for the FTA to c<strong>on</strong>servatively<br />
assume that no holes in coverage due to latent failure in the detecti<strong>on</strong> method affect detecti<strong>on</strong> of all failures<br />
assigned to the failure effect category of c<strong>on</strong>cern. The FMEA can be revised if necessary for those cases where<br />
this c<strong>on</strong>servative assumpti<strong>on</strong> does not allow the top event probability requirements to be met.<br />
After these three basic steps the Risk level may be provided.<br />
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Failure_mode_and_effects_analysis<br />
Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang