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industrial cyber security<br />

CRITICAL MASS<br />

CRITICAL ASSET OWNERS INCREASINGLY HAVE TO PROTECT THEIR ICT INFRASTRUCTURES AGAINST<br />

CYBER ATTACKS. IT'S NO LONGER ENOUGH FOR THE SUPPLIER OF A SINGLE MACHINE COMPONENT<br />

OR SUBCOMPONENT TO CLAIM IT IS CYBER-SECURE - THE ENTIRE MACHINE MUST BE SO<br />

Quite recently, hacking group<br />

Xenotime reportedly started to probe<br />

industrial control systems of power<br />

grids in the US. Xenotime are the group<br />

behind the infamous Triton malware,<br />

designed to disable safety systems at<br />

petrochemical plants. This malware was<br />

used in December 2017 to attack the safety<br />

systems of an unidentified power station in<br />

Saudi Arabia. Dragos, which specialises in<br />

industrial control system (ICS) security, found<br />

evidence of Xenotime collecting open source<br />

research on targeted electric companies,<br />

externally scanning those companies'<br />

networks and attempting to gain access<br />

through either credential stuffing or stolen<br />

credentials.<br />

"The Trisis malware used in the attack on<br />

Saudi Arabian petrochemical plants and now<br />

recurring in probes conducted against US<br />

industrial control systems is just one example<br />

of the increasingly complex threats posed by<br />

modernising legacy software," says John<br />

Titmus, director EMEA, CrowdStrike. "Across<br />

many of these facilities, previously air-gapped<br />

systems are now being connected to public<br />

internet, in order to make use of internet of<br />

things (IoT) technologies.<br />

"This news highlights the critical importance<br />

of leveraging threat intelligence to mount a<br />

proactive, rather than a reactive,<br />

cybersecurity defence. For groups like<br />

Xenotime, who have proven their capability<br />

at acquiring, reverse engineering and<br />

developing attack packages for industrial<br />

control system equipment, reactive measures<br />

are insufficient to address critical<br />

infrastructure threats," he states.<br />

As supply chain attacks from nation-states<br />

and other cybercriminals persist in plaguing<br />

organisations and government agencies,<br />

the effectiveness of current cyber-security<br />

methods is called into question. "While<br />

individual components may be labelled<br />

as cyber-secure, it only takes a single<br />

vulnerability to compromise the entire supply<br />

chain. To remedy this and improve OT<br />

(Operational Technology) hygiene,<br />

continuous monitoring and enhanced<br />

detection below the OS-level is essential.<br />

Today, most security products remain<br />

blind to attacks that attempt to leverage<br />

vulnerabilities in, for instance, BIOS<br />

firmware. Accessing endpoints in this way<br />

compromises the entire system and can even<br />

persist across reboots and reinstallation of<br />

the operating system."<br />

Titmus believes that firmware and<br />

hardware-level visibility into these<br />

vulnerabilities and attacks is the best option<br />

for protecting the supply chain - and can<br />

even prevent attacks before they have a<br />

chance to take off. "Importantly, this level<br />

of visibility allows cyber security teams to<br />

discover dormant threats that have not yet<br />

been detected. Industrial networks are<br />

particularly at risk to these types of attack,<br />

since their security has often been neglected<br />

for years; malware can spread rapidly from<br />

individual infected devices to the whole<br />

office, to plants in other countries."<br />

30<br />

computing security July/August 2019 @CSMagAndAwards www.computingsecurity.co.uk

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