Clas Blomberg - Physics of life-Elsevier Science (2007)

Chapter 36. Higher functions of life 397
was important for my (free?) choice of career. Was my choice of continuing in the academic
world predetermined as a consequence of some ancient circumstances? Later I realised that
quantum mechanics didn’t yield a proper solution of the free will, and I eventually developed
the ideas I show here, denying any true free will, but also realising that the problem is
quite complex. What should be meant by a free will?
The question is evidently still with us. New Scientist in its 50th anniversary issue (18
November, 2006) presents a number of articles about “The Big Questions”. This includes
the free will problem, regarded as so big that it is treated in two articles by Churchland (2006)
and Vedral (2007). At the internet, one finds a bewildering number of comments and active
discussion groups that discuss the free will, mainly associated with determinism and the
question whether persons are responsible for their actions. Much of the discussion appears
to me quite confusing, often contradictory.
Basically, the problem is easily stated with Laplace’s statement in mind: Natural laws are
deterministic, which should mean that everything follows a predetermined scheme. What
will happen tomorrow is determined by the details of the state today, last year or millions
or billions of years ago. One cannot change what is to happen, and that also concerns our
mind. Free will is not compatible with determinism. Is this then saved by quantum mechanics?
It is true that quantum mechanics yields a kind of uncertainty, there are events that cannot
be determined by certainty but by some probabilities. However, these probabilities
follow deterministic laws. This can hardly change anything: the strange free will is not
solved by probabilities that follow strict laws.
There is a still stranger concept. Those that take this question seriously speak about a free
will that leads to actions not anticipated by anything that has happened. That are non-causal
and appear without any cause. What does that really mean? In physics, as in general in science,
it is very difficult to comprehend anything that happens without a cause. Can one really claim
that we make decisions that do not have any causes? Indeed, both New Scientist articles deny
this. Is a decision based on my thoughts and a choice of certain alternatives without causes?
Related to that are questions about responsibility. If there is no free will, as some people
argue, what I do is predetermined and I cannot be held responsible for what happens.
Others, the compatibilists claim that free will is compatible with determinism: there is still
a question of choosing among possible alternative decisions.
For me, this kind of discussion appears contradictory. One might assert in a court that a
criminal is not responsible for his deeds and could not be punished. On the other hand, the
trial itself must according to such ideas be predetermined as also the verdict. We may all be
marionettes in a play determined long ago.
But the question of responsibility also concern non-causal decisions. How can anyone
be responsible for decisions that do not have any cause, that are not caused by any deliberate
action? One can claim that actions of an acausal mind must lack rationality, must
lack reason, be in some way irregular, nonsensical. What should a decision without any
cause mean?
Clearly, the questions are very confusing with contradictory arguments. Can the problem
be resolved? There are many people who see these questions as motivations to use quantum
mechanics, and some who recognised that conventional quantum theory does not solve the
problem have gone on to further strange ideas. Penrose in “Shadows of the Mind” (1994)
proposes that one has to go to quantum gravity theories that may allow acausal events.