Harpoon 4 Naval Sitrep 37 Iran

Issue #37 October 2009

The Naval SITREP

The Journal of the Admiralty Trilogy Game System

Natanz

6 95

Operation Morvarid

Korean King

Many New Products

Special Offer!


Table of Contents on page 2

Naval SITREP Page 1

Doug Birtles (Order #25307632)


Table of Contents

Features

Bear Video 2

Harpoon Scenario: Operation Ha’lom 3

Briefing: Natanz Uranium

Enrichment Facility, Iran 6

Natanz Air Defense Plan 10

The Iranian Air Defense Force 11

Dedication or Obsession? 12

Gaming the Iranian Air Defenses 14

Air Data Cards for Ha’lom 17

Harpoon scenario:

Operation Morvarid 21

Air Data Cards for Morvarid 24

Annex A Listings for

Operation Morvarid 26

Operation Morvarid Game Matrices 27

Korean King 28

Departments

Product Updates 2

New Trilogy Game Markers 2

Special Offer:

North Head Kaman PTG 23

Movie Review: Admiral 30

Book Review: Raising the Red

Banner by Vladimir Yakubov

and Richard Worth 31

Cover: An overhead view of the Natanz

Uranium Enrichment Facility from

GoogleEarth TM .

Bear Video

Don Gilman sent a link to an hourlong

Russian language video of a Tu-95 Bear

mission. It follows the crew from takeoff

throughout the mission to landing, with

extensive video of the aircraft’s equipment

and even includes an F-16 intercept.

See http://shock.military.com/Shock/

videos.do?displayContent=193489&page=7

The first Tu-95 Bear entered service

in 1956, and there’s no indication that the

Russians are planning on removing them

from service.

Thanks, Don.

BT

Our next release will be Mal Wright’s

Convoy series, an operational - tactical game

of the Battle of the Atlantic in WW II.

Combining operational-level map movement

with a fast-play set of tactical rules,

the game lets players follow a convoy from

embarkation point to destination in a single

play session.

Both the map rules and the tactical

rules emphasize simplicity and fast play.

Mal Wright’s paintings have appeared

on the covers of other Trilogy games. Not

only are his paintings on the covers of the

two booklets, Deadly Waters and Convoy, but

color profiles of vessels from the Battle of

the Atlantic fill both books and the damage

cards which players use to record information.

The first release in the series will be

Deadly Waters, an operational-level map

game played in 8-hour turns. It will cover

Product Updates

the Gibraltar Run from January 1941 - December

1942. Included with the rules book

will be a CD with color damage cards for all

the ships and subs needed for convoy battles

in that period. This allows the players to

print out fresh copies of the cards for each

game, or they can be laminated for repeated

use.

Battles generated by Deadly Waters

can be resolved with Mal’s fast-play tactical

rules in the companion booklet, Convoy, or

resolved with Command at Sea.

Future map games are in development,

covering other parts of the Battle of the Atlantic

and the Russian convoys, and will all

be supported by the same Convoy fast-play

tactical rules.

Convoy and Deadly Waters will cost $48

and will be available by Christmas ‘09.

BT

New Trilogy Game Markers

Litko is now selling special Trilogy

system game markers. These purposedesigned

plastic tokens, varying between

3/4” and 1 1/4” across, are shaped and

marked to indicate special damage

conditions (“Bridge”) or ships status

(“Evasive Steering”).

The full set of 24 pieces includes

Bridge, Jammed, Steering, Illuminated,

Evasive, Datum, Fire markers, and one

“Special” marker. It costs $8.99 and is

available from Litko’s website.

These markers are usable with any of

the three Trilogy games. Litko has other sets

(“Flaming Wreckage” for instance), that can

also be used with Trilogy games. Visit www.

litkoaero.com for a complete catalog of their

game markers.

BT

The Naval SITREP is edited by Larry

Bond and is published biannually by the

Admiralty Trilogy Group (AdmiraltyTrilogy.

com). Price per digital issue is $3.00 US.

Article contributions should be sent to

AdTrGroup@aol.com. Include name, postal

address, and phone number.The Admiralty

Trilogy is a registered trademark of Larry

Bond, Chris Carlson, Ed Kettler, and Mike

Harris. Harpoon is a registered trademark of

Larry Bond and Chris Carlson. Command at

Sea is a registered trademark of Larry Bond,

Chris Carlson, and Ed Kettler. Fear God &

Dread Nought is a registered trademark of

Larry Bond, Chris Carlson, Ed Kettler, and

Mike Harris.

©2015 The Admiralty Trilogy Group

Naval SITREP Page 2


Harpoon Scenario: Operation Ha’lom


Location: Natanz Nuclear Enrichment

Facility, Iran (33°43’N, 51°43’E)

Operational Situation: The exact status of

the Iranian nuclear program is one of the

great intelligence issues of this decade. Are

the Iranians trying to develop a bomb or

peaceful nuclear power? Are they actually

capable of building a bomb? If so, when will

they be finished? How will they use such a

weapon? Considering the volatile rhetoric

from Iran’s president and the anti-Western

philosophy of its government, their desire

may be more than simple deterrence. Even

without the rhetoric, military planners must

look at a nation’s capabilities, not a just a

government’s public statements.

Or is the entire program a sham? The

Iranians could be bluffing, hoping for concessions

from the West in exchange for stopping

a race they only pretended to run. They

play a dangerous game, so far earning more

sanctions than benefits, and the unwelcome

attention of Western intelligence agencies.

Israel has the most to lose from an

Iranian bomb. Iranian ballistic missiles can

already reach Israel. Even a small nuclear

bomb used against Tel Aviv would cut the

heart out of the Jewish state. Two or three

bombs could cause a national collapse.

Israel has taken preemptive action

against other nations that were developing

nuclear technology. The attacks on Iraq’s

Osirak reactor in 1981 and Syria’s mysterious

facility in 2007 were meticulously

planned and executed, and completely

successful. The Israelis have been more than

vocal about the threat posed by a nucleararmed

Iran, and numerous government officials

have stated publicly that Iran cannot

be allowed to posses nuclear weapons.

To make its point, Israel staged a massive

exercise in the summer of 2008, sending

hundreds of aircraft against simulated

targets in Greece. The Greek air defenses

include the Russian S-300 SAM system,

which is the subject of intense and ongoing

negotiations between Iran and Russia.

The Israeli commander will organize

and execute the airstrike, while the Iranian

commander will defend the facility.

Environment: Attacker’s choice as to time.

It is assumed that the attack will not be

executed unless the weather conditions are

favorable, meaning no precipitation.

Israeli Forces:

69th Sqdn (The Hammers) w/24 F-15I

Ra’am

107th Sqdn (Knights of the Orange

Tail) w/24 F-16I Soufa

One Shavit Special Electronics Mission

Aircraft from 122nd (Nashon) Squadron

Two Eitan UAVs from 200th (1st

UAV) Squadron.

The Israeli player also has 70 points

that he can spend to customize his force (see

page 30).

Israeli Orders: Destroy the Iranian enrichment

facility at Natanz.

Israeli Intelligence: Refer to the Natanz Facility

Brief on page 5 for information on the

installation and a description of its defenses.

Mediterranean

Sea

Turkey

Jordan

Syria

Israeli Mission Planning: The strike must

cross another nation’s territory to reach Iran,

and the Israeli planners have elected to overfly

Turkey, based on many factors, including

amicable relations and the mountainous

terrain on the Turkish-Iranian border, which

will help mask the strike’s approach. The

Israelis overflew Turkish territory during the

2007 strike on Syria.

The geographic distance to Natanz

from Ramat David airfield, where the flight

will begin, is 1120 nautical miles, or 2240

nm for a round trip.

The F-15Is will be lightly loaded, and

the F-16Is are clean, for calculating endurance

(see the air data cards on page 18).

After takeoff, the flight will head north

over the Mediterranean and enter Turkish

airspace, with the goal of avoiding Syrian

territory. While the raid could probably

fight its way through the Syrian air defenses,

the Israelis cannot risk the Iranians being

warned of their approach.

The raid will cruise at high altitude

over Turkish territory. There is every chance

that the Turks will detect the raid, and be

unhappy about it, but little chance that they

would intercept or interfere with the raid’s

purpose. The Turkish leadership does not

want Iran to get the bomb, either.

(continued on page 4)

Iraq

IP

Natanz •

Caspian

Sea

Iran

Tactical Situation: This scenario assumes,

for whatever reason, that the Israeli government

has decided it must act to delay or

destroy Iran’s nuclear program. It will attack

the linchpin of Iran’s nuclear program: The

Natanz nuclear enrichment facility. Without

it, Iran cannot produce weapons-grade

uranium.

Egypt

Saudi Arabia

Qatar

Persian Gulf

Naval SITREP Page 3



(Natanz scenario, cont fm page 4)

As the raid approaches Iranian airspace,

it will descend to medium altitude 200 nm

from the IP (Initial Point), near Orumiyeh,

Iran. The mountainous terrain will screen

the strike from Iranian air defense radars

until they actually reach the IP.

Israel has five Boeing KC-707 tankers

in service. As the raid descends to medium

altitude, the tankers will top off their tanks,

timing the operation to finish just before

they reach Iranian territory. Their mission

completed, the tankers will return by the

same route to Israel, refuel, then take station

off the Turkish coast to await the raid’s

return.

At the IP, the raid turns southeast and

descends to low altitude, remaining at cruise

speed to conserve fuel. Those aircraft tasked

with fighter or SAM suppression would

break away (if they haven’t done so earlier)

and make their attacks, returning independently

to Israel.

It is possible the raid will be attacked

by Iranian fighters before they reach Natanz.

The escorting F-16Is will maneuver to

engage the Iranians while the F-15I strikers

stay at cruise. The F-15Is can accelerate to

full military power approximately halfway to

Natanz, or they can remain at cruise speed

to conserve fuel.

At Natanz, the attackers will quickly

climb to medium altitude and loft their

GPS-guided weapons at the targets. This

profile keeps them away from the shortrange

AAA that surrounds the site, maximizes

penetration of the GPS-guided weapons

(the loft trajectory will take the weapons

into the high altitude band before they

descend), and minimizes time at full power.

The strikers will need full military power for

no more than a minute for the climb to medium

altitude. The loft trajectory also gives

the GPS-weapons the necessary time to find

their satellite signals and guide the weapon.

Now headed away from the target and

clean, the aircraft return to Israel along

the same route. They may use full military

power for a short while during egress, but

would return to cruise settings as quickly as

possible.

This profile, with the outbound inflight

refuel, provides enough fuel to reach the

target and return to Ramat David airbase.

It allows 12 minutes of combat at FMP for

the F-16Is and 44 minutes of FMP for the

F-15Is.

Iranian Forces: The Pasdaran are in overall

command of security at Natanz.

Refer to the Natanz Facility Brief for a

detailed description of the installation and

its defenses.

The Iranian player also has 70 points

that he can spend on customizing his defense.

See page 10.

Iranian Orders: Defend the Natanz installation.

Setup:

1) Both players should review the briefing

materials. These include a description of

the Natanz facility, an article on the Iranian

air defense forces, and the procedures for

using the nodal air movement chart.

2) Both players choose from their lists

of special upgrades.

3) The Israeli player plans his strike,

while the Iranian player arranges his defenses.

The Israeli player has the more complex

task.

4) The raid takes off. While the raid

is enroute, the Shavit aircraft executes a

“Suter” (network) attack on the Iranian air

defenses. If successful, the attack will degrade

the air defense’s reaction. If the Israeli

player wants to make the attack, he rolls

2D6 on the following table just before the

strike reaches the IP:

2: Iranians alerted, +2 on the

GCI fighter table

3-6: No effect.

7-11: Network degraded, -1 on

the GCI fighter table.

12: Network hacked, -2 on the

GCI fighter table.

[Ed Note: If the players have a referee,

he should have each player roll one of the

D6, so they have some hint of the attack’s

success, but only the referee knows the true

effect.

5) The players use the nodal movement

chart on page 14 to resolve the raid’s

approach and the reaction of the Iranian air

defenses.

6) The Israeli player resolves the attack

on the target.

7) The players use the nodal movement

chart again to see whether the Israelis are

attacked on the way out.

Victory Conditions: There are no victory

conditions for this scenario. It is likely that

the Israelis will be able to cripple or destroy

the Natanz facility, and the players can use

the “Criticality Points” provided on page 7

to see what the damage is. But the military

result has a larger political purpose, which is

outside the scope of the scenario.

Aside from the level of destruction at

the facility itself, discussion points include:

• Israeli losses. How many planes were

lost, and especially what happened to the

pilots? Players can use section 8.2.1 of the

Harpoon rules to resolve the fate of any aircraft

hit in the scenario. Did they manage to

leave the scene? Israeli CSAR forces would

be in position for recovery. A captured

Israeli pilot gives the Iranians some major

political theater.

• Conversely, what was the performance

of the Iranian defenses? If they did not do

well, and especially if they lost several fighters,

the leadership could suffer a political hit

domestically. The Pasdaran is responsible for

the defense of the nuclear sites. If they don’t

defend them, they look bad. There can be

disadvantages for both parties for being so

politically linked to the country’s leadership.

Naval SITREP Page 4


Israeli F-16I Soufa, showing the conformal tanks.


• Finally, how hard was this for the

Israelis? IAF real-world planners are going

through this process right now. The ease

or difficulty of a strike on Iran’s nuclear

infrastructure may have a profound effect on

Israel’s actions.

Special Rules:

The Israeli player can choose the payloads

for his Eitan UAVs. Each Eitan can

carry one of the following:

1) Offensive Jammer, -20% on SAM

suppression die roll, SAM hit chances.

2) Jammer/ES combination. 3rd Gen

ES and -10% on SAM suppression table,

SAM hit chances.

3) Digital Transmitter (+2 on Suter attack)

4) Decoy (DRFM 4th Gen jammer

transmits radar signature of multiple Small

signature aircraft) -2 on GCI Fighter table.

Jammer modifiers are not cumulative.

GoogleEarth TM view of the Natanz facility showing the ring road and its light AA positions

Note: The AA strengths used in this scenario

use the new rules that appeared in issue #35

(Oct ‘08) of The Naval SITREP on page 9.

You didn’t really want to roll for each of

those twin flak mounts, did you?

BT

Larger view of the facility

marking the AAA

positions immediately

around the site and in

the surrounding area.

from Fortress Iran, by

Planeman


Naval SITREP Page 5


Briefing: Natanz

Uranium Enrichment Facility, Iran

General Description

The Natanz uranium enrichment

facility, along with the Isfahan uranium

conversion facility and the Arak heavy water

reactor, is one of the three most important

parts of the Iranian nuclear weapons infrastructure.

The Natanz facility is 160 km north of

Isfahan, and is located in old Kashan-Natanz,

near a village called Deh-Zireh, itself

located about 40 km southeast of Kashan,

30 km north-northeast of Natanz, and falls

under the jurisdiction of the Governor’s Office

of Kashan.

It was first revealed to the public in

2002, and since that time has grown from

a pilot enrichment facility to commercial

scale, with at least 7000 centrifuges installed

and operational.

Located just off a major north/south

highway, the facility can be seen from the

road. The facility itself is a square approximately

1.5 km across, surrounded by a ring

of light AA 3 km in diameter, with medium-range

SAM sites located between 7 - 21

km away.

The Natanz facility, seen from the highway, looking west. Note the mountains.

These are also several tunnels located

approximately 2 km to the south in a

mountainous area. Constructed in 2007 and

2008, a road leads from the facility to the

tunnels, and they may serve as a hardened

command facility, a storage area for enriched

uranium, or a really good place to grow

mushrooms.

Area Defenses:

These are controlled by the Iranian Air

Defense Forces:

1 HQ-2J/Sayyad-1 site 21 km northwest

1 Improved Hawk site 7 km to the

north. Another one 17 km west of Natanz

has been abandoned.

1 S-200 site near Esfahan

Arak •

Tehran •

Natanz •

Isfahan •

Local Defenses:

These are controlled by the Iranian Air

Defense Forces:

1 Tor-M1 battery with 4 TELs, a Rangir

command vehicle, and a Kasta-2E2 early

warning radar.

These are controlled by the Pasdaran:

4 Skyguard sites (two twin 35mm AAA

plus radar) deployed to the north and south

of the facility

25 twin 23mm and 35mm AA emplacements

surrounding the facility, plus 2

more several kilometers to the southeast

4 RBS 70 positions

A note on sources: The best and greatest

amount of information on the Iranian air

defeneses can be found at the Fortress Iran

posting at MilitaryPhotos.net.

BT

Naval SITREP Page 6



Annex N - Natanz Facility Target List

Dimensions Size Armor Damage Criticality

Description (m) Area (m2) Class Class Points Points

Original Centrifuge Plant - Centrifuge Assembly complex

A Quality Control and pilot centrifuge plant 60 x 45 2700 C 0 150 3

B Pilot Plant 2 60 x 40 2400 C 0 150 2

C Pilot Plant 3 60 x 45 2700 C 0 150 2

D Pilot Plant 4 (center building) 40 x 30 1200 C 0 150 2

E Pilot Plant 5 55 x 22 1210 C 0 70 2

F Pilot Plant 6 55 x 22 1210 C 0 70 2

Underground Facility

G1 Centrifuge hall 150 x 150 22500 A 17 + D10 400 6

G2 Centrifuge hall 150 x 150 22500 A 17 + D10 400 6

H1 Centrifuge hall 150 x 150 22500 A 17 + D10 400 6

H2 Centrifuge hall 150 x 150 22500 A 17 + D10 400 6

I Support building 70 x 90 6300 A 17 + D10 300 4

J Building covering tunnel entrance to the underground facilities 72 x 19 1368 C 1 100 4

K Administration Building 103 x 98 10094 A 0 200 3

L Power Plant 1 62 x 85 5270 B 0 200 4

M Power Plant 2 17 x 40 680 D 0 50 4

Underground facilities G, H, I have 2.5m concrete w/8 meters of earth overhead.

Using the conversion factors in Annex Z, (18:1 for 5000 psi concrete and 120:1

for soil):

2.5m/18 = 250cm/18 = 13.9cm of armor steel

8 meters/120 = 800cm/120 = 6.67cm of armor steel or 22 meters/120 =

2200cm/120 = 18.3cm of armor steel

Total armor rating = (13.9 + 6.67) x .85 = 17.5 or Total armor rating =

(13.9 + 18.3) x .85 = 27.4

Treat the two centrifuge halls each as two size class A targets next to each

other. Combine all the critical hits for G1, G2 and for H1, H2. Each critical hit on

the centrifuge hall will destroy 3D10% of the centrifuges (currently estimated as

3500 in each hall)

The Natanz facility has 56 Criticality Points. If it loses half of them (28), the

facility is “crippled.” If it loses 85% of them (48), which is equivalent to leaving

maybe a powerplant and a couple pilot buildings standing, the facility is considered

“destroyed.” There may be a few buildings left standing, but there’s essentially

nothing to rebuild on, a lot of the workforce is dead, and so forth.

A pilot’s view of Natanz, showing hills to the west, and the valley to the northwest.

GoogleEarth TM


Naval SITREP Page 7


B

C

D

A

E

F

K

I

G

J

L

M

H

Naval SITREP Page 8



Annex C5 - Natanz AAA

Range Max Practical Gun Ammo Gunnery FC AA Str FC

Country Name Barrels (nm) alt ROF r/b/m AA Str Mod Standard Mod /mount Mode FC Radar

PRC Type 85 23mm 2 1.3 Low 200 0.1 1 3 .85 0.2 OP --

PRC Type 90 35mm 2 1.7 Low 100 0.2 1 5 1.5 0.5 RA, OP Type 902

PRC Type 90 35mm (optical only) 2 1.7 Low 100 0.2 1 3 1 0.3 OP --

The Type 85 23mm is a Chinese copy of the Russian ZSU-23-2. Its performance is the same as the Russian model. It is optically aimed.

The Type 90 35mm is a copy of the Swiss Oerlikon KDA 35mm, and the Type 902 FC radar is a copy of the Skyguard radar.

Annex D2 - Natanz SAMs

ATA Range Max Max Alt Min Alt Speed Engagem./ FC

Country Name Guidance Gen Rating (nm) Alt (m) Band Band (kts) battery Modes IOC

PRC HQ-2J/Sayyad-1 Cmd 2 2.0 4.3 - 16.2 27000 VHi Low 1650 1@3 msls RA, OP 1985

Russia 9M331 Tor-M1 [SA-15 Gauntlet] Cmd 3 6.0 0.8 - 8.1 6000 Med NOE 1675 8@2 msls RA, EO(D) 1989

Russia S-200VE Vega-E

[SA-5b Gammon] Cmd/TSARH 2 2.5 9.2 - 135 29000 VHi Low 2865 1@2 msls RA 1971

Sweden RBS 70 Laser Beam-R 2 4.5 0.3 - 2.7 3000 Low NOE 660 4@1 msl EO (D/N) 1977

USA Improved Hawk (I-Hawk) SARH 2 4.5 0.8 - 21.6 17700 VHi NOE 1550 1@3 msls RA 1971

Annex J2 - Natanz Missile Search Radars

Range

Country System Function Gen Large Medium Small VSmall Stealthy Remarks

Russia Scrum Half AS, MFC 3 22 16 11 4.4 1.3 Tor-M1 acqn & guidance

Russia Kasta-2E2 3D 3 81 81 61 24 7 Tor-M1 early warning

Kasta-2E2 mobile early-warning radar

www.ausairpower.net


Naval SITREP Page 9


Natanz Air Defense Plan

The large number of air defense weapons and the importance

of the Natanz facility mandates a separate commander

for air defense. He is Pasdaran, since they control the nuclear

program, but he has to coordinate with the Iranian Air

Defense Forces (IADF), both the local SAM sites, all manned

by IADF personnel, and the sector operations center for the

Kashan area. Since there are no dedicated air search radars in

the Natanz facility, any warning of attack will have to come

through IADF channels or through the acquisition radars on

the local SAM systems.

Any IADF attack warning has to be routed from the

air defense radar making the detection to sector operations

center, to the air defense operations center in Tehran, to the

national-level Pasdaran staff, who notify the local Natanz

commander.

The defenses can be grouped into three categories:

• The light AAA complicates an attack at low altitude.

This is less of a problem than it used to be, because many

PGMs are best delivered from Medium or High altitude,

especially to maximize penetration. The defenses themselves

are less impressive than they could be, because only a fraction

of the guns are radar-guided, and there is nothing larger than

35mm.

• The older SAMs (I-Hawk, HQ-2) are not a big problem

for the attackers, given Israeli expertise in electronic warfare

and the vulnerability of the sites to ARMs, and because

they are static, to GPS-guided weapons.

• The newer Russian SAMs are the only real defense

against aircraft attack. They have two advantages:

First, as more modern systems, they will be harder for

attackers to jam or decoy.

Second, as mobile systems the attackers cannot be sure

of their position, and cannot use prebriefed GPS-guided munitions

to attack them. The need to find their position allows

the defenders a chance to gain warning time and perhaps

even an early kill.

Type 80/ZU-23-2 23mm at Natanz

Variable Setup Options for the Iranian Defender

The player has 70 points to spend on upgrades:

Improved chance of fighter intercept

Effective GPS jammers to reduce air ordnance accuracy (-20% modifier)

Type 902/Skyguard radars upgraded with Indian technology (GS 6)

(Iran tried to buy this, but India turned them down)

GS5 2-gun battery: .46 * 2 = 0.9

GS6 2-gun battery: .54 * 2 = 1.1

Skyguard sites expanded to 6-gun batteries

GS5 6-gun battery: .46 * 6 = 2.8

GS6 6-gun battery: .54 * 6 = 3.2

AHEAD Ammunition for 35mm guns (AA value x4)

Type 59/S-60 57mm AA battery w/FC radar

Type 59 57mm/71 6-gun battery w/Fire Can radar: GS4, 0.8

Standing combat air patrol of 2 F-4E over Natanz

30 points per +1 on GCI fighter table

40 points

10 points per battery


30 points


30 points

Naval SITREP Page 10


The Iranian Air Defense Force


In February of 2009, Iran created a

separate armed service, the Air Defense

Force. Like the former Soviet Union’s

Voyska PVO, it is designed to bring all air

defense resources into a single integrated

command. It controls all air defense radars,

“military intelligence gathering equipment,”

(like the Kolchuga passive detection sites),

and SAM and AAA installations. It also has

operational control of fighters on intercept

missions.

Although the new service has taken

units from both the regular air force and

the Pasdaran, the new force is commanded

by a regular armed forces brigadier general.

Given the friction between the Pasdaran and

the Artesh, or regular armed forces, coordination

between the national air defense

forces and any local defenders may be poor.

Information from the Air Defense Forces

may not be passed at the local or even sector

level, but only between the national-level

headquarters.

The new service controls an amazing

mix of western, Russian/Chinese and European

equipment.

Sensors

The service operates U.S. and British

radars provided in the 1950s and 1960s,

Russian radars from the 1980s, and most

recently in the 1990s, Chinese JY-14 air

search radars. Although purchased only ten

years ago, the JY-14s are third-generation

technology, from the 70s and 80s.

Iran may have purchased one or more

of the Ukranian Kolchuga passive electronic

sensors. This system uses several antennas

spaced over tens of kilometers to automatically

triangulate the position of airborne

emitters, including not just radar, but

communications frequencies, even datalinks.

Attacking aircraft will have to remain

completely silent electonically to remain

undetected.

Iran has a bigger problem than the

age of its radars. The mountainous terrain,

especially along its western border, creates

serious gaps in radar coverage. It is possible,

especially along the border with Turkey, for

aircraft to fly at medium altitude close to

the border without being detected.

The best way to overcome rough terrain

along the border is with airborne early

warning radars. But building AEW aircraft

are beyond Iran’s capabilities. The Iraqi aircraft

“donated” to Iran during Desert Storm


could not be made operational. Current

sanctions also prevent her from purchasing

AEW aircraft abroad.

There are numerous reports of Iran

using F-14s as “mini-AWACS” during the

Iran-Iraq War. Even today, over thirty years

after the aircraft entered service with the

IIAF, the AWG-9 radar is still the most

powerful airborne radar they have.

With the Phoenix missile long past its

shelf life, the best use the Iranians could

make of flyable aircraft with operating radars

is as “gapfillers,” on patrol along threat

axes or covering known blind spots. Patrolling

during a time of tension, or launched

on warning of an incoming raid, the F-14s

might be the ones to spot an incoming enemy

using the terrain to mask his approach.

While the F-14s would be armed with a

few heat-seekers for self-defense, they would

remain well back from any intruder, instead

guiding fighters to an intercept.

Surface-to-Air Missiles

Since ground control intercept (GCI)

directed fighters will probably not reach an

enemy strike before they bomb the target,

Iran has based their air defense on layered

SAM sites.

The Russian S-200VE Vega-E [SA-5b

Gammon] is the first line of defense. There

are six fixed S-200VE sites in Iran - three

near Tehran, and one each at Esfahan,

Bushehr, and Bandar Abbas. Each site has

only two launchers, which restricts each

battery to only one engagement during a

scenario, since Iranian SAM units typically

fire two missiles at each target and reloading

is outside the scope of a tactical scenario.

Each S-200 site is supported by a

P-37M [Bar Lock D] early warning radar,

a PRV-13 [Odd Pair] height finding radar,

and one 5N62 [Square Pair] engagement

radar. While formidable on paper, the S-200

was designed to engage high-flying strategic

bombers and is not as effective against agile,

low flying tactical aircraft.

The remaining SAM systems are placed

around high-priority government and

nuclear-related sites for point defense. The

most common SAM systems used by the

Iranian forces are the MIM-23B Improved

Hawk and the Chinese HQ-2J Guideline (a

improved version of the Russian SA-2).

As an incoming raid closes in on Natanz,

they could encounter either an I-Hawk

or an HQ-2J battery, depending on their

line of approach. The Israeli player will be

able to choose his route. They will also come

within range of the S-200 battery at Isfahan.

The HQ-2J SAM system is supported

by a P-18 [Spoon Rest D] early warning

radar, a PRV-11 [Side Net] height finder

radar, and one SJ-202 [Gin Sling B] engagement

radar. The I-Hawk system uses several

acquisition and tracking radars (MPQ-48,

49, 50, and 51) and a single MPQ-46 High

Powered Illuminator.

Each SAM site has three launchers, and

can engage one target with three missiles.

Reloading SAM launchers is outside the

scope of the scenario.

Despite extensive discussions between

Russia and Iran regarding purchase of the

modern S-300PMU2 SAM system, there

is still no hard evidence that a delivery has

been made. Reports of Iran purchasing the

HQ-9 (the PRC copy of the S-300) are also

unconfirmed.

Other SAM systems deployed in lesser

numbers include the SA-6 (by the Pasdaran)

and the FM-80, a Chinese copy of the

French Crotale. These were purchased in

limited numbers in the late 80s and early

90s, but are not in widespread use.

Iran also purchased a small number of

Rapier SAMs from Britain in the mid-

1970s, but the purchase was interrupted by

the revolution and only a few systems were

delivered.

There are reports of U.S.-made Standard

missiles, first carried aboard Iranian

naval vessels as SSMs, being adapted in

boxes on I-Hawk launcher pedestals as the

Fajir system. The numbers and operational

status of the system is unknown.

Iran also has several different MAN-

PADS systems. The most numerous are

PRC-built systems, but they may also

include some Swedish RBS 70s.

Iran does not possess enough longrange

SAMs to create a complete SAM

belt along its border. Combined with her

less-than complete radar coverage, they are

unable to support each other. It is possible

for an attacker to either avoid some defenses

or defeat them in detail.

Small Batteries

Unfortunately, all of Iran’s SAM units

use understrength batteries that limit their

effectiveness. While most batteries operated

by other countries will have four to six guns




(Iranian Air Defenses, cont fm page 11)

or launchers, Iranian sites have two or three.

The lack of launchers may be due to lack of

personnel needed to maintain a larger installation,

or was a cost-cutting plan when the

weapons were purchased.

While it is possible to find some

reasons for understrength SAM sites, this

also applies to their AAA. For example, the

Iranians have purchased a Chinese copy

of the Skyguard AA system, the Type 902.

The radar can control up to six twin 35mm

mounts, but overhead photos of installations

show only two guns being controlled

by each radar. The Iranians have the guns

and crews, so this is a mystery. The effects

are clear.

Short Range SAMs

The point defenses around the Natanz

facility are based on the Russian Tor-M1

[SA-15 Gauntlet] mobile SAM system.

Iran has purchased 29 of these systems.

There are four vehicles in a firing battery

and they are supported by a Kasta-2E2 early

warning radar and a Rangir-M command

and control vehicle. The Rangir-M keeps

track of the air picture for the entire Tor-M1

battery and can coordinate their engagements

out to a range of 16 nm.

Assuming that the launchers are

grouped in batteries of four, the Iranians

could field six batteries, with the remaining

five vehicles assigned to training and

maintenance. With two other nuclear sites

to protect, along with Teheran, it is likely

that only one battery would be assigned to

Natanz. However, given the 8 nm/15 km

range of the missile, the battery can provide

all-round coverage from low-level attack.

The vehicles are designed to operate autonomously,

although linking to the command

vehicle provides an integrated picture. If

the command vehicle links to a long-range

surveillance or acquisition radar, e.g., the

Kasta-2E2, then it can take advantage of

that information. Tor vehicles have been

photographed in the vicinity of Natanz.

Each vehicle has a Scrum Half 3D

acquisition radar and a phased-array illuminator

that can engage two targets simultaneously.

There is a secondary electro-optical

TV tracker with a range of 10.8 nm for

use during the day in heavy ECM environments.

Dedication or Obsession?

Several people have sent us links to

a spectacular project. Just go look and be

amazed.

http://www.geocities.jp/jun_brick/

yamato_m.html

Brooks said it best: “I thought I was

patient.”

BT




AAA Defense & MANPADS

The final defensive layer around the

Natanz facility is a ring of light AAA, 23mm

(ZU-23/Chinese Type 85) and 35mm

(Oerlikon KDA/Chinese Type 90) guns.

These are optically aimed and have limited

effectiveness, particularly at night. Eight of

the the 35mm mounts are linked to four

Type 902 radars (range 8 nm). If a lowflying

aircraft approaches within 1 nm of

the facility, it will be fired on by six to ten

23mm and 35mm optically-guided AAA

and one of the radar directed 35mm batteries.

In addition to the light AAA, low-flying

aircraft are also at risk of being fired on by

RBS 70. There is no target cueing for the

missile operators, so they will have to sight

and line up optically. There are four RBS 70

sites, and if an aircraft approaches from

the south or north, roll D6 for each SAM

site. On a die roll of “1”, it can fire at that

aircraft. Once it has fired, it cannot engage

until it has reloaded, which takes one Tactical

Turn.

The light AAA and RBS 70 launchers

are manned by Pasdaran and are considered

to be competent. However, they will concentrate

on incoming aircraft and will not

shift fire to those aircraft that have completed

their bombing run and are withdrawing.

Putting it Together

Iran’s air defense network is a nonautomated,

federated system that has seen

little improvement since the 1980-88

TOR launcher near Natanz 9 Apr 07

Iran-Iraq War. Based largely on late-1970s

U.S. air defense systems that were not fully

integrated due to the 1979 revolution, age

and a prolonged arms embargo by the U.S.

has resulted in low operational availability

of many systems. Despite an aggressive

self-sufficiency policy and a number of

purchases of more modern air defense radars

and surface-to-air (SAM) missiles in the late

1990s and 2000s from China and Russia,

the sheer size of the country and its mountainous

geography have had little effect in

sealing the holes in Iran’s porous air defense

network.

While other nations have been able

to create an Integrated Air Defense System

(IADS) patterned as the Soviets, the Iranian

system still uses older technology, with radar

data being passed by voice nets. The Iranians

are trying to use commercial computer technology

to link different elements, but the

demands of a military system exceed most

commercial capabilities. The many different

types of equipment also complicate the

interface requirements.

Air defense nets have reliably used voice

to transmit information, but it is slow, has

a higher error rate than automated methods,

and is more vulnerable to jamming or

deception.

The air defense radars (and any airborne

fighters) report their observations

to four sector operations centers (SOCs),

and the four SOCs in turn report to the

national-level Air Defense Operations Center

outside Tehran.

Under lower warning levels, the SOC

cannot act on its own authority, which

will delay any response. There is also little

coordination between the SOCs, meaning

no mutual support, and possible delays

in dealing with an enemy crossing sector

boundaries. And if a SOC is hit, or simply

rendered incommunicado, all of the defensive

resources in that sector must operate

independently.

Figuring the Odds

This unhappy concatenation of dissimilar

systems has one thing in common: It’s

all old technology. The most effective of the

three primary SAMs, the I-Hawk, entered

U.S. service in the mid-60s. The SA-5 and

HQ-2/SA-2 are even older. Except for the

Tor systems, the shorter-range systems are

just as bad.

These systems may be enough to deter

isolated attacks by a second-rate air force,

but will not stop a first-line opponent, especially

one with heavy EW support like the

Israelis.

There are two major weaknesses in the

Iranian air defense system and, unfortunately,

they work together in a negative way.

First, Iran lacks an overlapping early warning

radar network with good low altitude

coverage. Most of the radars suffer badly

from ground clutter; a significant vulnerability

given the country’s terrain. These

radars are also highly susceptible to advanced

electronic warfare systems employed

by many modern air forces, including Israel.

Secondly, Iran has been unable to construct

a nationwide, integrated command

and control network to pass contact data between

the operations centers, making timely

ground control direction of fighters difficult.

The lack of real-time warning means that

Iranian fighters will have little opportunity

to engage the enemy before they attack their

targets.

During the Iran-Iraq War, this vulnerability

was reduced by using F-14A Tomcats

as mini-AWACs orbiting over gaps in the

radar coverage and with direct fighter direction

control. Given the age and availability

issues, it is very unlikely that Iran’s remaining

Tomcat fleet could perform the same

role for an extended period of time.

BT




Gaming the Iranian Air Defenses

Instead of gaming every element of an

attack on Iran and the Iranian air defenses,

we have abstracted the process, focusing on

the operational and tactical decisions that

each player must make and the trade-offs

associated with them. For instance, the

Israeli player has a fixed number of aircraft.

Does he want to use some of them to

suppress the Iranian fighters at their bases? It

may reduce their effectiveness.

The Air Defense Flow Chart

The Iranian air defenses are broken

up into separate nodes, each representing a

different portion of the air defense network.

Attacking aircraft must pass through each

node on their way to the target, and after

they have dropped their ordnance, they

must pass through the nodes again on their

way out (see the Iranian Air Defense Flow

Chart below).

As the strikers proceed through each

node, the defender can attempt to shoot

down or damage some of the raiders. Not

every node will require action, since there

will be some occasions when the Iranian

player will not have forces to put in a

particular node, or the Israeli player may

neutralize it. For example, if the Israeli

raid stays at medium altitude or less as he

approaches the IP (Orumiyeh), the SA-5

batteries near Tehran in the first node

cannot get a shot.

S-200 [SA-5]

Long-Range SAMs

GCI-Directed

Fighters

Area SAMs: S-200,

I-Hawk, HQ-2

After the air defense attacks in a

particular node are completed, the attacking

force moves on to the next node. The

distance between nodes is not specified, and

the attacking aircraft are assumed to have

reformed their formation between nodes if

necessary.

Before beginning to move through the

nodes, the Iranian player has no information

on the raid’s strength of composition.

When ESM or visual information becomes

available, the contacts can be classified by

the defender and their exact type revealed.

Preparation for Play

1a) The Israeli player spends his

points to customize his force (see page 30)

and decides what the UAV payloads will be.

1b) The Israeli player plans his

mission: The fighter aircraft that the Israeli

player has can be assigned to three different

tasks:

• Target strike - these aircraft are loaded

with ordnance for the actual attack on the

target and its immediate defenses.

• Fighter Suppression - some of the

player’s attack aircraft can be assigned to

suppress the fighters along the route. The

player does not have to decide exactly what

they will do, or what they are armed with.

Targets might include bombing fighter

runways, strafing the flight line, attacking

the sector operations center or launching

decoys designed to distract the fighters from

real targets. The strikers are simply attacking

some part of the air defense system that will

reduce the fighters’ overall effectiveness.

Once assigned to that task, they are

no longer part of his attack force. In the

appropriate node, the Israeli player will roll

on the fighter suppression table. Note that

the Israeli player can suffer losses in these

attacks.

• SAM Suppression - some of the player’s

attack aircraft can be used to suppress the

fixed SAM defenses. The player does not

have to decide exactly what they will do, or

what they are armed with. Once assigned to

that task, the planes are no longer part of his

attack force.

Aircraft must be assigned to specific

SAM targets: The Esfahan S-200 site, or the

Hawk site or the HQ-2 site near Natanz.

The player can assign two or four aircraft to

each mission. A pair has a 75% chance of

suppressing the site and preventing it from

engaging the Israeli raid. Four aircraft have

a 95% chance of knocking out the site.

This chance is rolled when the Israeli player

enters the node for that SAM site.

Roll D100 for each aircraft assigned to

a suppression mission. On a 05 or less, it is

shot down.

At the same time...

1c) The Iranian player plans his

defense. The Iranian player spends his

points to customize his force (see page 10).

2) The Israeli strike takes off. Once

both players are ready, the Israeli player

launches his air strike. There is a chance that

some of the planes in the strike may abort

or have mechanical problems right before

launch that prevent them from taking part.

For each twenty-four-plane squadron,

roll D10. On a 1 or 2, two aircraft of the

squadron are down and cannot take part.

On a 3 to 6, one plane is down. On a 7

or higher, all aircraft in the squadron are

mission-ready. If a plane must abort, roll

randomly to see which one it is.

S-200 [SA-5]

Long-Range SAMs

GCI-Directed

Fighters

Area SAMs: S-200,

I-Hawk, HQ-2

Tor-M1 [SA-15]

Short-Rng SAMs

Local AAA

& MANPADS

Execute

Air Strike

Local AAA

& MANPADS

Tor-M1 [SA-15]

Short-Rng SAMs




For groups of less than squadron

strength, roll D10 and then roll randomly

to see which aircraft has broken down. If the

random number rolled is higher than the

number of aircraft in the group, ignore the

abort.

3) The Israeli Shavit aircraft executes

its Suter (network) attack. Results are

implemented.

4) Long-Range SAM node. As the

Israeli planes approach the IP, they will be

within range of the S-200 [SA-5] SAMs

near Tehran. If the raid flies at Medium

altitude, he can ignore these because the

S-200’s radar is blocked by the Zagros

mountains.

The Israeli mission plan already

includes flying at Medium altitude in the

S-200’s engagement zone. Thus, this box is

grayed out.

5) Inbound GCI-directed fighters.

In a more robust air defense network, the

strikers would be detected by radar and

fighters vectored to intercept. Reasonable

planning by the Israelis as they fly at

Medium and Low altitude through the

Zagros mountains will prevent them from

being detected by the Iranian air defense

radars. Thus, this box is grayed out.

6) Area SAM defenses. After the Israeli

aircraft leave the GCI Fighter node, they

enter the Area SAM node.

This node includes an HQ-2 and an

I-Hawk site near Natanz, but not part of

the installation. It also includes the S-200

site near Isfahan. If the Israeli player has

planned any suppression missions against

these sites, he can roll them now.

He will fly through the engagement

zone of the S-200 site. He must fly through

the engagement zone of one of the I-Hawk

or HQ-2 sites, but not both. He can choose

which site to overfly, and can make that

choice after he learns the results of any SAM

suppression strikes he has ordered.

If he has fitted jammers to the support

UAVs, their effects are applied to the SAMs

before they fire.

If any of the SAMs are able to fire, and

the raid enters their engagement zone, they

can now fire. The I-Hawk and HQ-2 sites

can engage one aircraft with three missiles.

The S-200 site can engage one plane with

two missiles.

The attacking SAMs cannot coordinate

their targeting, and the Iranian player


should roll randomly to see which aircraft is

targeted.

The SAM attacks are resolved using

standard Harpoon 4 rules.

7) Short-range SAM defenses. After

leaving the Medium-range node just before

reaching the target, the raid will enter the

engagement zone of the Tor-M1 [SA-15]s.

These four vehicles are mobile, so there is no

way to know their exact position.

STAR-1 ARMs can be launched against

any radiating vehicles. ESM systems on

the Shavit aircraft, the Eitam UAVs, and

the ELS systems aboard the F-16s can also

locate any radiating radars. Once their

location is known, GPS-guided weapons

can be launched against them. The STAR‐1

ARMs also have a loiter mode, allowing

them to be launched before the raid reaches

the target

8) AAA and MANPADS node. The

entire site is within range of the AAA

ringing and near the site. Without radar or

optical directors, they are briefed to follow

the fire of the radar-guided AAA, or as a last

resort, set up barrage fire.

Any aircraft at Low altitude that comes

within 8 nm of a Type 902/Skyguard site

will be detected. (Note: The upgraded Super

Fledermaus radars from India provide a 12

nm detection range). Each of the 4 Skyguard

sites has an AA strength of 1.0.

If the Israeli raid comes within 1 nm of

the facility at Low altitude, they will be fired

on by anywhere from six to ten 23mm and

35mm optically-guided AAA. Assuming six

23mm and 2 35mm, the AA strength is 1.8.

In addition to the light AAA, lowflying

aircraft may also be fired on by RBS

70. There is no target cueing for the missile

operators, so they will have to sight and line

up optically. Each turn that aircraft are in

range, roll D6 for each of the four launchers.

On a 1, it can fire at an aircraft (roll

randomly to see which one). Once it has

fired, it cannot engage until it has reloaded,

which takes one three-minute Tactical Turn.

Planes that fly at Medium altitude or

higher will not be engaged.

9) Air Strike Node. The surviving

Israeli aircraft have reached their target.

They attack using standard Harpoon 4 rules.

10) Departing AAA. If the strike leaves

the target area at Low altitude, it may be

attacked again by the target’s AAA defenses.

Use the same procedure as described in step

8, reducing the strength if any of the AAA

have been knocked out. Each opticallyaimed

35mm destroyed reduces that side’s

AA strength by 0.3, and each 23mm lost is

worth 0.2. Depending on whether or not

they have already fired, remaining RBS 70

positions can also engage.

Planes that fly at Medium altitude or

higher will not be engaged.

11) Departing Short-Range SAM

attacks. The departing Israeli aircraft are

fired at again by SA-15s, unless they have

been destroyed by the Israeli aircraft or have

fired all their missiles.

Type 90/Oerlikon KDA 35mm on the perimeter at Natanz




(Gaming the Defenses, cont fm page 15)

12) Departing Area SAM attacks. If

the HQ-2, I-Hawk, or S-200 sites fired on

the Israelis on the inbound leg, they cannot

engage the outbound raid, because they

have not had time to reload their launchers.

If they were suppressed on the way in, they

are still suppressed as the strikers leave.

13) Outbound GCI-directed fighters.

While the Israeli aircraft have been attacking

the target, the IADF has been arranging a

going-away party for the strikers.

When Israeli aircraft enter the GCI

fighter box, if the Israeli player dedicated

any aircraft to fighter suppression, roll on

the table below:

Number of a/c

D10 roll 2 4 6 8

1 - - - -

2 - - - -1

3 - - -1 -1

4 - -1 -1 -1

5 -1 -1 -1 -2

6 -1 -1 -1 -2

7 -1 -1 -2 -2

8 -1 -1 -2 -2

9 -1 -1 -2 -2

10 -2 -2 -2 -3

The resulting number on the table is

the modifier applied to the GCI fighter

table.

Roll D10 on the GCI Table to see how

many aircraft are able to attack, and then on

the Fighter Type Table to see what type of

aircraft makes the intercept:

GCI Fighter Table

D10

Roll Result

1 One pair

2-4 Two pair attacking separately

5-7 Three pairs attacking separately

8-9 Flight of four

0 Two flights of four attacking

separately

Roll separately for the type of each pair

or flight)

Fighter Type Table

D10 Roll Type

1-8 F-4E

9-10 MiG-29

Also, Roll D100 for each aircraft

assigned to a suppression mission. On a 05

or less, it is shot down.

Place the intercepting fighters at

maximum weapons range anywhere in the

forward hemisphere of the Israeli raid.

Example: The Israeli player has assigned

four attack aircraft to fighter suppression

and rolls a 5, subtracting 1 from the die roll.

The Iranian player rolls D10 and gets a

5, modified to 4. The Israeli raid is attacked

by two separate pairs of aircraft. Rolling

twice on the Fighter Type Table, the Iranian

gets a pair of F-4Es and a pair of MiG-29s.

Because the aircraft are in two groups,

they must be resolved as two attacks.

Rolling randomly, the Iranian player finds

that the F-4s will reach the Israeli raid first,

then the MiG-29s.

These attacks are resolved using

standard Harpoon 4 rules.

14) Departing Long-Range SAM

attacks. Because the Israelis can fly at

Medium altitude, the S-200s near Tehran

will not be able to engage the outbound

raid. Thus, this box is grayed out.

BT

35mm AA site located 2.3 km SE of facility, from Fortress Iran by Planeman



Air Data Card

Aircraft Type

Radars Range Range Range Range Range Annex J

Name Large Medium Small VSmall Stealthy Function

Mission

SPEEDS

Throttle Setting in knots (nm per phase)

Altitude Cruise Full Mil Afterburner Mach 1.0

V/Low:

Medium:

High:

VHigh:

Other Sensors

Name/Type

Cannon

( 460 )

( 460)

( 460)

( )

Cannon Rating

( 580 )

( 665)

( 750)

( )

Performance

( 700)

( 980)

( 1260)

( )

Maneuver Rating

Light/Full Load

5.0 / 2.5

Cruise Range (nm) Internal Fuel (kg) Ceiling (m) Payload (kg)

Inflight Refuel? Size Signature

Platform Type

810

Countermeasures

N-019E

Topaz

Engine Type

3200

MiG-29 Fulcrum

17000

Bombsight

3200

Damage Value

3rd Gen D TF Ballistic 20

Sonars Range (nm) Annex K

Name Mode Type 75% 50% 25% Freq

660

649

573

573

Annex B, Rules Booklet

Ordnance Loadout Number Min Max Wt (kg) Annexes E, F, G, H

Name Type Carried Guidance Range Range ATA Damage Pts. Speed in knots each Remarks

R-27R1

R-73E

1200 L

91

AAM

AAM

64

Drop T

ATA

No

IRST

30mm

GSh-30-1 3.5

Small Small Fixed-W.

2

I/TSARH

(3rd)

-- 29.3 5.5 -- 2008 253

2 IRH (3rd) -- 8.1 6.0 -- 1434 105

2

45

18

--

5.5

LD/SD

RWR

-- -- -- --

--


975

exp. version

exp. version

+245 nm

Total Ordnance Wt:

716

% Max Payload:

22%

Load: Clean / Light / Full

Range add fm Ext Fuel:

490

Total Cruise Range:

1300

Remarks:

Air Data Card

Aircraft Type



Mission

SPEEDS



V/Low:

Medium:

High:

VHigh:

Other Sensors

Name/Type

Cannon

( 520 )

( 520 )

( 520 )

( )

Cannon Rating

( 600 )

( 620 )

( 620 )

( )

Performance

( 750 )

( 850 )

( 1056)

( )

Maneuver Rating

Light/Full Load

3.5 / 1.5



Platform Type

480

Countermeasures

--

APQ-159

40

Engine Type

28

2071

TJ

20

F-5E Tiger II

15240

Bombsight

Ballistic

3175

Damage Value



8

2.4

16

AI

ATA

No

RWR

2 M39

20mm

2.8

Small Small Fixed-W.

660

649

573

573




AIM-9J

AAM

4

IRH/2nd

-- 5.1 4.5* --

1434 78

wide-aspect

275 USG

Drop T

3

--

-- -- -- -- -- 850 +195 nm

Total Ordnance Wt:

Remarks:

312

% Max Payload:

10%



585

Total Cruise Range:

*Although the rating of the missile is 4.5, these missiles are long past their shelf life. A rating of

3.5, or a failure rate of 30%, might be more accurate.

1065

Harpoon Form 2 1 Nov 2009

This form is provided by Clash of Arms. It can be

photocopied for use with any Admiralty Trilogy games.




Air Data Card

Aircraft Type



Mission

SPEEDS



V/Low:

Medium:

High:

VHigh:

Other Sensors

Name/Type

Cannon

( 493 )

( 493)

( 493)

( )

Cannon Rating

( 660 )

( 713)

( 765)

( )

Performance

( 810 )

( 1074)

( 1358)

( )

Maneuver Rating

Light/Full Load

4.0 / 2.0



Platform Type

Countermeasures

APG-70I

Engine Type

F-15I Ra'am

Bombsight

Damage Value



HStrike

20mm

Vulcan 3.9

2400 10375 18300 11113 Boom Medium Medium Fixed-W.

3rd Gen J&D

TF Computing 30

100 89 63 25 8 LD/SD

660

649

573

573


AAQ-13

Nav Pod (195 kg)

AAQ-14

Tgt Pod (245 kg)



EGBU-28 PGM

GBU-31/

Mk84

PGM

AIM-120 AAM

Python 4

600 USG

Total Ordnance Wt:

AAM

Drop T

4962

1 I&GPS/SALH 2.5 6.5 -- 57

528 2136 pen 28/58

2 I&GPS 2.0 11.3 -- 54

528 934 pen 9

2

I/M/TARH

(4th)

-- 40/10 7.0/8.0 -- 2295 152 2 tgts @ once

2 IRH (3rd) -- 8.1 6.5 -- 1721 107 --

2 -- -- -- -- --

-- 1855 +430 nm

% Max Payload:

44% Load: Clean / Light / Full


860

Total Cruise Range:

3260

Remarks:

Helmet-Mounted Display, 3rd Gen RWR

Air Data Card

Aircraft Type



Mission

SPEEDS



V/Low:

Medium:

High:

VHigh:

Other Sensors

Name/Type

Cannon

( 533 )

( 533 )

( 533 )

( )

Cannon Rating

( 650 )

( 693 )

( 735 )

( )

Performance

( 791 )

( 974)

( 1158)

( )

Maneuver Rating

Light/Full Load

3.5 / 1.5



Platform Type

Countermeasures

APG-

68(v)9

Engine Type

F-16I Soufa

Bombsight

Damage Value



Escort

20mm

Vulcan 3.9

1573 4522 15240 8714 Boom Small Small Fixed-W.

3rd Gen J&D

127

160

89

89

TF

63

51

Computing

25

29

8

16

21

LD/SD

SS

ELS

660

649

573

573


3RD Gen RWR, Emitter Location System

HMD

Helmet-Mounted Display



600 USG

300 USG

AIM-120

Python 4

450 USG

Total Ordnance Wt:

Remarks:

Drop T

Drop T

AAM

AAM

CFT

822

2 -- -- -- -- --

--

1 -- -- -- -- --

--

4

2

2

% Max Payload:

I/M/TARH

(4th)

IRH/3rd

9%

--

--

--



1855

925

40/10 7.0/8.0 -- 2295 152 2 tgts @ once

8.1 6.5 -- 1721 107 --

--

--

2097

1390

+645 nm

+322 nm

+485 nm

Total Cruise Range:

2962







Air Data Card

Aircraft Type

F-16I Soufa

Mission

SEAD

Cannon

Cannon Rating

20mm

Vulcan 3.9

Maneuver Rating

Light/Full Load

3.5 / 1.5



Platform Type

Countermeasures

Engine Type

Bombsight

Damage Value



APG-

68(v)9

1573 4522 15240 8714 Boom Small Small Fixed-W.

3rd Gen J&D TF Computing

127

160

89

89

63

51



25

29

8

16

21

LD/SD

SS

SPEEDS



V/Low:

Medium:

High:

VHigh:

Other Sensors

Name/Type

( 533 )

( 533)

( 533)

( )

( 650 )

( 693)

( 735)

( )

Performance

( 791)

( 974)

( 1158)

( )

660

649

573

573




ELS

HMD

3rd Gen Emitter Location System

Helmet-Mounted Display

600 USG Drop T

300 USG Drop T

AIM-120 AAM

Python 4 AAM

450 USG CFT

2 -- -- -- --

-- 1855 +645 nm

1 -- -- -- --

-- 925 +322 nm

2

I/M/TARH

(4th)

-- 40/10 7.0/8.0 2295 152 2 tgts @ once

2 IRH/3rd -- 8.1 6.5 1721 107 --

2

-- 1390 +485 nm

Total Ordnance Wt:

% Max Payload:



Total Cruise Range:

Remarks:

Air Data Card

Aircraft Type

F-16I Soufa

Mission

SEAD

(cont)

Cannon

Cannon Rating

Maneuver Rating

Light/Full Load



Platform Type

/

Countermeasures

Engine Type

Bombsight

Damage Value





SPEEDS



V/Low:

Medium:

High:

VHigh:

Other Sensors

Name/Type

( )

( )

( )

( )

( )

( )

( )

( )

Performance

( )

( )

( )

( )

660

649

573

573




AAQ-13

Litening

II

STAR-1

Nav P

Tgt P

PGM

1

1

--

--

--

--

2 I&GPS/ARM --

--

--

--

--

--

--

135 -- 23 370 182 Loiter

--

--

195

210

Total Ordnance Wt:

% Max Payload:

Load: Clean / Light / Full Range add fm Ext Fuel:

Total Cruise Range:

1287 14% 2097 2962

Remarks:







Air Data Card

Aircraft Type



Mission

SPEEDS



V/Low:

Medium:

High:

VHigh:

Other Sensors

Name/Type

Cannon

( 488 )

( 488)

( 488)

( )

Cannon Rating

( 510 )

( 510)

( 510)

( )

Performance

( )

( )

( )

( )

Maneuver Rating

Light/Full Load

1.5 / 1.0



Platform Type

Countermeasures

Engine Type

Bombsight

Damage Value



Shavit SEMA Command --

--

5800 18772 15545 -- No Medium Medium Fixed-W.

3rd Gen D TF None

31

660

649

573

573


ELS

3rd Gen

SIGINT

Communications intercept



Total Ordnance Wt:

-- % Max Payload: -- Load: Clean / Light / Full Range add fm Ext Fuel: -- Total Cruise Range: 5800

Remarks:

Fitted for command staff, can control UAVs, also ELINT - Radar transmission intercept

Air Data Card

Aircraft Type



Mission

SPEEDS



V/Low:

Medium:

High:

VHigh:

Other Sensors

Name/Type

Cannon

( 180 )

( 180 )

( 180 )

( )

Cannon Rating

( 220 )

( 220 )

( 220 )

( )

Performance

( )

( )

( )

( )

Maneuver Rating

Light/Full Load

0.5 / 0.5



Platform Type

6500 1750

Countermeasures

Engine Type

-- TP --

Bombsight

Damage Value



Eitan UAV -- --

13716 1000 No Medium VSmall Fixed-W.

12

660

649

573

573




Off Jmr

Off EW

-20%

Jmr/ES Sensor

ES, -10%

Suter T Off EW

+2 Suter

Decoy Off EW

-2 GCI Table

(The Iraeli player should select one payload type for each aircraft)

Total Ordnance Wt:

-- % Max Payload: -- Load: Clean / Light / Full Range add fm Ext Fuel: -- Total Cruise Range: 1573

Remarks: Eitan is Hebrew for “Steadfast.” Endurance 36 hours. 26 m wingsan. LOS comms, SATCOM for extended range






Harpoon Scenario: Operation Morvarid

Location: Off the Faw Peninsula, 29 November 1980, dawn, 0700

hours.

Environment: 80% visibility, dropping to 20% within 1000 yards

of the oil terminals, wind 10 knots from 315° T, sea state 2.

Operational Situation: Operation Morvarid (“Pearl”) was an Iranian

attack on radar and missile installations off the Faw peninsula.

On 28 November 1980, Iranian F-4 Phantoms and F-5 Tiger

IIs attacked Iraqi airfields around Basra. This was designed to reduce

the air threat during the planned assault.

On the morning of 29 November, the six ships of Task Force

421 attacked the Iraqi offshore oil terminals at Al-Omayeh and Al-

Bakr. These platforms had been taken over by the Iraqi armed forces

and were fitted with radar and radio listening posts.

Iranian troops (either marines or special warfare troops) landed

on both rigs simultaneously by helicopter and quickly overwhelmed

the defenders. After planting demolitions, they successfully evacuated

the facilities, taking several prisoners with them. Both installations

were completely destroyed.

Two Iranian Kaman class (La Combattante II class) missile

boats (Peykan and Joshan) escorted the task force.

Tactical Situation: After a successful attack, and with the platforms

destroyed, the Iranian force must withdraw. The Iraqis are responding

with both air and naval units.

Iranian Orders: The Kamans must screen the other four ships of the

task force as they make their escape.

Iranian Forces: Task Force 421

Peykan, Joshan (both Kaman class PTG)

carrying SA-7 missiles

Tonb, Lavan (both Hengam class LSTs)

Each has an AB-212ASW embarked

Keyvan, Azadi (both Ex-U.S. Coast Guard Cape class PB)

2 F-4E on CAP at Point R


Iranian Victory Conditions:

Decisive: The attack force successfully exits the map and only

one Kaman is crippled or sunk.

Tactical: Only one ship of the attack force is crippled or sunk.

Iraqi Orders:

Punish the Iranian forces.

Iraqi Forces:

At Al Faw:

Al Yarmouk (T-43 class) (flotilla commander embarked)

Nsan, Khalid Ibn, Al Walid (all Osa I PTG)

Hazirani, Sa’d (both 2 Osa II PTG)

14 Ramadan, Al Bahi, Al Tami, Tamour,

Al Adrisi, Al Shab, Alef, Shulan (all P-6 PTs)

At Nasseriyah airbase:

No 77 Fighter-Bomber squadron, with 12 MiG-23BN

Iraqi Victory Conditions:

Decisive: Sink or cripple at least three ships of Task Force 421.

At least one must be a Hengam class LST.

Tactical: Sink or cripple at least two ships of Task Force 421. At

least one must be a Hengam class LST.

Setup:

Tonb and Keyvan are within 1 nm of Al-Omayeh terminal,

and Lavan and Azadi within 1 nm of Al-Bakr terminal. Peykan and

Joshan can be positioned anywhere within 5 nm of either terminal.

The AB-212s have just finished evacuating the Iranian commandos

and Iraqi prisoners.

Two F-4Es from Bushehr, armed for air-to-air combat, are

orbiting at point R (D100% time left on station). F-4Es will automatically

be ordered out if the CAP is engaged or reaches 25% time

on station. Bushehr is 80 nm east of Point R.

If a surface threat is detected, the player can request support

from Shiraz airbase. Two F-4Es with six AGM-65s each will be

launched fifteen minutes later. Shiraz is 180 nm ENE from Point R.

The Iraqi flotilla is getting underway from Al Faw. They are

limited to 12 knots until they reach open water at the mouth of the

river, when they can maneuver freely.

Four Iraqi MiG-23BN are taking off from Nasseriyah air base,

150 nm WNW of Al Faw. They are armed for air-to-air missions.

The rest of the squadron is preparing for launch. The remaining

four pairs of aircraft can be armed for air-to-air or air-to-surface

missions, which the player must commit to when the game begins.

Each fifteen minutes, the player rolls D10. On a 1 or 2, a pair of aircraft

have been fueled and armed. Roll randomly to see which one.

They can take off immediately, or they can be held ready for launch

at a later time. Aircraft loadouts are shown on pages 24 and 25.

Historical Outcome: As the task force evacuated the oil terminals

and tried to escape to the east-southeast, the Iraqis began a vigorous

but uncoordinated response. Accounts differ so much that an accurate

narrative of the battle is impossible, but the Iraqis sent several

groups of MiG-23s and apparently sortied every vessel they could

from the port of Faw.

Al-Omayeh Oil Terminal (continued on page 23)







(Morvarid, cont fm page 21)

While most of the Iranian force withdrew, Peykan apparently

remained in the area. At one point, she used the ruined hulk of the

Al-Omayeh oil terminal as cover from an Iraqi P-15 Termit missile.

This may have been intended to pull the attackers away from the

fleeing Task Force, or it may he been a result of violent maneuvers

designed to evade missile and aircraft attacks.

In either event, Peykan survived several attacks, may have sunk

one or more Osa missile boats, and even managed to shoot down

a MiG-23 with an SA-7, but completely exhausted her missile and

gun ammunition. She was finally hit at 1400, about six miles from

Al-Omayeh, by several P-15 Termit [SS-N-2s].

While the missile craft engaged in a running battle, groups of

Iraqi MiG-23s and Iranian Phantoms dueled overhead. Again, accounts

differ about the types and numbers of aircraft and of course

the losses, but the Iraqis got the worst of it.

All the sources do agree that shortly after Peykan’s demise, two

F-4Es from TFB.6 at Bushehr arrived on the scene. They were each

loaded with six AGM-65A Maverick, and proceeded to methodically

attack and sink many of the Iraqi boats.

It is reasonably certain that the only Iranian loss was Peykan,

while the Iraqis lost two Osa Is, three Osa IIs, and four P-6 torpedo

boats.

Note: This scenario is based on what information can be

gleaned from the wildly differing accounts. None of the sources discussed

the composition of the assault force, although one web page

described it as “six ships.” Two helicopters had to be involved in the

assault, and the only Iranian vessels capable of embarking helicopters

are the Hengam LSTs. The patrol boat escorts are speculative but

reasonable close-in escorts. We know they saw action. Three of this

class were lost in combat during the Iran-Iraq war.

Variations: In addition to the units listed in both sides’ orders

of battle, other Iraqi participants could include an Iraqi Alouette

armed with AS.12, MiG-21s, the Polnocny D class LST Nouh

(L78), reported by one source as sunk by Harpoon missiles, and

two SO.1s (possibly lost to Mavericks). Unconfirmed Iranian

participants include F-14s, SH-3s, AH-1s, and a CH-47. These

were all mentioned in different sources, but not clearly enough to be

included here.

Skill levels: In the basic scenario, assume all boat crews are

competent. At this skill level, boats cannot perform OTH targeting

or bearing-only launches with their SSMs. All missile targets must

be detected by the firing unit before they can be attacked.

Both sides’ pilots are competent, although historically the

Iranians were better pilots than the Iraqis. Few pilots on either side,

especially this early in the war, were better than competent. If the

players want to see the effects of skill levels on the game, as each

aircraft is placed on the game board, roll D10 secretly for the skill

level of the aircrew:

Recruit Inexper. Competent Veteran

Iran -- 1 - 3 4 - 9 0

Iraq 1 - 2 4 - 7 8 - 0 --

Bibliography:

Wikipedia (en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Morvarid)

Operation Morvarid web page (book by Tom Muffin) (www.

iinavy.org/morvarid.html)

Iran-Iraq War in the Air 1980 - 1989, by Tom Cooper and

Farzad Bishop

Boardgamegeek (www.boardgamegeek.com/boardgame/28652)

ACIG Journal Persian Gulf War Database (www.acig.org/

artman/publish/article_209.shtml)

Imperial Iranian Air Force - Operation Pearl (www.iiaf.net/

stories/warstories/s4.html)

BT

In cooperation with North Head Miniatures (www.nhminiatures.com),

Clash of Arms is offering a 1/1200 miniature of the

Kaman class featured in the Operation Morvarid scenario. This

miniature, crisply produced with 3D printer technology, is accurate,

free of flash, and is fully assembled - just prime and paint.

North Head will sell these at $10 U.S., but Clash of Arms

is offering one miniature for $8, two for $15, and three for $20.

Alternately, you can order two miniatures and a pack of Litko game

markers (see page 2, the Fire marker is shown below) for $20.

BT

BT

MiG-23BN firing

Special Offer from Clash of Arms!

Russian P-6 torpedo boat




Air Data Card

Aircraft Type



Mission

SPEEDS



V/Low:

Medium:

High:

VHigh:

Other Sensors

Name/Type

Cannon

( 330 )

( 417 )

( 460 )

( 503 )

Cannon Rating

( 660 )

( 830 )

( 920 )

( 1005)

Performance

( 826 )

( 1041)

( 1149)

( 1256)

Maneuver Rating

Light/Full Load

3.0 / 1.0



Platform Type

Countermeasures

APQ-120

Engine Type

F-4E Phantom II

Bombsight

Damage Value



ATA

20mm

Vulcan 3.9


2nd Gen D TJ Computing 29

50 39 28 11 3 AI

660

649

573

573




AIM-7E2

AIM-9J

AAM

AAM

4 SARH/2nd -- 16.1 4.5 -- 2008

4 IRH/2nd -- 5.1 4.5 -- 1434

not dogf-rated

wide-aspect

330 USG Drop T 2 -- -- -- -- -- -- 1020 +200 nm

600 USG Drop T 1 -- -- -- -- -- -- 1855 +365 nm

205

78

Total Ordnance Wt:

976

% Max Payload:

13%



765

Total Cruise Range:

1865

Remarks:

Air Data Card

Aircraft Type



Mission

SPEEDS



V/Low:

Medium:

High:

VHigh:

Other Sensors

Name/Type

Cannon

( 330)

( 417)

( 460)

( 503)

Cannon Rating

( 660 )

( 830)

( 920)

( 1005)

Performance

( 826)

( 1041)

( 1149)

( 1256)

Maneuver Rating

Light/Full Load

3.0 / 1.0



Platform Type

Countermeasures

APQ-120

Engine Type

F-4E Phantom II

Bombsight

Damage Value



Strike

20mm

Vulcan 3.9


2nd Gen D TJ Computing 29

50 39 28 11 3 AI

660

649

573

573




AIM-7E2

AGM-65A

AAM

PGM

4 SARH/2nd -- 16.1 4.5

2008

6 EO(D)/1st 0.5 2.0 -- 28

791

330 USG Drop T 2 -- --

--

205

210

not dogf-rated

-- -- -- -- 1020 +200 nm

Total Ordnance Wt:

2080

% Max Payload:

29%



200

Total Cruise Range:

1300

Remarks:






Air Data Card

Aircraft Type



Mission

SPEEDS



V/Low:

Medium:

High:

VHigh:

Other Sensors

Name/Type

Cannon

( 436 )

( 436 )

( 436 )

( 436 )

Cannon Rating

( 650 )

( 708)

( 737)

( 765)

Performance

( 729 )

( 850 )

( 911 )

( 972 )

Maneuver Rating

Light/Full Load

3.0 / 1.0



Platform Type

Countermeasures

Engine Type

MiG-23BN

Bombsight

Damage Value



ATA

23mm

GSh-23L 3.2

1060 4593 17500 3500 No Small Small Var-W.

2nd Gen D TJ Manual 22


660

649

573

573




R-3S Atoll

AAM

2 IRH/1st -- 2.0 2.0 -- --

narrow-aspect

800 L Drop T 1 -- -- -- -- -- -- 640 +150 nm

75

Total Ordnance Wt:

150 % Max Payload: 4% Load: Clean / Light / Full Range add fm Ext Fuel: 150 Total Cruise Range: 1160

Remarks:

Air Data Card

Aircraft Type

MiG-23BN

Mission

Strike

Cannon

Cannon Rating

23mm

GSh-23L 3.2

Maneuver Rating

Light/Full Load

3.0 / 1.0



Platform Type

Countermeasures

Engine Type

Bombsight

Damage Value



SRD-5M

1010 4360 16000 3500 No Small Small Var-W.

2nd Gen D TJ Manual 22

-- -- -- -- -- RO



SPEEDS



V/Low:

Medium:

High:

VHigh:

Other Sensors

Name/Type

( 436 )

( 436 )

( 436 )

( 436 )

( 650)

( 708)

( 737)

( 765)

Performance

( 729 )

( 850 )

( 911 )

( 972 )

660

649

573

573




UB-32-57 Rkt Pod 4 -- -- -- 2.0 22

--

225

800 L Drop T 1 -- -- -- -- -- --

640

+150 nm

Total Ordnance Wt:

900 % Max Payload: 26% Load: Clean / Light / Full Range add fm Ext Fuel: 150 Total Cruise Range: 1160

Remarks:







Annex A listings for Operation Morvarid

IRAN

US Coast Guard Cape Class

PB

Displacement: 85 std In Class: [4]

Size Class: F/VSmall In Service: 1956 - 05

Propulsion: Diesel Crew: 15

Signature: VSmall/Noisy Armor Rating: 0

Weapons:

ROF

A(1)1 Mk3 40mm/60

C/USA

F(4)2 Mk20 Mousetrap

E/USA

2 DC rail w/6 Mk9 DC E/USA

Sensors:

CR-103

J/USA

Remarks:

Keyvan, Azadi, Mehran, Mahvan.

• 1980-81: Mahvan lost to Iraqi forces.

• 1980s?: Sonar and Mousetrap removed. Fitted with F(2)1 ZU-23

23mm/81 (C/Russia). Assume radar to Generic nav radar (J/Intl),

Damage and Speed Breakdown:

Dam Pts: 0 2 3 4 5 6

Surf Speed: 20 15 10 5 0 Sinks

Combattante IIB

PTG

Displacement: 249 std In Class: 12 - 2

Size Class: E/VSmall In Service: 1977


Electrn Cnt: 2nd Gen J

Acoust Cnt: None


Weapons:

ROF

PB&SB(2)2 Mk141 w/2 Harpoon (8) D/USA

F(1)1 Compact 76mm/62//WM28

C/Italy

A(1)1 Bofors 40mm/70

C/Sweden

P/S(1)2 12.7mm mg

C/Intl

Sensors:

ESM: 2nd Gen

Decca 1226

J/UK

Remarks:

Kaman class. P221-232. Last two, Neyzeh and Tabarzin, delivered without

Harpoon launchers. Only 12 Harpoon missiles delivered for entire class.

Some fitted with 20mm or 23mm vice 40mm. Carry SA-7 missiles.

• Nov 80: Peykan sunk by Iraqi Osa msls.

• 1988: All Harpoon missiles expended by this date.

• Apr 88: Joshan sunk by USN.

• 1993-98: Class refitted with PB&SB(2)2 C802 (4) D/PRC. Five units fitted

by 1996, 9 by 1998.

• 2000: Only one unit, Goraz, is configured to carry PB&SB(1)2 Standard

missile box launchers.

• 2003 on: SINA class (local production) enters service. Until more information

available, use Combattante IIB stats. Four in class. Peykan (2003);

Joshan (2006); Derafsh, Kalat (2008)

Damage & Speed Breakdown:

Dam Pts: 0 4 8 11 14 15


Hengam

LST

Displacement: 2940 fl In Class: 4

Size Class: C/Small In Service: 1974

Propulsion: Diesel/CPP Crew: 75 + 168

Signature: Small/Noisy Armor Rating: 0

Weapons:

ROF

P&PB/S&SB/S&SQ/P&PQ(2)4 ZU-23 23mm/81 C/Russia

F(40)1 BM-21 --

P/S(1)2 12.7mm mg

C/Intl

F&A(4)2 9M32 Strela-2 [SA-7a] w/4 Grail (1) D/Russia

Sensors:

Decca TM 1229 (Decca 1200 series)

J/UK

Remarks:

Hengam, Larak, Tonb, Lavan. Amphibious, special damage modifier of

-25%. Aft pad for large helicopter. Can carry 300 t vehicle fuel, 600 t cargo

including 6 Chieftain or 12 T-55 tanks. Has 10 t crane to launch small

boats, can carry 2 LCVP or 12 LCU. Hengam and Larak have (1)4 Bofors

40mm/70 (C/Sweden) vice 23mm guns. Lavan has additional Decca TM

1229 radar (two total).

• 1980s: Used as mother ship for small craft – can carry 12 small craft

(Boghammers, etc.) on upper decks vice LCVP/LCU.


Dam Pts: 0 17 35 52 62 69


IRAQ

Russian Project 205M [Osa II]

PTG


Size Class: E/VSmall In Service: 1974 - 91



Weapons:

ROF

F/A(2)2 AK-230 30mm/65//1

MR-104 Rys [Drum Tilt]

C/Russia

PB&SB(1)4 P-15 Termit [SS-N-2A]

w/1 Styx//1 Rangout [Square Tie] (4) D/Russia

Sensors:

ESM: Rangout

Rangout [Square Tie]

J/Russia

Remarks:

Two transferred each year 1974-78. Rangout can serve as 1st Gen ESM

sensor when not transmitting. Russian construction, special damage modifier

of -10%.

• 1980-81: Two units sunk in Iran-Iraq war.

• 1980s: Further two sunk by Iran.

• 1984: Replacements for lost units delivered.


Dam Pts: 0 3 6 9 11 12


Russian Project 205M [Osa I]

PTG


Size Class: E/VSmall In Service: 1971 - 91



Weapons:

ROF

F/A(2)2 AK-230 30mm/65//1 MR-104 Rys

[Drum Tilt]

C/Russia

PB&SB(1)4 P-15 Termit [SS-N-2A]

w/1 Styx//1 Rangout [Square Tie] (4) D/Russia

Sensors:

ESM: Rangout

Rangout [Square Tie]

J/Russia

Remarks:

Rangout can serve as 1st Gen ESM sensor when not transmitting. Special

damage modifier of -10%.

• Two units retired by mid-80s.


Dam Pts: 0 3 5 8 9 10


Ex-Russian Project 183 [P-6]

PT


Size Class: F/VSmall In Service: 1959



Weapons:

ROF

F/A(2)2 2M-3 25mm/79

C/Russia

PB&SB(1)2 533mm TT w/1 53-56VA torp

F/Russia

Sensors:

Zarnitsa [Skin Head]

J/Russia

Remarks:

Transferred 1959 - 61.

• Zarnitsa replaced by Reya [Pot Head] in some units.


Dam Pts: 0 1 2 3 4 5





Russian Project 254 [T-43]

MSC


Size Class: D/Small In Service: 1969 - 91


Signature: Small/Noisy Armor Rating: 0

Weapons:

ROF

F/A(2)2 V-11M 37mm/67//1 Ball End

C/Russia

P/S(2)2 2M-3 25mm/79

C/Russia

2 DC Proj w/10 B-1 DC E/Russia

Sensors:

ESM: 1st Gen

Don 2 or Vyaga [Spin Trough]

J/Russia

Tamir-11 [Stag Ear]

K/Russia

Remarks:

Auxiliary, special damage modifier of -25%, Russian construction, special

damage modifier of -10%.

• One unit scrapped

• 1991: Last unit sunk in Gulf War.


Dam Pts: 0 4 9 13 15 17


Operation Morvarid Game Matrices

Proper preparation prevents...

You know the rest. To speed game play, I like to make up detection and combat matrices. Not only do these make sure I don’t forget

any modifiers, or mess up my math in the heat of battle, but it familiarizes me with all the units’ characteristics before play starts.

Detection Matrix

Observing Unit

Kaman Hengam Cape F-4E MiG-23BN

class class Class Med Osa I/II P-6 T-43 Small

Contact E/VSmall C/Small F/VSmall A/C F/VSmall E/VSmall D/Small A/C

Burning

Terminal

(Large) 80/-/25.2 86/-/32.4 72/-/25.2 -/-/45 50/-/25.2 50/-/23.4 75/-/28.8 -/-/45

Kaman 14 16 16 -/-/20.8 10.2/44/13.6 10.6/-/12 14/50/16/8 -/-/20.8

Hengam 26 28 28 -/-/30.4 26/50/19.2 18/-/17.6 24/56/22.4 -/-/30.4

Cape 24 16 16 -/-/20.8 10.2/44/12 10.6/-/10.8 14/50/13.2 -/-/20.8

F-4E -- -- -- -/-/7.0 -/-/7.0 26/-/7.0 -/-/7.0 -/-/7.0

Osa I/II 14/48/13.6 16/50/20 16/44/12 -/-/20.8 10.2 10.6 14 -/-/20.8

P-6 14/48/12 16/50/18.4 16/44/10.4 -/-/20.8 10.2 10.6 14 -/-/20.8

T-43 26/54/16 28/56/26.4 28/50/14.4 -/-/24 13 18 24 -/-/24

MiG-23BN -/-/20.8 -/-/24 -/-/20.8 -/-/3.5 -/-/3.5 20/-/3.5 -/-/3.5 -/-/3.5

Radar Type 756 Decca Nav APQ-120 Rangout Reya Vyaga SRD-5M

Type:

TN1229

ES

Generation: 2nd 1st -- -- 1st 1st 1st RWR/1st

Radar/ES/Visibility ranges are in in kyds. The listed ranges will be limited by the hvisual or radar horizon. Vis is base 80%.

Example: An Osa II can detect a Hengam class LST at 26 kyds on its Rangout radar, and see it visually at 19.2 kyds. It cannot detect

the Hengam’s radar.

P-15/P-21 Termit

1st Gen, 52 dp

Missile Attack Matrix

RGM-84 Harpoon

2nd Gen, 40 dp

vs.

vs.

Kaman 53% E/VSmall, 2nd Gen J Osa I/II 80% E/VSmall, no CM

Hengam 75% C/Small, no CM P-6 80% F/VSmall, no CM

Cape 75% F/VSmall, no CM T-43 80% D/Small, no CM

AGM-65A Maverick

SA-7 Strela

1st Gen EO, 28 dp 1st Gen IRH, ATA 2.5

vs.

vs.

Osa I/II 65% E/VSmall MiG-23BN Missile Pk

P-6 65% F/VSmall 2nd Gen D Index

T-43 75% D/Small Full (1.0) 1.5 9%

Lt (3.0) -0.5 3%




Korean King

On December 22nd, 2008, the Republic

of Korea commissioned King Sejong the

Great, the first of three guided missile destroyers

built under the KDX III program.

The previous KDX II yielded the Chungmugong

Yi Sunshin class of six vessels, with the

first commissioned in 2003. This followed

the KDX I Gwanggaeto the Great, three

destroyers, with the first entering service in

1998.

The KDX (Korean Destroyer Experimental)

program is designed to expand the

ROK Navy’s role from a coastal defense

force to a blue-water force. This can be

seen as a response to China’s growing naval

capability, as well as South Korea’s expanding

trade interests. In addition to surface

combatants, the ROK Navy’s expansion has

included the Dokdo class amphibious ships,

which were discussed in issue 29 (Oct ‘05).

While the KDX I and II designs were

capable vessels, the KDX III is more than

a simple evolution or improvement. It is a

first-line warship, a match for any vessel of

its class anywhere in the world, including

the United States.

The obvious point of comparison is the

Burke Flight IIA, arguably the most capable

DDG class in the world. The King Sejong

DDG is almost the same size, 7650 tons



King Sejong the Great in October 2008

The Cheong Sahng-uh (Blue Shark) Lightweight Torpedo

standard, as opposed to the Burke’s IIA’s

7500.

The Korean ship has 128 VLS missile

cells, while the Burke has 96. It has 16

Harpoon-equivalent missiles, while the

Burke IIA does not carry any. It is fitted

with a 21-tube Mk31 RAM launcher and

a Goalkeeper instead of the U.S. ship’s

U.S. Navy

two Phalanx, and it has the newer Mk45 5

inch/62 Mod 4 gun. Like the later Burkes, it

also is fitted with (3)2 Mk32 torpedo tubes

and two helicopters.

Many of these features, especially the

gun and the point defense weapons, could

be refitted to the U.S. vessels, but the increase

in VLS cells lets them carry 80 SAMs,

32 land-attack missiles, and 16 antisubmarine

missiles. Additionally, she carries 16

dedicated antiship SSMs, which the Burke

does not have at all.

As impressive as the armament fit is

the electronics, which in addition to the

SPY‐1D includes a first-line hull sonar.

These vessels, indeed this program, also

showcase the strength and sophistication of

South Korea’s shipbuilding and electronics

industry. The three large, sophisticated KDX

III vessels are being built at three different

Korean yards.

And while the Aegis missile system

and Mk45 gun are American, the torpedoes

(Blue Shark), land-attack missiles (Hyunmoo

III (Guardian of the Northern Sky)),

antisubmarine missile (Hang Sahng-un (Red

Shark)), and antiship missile (Hae Sung (Sea

Star)), are all locally-developed and are likely

as good as their American equivalents.

The Form 10 on page 29 provides the

statistics for this impressive vessel, and our

best information on the Korean weapons

she is fitted with.

BT


King Sejong DDG

BASIC SHIP DATA

Size Class: B/Medium

Signature: Small/Quiet

Armor Class: 0 Crew: 310

Advance per 45° turn (Speed Loss)

Standard rudder: 300 yards (2)

Hard rudder: 200 yards (3)

Accel/Tac Turn from 0-50% Max Speed 15

Accel/Tac Turn from 51-100% Max Spd 8

Deceleration/Tac Turn from any speed 18

ELECTRONIC WARFARE

ES: 3rd Generation

Counterm: 3rd Gen J&D

King Sejong class South Korea

RADARS

Name Lge Med Small VSmall Stealthy Function

SPS-95K 36 21 12 7 3.7 SS

SPY-1D 175 175 137 55 16 3D, FC

(phased array) 45 37 21 12 7 SS

SONARS

Range


DSQS-21BZ-M Active H 3.0 6.0 8.0 LF-MF

Passive H 1.3 2.6 3.8 LF-MF

WEAPONS

Critical Hit Roll

F&A(48) Mk41 VLS w/48 SM2MR Blk IIIB//3 SPG-62 (01-08)

■■■■■ ■■■■■ ■■■■■ ■■■■■ ■■■■■ ■■■■■ ■■■■■ ■■■■■ ■■■■■ ■■■

F&A(32) Mk41 VLS w/32 SM2MR Blk IIIB//3 SPG-62 (09-15)

■■■■■ ■■■■■ ■■■■■ ■■■■■ ■■■■■ ■■■■■ ■■

SM2MR Blk IIIB. VSmall signature. Max Alt: VHi, Min Alt: VLow/NOE. Ballistic profile. ROF = 20 msls per turn.

SAM. 3.0 - 60 nm I/M/TSARH&IIRH ( 4th gen) 1980 knots. ATA rating 7.0.

SSM. 3.0 - 25 nm I/M/TSARH&IIRH (4th gen) 1980 knots, 27 dp vs. ship.

F&A(48) K-VLS w/16 Red Shark, 32 Hyunmoo III (16-23)

Red Shark: ■■■■■ ■■■■■ ■■■■■ ■

Hyunmoo III : ■■■■■ ■■■■■ ■■■■■ ■■■■■ ■■■■■ ■■■■ ■■

Hang Sahng-uh (Red Shark). VSmall signature. Ballistic profile. ROF = 1 msl per turn (from 2012).

ASW Standoff. 2.0 - 10.8 nm, 600 knots. Payload Blue Shark torpedo.

Hyunmoo III. Stealthy signature. Max Alt: Low, Min Alt: VLow/NOE. Cruise profile. ROF = 16 msls per turn.

SSM. 25 - 810 I&GPS (3rd gen) 600 knots, 50(e) dp vs. land target.

F(1) Mk45 5 in/62 Mod 4//1 SPY-1D (24-31)

AA Strength: 0.5 (GS5) per mount

Shell Short Range (Hit = 70%) Med Range (Hit = 50%) Long Range (Hit = 20%) Extreme Range (Hit = 10%)

Type kyds Pen Dam kyds Pen Dam kyds Pen Dam kyds Pen Dam

HE 0 - 8.5 2 22 8.6 - 22.0 1 18 22.1 - 32.0 1/0 16 32.1 - 40.0 1/1 14

F(21) Mk31 RAM w/21 RIM-116 (32-38)

■■■■■ ■■■■■ ■■■■■ ■■■■■ ■

RIM-116B-1. VSmall signature. Max Alt: Med, Min Alt: VLow/NOE. Ballistic profile. ROF = 15 msls per turn.

SAM. 0.3 - 5 nm PRH/TIRH (3rd gen) 1320 knots. ATA rating 5.5.

SSM. 0.3 - 5 nm PRH/TIRH (3rd gen) 1320 knots. 20 dp vs ship only.

A(R) Goalkeeper 30mm w/6 bursts ■■■■■ ■ (39-46)

AA Strength: 6.4 (GS5) per mount

Shell Short Range (Hit = 70%) Med Range (Hit = 50%) Long Range (Hit = 20%) Extreme Range (Hit = 10%)

Type kyds Pen Dam kyds Pen Dam kyds Pen Dam kyds Pen Dam

APDS 0 - 0.4 6 1.3 0.5 - 1.0 5 1.1 1.1 - 1.5 4/1 1.0 1.6 - 1.9 3/3 1

PB&PQ(4) Mk141 w/4 Hae Sung ■■■■ (47-54)

PB&PQ(4) Mk141 w/4 Hae Sung ■■■■ (55-62)

SB&SQ(4) Mk141 w/4 Hae Sung ■■■■ (63-69)

SB&SQ(4) Mk141 w/4 Hae Sung ■■■■ (70-77)

SSM-700K Hae Sung. Guidance I&GPS/TARH. Stealthy signature. Max Alt: Low, Min Alt: VLow. Cruise profile. ROF = 16 msls per turn (all tubes).

SSM. 3.0 - 81 nm (3rd gen) 561 knots. 40 dp vs. ship only, waypoints, reattack capability.

PB(3) Mk32 324mm TT w/3 Cheong Sahng-uh (Blue Shark) ■■■ (78-85)

SB(3) Mk32 324mm TT w/3 Cheong Sahng-uh (Blue Shark) ■■■ (86-92)

Blue Shark. 19.4 kyds @ 45 kts (Act/Pass, 4th Gen) 50(e) dp vs. sub only. Contact fuze. Max depth Int V.

Aft Pad Super Lynx Mk99 ■■ (93-00)

REMARKS

KDX III program. King Sejong the Great, Yulgok Yi I, Gwon Yul.

DAMAGE & SPEED BREAKDOWN Starting Dmg Turn / Inflicted Remaining CH Ratio Severity Conditions: 1% = 2.2 dp

None 25% 50% 75% 90% 100% Minor: 1 - 12%

Damage Taken: 0 57 113 170 203 226 ___________ ___________ ___________ _______ Major: 13 - 17%

Maximum Speed: 30 22 15 8 0 Sinks Severe: 18 - 19%

___________ ___________ ___________ _______ Overwhelmed: 20% +

Engineering: ■ ■ ■ ■ Bridge: ■ Rudder: L ■ S ■ R ■

___________ ___________ ___________ _______

Fire/Flooding _____ % Fire/Flooding _____ % Fire/Flooding _____ % Fire/Flooding _____ % Fire/Flooding _____ % Fire/Flooding _____ %

HARPOON FORM 10 1 Nov 09


This form is provided for use with Harpoon.

It may be photocopied for use with any Harpoon game.



Movie Review: Admiral

Movie Review: Admiral, directed by Andrei Kravchuk, starring

Konstantin Khabenskiy, $35.99

What attracted me to this movie was a battle scene, which

begins the story. A small Russian vessel in WW I is laying mines

in the Baltic when it is attacked by a German dreadnought. The

CGI depiction of the WW I vessels, as well as the live action

scenes aboard ship, were stunning. Forget Battleship Potemkin. The

production values were worthy of any Hollywood studio.

The admiral of the title is Aleksandr Kolchak, an Imperial

Russian naval officer and a real-life historical figure. Researching

him after I watched the movie, I read that he distinguished himself

in the Russo-Japanese War and participated in the rebuilding of the

Russian Fleet after its disastrous defeat by the Japanese. He was also

a noted Arctic explorer in the years before WW I.

Distinguishing himself in the Great War, he rose to command

the Black Sea Fleet. When the Revolution began, he initially

supported the Kerensky government, but when that collapsed, he

opposed the Bolsheviks and eventually commanded the White

forces during the Russian Civil War.

Some nationalist groups in Russia want to rehabilitate

Aleksandr Kolchak as a heroic Russian historical figure. As leader

of the Whites, his name was not mentioned in Soviet Russia, and

the movie glosses over the many faults of the Tsarist Navy, and the

uglier parts of Kolchak’s struggle with the Reds. The Revolution

was a bloody business, and Kolchak was a harsh disciplinarian with

his own troops. He showed no mercy to the enemy. The movie

also makes many references to the Russian Orthodox church, an

important group with Russian nationalist movements.

The movie follows Kolchak through the war and the

Revolution, but takes many liberties with both the historical record

and Kolchak’s personal life. It’s better if you don’t know too much

about the man before you watch this.

Think Titanic meets In Harm’s Way, with a dash of PT 109.

Linking the battle scenes is a love story, with Kolchak falling for one

of his officer’s wives. But although they are attracted to each other

and eventually declare their love, they never betray their spouses.

At one point, Kolchak says, “We never even danced.” Torn apart by

war, able to steal only moments together, blah, blah,…

Israeli Player Special Upgrades

You get the idea. But the acting is good, the battle scenes are

excellent, the love story doesn’t get in the way, and like Titanic, you

know how it ends. After all, the best love stories are tragic ones, and

it is a Russian movie.

It’s available at Amazon. Watch out for bootleg copies. The

people who made this movie did a good job. They deserve their

piece of the pie.

Larry Bond

The Israeli player has 70 points to spend on upgrades

Improved offensive EW performance (+10% on all jammers)

10 points

Better intelligence on facility, results in improved targeting (+10% damage)

30 points

Special Warfare team plants differential GPS (+10% GPS weapon accuracy)

40 points

U.S. AGM-88 HARM missiles (20 purchased) for F-16I vice STAR-1,

+20% to SAM suppression die roll) 30 points

Lieutenant Zidon’s idea

20 points

Lieutenant Zidon’s Idea: [Do not tell the Israeli player about this until after they have spent the points.] There is a valley running east-west

whose eastern end is near the NW corner of the facility. A pilot could fly at RLow (Really Low) altitude down the valley and not be detected

by air defense radars. The Israeli player must decide to adopt this tactic during the planning process, so that the pilots(s) who perform this

maneuver can be briefed and practice. The option can be aborted up to the time of execution. [Ed Note: I’m not making this up. Look on

GoogleEarth TM at 33°43’40.66” N, 51°41’19.97” E]

Pilots have a 2% chance of crashing (01- 02) and a 10% chance of being detected on radar (03-12).



Book Review: Raising the Red Banner


Raising the Red Banner - The Pictorial History of Stalin’s Fleet

1920-45, by Vladimir Yakubov and Richard Worth. Spellmount

Publishers, 2008, ISBN 978 1 86227 450 1, $39.95

In recent years, we have gradually seen more previously

unavailable material from Russian sources appearing in English.

This book covers an interesting era of twenty-five years, during

which the original Tsarist Russian fleet evolved into the Soviet Navy.

As shown by the authors, the fleet started with a bunch of leftovers

in very dubious condition, with crews not well trained to look after

them. The situation was no better in the shipyards where there was

a serious lack of skilled workmen to keep the aging ships at sea or to

repair those that were severely damaged during the revolution.

The authors take the reader step-by-step through the ship

classes, starting with battleships and working down to smaller

vessels. They start by showing what was done with the aging vessels,

and in many cases what the Soviets would like to have done, but

lacked the industrial skill to achieve.

Each chapter is accompanied by many photographs new to

the west, and indeed there was only one that I had not previously

seen. Serious students of naval history will be aware that one of

the frustrations of studying the Soviet fleet has always been the

very poor quality of most photographs. However the authors have

carefully selected views of higher standard.

The discussion of each ship class includes many of the

frustrations and the compromises that had to be made to meet

Stalin’s demands, and the practicabilities of existing shipbuilding

facilities. From this it can be seen that the Soviets strove to produce

a fleet of high standard and were not afraid to take steps into new

design territory to achieve what they wanted. Such a bold policy

of design was not always matched by the skill of the workmen, the

factories and material available.

Design experience was also lacking and resulted in some terrible

errors of weight calculation and ship layout. Once recognized, the

Soviets attempted to acquire examples of overseas shipbuilding

practice. This was not as successful as they hoped, because of the

high level of suspicion in which the Soviets were held. Foreign

governments were relucant to grant permission for their shipyards to

provide much of the assistance the Russians sought.

The largest section quite justifiably covers the submarine

arm, which has always been the most confusing for non-Soviet

researchers. Although the book reveals interesting snippets not

previously understood about the surface ships, it is with the

submarine service that one finds at last a sense of clarity. The classes

were numerous and their wartime successes were few, but the sheer

number of submarines built and their variants makes for very

interesting reading.

One disappointment is that while the information on large

ships and submarines is highly comprehensive, the data tails off

dramatically when dealing with the small ships that were such a vital

part of the fighting arm. Patrol craft, minesweepers and auxiliary

craft get short rift, being lumped into a single chapter with the title

“Other Surface Vessels,” which is a great shame, because as we find

more and more Soviet Navy history revealed to us, it is obvious the

small ships did most of the fighting. We are treated to tempting

glimpses of some of these craft through photographs only, with very

little text or discussion. That is surprising, considering that the other

chapters are full of information to back up the photographs.


Charts in most other chapters do show ships built, their actual

names, which is sometimes contrary to older histories, and some

idea of WW II additions to armament and electronics. Apart from

name clarifications and clarification of which ships entered service

and which did not, the charts are little different from those available

in most quality books available to the naval historian. It is nice to

see it in what appears to be a quite authoritive work.

Via the photographs it becomes obvious that some previous

books that have brushed past the subject of camouflage are quite

wrong in asserting that it was uncommon, and mostly limited to

the Northern Fleet. Although black and white, a variety of paint

schemes are evident for all fleets. I would love to have seen some

discussion of this or at least a little more detail. But having seen so

little of it in the past, I was grateful to see at least that much.

There are statements that camouflage was not standardised,

but an examination of ships in the Northern Fleet alone, reveals

sufficient similarities to suggest that there must have been some sort

of standard idea given to those responsible for painting warships.

I liked this book and considered it was well worth the purchase

price. I just hope that the authors will consider more work to better

cover the small craft and of course that ever puzzling question of

camouflage.

Highly recommended.

Mal Wright





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