KASSERINE PASS BATTLES Readings - US Army Center Of Military ...

6 . Lessons learned from the ORAN Operation
Immediately following the French surrender at ORAN, intensive efforts were made, by the Division,
to correct the deficiencies noted in that operation . _
The use of night maneuver and night combat . A severe setback had been suffered by the 18th
Infantry Regiment, during its initial attack against ST . CLOUD, on 8-9 Nov . Their initial attacks had
bogged down, and considerable casualties had been incurred This impasse was due to a lack of accurate
preliminary reconnaissance and a lack of maneuverability by the assault battalions . However, this grave
deficiency was corrected by the 18th Infantry Regiment, on the battle-field, on the night of 9-10 Nov . ,
'42, by the following measures ;
The 1st Battalion was held to contain the enemy forces at ST . CLOUD .
The 2nd and 3rd Battalions were withdrawn to bypass ST . CLOUD under _cover of darkness; and
by night maneuver were directed on to their assigned locations, for the assault on ORAN, early on 10
November .
After seeing the results of :his particular night maneuver, the 1st Infantry Division had become
completely sold on the results that might be attained, by the skillful use of night maneuver and night
attacks .
This night maneuver at ORAN was the fore-runner of many boldly executed night attacks launched
later, during the hard fought campaigns against the Germans in TUNISIA and later in SICILY . The
German Panzer Divisions learned to fear the dreaded night attacks of the 1st Infantry Division, which
invariably resulted in maximum damage to the enemy, and quick tactical success for the 1st Division .
II . THE INITIAL. COMBAT OPERATIONS IN TUNISIA
1 . Detachment of 1st Division Units to TUNISIA .
Hardly had the 1st Division regrouped and reorganized, after the surrender of the French forces at
CP,AN, on 10 Nov . . '42, when varlor_s units of the Division were }rastll} detached into UNLMA . This
was done, as an emergency measure, on orders of the Allied High Command, to bolster the Allied
defenses against the rapid German build-up on the Eastern front . These early troop movements were as
follows :
The 3rd Battalion, 26th Infantry , Lt . Col . John W . Bow-a . Comdg., left by transport planes
and gliders, on 15 Nov , '42, to outpost the southern approaches to the ATLAS Mountains, in the GAFSA
area In Southern TUNISIA .
The 18th Infantry Regimen t , Col . Frank Greet, Comdg ., the 32nd Field Artillery Battalion ,
and the 5th Field Artillery Battalion left later in November '42, to reinforce the British V Corps, then
fighting against heavy odds In Northern TUNISIA .
The 26th Infantry Regiment , Col . Alec . Stark, Comdg ., (less the 3rd Battalion - already
detached) together with the 33rd Field Artillery Battalion, left early in Jan. '43, to join the American
11 Corps, in Southern TUNISIA .
The detachment of these 1st Division Units, to various Allied Task Forces, then operating under
American, British and French command, !n Eastern TUNISIA, was a matter of grave concern to 1st Division